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Abstract and Keywords

This dissertation examines the colonial experience in the Islamic Philippines between 1899
and 1942. Occupying Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in 1899, U.S. Army officials
assumed sovereignty over a series of Muslim populations collectively referred to as ‘Moros.’
Beholden to pre-existing notions of Moro ungovernability, for two decades military and
civilian administrators ruled the Southern Philippines separately from the Christian regions of
the North. In the 1920s, Islamic areas of Mindanao and Sulu were ‘normalized’ and
haphazardly assimilated into the emergent Philippine nation-state. Never fully integrated, the
Muslim South persisted as an exotic frontier zone in the American and Filipino colonial
imaginaries.
The following chapters argue that Americans acting in both official and non-official
capacities undertook a project of cultural reconfiguration among the Moros. Essentializing
Moro ‘characteristics,’ American colonial actors implemented a variety of programs aimed at
transforming Muslim social, legal, commercial, medical, and educational practices. These
complex and imperfect processes often met with resistance from Moro populations, and
American authorities used violence as a means of ‘correcting’ recalcitrant behaviours. A
second seam of argumentation asserts the centrality of inter-imperial dialogue and transfer to
the colonial experience in the Southern Philippines. Americans borrowed and modified
European imperial antecedents in myriad ways, from carceral technologies to the creation of
racially demarcated leisure spaces. As a region, the Muslim South was shaped during the
period under study by transcolonial flows of personnel, ideas, and commercial products. This
involved transfers not only between Americans and Europeans, but also between Moros and
the Islamic world.
Emphasizing understudied and unstoried histories, this project contributes to a
growing body of work that situates American colonial encounters in a global context.
Overlooked in much of the literature on American colonialism in the Philippines, the Muslim
South was an important site for the development of American civilizational imperatives.
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These imperatives, and the colonial project writ large, were shaped and reshaped by pervasive
supraregional connectivities and inter-imperial exchanges. Far from being mere colonial
backwaters, Mindanao and Sulu are critical to understanding the character of American
empire in the early twentieth-century.

Keywords: American colonial empire, U.S. imperialism, Moros, Philippines, 1904 Louisiana
Purchase Exposition, Islam, colonialism in Southeast Asia, empire, colonial culture, colonial
education, transcolonial, transnational, inter-imperial, missionaries, religion, race, colonial
violence, civilizing missions
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Terminology and Usage

The term ‘Moro’ as a designation for Muslims in the Philippines originates from Spanish
history. The fall of the last Islamic state in Granada in 1492 occurred mere decades before
early Iberian incursions into Southeast Asia, and memories of the Reconquista resonated
among Spain’s Catholic empire-builders. Encountering Muslim populations on the fringes of
Southeast Asia, they narratively integrated them into their long conflict with North African
Muslims by giving them the same name. By virtue of their Islamic faith, these people became
‘Moros’ in the Spanish colonial imagination (as Christianized natives of the Philippines
became ‘Indios’). This term had no practical value other than denoting whether an ethnic
group had undergone Islamization or not. An array of competing royal lineages existed in the
Southern Philippines, as did differing cultural practices and adaptations of Islam. With some
notable exceptions, Americans adopted these racial-religious taxonomies after 1898.
Newspaper and magazine articles emphasized the unitary identity of Muslims, although
sustained efforts to map the groups also occurred. Most Americans imagined ‘the Moro’ as a
single body of Muslims, not as a willful misnomer for a collection of ethnicities. Civilian and
military officials on the ground learned to appreciate the differences between Maguindanao
and Maranao societies in their daily work, yet the notion of ‘the Moro’ remained. As we shall
see, this reductionist thinking had powerful effects on colonial policy.
In compiling this project, I’ve struggled with the use of the term ‘Moro’ as shorthand.
For many years, the designation was viewed as a slur, but in recent decades some Muslim
groups have reclaimed the word and speak of the Bangsamoro (community or nation of Moro
people) struggle against the hegemony of the Philippine nation-state. The term ‘Filipino
Muslims’ is likewise imperfect, suggesting as it does that Islamic groups fit neatly into a
national identity developed elsewhere in the archipelago. In the following pages, I use the
term ‘Moro’ and ‘Muslim’ interchangeably for the sake of flow, but wherever possible
identify specific ethnic groups. I do not simply use ‘Moro’ where ‘Tausūg’ is applicable, for
example. Nevertheless, in some instances I discuss primary source documentation where the
term is used uncritically. This is most prevalent in the second chapter, which explores how
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Americans framed Moro identity. Reducing these identities was a strategy of colonial rule,
and I make every attempt to avoid doing so myself. Thirteen Moro groups live in the
Southern Philippines: the Badjao, Iranun, Jama Mapun, Kalagan, Kalibugan, Maguindanao,
Maranao, Molbog, Samal, Sangil, Tausūg, and Yakan. The Muslims who inhabit this work
hail primarily from the four largest of these groupings: the Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausūg,
and Samal (also referred to as the Sama-Bajau). Wherever possible, I emphasize that these
were and are distinct groups with a shared Muslim heritage. The term Lumad is similarly
flattening, and refers to a diverse collection of peoples on Mindanao. These are groups
American colonials referred to as ‘pagans,’ and in sum represent the indigenous peoples of
the island. Included in the designation are the Manobo, Bukidnon, Subanon, Mandaya,
Sangil, Tagabawa, and other peoples.
I also acknowledge my problematic use of ‘Americans’ to describe citizens of the
United States. I use the term for stylistic reasons, but recognize that it improperly gives a
transcontinental identity to men and women of European origin from limited areas of North
America. In some instances, I use the shorthand ‘colonials’ to describe white inhabitants of
the American Philippines. Here I take my lead from scholars writing on European colonies,
particularly the example of the British Empire in India. In the American context, we find
racially stratified environments and particular cultural rituals common to colonial settings. I
have applied standard transliterations of the many place names, peoples, official titles, and
regional products with Austronesian linguistic origins. In quoted material I have left alternate
transliterations in place. Most Maguindanaon, Tausūg, and Maranao words used are
italicized, however, the term ‘datu’ – denoting a local leader or chief – remains unitalicized
due to its frequent appearance. There is a small glossary at the end of this project.
Unless otherwise noted, I use the place names common during the period under study.
In some cases, I provide the present-day name if it has changed substantially. Readers
unfamiliar with the geography of Muslim South should be aware that Jolo denotes both the
name of the primary island in the Sulu Archipelago and its largest settlement. When possible,
I try to distinguish the two by calling the latter ‘Jolo town’ or ‘the town of Jolo.’

xi

“Italy in Tripoli, Spain in Morocco, France in Algeria, Austria in Herzegovina and Bosnia,
England in Egypt, India, Borneo and the Straits Settlements, and the Dutch in the East Indies
are in contact with the Mohammedan problem of government, in varying degrees of success,
with probably the greatest advance having been realized, through a reasonable measure of
paternalism, in the Dutch possessions. The United States has made its advent in the East as a
new power for good, not alone for the island races that come under her care, but also in that
great settlement of European spheres of influence in Asia, where exists the greatest world
problems of our day. We must accept the responsibilities of the new situation as a
providentially imposed task upon a progressive and powerful nation. We cannot shirk the
trust imposed whether for the present or for posterity. From national birth to the present time
our development has been westward. It is our destiny. Our industrial and commercial future is
indissolubly linked with the destinies of the thousand millions of souls occupying today the
oldest empires of the earth.”
- John P. Finley, District Governor of Zamboanga, 1913

“Just by saying that something was so, they believed that it was. I know now that these
conquerors, like many others before them, and no doubt like others after, gave speeches not
to voice the truth, but to create it.”
- Laila Lalami, The Moor’s Account

1

Introduction / American Empire and the Colonial Remote

In January 1842, the United States Exploring Expedition sailed into the azure waters of the
Sulu Sea en route to the island of Jolo. The expedition’s leader, a brilliant but difficult naval
officer named Charles Wilkes, had spent his time in Manila collecting information on the
Southern Philippines. In the colonial capital, he consulted with a Spanish naval captain, one
1

Señor Halcon, who admitted that existing nautical maps were rife with errors. This posed
few problems for the men aboard the five remaining ships of the expedition, who were at the
tail end of an epic four year and 87,000 mile long journey. During that time, they had charted
coastlines, discovered new islands, and conducted scientific inquiries from the American
Pacific Northwest to the desolate shores of Antarctica. Sailing through the Mindoro Strait, the
squadron noticed the hills of Panay were riddled with strange “telegraphs of rude
construction” that warned inhabitants “of the approach of piratical prahus from Sooloo, which
formerly were in the habit of making attacks upon the defenceless inhabitants and carrying
2

them off into slavery.” Five decades hence, the descendants of these “pirates” became the
colonial subjects of the United States.
The expedition laid anchor at La Caldera, northeast of the Spanish town of
Samboangan. A colonial stronghold, the settlement was located at the southern tip of a
peninsula that jutted outwards from the western side of Mindanao, the second largest island in
the Philippine Archipelago. Wilkes and some of his men went ashore at La Caldera to survey
the Spanish fort and its surroundings. Several of the expedition’s scientists joined the shore
party so they could examine the flora and fauna of the unknown land. Here they observed a
small sampling of Mindanao’s incredible biodiversity: trees of 150 feet or more feet whose
trunks shot up “remarkably straight”; dense tropical forest swarming with monkeys and
cacophonous birds; and native villages growing an abundance of vegetables and fruits – “all
of a fine and of large size.” Wilkes and his crew had no time to travel down the coast to

1
2

Charles Wilkes, Synopsis of the Cruise of the U.S. Exploring Expedition (Washington: Peter Force, 1842), 39.
Charles Wilkes, Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, Volume 5 (Philadelphia: n.p., 1849), 325.
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Samboangan, but the commander related afterwards that it was a place where deportados –
“native rogues” – were sent for punishment. Wilkes commented upon the fearsomeness of
Mindanao’s interior: “wild beasts, serpents, and hostile natives” meant that Spanish inland
exploration was done rarely and only in numbers. The inhabitants of the island were “very
cruel and a bad set” who had “hitherto bid defiance to all attempts to subjugate them.” After
surveying the bay, charting its geographic position, recording the flood tides, and making
observations about the magnetism of the location, the expedition set sail for Jolo.

3

The squadron reached Soung, later known as the town of Jolo, on the morning of
February 2nd. Approaching the island, Wilkes was awed:
As we were brought nearer and nearer, we came to the conclusion that in
our many wanderings we had seen nothing to be compared to this
enchanting spot. It appeared to be well cultivated, with gentle slopes rising
here and there into eminences from one to two thousand feet high…much of
the island was under cultivation, yet it had all the freshness of a forest
region. The many smokes on the hills, buildings of large size, cottages, and
cultivated spots, together with the moving crowds on the land, the prahus,
canoes, and fishing-boats on the water, gave the whole a civilized
appearance.

4

Unfortunately, the serene effects of the environment were “destroyed in part by the
knowledge that this beautiful archipelago was the abode of a cruel and barbarous race of
pirates.” The following morning the Sultan of Sulu gave Wilkes and his men permission to
disembark and, with the expedition’s naturalists in tow, they went ashore. On land, the group
studied the bamboo dwellings, elevated on poles to escape tidal damage, and marvelled at

3
4

Ibid., 330-331.
Ibid., 332.
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how the men all wore a huge knife, called a kris, on their waists. As on Mindanao, tropical
produce – yams, camotes, cocoanuts – flourished.

5

As head of the expedition, Wilkes received an audience with Datu Mulu, the Sultan’s
chief representative, at the latter’s home. The captain was taken aback by the accumulated
curios, which included weapons, clothing, and instruments of all types. He wrote later that
“the whole [scene] was a strange mixture of tragedy and farce.” The commander claimed the
house “might justly be termed nasty” yet in his accounts the reader intuits a peculiar sense of
6

awe at the variety and exoticism of Datu Mulu’s possessions. Next, the datu took the
American to meet the Sultan himself, whom Wilkes believed to be “under the effects of
7

opium” and whose teeth were stained “black as ebony” from chewing betel nut. Despite his
misgivings, Wilkes and the Sultan concluded a modest treaty promising protection for
American commercial vessels sailing in the waters of the Sulu Sea and offering favourable
terms of trade within the Sultanate. It also gave an assurance that shipwrecked American
vessels in the region would have their officers and crews returned to Spanish settlements and
8

their property safeguarded. Shortly afterwards, treaty in hand, Wilkes departed Soung with
his ships en route to Singapore.
In the five-volume narrative he compiled upon returning to the United States, Charles
Wilkes devoted only thirty pages to his brief visit to Jolo. While some of this account simply
retold the events of the three-day stopover, the commander devoted most of it to cataloguing
the peoples of the Sulu Archipelago and the environments they lived in. As Wilkes met with
the Sultan and toured the markets of Jolo, the expedition’s scholars – two naturalists, a
geologist, a linguist, a botanist, a horticulturalist, and a conchologist – fanned out to
9

surrounding islands to collect and observe. Wilkes and philologist Horatio Hale provided

5

John S. Jenkins, Voyage of the U.S. Exploring Squadron (Auburn and Rochester: Alden and Beardsley, 1855),
454-455.
6
7
8
9

Wilkes, Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, 334.
Ibid., 336.
Ibid., 532.

A description of the assembly of the scientific corps is found in Nathaniel Philbrick, Sea of Glory: America’s
Voyage of Discovery, The U.S. Exploring Expedition, 1838-1842 (New York: Penguin, 2003), 49-50.
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descriptions of the natives, writing in the popular physiognomical style to morally assess
what they witnessed. The inhabitants of Sulu were “tall, thin, and effeminate-looking” and
had “faces…peculiar for length, particularly in the lower jaw and chin, with high cheekbones, sunken lack-lustre eyes, and narrow foreheads.” They had “but few qualities to redeem
their treachery, cruelty, and revengeful dispositions” and possessed “an inordinate lust for
power.” However, Wilkes observed, they were also cowards, a “trait of character” attributed
to them “among the Spaniards of the Philippines, who ought to be well acquainted with
them.”

10

Wilkes’ narrative was one of frenzied observation and accumulation. He jumped
between topics in an attempt to give American readers a summation of society in the remote
islands, frequently deploying casual racism and lazy generalizations. Topics included, but
were not limited to: the habits of fishermen, the sartorial styles of the women, the social
rituals of the elite, notions of law and governance, population estimates, the native penchant
for piracy, the Chinese presence in the islands, astronomical observations, the history of the
Sulu Sultanate, methods of pearl diving, the lack of hygienic practices, and the native’s
imperfect interpretation of Islam. Perhaps inadvertently, Wilkes also illustrated the high
degree of connectivity the maritime society of the Sulu Archipelago had to the outside world.
The accounts of Datu Mulu were kept in Dutch, indicating links with European colonial
commercial networks, and when Wilkes considered the matter of suppressing piracy he did so
11

by assessing the efforts of the British in Maritime Southeast Asia.

The United States Exploring Expedition represented an important attempt to create
and claim knowledge of the Pacific for an ascendant nation. Considering this, the brief
stopover in Jolo can be interpreted as a minor event. Indeed, what Wilkes wrote on other
regions after returning to the United States dwarfs the thirty pages of material on the Southern
Philippines. Yet as Brigadier General John Bates drafted another treaty with the Sultanate in
1899, this one defining the contours of American sovereignty in the island group, he looked
back at Wilkes’ brief time in Sulu and deemed it the foundation of “the friendly relations

10
11

Wilkes, Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition, 342-343.
Ibid., 355.

5

which have so long existed between the Sultan’s people and the people of the United
12

States.” Although he had no way of knowing, Wilkes was the first of many Americans who
interacted with and wrote about the Muslims of the Southern Philippines. While his encounter
was that of an explorer making contact fleeting contact on the Asian fringe, later writers
approached the topic as colonial officials, soldiers, businesspeople, journalists, travellers,
engineers, missionaries, teachers, and academics.

13

Writers during the American colonial

period shared many of the same preoccupations Charles Wilkes did. They attempted to
reduce the Muslims of the Southern Philippines to a set of essential qualities, and were
frustrated when their colonial subjects operated outside of these notional limitations. They
serially categorized the living and non-living matter around them, compiling their findings at
ponderous length in journals and letters to family. They accessed transcolonial concepts to
explain and control their surroundings. They fetishized and feared the cultures they attempted
to transform, compulsively collecting the foreign items they disparaged as savage. They
accessed and acted upon models of racial hierarchy drawn from their own personal histories,
and from that of their nation.

14

This project is an exploration of how imperial, national, and local histories interwove
in a specific region of America’s Pacific empire: the island of Mindanao and the Sulu
Archipelago. Situated between the American arrival in the Southern Philippines in 1899 and
the Japanese invasion of Mindanao in 1942, the following chapters are thematic reckonings
with the texture of colonial culture in the region, and, taken as a whole, ruminations on the
character and legacies of the American civilizing mission. I approached this task with a

12

Memorandum II – Concerning the Political History of the Sultanate Since the 1840s, 1899, Box 2, Folder 9.
John C. Bates Papers, 1807-1922, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania
(Henceforth referenced as USAHEC).
13

For further information on Charles Wilkes, the context of the journey, and its place in Southeast Asian and
American history, see William Ragan Stanton, The Great United States Exploring Expedition of 1838-1942
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); James Francis Warren, The Sulu Zone: The Dynamics of
External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast-Asian Maritime State (Singapore:
National University of Singapore Press, 2007); L.R. Wright, The Origins of British Borneo (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press, 1970).
14

The ethnographical implications of the United States Exploring Expedition, especially in relation to notions
of civilization and savagery that existed within America, are explored at length in Barry Alan Joyce, The
Shaping of American Ethnography: The Wilkes Exploring Expedition, 1838-1942 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2001).
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variety of questions. How was the concept of ‘the Moro’ constructed in American minds?
How were civilizing projects generated and in what ways, intentional or not, did they
reconfigure the colonized, the colonizers, and the landscapes each inhabited? What role did
the history of the United States and the personal histories of American colonials play in
shaping colonial culture? How and why did instances of violence occur between Americans,
Muslims, and Christian Filipinos? How did American colonials live in a profoundly foreign
environment and what anxieties did their experiences generate? What forms of cultural
exchange occurred between the colonial metropole and Muslim populations? And, finally,
how was the colonial experience in the Southern Philippines influenced and altered by global
connectivities?
This introductory chapter reflects upon the challenges of writing a regional history
that balances specificity with broader notions of supraregional transfer. In the first section, I
consider questions of terminology and explore historiographical trends placing American
foreign relations within a global context. I also examine works specifically focused on the
colonial occupation of Mindanao and Sulu. The second section is a rumination on issues of
theory and methodology, including how to use transnational / transcolonial frameworks to
move past the ‘colonial remote’ towards decentered histories; the complications of writing
about colonial cultures; and the utility of casting a wide net when sourcing. I conclude by
briefly summarizing each body chapter.

Liminal Spaces in the American Pacific
The complications of studying American colonial culture in the Southern Philippines are
manifold. The Sulu and Maguindanao Sultanates shared cultural and commercial connections
with the Malay States, China, Indochina, Siam, and a variety of other Southeast Asian actors.
Further, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Mindanao and Sulu existed at the
intersection of empires. Spanish, German, British, Dutch, Portuguese, and American colonial
entities were all linked to the region at different (and overlapping) points. When the
Americans arrived in Zamboanga in 1899, they inherited a state and people, the Christianized
majorities of Luzon and the Visayas, whose nationalist imaginary included Mindanao and
Sulu as a vital part of an independent Philippines. The Americans themselves grappled with
the domestic and international implications of acquiring overseas territories – ones with little

7

chance of incorporation into the union. After a century of ferocious territorial and commercial
expansion, the United States was positioned on the cusp of world power, simultaneously
foreswearing and emulating European antecedents as it spread into foreign spaces. In
Mindanao and Sulu, once-thriving maritime Muslim societies responded to their
circumscribed roles in the new colonial order by accessing connections they shared with
Mecca, Constantinople, and the Malay States in attempts to create bulwarks of spiritual and
15

temporal authority.

These tangled histories force us to reconceive our notions of the colonial remote. The
frontiers of the imperial body were at once places of isolation and connectivity. The linkages
between maritime trading centers like Zamboanga and Jolo and the outside world did not
simply vanish after the establishment of American colonial rule. Rather, they flourished.
Moros used shipping lines based out of Singapore to travel to Mecca for the hajj. Officials in
the Moro Province encouraged more vigorous links with Australia, Hong Kong, Shanghai,
and Batavia. Cruise ships stopped in Zamboanga and their passengers enjoyed the nightlife
there. The largest Japanese diaspora in Southeast Asia before the Second World War was
located in Davao Province. British banking representatives looked after the finances of the
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A number of magisterial surveys on empire have appeared in recent years. Comparative in nature, these
works present differing takes on the nature of imperial power. Each is useful for placing the United States within
global patterns of rule. Collectively, they run the gamut from traditional (Parsons), to thematic (McCoy), to
multi-disciplinary (Calhoun). See David B. Abernathy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European
Overseas Empires, 1415-1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Robert Aldrich, ed., The Age of
Empires (London: Thames and Hudson, 2007); David Armitage, ed., Theories of Empire, 1450-1800 (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 1998); Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill
and Wang, 2006); Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Craig Calhoun et al., eds., Lessons of Empire:
Imperial Histories and American Power (New York: The New Press, 2006); Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura
Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California
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Bloomsbury Press, 2007); Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals (New Haven: Yale
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Charles S. Maier, Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014); Alfred W. McCoy et al., eds., Endless
Empire: Spain’s Retreat, Europe’s Eclipse, America’s Decline (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012);
Anthony Pagden, The Burdens of Empire, 1539 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015);
Timothy H. Parsons, The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They
Always Fall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Bernard Porter, Empire and Superempire: Britain,
America and the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Balachandra Rajan and Elizabeth Sauer,
eds., Imperialisms: Historical and Literary Investigations, 1500-1900 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
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American colonials they drank with at the Zamboanga Golf and Country Club. International
corporations like Goodyear established plantations in the Mindanao interior. Ottoman
dignitaries visited in hopes of instructing the Moros on ‘modern’ Islamic practices.
Journalists and academics travelled through the region collecting information on its peoples
to transmit back to the United States and Europe. German merchant families intermarried
with the Tausūg elite on Jolo and were involved in political and commercial affairs from
Singapore to Zamboanga. American military officers travelled through European colonial
possessions and observed how Europeans administered their empires. These examples, all
drawn from the following chapters, suggest a space that, while often conceptualized as a
frontier, was intrinsically linked to a variety of national and imperial histories.

16

This study heeds Paul Kramer’s call to use “the imperial” as a category of analysis.

17

Here, ‘imperial’ and ‘empire’ are used interchangeably to suggest unequal iterations of power
generated by states and their non-state allies (corporations, academic institutions, religious
organizations, so forth). Imperial actors access or create hierarchies that employ race, gender,
religion, commerce, sexuality, education, and hygiene to assess and discipline subject
populations. Historically, the imperial finds its generative power when a polity aggrandizes
beyond its commonly held territories. These processes inevitably feature coercive elements,
although degrees of severity vary based on myriad factors from national-ideological
disposition to native collaboration. Built upon unstable formations of exceptionalized
difference and exploitative processes of extraction, imperial power needs active maintenance
by its agents lest native resistance or infiltration comprise it. Not limited to direct territorial
control, the imperial exists in the structuring of regional or global orders through commercial
and cultural regimes. Such regimes attempt to standardize cultural norms in the societies they
dominate as a means of entrenching and codifying power differentials there. Manifestations
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As it happens, ‘domestic’ and global frontiers often intertwined in the narratives of American travel writers
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, complicating notional demarcations and suggesting the presence
of a ‘Global West’ in the national imaginary. See David M. Wrobel, Global West, American Frontier: Travel,
Empire, and Exceptionalism from Manifest Destiny to the Great Depression (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 2013).
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Paul Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World,” The American
Historical Review 116.5 (2011): 1349-1350.
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of this phenomenon range from racial ordering and exclusion to promoting standards of
consumer desire.

18

Following Kramer, this project is more invested in analyzing how

Americans acted within the context of the imperial rather than rehashing well-worn debates
19

about whether the United States was or is an empire.

For the sake of specificity, I contrast the broad and inclusive contours of ‘the
imperial’ with a narrower definition of ‘the colonial.’ The colonial is an extension of imperial
impulses, wherein a state conquers and exercises direct territorial rule over a foreign body of
people. Within this definition there are gradations. The frontier settler colonialism practiced
by the expanding American nation in the nineteenth-century differed from the military
conquest and subsequent administration of overseas possessions after the Spanish-American
War. Nevertheless, the colonial or practice of colonialism denotes acknowledged sovereignty
over a geographic space. It also serves our purposes by way of periodization. If the imperial
is an analytical tool strengthened by its broad applicability and malleability, the colonial
excels at articulating, in terms of the historical record and the academic imagination, a
method of rule that began with the ‘discovery’ of the Americas in 1492 and receded nearly
20

five centuries later in the long aftermath of the Second World War.

In traditional accounts
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In the past three decades, there has been an enormous increase in literature charting the various iterations of
American imperial power. The “absence of empire in the study of American culture” that Amy Kaplan critiqued
in her seminal 1993 essay has been met with a vigorous response from scholars in a variety of disciplines.
Kaplan’s essay is found in Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., Cultures of United States Imperialism
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).
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Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1350. Despite the overwhelming volume of scholarship arguing the
necessity of analyzing American power through the lens of empire and hegemony, the concept remains
unpopular in mainstream U.S. culture. Among historians, there are those who evade or deny the experience of
empire, most recently: Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, American Umpire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
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best possible option for international ordering. The bête noire for scholars writing critical histories of American
power is inevitably Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New York: Penguin,
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Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Robert Kagan,
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Jürgen Osterhammel’s definition of colonialism is useful: “Colonialism is a relationship of domination
between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental
decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit
of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized

10

and the public consciousness, the United States is linked to European colonial empires
primarily through its disavowal of them. The republic was, after all, formed in response to the
coercive dynamics of British colonial dominance. Yet, as a recent collection of essays
skillfully demonstrates, American rejections, acceptances, and modifications of European
expansionist models were diverse.

21

Further, integrating America’s global reach into histories

of colonial empire allows the writer to use comparative and integrative strategies in their
work. When I call Americans living in the Southern Philippines ‘colonials’ or speak of
‘colonial’ governance, violence, business practices, or society, I am acknowledging U.S.
adaptations of established European practices in the colonies, as well as my own debt to the
22

rich literature on European colonial empires.

Alongside works investigating the imperial-colonial dimensions of American power,
my work is informed by two related developments in the historiography of U.S. foreign
relations: the so-called cultural and transnational turns. The former has diffuse origins.
Critiques of American foreign policy took shape in the late 1950s when revisionists, led by
William Appleman Williams, began interrogating the political and economic ramifications of

population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule.” –
Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005). As
demonstrated later in this study, relations between the colonizers and colonized unsettled conventional
understandings of the colonial encounter in the Southern Philippines. Osterhammel’s major survey of the
nineteenth-century is also helpful in conceptualizing the imperial world America operated within Jürgen
Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014). Other useful surveys of colonialism and colonialisms include: Frederick
Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005);
John Darwin, Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain (New York: Penguin, 2013); Jonathan Hart,
Comparing Empires: European Colonialism from Portuguese Expansion to the Spanish-American War (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); James R. Lehning, European Colonialism Since 1700 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013); James Mahoney, Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish
America in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Wolfgang Reinhard, A
Short History of Colonialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011).
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Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton, eds., Empire’s Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of
Terrorism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).
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Given the extent and temporal scope of the European colonial empires, the literature on them is much more
developed than that on the United States. In subsequent chapters, I often situate insights on issues like hygiene,
urban planning, human exhibitions, state violence, and the colonial imagination within the historiographies of
other empires. This acknowledges that Americans were participating in modifications of phenomena occurring
elsewhere.
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America’s ascent as a world power.

23

This distinctly anti-nationalist strain of historiography

posited the basic idea that U.S. actions around the globe were perhaps not as benign as
orthodox narratives suggested. This observation, banal as it appears now, spurred work by
New Left scholars looking to challenge status quo histories. In the 1980s, the trend towards
critical historiography converged with an increased awareness amongst historians that
methods of cultural analysis developed by critical theorists, sociologists, linguists, and
anthropologists could be adapted to provide more thickly descriptive reckonings with U.S.
history. Working within this emergent subfield, historians and social scientists wrote accounts
of American empire that emphasized how imperial actors employed unequal taxonomies of
race, class, gender, and sexuality to shape metropolitan rule over colonies.

24
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The classic revisionist text is Williams’ response to George Kennan’s American Diplomacy: William
Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1959).
Williams and the Wisconsin school of diplomatic history conceived of American power within the crucible of
the Cold War, arguing that the nation’s expansionism was elite-driven and often harmful to global stability.
Subsequently, revisionist historians began addressing the flaws of international monetary systems, considering
the role of colonialism and anti-colonial movements, and how culture “[spread] the American dream” abroad.
Influential examples include: David Green, The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and
Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia,
and the Cold War, 1945-2006 – Tenth Edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008); Walter LaFeber, The New Empire:
An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963); Thomas J.
McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1989); Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle
for Indonesian Independence, 1945-1949 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981); Thomas G. Paterson, SovietAmerican Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1973). Products of their era, both orthodox and revisionist diplomatic historians
dwelled heavily on assignations of blame in the Cold War. In the early 1980s, John Lewis Gaddis famously
argued for a post-revisionist synthesis, claiming that both the United States and Russia bore responsibility for
the decades-long international standoff. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal
of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). For our purposes,
Bruce Cuming’s seminal 1993 essay in Diplomatic History marks a convergence point between diplomatic
historians and cultural theorists from other disciplines. While my project is certainly not a diplomatic history in
any conventional sense, it does use many of the same state-generated documents as that subfield. As such, I
follow Cumings’ advice “’to think otherwise,’ while living in the imperfect tense of history.” See Bruce
Cumings, “’Revising Postrevisionism,’ or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History,” Diplomatic History
17.4 (1993): 539-570.
24

This project heeds Emily Rosenberg’s call for historians of international relations to ponder the spaces where
different systems of organization and meaning coalesce. See Emily S. Rosenberg, “Considering Borders,” in
Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas J. Paterson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 176-193; Emily S. Rosenberg, “Turning to Culture,” in Close
Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph et
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Lynch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 281-286. Culturally oriented historians of American empire
(and historically oriented scholars from other disciplines) have used analyses of race, religion, gender, sexuality,

12

The adoption and refinement of methods used by cultural historians and social
scientists studying other imperial contexts has been an important development in the study of
U.S. foreign relations. This study shares those debts, particularly in relation to the work done
by scholars who emphasize how the intimate intrudes upon colonial configurations. The ways
in which the “tactile and unseen” insist themselves, refuting simple domination-subordination
narratives, provides an entry point beyond traditional historiographical accounts of American

class relations, tourism, consumer culture, surveillance, technology, and modernization (among other things) to
probe overlooked histories and problematize once-familiar topics. A necessarily partial sampling of works
includes: Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives in America’s Civilizing Mission
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007); Daniel E. Bender, American Abyss:
Savagery and Civilization in the Age of Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Bruce Cumings,
Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendency and American Power (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2010); David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American
World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Vivian Green Frydt, Art and Empire: The Politics of
Ethnicity in the United States Capital, 1815-1960 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001); Robert D.
Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2003); Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through TwentiethCentury Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and the
Antebellum American Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); John Dower, War Without
Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); Jessica Gienow-Hecht,
Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999); Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., Culture
and International History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003); Michel Gobat, Confronting the American
Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Matthew Frye Jacobson,
Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad (New York: Hill and
Wang, 2001); Amy Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2002); Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked
the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Jane C.
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the Failed Conversion of the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Timothy Marr, The Cultural
Roots of American Islamicism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Alfred W. McCoy, Policing
America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison:
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Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit,
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Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2001); Emily S. Rosenberg and Shanon Fitzpatrick, eds., Body and Nation: The Global
Realms of U.S. Body Politics in the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015); Allison L.
Sneider, Suffragists in an Imperial Age: U.S. Expansion and the Woman Question, 1870-1929 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008); Shelley S. Streeby, American Sensations: Class, Empire, and the Production of
Popular Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Ian Tyrrell, Woman’s World / Woman’s
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Imperialism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
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colonial expansion.

25

U.S. officials tapped into circuits of imperial knowledge production to

fashion and refashion regulatory regimes that monitored and policed the bodies of imperial
and indigenous actors alike. Preoccupations with the maintenance of personal hygiene, sexual
relations, sociality, public sanitation, and gender norms blurred the binary of “colonizer” and
“colonized” in the American Philippines, as all bodies became the terrain of biopolitical
26

modes of ordering.

This cultural turn in the study of American foreign relations has also

delved into the roles of indeterminacy and ambiguity in the formation and operation of
imperial polities. Rather than coherent entities, colonial empires were stitched together
piecemeal from a variety of contingent and contextual zones that often functioned alongside
but not in tandem with one another. This “provinciality of American empire” was evident not
just between colonies, but also within them.

27

Interdisciplinary approaches to American colonial empire also provide the cultural
historian with alternative paths beyond the collection and aggregation of state documents.
Novels, travel writing, poetry, song, advertisements, diaries, marginalia, and photographic
captions all appear in later chapters. In particular, this work is beholden to evasive but crucial
notions of the mental landscapes of colonials. Templates for viewing the environment of the
Southern Philippines and its inhabitants informed strategies of rule and control among
officials, but also patterned the daily rituals and fleeting social interactions that were the
fabric of the colonial encounter. Administrators, soldiers, teachers, missionaries, and
businessmen drew on the ethnographic and territorial ‘expertise’ of Spanish colonial
progenitors, migratory journalists, popular fictions, and their own limited dialogues with the

25

I borrow this phrase from Ann Laura Stoler, “Intimidations of Empire: Predicaments of the Tactile and
Unseen,” in Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in Colonial North America, ed. Ann Laura Stoler
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006): 1-22.
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For specific examples from the Philippines, see Paul Kramer, “The Darkness that Enters the Home: The
Politics of Prostitution During the Philippine-American War,” in Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy
in Colonial North America, ed. Ann Laura Stoler (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006): 366-404; Warwick
Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2006), 104-129.
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Julian Go suggests this idea in his essay of the same name, which argues that “American authorities in all the
colonies crafted their forms of rule to fit local conditions as they perceived them.” This fragmentation occurred
not just between colonies but also within them. See Julian Go, “The Provinciality of American Empire: ‘Liberal
Exceptionalism’ and U.S. Colonial Rule, 1898-1912,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 49.1 (2007):
100.
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natives to create racial-pedagogical legitimations of dominance. Imperfect understandings
and, at times, pure fantasy shaped the American colonial imagination in the Southern
Philippines. These fantasies were given further shape by European notions of the tropical and
by America’s brutal frontier expansionism during the prior century. They also derived from
the visual and material pleasures and agonies colonial agents encountered in Mindanao and
Sulu. My insights on this subject derive from a substantial body of work investigating
28

interactivities between imagination, environment, race, and governance.

Culturally minded historians of American foreign relations have borrowed, translated,
and transformed methodological insights from other fields, including postcolonial studies,
29

borderlands studies, and subaltern studies.

In doing so, they have identified how

geopolitical concerns are often driven by more nebulous cultural constructions, and how
manifold iterations of American culture shape the imperial ideologies that underpin
30

phenomena like free market proselytism and liberal internationalism.

“The sharing and

28

The connections between colonial empire, race, and the imaginary are discussed in the introductory section of
Chapter Two.
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Insights from scholars in these fields have caused historians to question the positivist and historicist
orientation of much of the historiography of American foreign relations. Among other things, theorists writing
on colonial cultures and subaltern identities encourage reconceiving how we approach racial hierarchies, spatial
logics, gender relations, and the very act of writing colonial histories. Some important examples include:
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (New York:
Verso, 1991); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York:
Routledge, 1994); Gyan Prakash, After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and
Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (London: Routledge, 1995); Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New
York: Vintage, 1993); Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in
Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of
Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University Press,
1995); Nicolas Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994).
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On economic expansion, propaganda, and American consumer culture abroad, see Susan Brewer, Why
America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008); Mona Domosh, American Commodities in the Age of Empire (New York: Routledge, 2006);
Inderpal Grewal, Transnational America: Feminisms, Diasporas, Neoliberalisms (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2009); Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-61 (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Kristin L. Hoganson, Consumer’s Imperium: The Global Production of
American Domesticity, 1865-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Frank Ninkovich,
Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865-1900 (Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 2009); Emily S. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar
Diplomacy, 1900-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the
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transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries,” as Akira Iriye defines
the study of culture within the field of international relations, does not merely allow us to
rethink the foundations of the imperial state, but also illustrates how that state is itself
31

permeated and reshaped by the experience of empire.

The editors of a recent collection that

exhaustively explores the interpenetration of the imperial and the domestic observe that
American colonial empire “needs to be made visible in the skein of twentieth-century
American history if we are to understand matters of elemental import such as state formation
32

or conceptions of race and national identity.”

The experience of the imperial is vital to

conceptualizing the development of the American state, as the coercive and malleable
atmospheres of the colonial possessions allowed administrators, educators, prison wardens,
intelligence operatives, engineers, soldiers, and academics to experiment and refine
techniques they then imported to the metropole.

33

If concepts of identity and difference are inherently unstable, so too are the imperial
formations that generate them. The permeability of borders, imperfect and contested
inscriptions of hierarchy, intra-imperial divisions, and the fluidity of global power ensured
that empires were and are constantly in flux. The spaces between conceptual ‘civilizing
missions’ and ground-level practice show empire as “a form of limited rule, limited both in
relation to the exercise of totalizing power and to the will and ability to transform

American Dream (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); and Emily S. Rosenberg, “U.S. Mass Consumerism in
Transnational Perspective,” in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since
1941, Second Edition, ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 307-337.
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Akira Iriye, “Cultural and International History,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations,
ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas J. Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 242.
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State,” in Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and
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For instance, Daniel Bender suggests that notions of racial fitness or degeneracy transferred between
metropole and colony, shaping hierarchies in the Philippines and industrial America alike. See Bender,
American Abyss, 40-98.
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societies.”

34

Frictions between desires to transform, the contingencies of rule, and modes of

indigenous resistance propel these narratives. Imperial transformations were often
unintentional and deviational – natives recasted themselves as metropolitans, imperial agents
adopted native habits, encounters in the intimate sphere redefined boundaries. The instability
of bodies and cultural projects is a microcosm of larger fault lines running through empire.
The transitory and finite nature of imperial power is detailed by Alfred McCoy, who observes
that on a macro-level empires are destabilized by a loss of support among subordinate native
35

elites, economic instability, and military overreach, among other factors.

The insecurities of

empire, it turns out, are evident in both close textual readings and comparative surveys.
The historian Ian Tyrell proposed the internationalization of American history in 1991
36

in the pages of the American Historical Review.

This is not to say that the study of the

United States existed outside of academic trends addressing ‘global’ or ‘world’ history, but
that the nationalist lodestone of exceptionalism coloured both the popular imagination and
many scholarly accounts of the American past. While still persistent in the mainstream, the
concept of exceptionalism has since been challenged in the academy, particularly in the work
of Julian Go, who attacks the notion with tremendous analytical precision.

37

When one

moves past critiques of exceptionalism, there is a need in the historiography for accounts of
U.S. history within the world. The undercutting of the exceptionalist narrative comes not only
out of comparative analysis, but also through exploring the connected histories America
shares with other empires, nations, regions, localities, and even individuals. The discipline of
history, a perennial late adopter of innovative theoretical approaches, has only recently begun
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Postmortem (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
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University Press, 2011), 206-234.
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to move beyond constraining methodological nationalism and explore the diffuse connective
tissue that links and reshapes seemingly disparate societies. In the case of empire in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there are dense webs of transference that are only
now receiving their due attention. For historians of empire, the task remains to parse archival
records to locate the original sites of these connections.

38

The transnational (or, in this study, transcolonial) turn in the study of American
imperial formations is evident in articles, monographs, and collections published in the past
decade and a half.

39

Ian Tyrrell has written a broad survey of United States history through

the lens of transnationalism, and has also done more focused work on the importance of
transnational reform movements in promoting American cultural values at home and
abroad.

40

Ann Foster’s monograph on the United States and European colonialism in

Southeast Asia proved enormously helpful in the crafting of this project, emphasizing as it
does America’s collaborations and competitions with the British, French, and Dutch empires
during the interwar period. America’s crafting of an “empire of the mind” in the Philippines,
according to Foster, was done in ways that consciously mimicked and rejected European
colonial models, a task aided by the persistent circulation of people and ideas throughout

38

For a succinct summarization of future prospects for transnational historians, see Pierre-Yves Saunier,
Transnational History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 135-141.
39

Two asides: i.) In the following, I mainly use the term ‘transcolonial’ for greater specificity (the actors in this
work are often acting between colonies rather than nations), although at other times I merely refer to ‘connected
spaces’ or ‘webs of transference.’ The main point about the importance of studying connectivities remains
unchanged, regardless of terminology; ii.) I am not suggesting here that recent work with a transnational /
transcolonial slant arose from nowhere. In the historiography of American foreign relations, there are a number
of cultural historians who have pioneered globally oriented approaches. Preeminent among these is Akira Iriye,
whose insights on cultural internationalism developed out of his early work on Japanese-American relations in
the twentieth-century. His most recent contributions, editing and contributing to the massive six-volume series
The History of the World, suggest new avenues for how to think beyond national histories. For our purposes,
some of his more useful published material includes: Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International
Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002);
Akira Iriye, ed., Global Interdependence: The World After 1945 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2013); Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume III: The
Globalizing of America, 1913-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Akira Iriye, “The
Internationalization of History,” American Historical Review 94.1 (1989): 1-10.
40

See Ian Tyrrell, Crisis of the Wasteful Nation: Empire and Conservation in Theodore Roosevelt’s America
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s
Moral Empire (Princeton: Princeton: University Press, 2010); Ian Tyrrell, Transnational Nation: United States
History in Global Perspective Since 1789 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
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colonial Southeast Asia.

41

On America’s other oceanic border, Frank Schumacher and Paul

Kramer have both explored the deep connections between elites in the British and American
colonial empires, and the mutual identifications and disidentifications that generated imperial
42

policy.

Andrew Zimmerman’s Alabama in Africa highlights the truly innovative

scholarship possible through transnationally oriented research as it charts the surprising
relationships between fin-de-siècle continental sociology, African-American labour in the
post-Reconstruction South, and German colonial empire in West Africa.

43

In their own

unique ways, these works all demonstrate why emphasizing interactivity and interconnection
enriches our understanding of how American imperial formations operated and continue to
operate.
Moving from these broad questions of empire and connection, our focus narrows as
we draw closer to our subject. In the past several decades, a voluminous body of literature has
developed examining the cultural aspects of the colonial experience in the Philippines.
Beyond mere battlefield or political histories, these monographs and articles delve into the
granular experiences of colonial empire. The role of Protestant missionaries as informal
agents of empire, for example, is a perennial topic – and one that I expand upon in later
44

chapters.

Templates for colonial education, some based on methods used with the Native

41

Ann Foster, Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Southeast Asia, 1919-1939 (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2010), 177.
42

See Paul Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule Between the British and United
States Empires, 1880-1910,” Journal of American History 88.4 (2002): 1315-1353; Paul Kramer, “Race,
Empire, and Transnational History,” in Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State,
ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 199-209;
Frank Schumacher, “The American Way of Empire: National Tradition and Transatlantic Adaptation in
America’s Search for Imperial Identity, 1898-1910,” GHI Bulletin 31 (2002): 35-50; Frank Schumacher,
“Kulturtransfer und Empire: Britisches Vorbild und US-Amerikanische Kolonialherrschaft auf den Philippinen
im fruehen 20 Jahrhundert,” in Kolonialgeschichten: Regionale Perspektiven auf ein globales Phaenomen, ed.
Claudia Kraft et al. (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2010), 306-327.
43

See Andrew Zimmerman, Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the
Globalization of the New South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
44

The most comprehensive text is: Kenton J. Clymer, Protestant Missionaries in the Philippines, 1898-1916:
An Inquiry into the American Colonial Mentality (Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1986). Other works
include: Kenton J. Clymer, “Religion and American Imperialism: Methodist Missionaries in the Philippine
Islands, 1899-1913,” Pacific Historical Review 49.1 (1980): 29-50; Matthew T. Herbst, “Regime Change,
Occupation, and Aggressive Christianity: The Detroit Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church
and the U.S. Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1903,” Methodist History 43.4 (2005): 297-308; Arun W.
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Americans, have also been a germane area of study for historians.

46

the ideological orientations of American empire in the Philippines,

Scholars have examined
the deployment of race

Jones, “Pragmatic Anti-Imperialists? Episcopal Missionaries in the Philippines, 1933-1935,” Anglican and
Episcopal History 82.1 (2013): 1-28; Anne C. Kwantes, Presbyterian Missionaries in the Philippines: Conduits
of Social Change, 1899-1910 (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1989).
45

Material on colonial education in the Philippines began appearing in peer-reviewed journals in the early
twentieth-century, usually written by colonial agents. For an example, see David Prescott Barrows, “Education
and Social Progress in the Philippines,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 30
(1907): 69-82. Contemporary work has taken a more critical approach to the topic. See Kimberly Alidio,
“Between Civilizing Mission and Ethnic Assimilation: Racial Discourse, U.S. Colonial Education and Filipino
Ethnicity, 1901-1946” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2001); Roland Sintos Colomo, “Empire and
Education: Filipino Schooling Under United States Rule, 1900-1910” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2004);
Funie Hsu, “Colonial Articulations: English Instruction and the ‘Benevolence’ of U.S. Overseas Expansion in
the Philippines, 1898-1916” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2013); Anne Paulet, “To Change the
World: The Use of American Indian Education in the Philippines,” History of Education Quarterly 47.2 (2007):
173-202; Vincente L. Rafael, “The War of Translation: Colonial Education, American English, and Tagalog
Slang in the Philippines,” Journal of Asian Studies 74.2 (2015): 283-302; Malini Johar Schueller, “Colonial
Management, Collaborative Dissent: English Readers in the Philippines and Camilo Osias, 1905-1932,” Journal
of Asian American Studies 17.2 (2014): 161-198; Meg Wesling, Empire’s Proxy: American Literature and U.S.
Imperialism in the Philippines (New York: New York University Press, 2011).
46

The literature on American colonialism in the Philippines extends far beyond the purview of this project. In
the past quarter-century in particular, scholars have dissected the American colonial period in the Christian
regions with great skill, and collectively illustrated the complex expanse of the colonial state. Below is a
sampling of such writings. Others appear in individual chapters. For broad studies, see H.W. Brands, Bound to
Empire: The United States and the Philippines, 1890-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University, 1990); Luis H Francia,
Vestiges of War: The Philippine-American War and the Aftermath of an Imperial Dream, 1899-1999 (New
York: New York University Press, 2002); Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines
(New York: Random House, 1989); Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States,
and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Glenn A. May, Social Engineering
and the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1980). On the ideological character of American colonial power in the Philippines, see
Michael Adas, “Improving on the Civilizing Mission? Assumptions of United States Exceptionalism in the
Colonization of the Philippines,” Itinerario 22.4 (1998): 44-66; Kenton J. Clymer, “Humanitarian Imperialism:
David Prescott Barrows and the White Man’s Burden in the Philippines,” Pacific Historical Review 45.4 (1976):
495-518; Max Paul Friedman, “From Manila to Baghdad: Empire and the American ‘Mission Civilisatrice’ at
the Beginning and End of the 20th Century,” Revue Francaise d’Etudes Americaines 113 (2009): 26-38; Joseph
Fry, “Imperialism, American Style, 1890-1916,” in American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993, ed.
Gordon Martel (London: Routledge, 1994), 52-70. For more specific studies on American colonial bureaucracy
and governance, see Lewis E. Gleeck, American Institutions in the Philippines, 1898-1941 (Manila: Historical
Conservation Society, 1976); Lewis E. Gleeck, The American Governors-General and High Commissioners in
the Philippines: Proconsuls, Nation-Builders and Politicians (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1987); Paul D.
Hutchcroft, “Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy
in the American Philippines, 1900-1913,” Journal of Asian Studies 59.2 (2000): 277-306; Frank L. Jenista, The
White Apos: American Governors in the Cordillera Central (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1987).
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as a means of categorizing and controlling Filipinos,
indigenous opposition to the state,
49

of social control,

48

47

the use of violence and torture to crush

the development of colonial medical models as a means

the gendered dimensions of domesticity and sexual relations in the

47

The racial dimensions of the American Philippines are explored in Barbara S. Gaerlan, “In the Court of the
Sultan: Orientalism, Nationalism, and Modernity in Philippine and Filipino American Dance,” Journal of Asian
American Studies 3.2 (1999): 251-287; Willard B. Gatewood, Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden,
1898-1903 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975); Daniel Goh, “States of Ethnography: Colonialism,
Resistance, and Cultural Transcription in Malaya and the Philippines, 1890s-1930s,” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 49.1 (2007): 109-142; Servando D. Halili Jr., Iconography of the New Empire: Race and
Gender Images and the American Colonization of the Philippines (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007);
Paul Kramer, “The Pragmatic Empire: U.S. Anthropology and Colonial Politics in the Occupied Philippines,
1898-1916” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1998); Scot Ngozi-Brown, “African-American Soldiers and
Filipinos: Racial Imperialism, Jim Crow and Social Relations,” Journal of Negro History 82.1 (1997): 42-53;
Vincente L. Rafael, White Love and Other Events in Filipino History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000);
Michael Salman, The Embarrassment of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American
Colonial Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Christopher A. Vaughan, “Ogling
Igorots: The Politics and Commerce of Exhibiting Cultural Otherness, 1898-1913,” in Freakery: Cultural
Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body, ed. Rosemarie Garland Thomson (New York: New York University
Press, 1996), 219-233.
48

On militarism and colonial violence, see Patricio Abinales, “The Good Imperialists? American Military
Presence in the Southern Philippines in Historical Perspective,” Philippine Studies 52.2 (2004): 179-207; Louise
K. Barnett, Atrocity and American Military Justice in Southeast Asia: Trial By Army (New York: Routledge,
2010), 9-120; James Grant Crawford, “’Civilize ‘Em With a Krag!’ Punitive Violence and the American
Mission of Uplift,” Journal of the North Carolina Association of Historians 17 (2009): 135-167; Michael
Cullinane, “Bringing in the Brigands: The Politics of Pacification in the Colonial Philippines, 1902-1907,”
Philippine Studies 57.1 (2009): 49-76; Paul Kramer, “Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire:
the Philippine-American War as Race War,” Diplomatic History 30.2 (2006): 169-210; Clayton Laurie, “The
Philippine Scouts: America’s Colonial Army, 1899-1913,” Philippine Studies 37.2 (1989): 174-191; Brian M.
Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1989); Frank Schumacher, “’Marked Severities’: The Debate Over Torture During
America’s Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1902,” Amerikastudien 51.4 (2006): 475-498; Richard E. Welch
Jr., “American Atrocities in the Philippines: The Indictment and the Response,” Pacific Historical Review 43.2
(1974): 233-253.
49

For intersecting histories of medicine and colonial empire in the Philippines, see Anderson, Colonial
Pathologies; Warwick Anderson, “Immunization and Hygiene in the Colonial Philippines,” Journal of the
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 62.1 (2007): 1-20; Ken De Bevoise, Agents of Apocalypse: Epidemic
Disease in the Colonial Philippines (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ken De Bevoise, “Until God
Knows When: Smallpox in the Late-Colonial Philippines,” Pacific Historical Review 59.2 (1990): 149-185;
Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, “Cholera and the Origins of the American Sanitary Order in the Philippines,” in
Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, ed. David Arnold (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1988), 125-148; Matthew Smallman-Raynor and Andrew Cliff, “The Philippines Insurrection and the 1902-4
Cholera Epidemic, Part I: Epidemiological Diffusion Processes in War,” Journal of Historical Geography 24.1
(1998): 69-80; Matthew Smallman-Raynor and Andrew Cliff, “The Philippines Insurrection and the 1902-4
Cholera Epidemic, Part II: Diffusion Patterns in War and Peace,” Journal of Historical Geography 24.2 (1998):
188-210.
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colony,

50

the promotion of American architecture and urban planning as modes of societal

transformation,

51

and the rationalization and management of the colonial environment.

52

Curiously, most of these books and articles are partially or completely silent on Mindanao
and Sulu.
Why does this silence exist? One can posit numerous reasons. For one, large swathes
of Mindanao and all of Sulu were only part of the Philippines inasmuch as the Spanish
imagined them to be colonial possessions. Muslim regions were never Christianized and their
elite never Hispanicized, although some did speak Spanish for the purposes of commerce.
The cultures of Christian Luzon and the Visayas developed apart from those in the Sultanates
of the South. If Mindanao and Sulu were part of the Philippines, it was only because of
geographic demarcation and the colonial imagination, and not because of a shared culture or

50

On gender, sexuality, and domesticity: Nerissa S. Balce, “The Filipina’s Breast: Savagery, Docility, and the
Erotics of the American Empire,” Social Text 87 (2006): 89-110; Catherine Ceniza Choy, Empire of Care:
Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); Elizabeth Mary
Holt, Colonizing Filipinas: Nineteenth-Century Representations of the Philippines in Western Historiography
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2002); David Keoni Lawrimore, “Imperial Ambivalence:
Gender, Discourse and Empire in Early Twentieth-Century Women’s Travel Narratives of the Philippines,”
Interventions 17.4 (2015): 585-602; Alfred W. McCoy, ed., An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the
Philippines (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998); Victor Roman Reyes Mendoza, “The
Erotics of ‘White Love’: Or, Queering Philippine-U.S. Imperial Relations” (PhD diss., University of California,
Berkeley, 2007); Vincente L. Rafael, “Colonial Domesticity: White Women and the United States Rule in the
Philippines,” American Literature 67.4 (1995): 639-666.
51

Texts on the spatial legacies of colonialism in the Philippines include: Jonathan Best, “Empire Builders:
American City Planning in the Philippines,” Bulletin of the American Historical Collection 37.1 (2009): 23-34;
David Brody, “Building Empire: Architecture and American Imperialism in the Philippines,” Journal of Asian
American Studies 4.2 (2006): 123-145; David Brody, Visualizing American Empire: Orientalism and
Imperialism in the Philippines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Daniel F. Doeppers, Manila,
1900-1941: Social Change in a Late Colonial Metropolis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Estela
Duque, “Modern Tropical Architecture: Medicalization of Space in Early Twentieth-Century Philippines,”
Architectural Research Quarterly 13.3/4 (2009): 261-271; Robert Ronald Reed, City of Pines: The Origins of
Baguio as Colonial Hill Station and Regional Capital (Berkeley: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies,
University of California, 1976); Ron Theodore Robin, Enclaves of America: The Rhetoric of American Political
Architecture Abroad, 1900-1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 15-88.
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On technology, the use of science to legitimate colonial projects, and environmental change, see Adas,
Dominance by Design, 129-184; Greg Bankoff, “Breaking New Ground? Gifford Pinchot and the Birth of
‘Empire Forestry’ in the Philippines, 1900-1905,” Environment and History 15.3 (2008): 369-393; Greg
Bankoff, Cultures of Disaster: Society and Natural Hazards in the Philippines (London: Routledge Curzon,
2003), 31-60; Greg Bankoff, “One Island Too Many: Reappraising the Extent of Deforestation in the Philippines
prior to 1946,” Journal of Historical Geography 33.2 (2007): 314-334; Babette P. Resurrección, “Engineering
the Philippine Uplands: Gender, Ethnicity, and Scientific Forestry in the American Colonial Period,” Critical
Asian Studies 31.1 (1999): 13-30.
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kinship. The Americans, recognizing this, bifurcated the Spanish colonial state and ruled
Mindanao and Sulu as separate entities for two decades. Even as it began its slow integration
into the national fold during the 1920s and 1930s, the South remained outside of the Christian
Filipino mainstream (as areas of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao do to this
day). The Filipino political and cultural grandees during the American colonial period did not
reside in Mindanao and Sulu, nor did they originate from there. Many of these ilustrado
nationalists adopted similar racialized views to the Spanish and Americans when they talked
53

about the non-Christians of the Southern Philippines.

Mindanao and Sulu’s role as a colony-within-a-colony - first as a separately governed
entity and later as a politically and culturally subordinate region in a national body - helps
explain its historiographical absence. Swamped demographically by larger Christian
populations and living outside of the northern centers of power, Muslims did not produce the
litany of political and cultural documents that populate the archives and, consequently,
colonial histories. To illustrate this phenomenon, one need not look further than some of the
best work on Philippine colonial encounter, including that of Paul Kramer and Alfred
McCoy. When Moros warrant mention, it is in passing. Perhaps the massacre of Bud Dajo is
discussed in brief, or a paragraph is included noting the establishment of the Moro Province.
The reader does not get a sense from these texts that a concurrent and related experiment in
colonial tutelage, one with implications for colonized and colonizer alike, was occurring in
the South at the same time that the Insular authorities were clashing with nationalist
54

politicians in Manila.

Here, historiography mimics political history, with Muslims

marginalized or entirely absent from dominant narratives.
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Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., “Tracing Origins: Ilustrado Nationalism and the Racial Science of Migration
Waves,” Journal of Asian Studies 64.3 (2005): 605-637; Megan C. Thomas, Orientalists, Propagandists, and
Ilustrados: Filipino Scholarship and the End of Spanish Colonialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2012), 1-22.
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For example, in Kramer’s monograph, the Moros are mainly lumped in with the other ‘non-Christian tribes.’
They are given more attention in his chapter on the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition, but the book remains
almost entirely focused on the Christian North. See Kramer, Blood of Government, 280-288 (on Muslims at the
World’s Fair).
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Writing focusing specifically on the Southern Philippines by American historians has
primarily emphasized the bureaucratic and military aspects of colonial rule. These accounts
build upon the pioneering work of Peter Gowing, an American missionary turned academic
who spent most of his later life in the Philippines. Although he died in 1983, Gowing left
behind an impressive corpus on the first two decades of American rule in Mindanao and Sulu.
Most significant is Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos,
1899-1920, a revision of his doctoral dissertation originally published in 1977. Drawing its
conclusions mainly from official documents produced by the Moro Province and the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, the book depicted American rule as a period of progress
occasionally marred by violence stemming from the racial intolerance of officials like
Leonard Wood. In the conclusion, Gowing wrote that “the Americans genuinely sought to
help the Moros. There was a real concern for political, economic, and social development so
55

that the Moros could fulfill their potential as human beings.” Reifying the paternal
assumptions of American colonials, Gowing claimed that Filipinization in the 1920s and
1930s was a “betrayal of trust” by the Americans, whose humanist tendencies the Moros
came to love. This is a gross oversimplification of the complexities faced by Muslim societies
witnessing, and sometimes participating in, the dismantling of traditional power structures.
While imperfect and insufficiently critical as a piece of analysis, Gowing’s book remains the
single best compendium of American political, military, and social policies in the Southern
Philippines for new arrivals to the topic. In the years before his death, Gowing produced a
fascinating article on “commonalities” between Moros and Native Americans, as well as two
collections that considered the role of Muslims within the Filipino nation-state.
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Peter G. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920
(Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1983), 335.
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On Indian policy in the United States and the Moros: Peter G. Gowing, “Moros and Indians: Commonalities
of Purpose, Policy and Practice in American Government of Two Hostile Subject Peoples.” Philippine
Quarterly of Culture & Society 8.2/3 (1980): 125-149. Gowing also studied “common themes” among Filipino
Muslim communities in a revision of his 1964 work Mosque and Moro: Peter G. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos:
Heritage and Horizon (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1979). The scope of Gowing’s scholarship, covering
Muslim history in the Philippine Archipelago across generations, is foundational for those who have written on
the topic since his death. Other articles and edited collections include: Peter G. Gowing, “Of Different Minds:
Christian and Muslim Ways of Looking at their Relations in the Philippines,” International Review of Mission
67 (1978): 74-85; Peter G. Gowing, “Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899-1920,” in The
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Andrew Bacevich, Charles Byler, and James Arnold have all studied various aspects
of military rule in Mindanao and Sulu, with a particular emphasis on the massacre at Bud
Dajo. Drawing on Gowing’s writings, archival materials, and biographies, these texts critique
elements of the military state in the Muslim South but largely direct their attentions towards
pacification campaigns led by the likes of Leonard Wood and John Pershing.

57

Interestingly,

the most sustained engagement with archival material available in the United States is by a
historian outside of the academy, Robert Fulton. Fulton’s Moroland is a comprehensive
account of the Southern Philippines between 1899 and 1920 and is rich in primary source
detail to a degree not found in the other works. Specifically, Fulton is adept at using a
combination of reports, diaries, and letters to illustrate the brutality of encounters between
Americans, Filipinos, and Moros. His second book, Honor for the Flag, focuses entirely on
the Bud Dajo massacre and the domestic response to it in the United States. More critical of
U.S. policy, it shares Moroland’s textural and archival richness but also its occasionally
slipshod formatting.

58

Taken in sum, the texts emphasizing the American military experience

are strong when assessing the challenges of counterinsurgency and military government in a
difficult environment, but provide us with little information on the transformational
dimensions of colonial rule.

Muslim Filipinos: Their History, Society and Contemporary Problems, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D.
McAmis (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1976), 372-382; Peter G. Gowing, “Muslim Filipinos Today,”
The Muslim World 54.1 (1964): 39-48; Peter G. Gowing, ed., Understanding Islam and Muslims in the
Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988).
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Works that analyze conflicts in Mindanao and Sulu through the lens of military history include: James R.
Arnold, The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913 (New
York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011); Andrew Bacevich, “Disagreeable Work: Pacifying the Moros, 1903-1906,”
Military Review 62.6 (1982): 49-61; Charles Byler, “Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the
Southern Philippines, 1899-1913,” Military Review 85.3 (2005): 41-45; George Wlliam Jornacion. “The Time of
the Eagles: United States Army Officers and the Pacification of the Philippine Moros, 1899-1913” (PhD diss.,
University of Maine, 1973); Wayne Wray Thompson, “Governors of the Moro Province: Wood, Bliss, and
Pershing in the Southern Philippines, 1903-1913” (PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 1975).
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Robert Fulton, Honor for the Flag: The Battle for Bud Dajo – 1906 and the Moro Massacre (Bend, Oregon:
Tumalo Creek Press, 2011); Robert Fulton, Moroland: The History of Uncle Sam and the Moros, 1899-1920
(Bend, Oregon: Tumalo Creek Press, 2009).
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A number of scholars have conducted fruitful explorations of the cultural dimensions
of American power in the Southern Philippines. Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, a specialist in the
philosophy and history of education, has written an enormously insightful monograph and
series of articles on the attempts of successive colonial regimes in the Muslim South to use
education as a mode of cultural control and integration. Milligan’s reflections on American
“pedagogical imperialism” were crucial for this project, particularly his contention that by
redefining the ‘Moro Problem’ as a “pedagogical problem…the American colonial regime
was able to soften both its own and the world’s perception of its occupation of Mindanao.”
This calculated position recast coercive policies and “cultural and religious bigotry” as
benevolent acts of tutelage.
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The anthropologist Thomas McKenna’s writings on

Maguindanao history and identity in Cotabato are similarly useful. Charting Islamic identities
and state impositions on them across centuries, McKenna devotes one chapter in his
monograph to considering the ways in which the Americans co-opted Maguindanao elites in
an effort to create a “Mohammedan” Filipino leadership.
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Vivienne Angeles examines

representations of Muslims in the colonial and postcolonial Philippines, demonstrating how
media was used to shape the notion of ‘the Moro’ in Spanish, American, and Christian
Filipino imaginaries.
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in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 117-125; Shinzō Hayase, Mindanao
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(Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2007); Renato T. Oliveros, “Islam in the Moro-American War
(1899-1913)” (PhD diss., Temple University, 2005).
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Vivienne SM. Angeles, “Moros in the Media and Beyond: Representations of Philippine Muslims,”
Contemporary Islam 4.1. (2010): 29-53. Angeles has also studied the role of women in Moro societies. See
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The most expansive scholarship on the American period originates not from the
United States but from Filipino social scientists. These regional studies situate the experience
of American colonialism within the longue dureé of Muslim history in Mindanao and Sulu.
As such, they are excellent reflections on the patchwork origins of modern Filipino identity
and reminders that studies of American rule cannot be historically isolated or
decontextualized. The turbulent 1960s and 1970s in the Philippines gave rise to a brand of
progressive historicism that at once emphasized the distinctiveness of Muslim societies in the
Southern Philippines but also sought to integrate them into an evolving history of the
Philippine nation-state. The writings of Samuel K. Tan are notable in this respect. Tan’s work
in the 1970s and 1980s argued that Muslim responses to outside rule were best understood as
a series of semi-isolated local developments. To suggest “unitarism” in patterns of resistance
was a reification of Spanish and American colonial histories, which “assumed that the
‘Moros’ were a fierce group of people, strongly influenced by ‘Mohammedanism,’ bound by
62

a common Malay culture, and intensely antagonistic to Christianity.”

Such flattening notions, which homogenized complex and variable local histories in
the Muslim South into a single fanatical or mythic (depending on the writer) struggle,
retained their currency in the post-independence Philippines. In opposition to this trend, Tan
suggested that Muslim resistance to colonialism was “circumstantial or incidental” and
“lacked the essence of unity which could come only from a realistic integration of
experiences and meaningful communications and relationships which were not present in
Muslim societies.”
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An alternative to this, Tan argued, were deep histories of individual

Muslim societies and their relations with the outside world. His writings were strengthened
by an extensive understanding of the transformations of local and imported cultural traditions
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in the region, especially regarding the Tausūg of the Sulu Archipelago. In his history of
American military rule in Sulu, Tan used class-based analysis to argue that “the benefits of
economic progress and reforms seeped only to the native bourgeoisie or middle class” during
64

the American period.

His 1977 book The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle included

reflections on Islamic models of resistance in the Philippines and the role of American
65

weapons systems in forcing submission in the Muslim South.

Samuel Tan’s writings coincided with a historiographic interest in exploring the
regional histories of the Southern Philippines. In Cotabato, the historian Michael O. Mastura
wrote in compelling detail about the rise and fall of Islamic rule along Mindanao’s western
66

coast.

These projects, forged in the tumult of the Marcos era, were admirable in their

assertion of the importance of local histories, but sometimes contained troubling
undercurrents. Tan argued in one essay that Filipinos should look to pre-Christian and preIslamic Malay antecedents for “a distinct geo-historical process which resists geo-political
fragmentation” and that “the imperatives of Christian and Islamic traditions in Filipino
culture are not as crucial to unity as the indigenous foundations of Filipino heritage.”
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As is

apparent elsewhere in the essay, Tan wrote with the intention of acknowledging local
variance while gently encouraging integration. Nevertheless, his approach was to cast the
insecure nation backwards through history, creating a pre-European and pre-Islamic
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cohesiveness. In this light, the unified Philippine nation-state is not a construct arising from
68

the variability of history, but simply a natural recurrence of a mythologized past.

Amendments to this nationalist imaginary are found in the work of Patricio Abinales,
who for the past two decades has critically engaged the notion that state formation in the
Philippines was a unitary process. Important for the purposes of this study are Abinales’
observations about how the Americans inherited from the Spanish a series of societies that
they then attempted to reform. This was hardly a linear, untroubled march towards a single
national entity, but instead a fraught, contested, and decades-long argument over what the
archipelago should look like at the end of American rule (if American rule should terminate
at all, that is).
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In examining the Muslim elite in Cotabato during the interwar years,

Abinales demonstrates how strategies of accommodation and resistance to both Filipino and
American imperatives arose not from the inevitability of integration into an independent
national body, but from the uncertainty of integration.
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Such uncertainty arose not only from

uneven manifestations of local power but also the colonial state itself, which Abinales claims
was “a patchwork apparatus of agencies and offices that mixed patronage, corruption, and
71

compromises with isles of administrative efficiency and autonomy.”

In his studies of the Muslim South, Abinales explores how colonial and national
imaginaries conceived of these spaces as ecological and sociological frontiers. To the
American settlers intent on growing cash crops in Davao, the colonial hinterlands represented
an allure similar to the U.S. western and southern frontiers in the previous century. White
civilization in the districts of the Moro Province would, officials believed, bring untold
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economic and cultural benefits to both settlers and natives alike.
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In the years after

Filipinization and into the postcolonial era, northerners and those living in the increasingly
urbanized settlements along the Mindanao littoral perpetuated the idea that the remote and
marginal spaces of the South were “zone[s] of darkness, savagery, and instability.”
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Several

sections of this project expand upon Abinales’ observations about the South-as-frontier, while
simultaneously avoiding the danger of reifying those notions by exploring the region in a
wider Southeast Asian context.
Where Abinales is concerned with Muslim identity formation in relation to the
Philippine state, Michael Hawkins focuses on epistemologies of rule amongst American
colonial administrators during the military period (1899-1913). Men like Leonard Wood and
John Pershing operated according to the discursive contours of what Hawkins calls “imperial
historicism” – an evolutionary schematic that standardized and ordered models of progress
then deduced “the best possible means for enabling indigenous development into
74

modernity.”

Predictably, the ideal iteration of modernity was manifest in the patrician East

Coast culture of the very men who defined and promoted the discourse. Imperial historicism
was, according to Hawkins, “the fundamental philosophy of American colonialism in the
Philippines [and] represents a coherent and reliable discourse informing and underwriting the
75

essential logic of the United States’ colonial project in Mindanao and Sulu.” Hawkins’
concept finds its antecedents in the work of scholars like Anne McClintock, Dipesh
Chakrabarty, and Homi K. Bhabha, who explore of the secularization of time and European
master narratives of progress. In particular, we can read imperial historicism as an adaptation
of McClintock’s notions of “panoptical time” and “anachronistic space,” which explain how
European colonials deployed teleological images of racial progress and world history to
explain and legitimate systems of cultural power. In the imaginary of the American imperial
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historicist, the “family tree of man” that Europeans used to map civilizational fitness was
altered ever so slightly, with U.S. capitalist modernity now at its apex and terminus.
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In his monograph, Making Moros, and several journal articles, Hawkins promotes
imperial historicism as a novel way of understanding American empire in the Southern
Philippines. Within this broader concept, he interrogates how gender informed responses to
violence in Mindanao and Sulu, particularly after the Bud Dajo massacre in 1906.
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In

Making Moros’ most fascinating chapter, Hawkins charts the anxieties inherent in American
colonials at the turn of the twentieth-century, observing that the homogenizing tendencies of
industrial capitalism and the loss of the divine in daily life led some to argue American
masculinity was in crisis. Vanishing continental frontiers exacerbated this sense, and the
overseas empire presented itself as a balm. The Moro Province was “an exotic frontier filled
with adventure and unknown possibilities” and Hawkins argues that “colonial explorers felt
they were entering a spatial realm beyond the surveying gaze of technical modernity.”
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Romantic notions of the Muslims as vigorous peoples unsullied by the modern world gave
way to feelings of guilt at the necessary implementation of the historicist vision.
Imperial historicism is a seductive analytical tool when attempting to understand the
Muslim South under American military rule, yet has its drawbacks. In championing the
concept as “a foundational rationale for virtually every policy and project in Moro Province
between 1899 and 1913” Hawkins risks reproducing the flattening qualities of imperial
historicism in his own work.
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When one looks closer, the notion of coherence begins to

deteriorate. Ideals of governance featured in annual reports and newspapers often masked the
ad hoc nature of local rule, where degrees of compromise and force varied alongside the
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ability to introduce state structures. Added to this were the disparate personalities of the
colonials themselves. Some, like Leonard Wood and John Pershing, were dismissive of native
forms of governance, law, and education. Others, like Najeeb Saleeby and Charles Cameron,
advocated the use of Islam and the datuship in colonial rule. While overarching civilizational
prerogatives certainly existed, they were often modified, altered, or overlooked by
unanticipated vagaries of rule. Thus, translating the imperial historicist worldview in
Cotabato, under the firm rule of Datu Piang, was a very different experience than in Sulu,
where a shifting cast of datus vied for power against the ‘leadership’ of a weak Sultan.
Hewing so closely to his concept, Hawkins occasionally overlooks important details.
Muslim populations are differentiated in the opening section of his monograph, but these
important distinctions and their roles in colonial relations during the military period are
repeatedly glossed over in subsequent chapters. One develops the sense that ‘the Moro’ is
precisely as the American envisioned him, a product of civilizational fantasy rather than a
panoply of ethnic and religious identities. In neglecting to look at Spanish antecedents,
regional links between the sultanates and other maritime states, and contacts between
American and European colonials, Hawkins foregoes important instances of transcolonial
exchange. “Historicism at its roots is an exclusive product of the metropole,” Hawkins writes,
yet this same historicism was itself an adaptation of European concepts, and when it arrived
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in the Southern Philippines it was diluted and transformed by insistent connectivities.

Karine V. Walther’s Sacred Interests takes a broader approach to Moro-American
relations, placing them within an Orientalist cultural discourse stretching back to the early
nineteenth-century. Recentering religion as a driving force in American foreign relations,
Walther argues there has “been a long-standing tendency in the United States…to
overemphasize the significance of religious belief in shaping the actions of historical agents
who happen to be Muslim and underemphasize that of Europeans and Americans.”
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Her
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scholarship also stresses the importance of inter-imperial relationships during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. “We must reinsert the United States within the
larger global history of nineteenth-century imperial expansion,” she writes, “and the
exchange of transnational discourses about Islam and Muslims while recognizing the
domestic particularities that distinguished American discourses from those of European
82

powers.” This project shares Walther’s focus on the coalescences and divergences in EuroAmerican imperial histories.
While much of Sacred Interests centers on America’s role in the Ottoman world, one
section of the monograph pertains to events in the Southern Philippines between 1899 and
1920. Walther is strongest when analyzing the transcolonial adventures of Leonard Wood and
his coterie in the early 1900s, a topic which figures into Chapter Eight of this work. Stopping
in Istanbul, Wood and his deputies saw nothing of value, yet were impressed with Evelyn
83

Baring (popularly known as Lord Cromer) and his transformation of Egypt.

Elsewhere,

Walther provides a sound chronology of the first twenty years of American colonialism in the
Southern Philippines and references important topics (missionaries, violence, colonial
imaginaries) that I explore at greater length in the coming chapters. The book’s most
important contribution to the literature, however, is integrating the Southern Philippines into
a much larger relational history of Americans and the Islamic world, and illustrating the
damage caused by “simplistic understandings of Islam and Muslims” across centuries.

84

Drawing on a variety of historical subfields and scholarly disciplines, my intention is
to demonstrate that the history of U.S. colonialism in Mindanao and Sulu cannot be
understood only through reading material on American empire in the Philippines. In many of
these accounts, the Muslim South is a peripheral space that never fully enters focus. It is only
through scouring the historiographies of the Philippines as a nation-state, Islam in Southeast
Asia, and European colonial empire in Asia, that we find appropriate resonances. With this in
mind, the following chapters draw from a range of literatures. Vast histories of imperial
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power and small regional studies are equally important in demarcating the parameters of this
project, which is at once a history of a specific time and place and a rumination on how a
supposed periphery connected in expected and unexpected ways to the world around it.

Connectivities and Complications
A week after Leonard Wood’s death in August 1927, Governor of the Mountain Province
John C. Early eulogized him before an assembled crowd at the Baguio Auditorium. Early
recalled the intra-colonial legacy of the famed soldier. Wood battled the Apache Indians and
“cleared the way for a million peaceful homes.” As a “man of science,” he fought against
yellow fever and malaria, saving Cuba and aiding in the “great engineering works” of
“tropical America…like the Panama Canal.” Transferred to Mindanao from Cuba, Wood
“conquered the Moros…and extended to them the right hand of friendship when they laid
their arms down and has treated them as men ever since.” Returning to the Philippines in the
early 1920s, Wood propped up a faltering financial system, rooted out corruption in
government and the judiciary, and expanded public works. In Early’s estimation, Wood’s
years as Governor General were his “last supreme service to humanity…he died rendering
service and his death is a supreme service fixing as it does the eyes of the world upon the
Philippines.”
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Governor Early believed there was “no one in American history” who solved similar
problems to those faced by Wood. Looking across the imperial landscape, he saw Wood’s
“parallel” in Lord Cromer, the British diplomat and administrator famed for the colonial
management of Egypt in the closing decades of the nineteenth-century. “[Lord Cromer] was
Britain’s last great Colonial Administrator,” Early declared. “Leonard Wood is our first. We
86

may learn in time to appreciate such service.”

Far from evading comparisons to European

empire, the American official embraced them in his commemoration of Wood. The late
military man’s achievements stretched across the arc of America’s expanding global presence
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at the meeting point of two centuries. Giving them context and credit meant fixing one’s gaze
not just upon national histories, but also looking outwards onto a world saturated by imperial
power.
Infusing an already complex regional story with all the descriptors developed by
globally oriented scholars means contesting isolated histories. The lack of attention given to
the Southern Philippines in the historiography of American foreign relations is a continuation
of trends originating in the American and Filipino colonial imaginaries. Mindanao and Sulu
were frontier spaces, depicted alternately as foreboding and dangerous or else virginal and
exploitable. These narratives of what I deem the ‘colonial remote’ are often used to explain
regions viewed as peripheral by imperial and national centers, particularly if the inhabitants
are minority populations alienated from the status quo. Unlike frontiers, which vanish with
conquest or settlement, the colonial remote has a remarkable resiliency in national
imaginaries long after questions of possession are deemed settled. We find examples of this
throughout the Islamic world and elsewhere: the North Caucasus in Russia, the Kurdish
regions of Eastern Anatolia / Northern Kurdistan, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
in Northwestern China, Naxalite areas in Jharkhand and West Bengal in India, and so on.
In the case of the Philippines, the reification of the South as a colonial remote in the
historiography perpetuates myths of isolation and disconnection. Part of writing connected
histories is challenging the belief that so-called peripheries exist in mere relation to an
imperial or national center. The inhabitants of the Southern Philippines – Muslims, Lumads,
Americans, Christian Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, and Europeans alike – were undoubtedly
shaped by reciprocal flows of information, personnel, policies, and cultural ephemera to and
from Manila and Washington, but also by what Julian Go calls “horizontal” circuits of
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exchange.

This meant transfers between American and European colonies, but also between

colonized peoples themselves. In this narrative, people and ideas travel in surprising ways.
British colonial agricultural schemes reach the Southern Philippines by way of London and
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Cairo; racial segregationists in the U.S. Senate suggest a mass migration of AfricanAmericans to Mindanao; German botany arrives in Jolo by way of Argentina and
Philadelphia; Ottoman emissaries offer their services to the Samal Moros of the Zamboanga
Peninsula; Tausūg princesses study in Illinois and date NCAA football players; Sultans visit
Central Park in New York City; Dutch and American authorities collaborate to track down
pirates in the Sulu Sea. These and other incidents give anecdotal life to my refutation of
histories that reproduce imperialist and nationalist orderings. In uncovering and probing
instances of permeability and exchange, this study does not renounce the nation-state or
territoriality as crucial tools of inquiry. Instead, it recognizes their utility while also
acknowledging their limitations.
A second major thematic concern regards the complications of rule in a colonial state.
Between 1899 and 1942, authorities reorganized Mindanao and Sulu multiple times. Pure
military government gave way to the Moro Province in 1903, a civil-military hybrid
administered by U.S. Army officers. The Moro Province itself transitioned to the civilian-led
Department of Mindanao and Sulu in 1914, which brought with it a Filipinization of the
colonial administrative class. From 1920 until its abolishment in 1936, the Bureau of NonChristian Tribes in Manila oversaw the provinces of the Southern Philippines. Manuel
Quezon’s government ‘normalized’ provinces like Cotabato, Lanao, and Sulu in 1936,
although their relationship to the national center remained strained. The various permutations
of rule in the Southern Philippines began with American military men in 1899 and concluded
with Christian Filipino politicians and bureaucrats in the late 1930s. Within these
administrative variations, the inhabitants of the Southern Philippines – colonials, natives, and
those in between – carved out representative spaces that gave the region its polyrhythmic
cultural character.
If the colonial rulers changed from military officers to American civilians to Filipino
politicos during this period, there remained a constant emphasis on the need to pacify and
transform ‘savage’ and ‘warlike’ Moros into modern national subjects. These civilizational
imperatives – called ‘benevolent assimilation’ in some circles, ‘democratic tutelage’ in others
– pervaded colonial encounters, colouring government discourse and legitimating state
violence. Within these overarching desires to reform and recreate, however, there were
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variations. Among Americans, strategies of governing and interacting with Muslim
populations depended on everything from personal beliefs about race and religion to whether
one was a Democrat or Republican. Christian Filipinos from the North ranged from staunch
Catholic chauvinists to Moro sympathizers, which in turn dictated their actions when they
arrived in Mindanao and Sulu. Most importantly, Muslims themselves developed strategies of
resistance, accommodation, and collaboration. Some, like the ruling Piang family in
Cotabato, politicked with American and Filipino leaders throughout the colonial period in an
attempt to maintain their status. Others, such as Panglima Hassan of Sulu and Dimakaling of
Lanao, violently opposed and paid with their lives. The following chapters acknowledge that
any study of a colonial culture is really a study of interactive and shifting colonial cultures.
The stories told in this project present a portrait of peoples and spaces caught between
and within an ascendant global power and a nation-in-the-making. If Muslim responses to the
civilizing mission and the Filipinization of the Southern Philippines were schismatic and
inconsistent, so to were American applications of power. Moving past general chronology
requires acknowledging contradictions and occasional irreducible complexities. Well beyond
the pat narrative of how America’s ‘Moro Problem’ became the Philippines’ ‘Moro Problem’
lies a rich history of how an understudied region and its peoples were the target of colonial
reformation schemes. Mindanao and Sulu between the Spanish-American conflict and the
Second World War remain marginally examined and understood in histories of American
empire, the Philippine nation-state, and colonialism in Southeast Asia. My intention from the
first has been to cover the subjects in each chapter comprehensively, although I dispute the
idea that any single authorial voice can create the comprehensive account of so large a topic.
To use a tired phrase: many gaps still exist in the historiography. What were the experiences
of Christian settler and Lumad groups in Muslim majority areas? How extensive was foreign
commercial penetration of Mindanao during the colonial period and what were its
ramifications? How did Muslim women experience American colonial rule? How did
American colonials use visual mediums to ‘capture’ Muslim subjects? Many questions and
areas of study remain. I present my own work in a contributory spirit and acknowledge its
shortcomings.
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My methodological approach is that of a cultural historian. In state-generated
documentation I have attempted to find idiosyncratic moments where colonial agents
abandon mechanistic government-speak and provide brief glimpses into their worldviews and
the spaces they managed. In an effort to bring a human element to the proceedings, I
contextualize abstract colonial processes through individual narrative. The stories of Tarhata
Kiram, Frank Laubach, John Finley, or Caroline Spencer are fascinating in isolation, but also
illustrative of larger stories of contact, control, and transformation. Wherever possible, I have
tried to include non-Western voices, although admittedly Americans themselves are the
primary inhabitants of the colonial archives. In parsing these fragmentary histories, my focus
is on: i) translating the thematic and textural resonances of American colonial culture in the
Muslim regions of Mindanao and Sulu; and ii) establishing arcs of connectivity between the
Southern Philippines and the outside world. The relative elasticity of ‘culture’ allows me to
work in the spaces between political, economic, and military histories, and I have
supplemented official histories with a variety of materials. Dime novels, children’s radio
programs, motion pictures, advertisements, yellow journalism, speeches, songs, poetry, diary
entries, marginalia, captions scrawled on timeworn photographs, fair pamphlets, student
journals, petitions to the powerful, cablegrams, and dinner menus all make appearances in
these pages. While it is tempting to dismiss such documents as ephemeral detritus, I believe
they are powerful tools in acts of historical reconstruction.
The body of this project is split into eight parts. Chapter One, “Contact and
Conquest,” chronologically examines the history of the Southern Philippines from
Islamization in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, through the Spanish colonial period,
and into the American era, terminating with the Japanese invasion. In narrative fashion, it
introduces the peoples, places, and events referred to in later thematically structured chapters.
Chapter Two, “Imagining the Moro,” focuses on how a variety of Western actors generated
notions of ‘the Moro’ to fit within prevalent notions of savagery and civility, consulting
Spanish colonial knowledge and reaching back into America’s violent history with
indigenous populations to do so. It also connects fantasies about the civilizational potential of
‘lesser’ peoples with notions that the sparsely cultivated land they inhabited presented unique
developmental opportunities for the state and private enterprise.
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Chapters Three and Four, “Civilizational Imperatives,” examine the civilizing agendas
of American colonials and their methods of implementation. Chapter Three centers on
tensions between Moro customary practices and a variety of governmental initiatives. This
included the creation of new legal structures to replace traditional ones, the application of
modern hygiene and sanitary measures, the establishment of a system of marketplaces
designed to win Moros over to capitalism, and the promulgation of Mindanao as a settler
space. Chapter Four looks at education as a vehicle for the reform and reconfiguration of
Muslim children. The public school system in the South was a source of constant friction
between state authorities and natives who feared it was drawing youth away from Islam and
community social practices. Alongside state schooling were private efforts to educate the
Moros. Most prominent of these was the Bishop Brent Moro School on Jolo, funded by a
network of wealthy patrons in the Eastern United States. In Lanao, the missionary and
literacy specialist Frank Laubach ran a variety of programs aimed at rescuing Maranao Moros
from irrelevance in the ‘new’ Philippines. While all of these programs attempted to reorient
the Moros towards Western civilizational models, they were often applied ineptly or
unevenly, making outcomes questionable. Chapter Five, “Corrective Violence,” assesses the
violence inherent in colonial state-building. Beset by paranoia about the juramentado (Moro
religious warriors), American and Christian Filipinos responded viciously to Muslim
resistance. Opposition to taxation, land surveys, mandatory public schooling, and other
colonial initiatives elicited disproportionate responses from the state, creating an atmosphere
of ambient violence throughout the period under discussion. For the imprisoned, Americans
devised new carceral strategies that attempted to combine moral reform with profit.
Chapter Six, “Tropical Idylls,” investigates the relationship between Americans and
the environment of the Southern Philippines. Eager to create suitable living spaces,
Westerners adopted and adapted insights on architecture, urban planning, and comfort from
other colonial contexts. Americans established racially segregated clubs, built golf courses,
organized baseball teams, and shipped in modern luxuries from Europe and the United States.
In spare moments, they explored their surroundings, and compulsively collected, catalogued,
and photographed their findings. Underpinning this frivolity, however, were deep anxieties
about how the environment and inhabitants of the Muslim South destabilized Western
masculinity. Neurasthenia, ‘Philippinitis,’ and fears of deracination instilled a sense of
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constant threat in Americans. Chapter Seven, “Moros in America,” moves across the Pacific
to explore how America’s Muslim subjects entered the metropolitan consciousness. Initially,
this occurred through the display of Samal and Maranao groups at the Louisiana Purchase
Exposition in 1904. Part of the massive Philippine Reservation, these stage-managed Moros
were shown to paying visitors in their ‘natural’ environments. Organizers of the spectacle
simultaneously assumed roles as moral-minded ethnologists and carnival ringleaders.
Members of the Maguindanao and Tausūg aristocracy later visited the United States
independently. Some, like Tarhata Kiram, received schooling at American universities and
later questioned their subordinate status. Americans also learned about their new ‘wards’
through popular entertainments: dime novels, radio programs, and motion pictures.
The final chapter, “Imperial Exchanges,” contemplates linkages between the Southern
Philippines and the outside world. Despite its portrayal as a backwater, the Muslim South
maintained, by virtue of its long independence from Spanish colonial authority, numerous
links with external actors. This included not only spatially obvious connections with North
Borneo and other polities in Maritime Southeast Asia, but also real and imagined exchanges
with the wider Muslim world. A place where people came to start anew, the region hosted a
variety of characters whose hybrid identities allowed them to act as intermediaries between
local populations and the state. For their part, Americans collected and assessed strategies of
rule from a variety of European colonies. Travelling within Europe and in European colonial
possessions, U.S. officials swapped notes with their imperial counterparts. In speeches and
correspondence, men like Leonard Wood consciously framed their endeavours within global
histories of empire. Engineers and professional soldiers circulated through the Southern
Philippines, using skills honed in other colonies to benefit the American project. Our story
closes with two vignettes and a consideration of the legacies of American colonial empire in
Mindanao and Sulu.
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Chapter One / Contact and Conquest
A Historical Survey of Mindanao and Sulu, 1300s-1900s

Islamic Sultanates and Spanish Colonial Empire
Islam arrived in the Southern Philippines during the fourteenth-century. Arab and Indian
trader-missionaries sojourning in Southeast Asia developed networks of commercial and
cultural exchange, facilitating the faith’s rapid growth in the region. Malacca (Melaka), the
Malayan commercial hub and strategic entry point to Maritime Southeast Asia, was an initial
conversion point. One hundred and fifty kilometers south of present-day Kuala Lumpur, this
early sultanate was key in disseminating Islam along the coastal regions of Java, Sumatra,
Borneo, and, eventually, the Southern Philippines. According to Patricio Abinales and Donna
Amoroso, the fusing of Hindu-Buddhist court traditions with centralizing Islamic notions of
governance in Malacca helped accelerate Islam’s spread. “As Melaka’s power and
commercial success grew,” they write, “so did the moral, military, and commercial
1

momentum of the new faith among port rulers seeking advantage against rivals.” Leaders in
the littoral societies of the region quickly realized that adopting Islam meant tapping into
webs of economic, political, and religious authority. Interweaving the temporal and spiritual,
Islam provided rulers with a unified framework for governance while simultaneously
increasing its credibility by adapting to indigenous cultural particularities. After gaining
traction among elites, the faith soon spread to the lowland peasantries of coastal Southeast
Asia.
Islam entered the Sulu Archipelago by way of Borneo during this period of rapid
Islamization. Some 2,300 kilometers from the Strait of Malacca, the nearly nine hundred
islands in the chain stretched between the eastern coast of the Bruneian Empire in North
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Borneo and Mindanao, the southernmost major island in the Philippine Archipelago. In the
fourteenth-century, the islands were already integrating into commercial and cultural systems
generated by larger Asian states. Developments in the region during the previous three
centuries created deeper links between societies. These included: population growth and the
expansion of urban centers; increased political influence of the regionally powerful China;
religio-cultural importations from the Indian subcontinent; enlarged trade networks and an
amplified desire for luxury goods throughout the Indian Ocean world system; and the rise of
2

port cities as administrative and economic centers. Makhdum Ibrahim Al-Akbar, an Arabic
trader-missionary, landed at Siminul in 1380. On the island, part of the Tawi-Tawi group near
the Borneo coast, he encountered peoples in contact with the trading cultures of China, the
Malay States, and Siam. Islam became a political force in the Southern Philippines a halfcentury later with the appearance of Sayyed Abu Bakr Abirin (also known as Sharif ulHashim), a Meccan Arab who travelled to the Sulu Archipelago from Brunei. Bakr married
Paramisuli, one of the daughters of Raja Baginda, a Sumatran leader whose arrival in Sulu in
1390 marked the beginning of the centralization of power there. Assuming leadership after
Baginda’s death, Bakr leveraged his father-in-law’s political clout to create a Sultanate
modeled on the Turkish example. The effects on Sulu, and eventually other parts of the
Philippines, were profound:
The thirty-year influence and rule of Abu Bak’r until his death in 1480 was
characterized by important reforms which included the teaching of Arabic
and the Koran, the building of mosques, the organization of the archipelago
into districts under Panglimas, the introduction of an equitable system of
taxation, the initiation of legal forms, the establishment of the first Sulu
Code, and the inauguration of a system of courts. In effect, Abu Bak’r
assumed the role of a religious, social, and political potentate and succeeded
in establishing a truly strong Sultanate throughout the archipelago with
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influence radiating to the Visayas, Luzon, Celebes, Palawan, and North
Borneo. He established trade between Sulu and China, Japan, Malacca,
Sumatra, and Java.

3

In other words, when Spanish incursions began, the Sulu Sultanate was already a state with
4

well-developed systems of governance, legal structures, and commercial institutions.

Spain’s colonization of the Philippines occurred in a piecemeal fashion throughout the
sixteenth-century. After the ‘discovery’ of the islands by Magellan in 1521, the Spanish
Crown sent successive military expeditions to conquer territory. One led by the conquistador
Barbosa landed on Mindanao in 1523, only to be slaughtered en masse by natives shortly
5

thereafter. From the mid to late sixteenth-century, the power of Islamic rulers in the central
and northern Philippines was progressively eroded by Spanish incursions. Miguel Lopez de
Legazpi founded the first permanent Spanish settlement in 1565. Six years later, the Islamic
stronghold of Manila was overrun. In 1578, Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, a
companion of Legazpi, was ordered by Governor General Francisco de Sande to attack Jolo
and force the Sultanate to accept Spanish sovereignty and convert to Roman Catholicism.
“You shall order them that there be not among them any more preachers of the sect of
Muhammad, since it is evil and that of the Christians alone is good,” Sande instructed
Figueroa. “And because for a short time since the Lord of Mindanao has been deceived by
preachers of Borneo, and the people have become Moros, you shall tell them that our object
is that he be converted to Christianity…and the natives may hear preaching and be converted
without risk or harm from the chiefs.”

3
4
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Rather than accept their role as a vassal state and pay tribute to their new colonial
masters, the Muslims of the Sulu Archipelago actively resisted. This marked the beginning of
a state of intermittent conflict between Spanish colonial forces and the peoples of the
Southern Philippines lasting over three centuries. Establishing forts along the northern coast
of Mindanao and adjacent islands, the Spanish launched assaults against the Sulu Archipelago
while simultaneously attempting to consolidate their rule in Mindanao’s uncharted interior.
Spanish authorities bestowed the title “Governor of Mindanao” upon Captain Figueroa in
1596, and he launched a punitive venture up in the Rio Grande River in Maguindanao, only
7

to be killed in battle near Tampacan. Maguindanao and the other Muslim societies on
Mindanao developed simultaneously but separately from the Sulu Sultanate. Islam reached
Maguindanao (known as Cotabato during the American period) in 1460, and a ruling dynasty
formed there in the early sixteenth-century under Sultan Muhammad Kabungsuwan.
However, it was not until the seventeenth-century, during the long reign of Sultan Dipituan
Kudarat, that the Maguindanao Sultanate consolidated its power. A maritime society like
their neighbours in Sulu, the Maguindanao people lived in a state of uneasy truce with the
Spanish for much of the colonial period and earned their livelihood trading with Manila and
8

other commercial centers in Southeast Asia. A third center of Islamic society was located
around Lake Lanao, northeast of Maguindanao, where the Maranao people lived. Living
inland, this group remained almost entirely independent until the late nineteenth-century.
By the mid seventeenth-century, a discernable pattern emerged in Spanish-Muslim
relations. Small Spanish coastal outposts materialized and vanished based on the intensity of
conflict. During times of truce, Spanish traders or Jesuit missionaries appeared in the trading
ports of Maguindanao, but actual control over the South was more the fantasy of crusading
colonial administrators in Manila and Madrid than it was a practical reality. For example,
Samboangan (later called Zamboanga) was established in 1634, abandoned in 1662, and only
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completed in 1718. Muslim raids on ships and coastal communities plagued the Spanish and
Christianized native populations of the Philippines. A vigorous slave trade emanating from
the Dutch East Indies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries meant that the capture and
sale of Muslims and non-Muslims alike was a profitable, if dangerous, enterprise for
generations of young men in Sulu, Mindanao, and Borneo. Although slavers themselves,
Spanish colonials were outraged by the actions of these ‘pirates.’

10

With bombastic prose,

they wrote of indignities committed against the faithful by the hated Moros. Chroniclers
described Muslim leaders as heathen blasphemers, and when the Spanish were victorious
11

their successes were attributed to the divine.

At the height of the Muslim raids in the 1750s, communities from Northern Mindanao
to Luzon were sacked regularly. At times, more than a thousand Muslims participated in
these attacks, some of which ended in sieges. When Tandag was invaded in 1754, villagers
fled to the nearby fort only to be blockaded by the pirates for four and a half months. After
12

surrendering, the half-starved survivors were enslaved and the town’s possessions looted.

Those involved in piracy saw the Spanish and their Filipino subjects as both an economic
threat and a source of income, and further resented state-sanctioned missionary efforts to
convert them. Maritime Southeast Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was home
to myriad competing states and colonial entities, which meant that the plunder of Tausūg
(Sulu) and Maguindanao pirates easily found markets. Additionally, slaves played a pivotal
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role within Muslim societies. James Francis Warren writes that in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries the “labour of slaves made global-regional trade possible” and was the
“dominant mode of production” for the Sulu Sultanate.

13

Warren calls this an “open” slavery

system, wherein captured slaves eventually assimilated into the Tausūg identity through their
14

labours and length of service.

Spain’s faltering position in Europe and the peripheral role the Philippines played in
its empire benefitted the thriving Muslim societies of Mindanao and Sulu. In 1762, the British
East India Company, keen on access to the China trade, used its forces to occupy Manila and
remained there for two years. The effects of this were limited in the Muslim South, as the
Sultan of Sulu had previously concluded a treaty with a young representative of the East India
15

Company, the Scottish geographer Alexander Dalrymple.

In late eighteenth-century, the

power of the Maguindanao Sultanate was reduced by the Spanish blockade of Cotabato,
making Sulu the dominant entity in the Southern Philippines. Patricio Abinales and Donna
Amoroso describe the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a period of “stalemate,” where
the “Muslim south represented a space inside the territory claimed by the Spanish that was
outside the control of the state.”

16

This stasis ended only in the mid nineteenth-century, when

advances in military technology (particularly the advent of military steamships) allowed the
Spanish navy to erode the power of the sultanates. The concurrent marginalization of small
states across Southeast Asia in the face of European colonial aggrandizement limited the
movement of goods and people, further eroding political and economic resources.

17

A series of military encounters with the Spanish between 1850 and 1877 marked the
end of the Sulu Sultanate as an independent entity. The island of Jolo was repeatedly attacked
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by Spain, culminating in an invasion in 1876 where Jolo town was captured. The Spanish also
removed outside threats to their control of the archipelago by negotiating a free trade protocol
with the British and Germans, whose primary interest was unfettered economic access to the
area. In July 1878 at Licup, Sultan Jamalul Alam signed a treaty with Spain recognizing their
sovereignty in Sulu. The situation on Jolo remained unstable, however, and Spanish troops
garrisoned there were routinely attacked by juramentados – religiously-motivated warriors
committed to killing as many colonials as possible in an act of ritual suicide. In addition, the
18

sultan’s new residence at Maibun functioned as a space of resistance.

Najeeb Saleeby,

writing in the early 1900s, was unimpressed with the exercise of Spanish power at this
juncture. “Apparently the worthy cause of peace and Sulu welfare were completely
overlooked,” he wrote, “Governor Arolas trampled on the treaty, assumed arbitrary and
absolute authority, and treated noncompliance with his wishes as disloyalty and
19

insurrection...The result of such coercion is hatred, and the effect of abuse is enmity.”

Unrest in the 1880s and 1890s partially arose from Spain’s installation of the unpopular
Harun Ar-Rashid as Sultan of Sulu. This approach was abandoned in 1894, when the Spanish
recognized the young Jamalul Kiram II as Sultan of the Sulu Archipelago. Kiram outlasted
Spanish colonial rule, and was a fixture in the Muslim South throughout the American
colonial period.
Elsewhere, the arriviste Datu Piang collaborated with Spain to supplant his mentor,
the capricious and unpopular Datu Uto, in Maguindanao. Like Kiram, Piang outlasted the
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Spanish colonial presence and continued to exercise power during the American era.

Lanao

remained problematic for the Spanish until the very end. Campaigns led by Governor General
Valeriano Weyler, later infamous for his reconcentración policy in Cuba, made some inroads.
In 1895 Governor General Ramon Blanco sent gunboats with mounted machine guns to
attack Maranao fortifications around the lake. English engineers, using Chinese coolie labour,
built a military road from Iligan to Marawi, at the northern end of Lake Lanao. Still, when the
Spanish forfeited the Philippines in 1898 the Maranao remained almost entirely outside of
21

their control.

The American Colonial Period
Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States after their defeat in the Spanish-American
War, formally signing over the territories in December 1898 at the Treaty of Paris. America’s
colonial inheritance included sovereignty over the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao, only
small sections of which were under Spanish control at the time of transfer. Left behind were
public works that did not extend far past the fortified coastal towns, a Spanish educational
system partially present among Christian populations but almost entirely absent in Muslim
areas, fragmented indigenous power structures (especially in Lanao and Sulu), and a legacy
of incursion and warfare. This project focuses on manifestations of American colonial culture
in the Southern Philippines in the period between the Spanish-American War and the
Japanese invasion of Mindanao four and a half decades later. The remainder of this brief
narrative is intended to compliment the thematically structured chapters of this text, situating
their cultural insights alongside linear military and political histories.
Preoccupied with matters in Luzon and the Visayas, the Americans did not relieve the
Spanish garrisons in Mindanao and Sulu until the spring of 1899, nearly a year after their
arrival in the Philippines. The rapid surrender of the Spanish gave way to fighting against the
forces of the Filipino nationalist movement, which by 1900 had devolved into guerilla
warfare throughout the northern and central islands of the archipelago. U.S. military
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commanders feared hostilities with the Muslims of the South could further complicate their
position, causing a depletion of manpower and resources. As such, they oriented their policies
towards détente with Muslim leaders in Mindanao and Sulu, with the understanding that any
necessary pacification would take place once the troubles ceased in the North. In July 1899,
Eighth Army Corps commander (soon after, military governor of the islands) Elwell S. Otis
sent Brigadier General John Bates to Sulu and tasked him with negotiating a written
22

agreement between the Sultan of Sulu and the United States government.

The resulting treaty – named after Bates – became the basis for American-Tausūg
cooperation during the next five years. While modeling the agreement, Bates looked back to
Spanish agreements with the Sultanate as well as British methods for managing native elites
and suppressing piracy in Malaya.

23

In Cotabato, the Americans found a native ally in Datu

Piang, the Maguindanao-Chinese ruler who replaced Datu Uto a decade prior with the aid of
the Spanish. Understanding that the colonial order of things had shifted, Piang quickly
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pledged his support to the U.S. military authorities.

24

Around Zamboanga, the Americans

acquired the support of the Samal Moro leader Datu Mandi. Born to poor parents, Mandi
fashioned an unusual career as an interpreter of dialects for the Spanish on the island of
Bongao. In 1877, he travelled to the Amsterdam Exposition as a colonial subject of Spain and
was awarded a gold medal for his participation there. He received numerous other
recognitions of merit from the Spanish for his work in suppressing juramentado attacks,
participating in vaccination campaigns, and doing relief work in the wake of the 1897
earthquake. Remaining neutral in the conflict between Filipino nationalists and the Spanish,
Mandi recognized the American arrival in 1899 as an opportunity. Mandi’s elevated status
among his people was partially the result of his facility with languages and ability to work
effectively with foreign occupiers. He quickly became a favourite of the Americans and the
Zamboanga Peninsula under Mandi’s leadership proved one of the least problematic areas to
25

control.

In contrast to what came later, the military authorities in these first years generally
permitted local leaders to continue governing daily affairs. This hands-off approach was an
expedient one, as the army had little interest in fighting an Islamic uprising in the South as
they tried to quell nationalist guerillas in the North. Nevertheless, prevalent social and
economic practices among the Muslims clashed with the transformative visions of military
administrators. Military governors William A. Kobbé and George W. Davis objected to the
persistence of the slave trade, polygamy, and local legal traditions that appeared draconian to
them. Repeated intelligence-gathering and surveying missions by the army caused unrest, and
in 1901 on Jolo there were a series of running battles between Tausūg leader Panglima
26

Hassan and the Americans.
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Major military operations occurred around Lake Lanao in 1902 and 1903. Led by
Captain John Pershing, later Governor of the Moro Province, these punitive expeditions were
designed to bring the Maranao datus under colonial control. The Battle of Bayan, fought in
May 1902, marked the first of many violent encounters between American military forces
and resistant Muslim populations. Characterized by an asymmetry of firepower and
resources, the clashes ended predictably. After Bayan, Adna R. Chaffee, military governor of
the Philippines, reported to Washington that “the trenches [were] lined with Moro dead from
rifle fire” and that it was “impossible to state [the] number [of] Moros killed.” Violent action,
27

Chaffee stated, was the “only kind of lesson these wild Moros seem to be able to profit by.”
Pershing and his men spent the next year stationed at Camp Vicars, a remote outpost on the
southern tip of Lake Lanao, meeting with Maranao dignitaries and insisting on their
submission. Holdouts at Bacolod, Maciu, and Taraka shared Bayan’s fate. Pershing’s men

also surveyed the land around Lanao and conducted a census. The conquest of the Maranaos
represented the last major hurdle in the consolidation of U.S. military rule in the Muslim
South. While resistance continued, there were no longer any major areas completely outside
of colonial control.

28

Direct rule came with the establishment of the Moro Province on 1 June 1903.
Spurred on by the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Filipino nationalist calls to integrate the South
into the nation, military officials reoriented themselves towards long-term tutelage and statebuilding projects aimed at refashioning the cultural fabric of Muslim regions.
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In September

1903, the government was reorganized into districts, each with its own governor (generally an
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American military officer) and district board. The system was further refined in 1904, when
districts were separated into ‘municipalities’ and ‘tribal wards.’ Within the latter,
‘uncivilized’ groups of peoples (shorthand for Moros and Lumads) were supervised by a local
leader chosen by the district governor and given limited legal powers. This method, officials
believed, would smoothly transition datus and their subjects into modern structures of
governance.

30

The districts themselves were under the overall supervision of the Legislative Council
of the Moro Province, headed by Governor Leonard Wood. A Harvard-trained physician,
Wood cultivated friendships with powerful figures in the years prior to the Spanish-American
War. He rose to prominence through his regimental command duties in the 1st Volunteer
Cavalry Regiment – more famously known as Theodore Roosevelt’s Rough Riders. Wood
served as Military Governor of Cuba until 1902, at which point he transferred to the
Philippines. Joining him on the council were others who will become familiar later in this
narrative, including Najeeb Saleeby and Frank McCoy. As provincial head, Wood massively
expanded government involvement in Muslim life. Dismissive of local custom – and Islam as
a whole – the governor implemented a series of legislative acts aimed at transforming the
region into a model colonial state. Drawing from information they had gathered while visiting
European colonies, Wood and his team created systems of taxation, made public education
mandatory, devised forced labour schemes, planned ambitious public works projects, and
attempted to reorient Muslims towards Western legal models.
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The abrogation of the Bates Treaty in 1904 and the invasiveness of new government
initiatives, in particular the cedula poll tax, caused unrest among Moro populations. Violent
confrontations occurred between American forces and local leaders unwilling to submit to the
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new realities imposed upon them. In Cotabato, the Maguindanao royal Datu Ali revolted and
played hit-and-run with the Americans for months in the tall grass and dense forest of
Southwestern Mindanao. American newspapers followed the story, describing Ali as being
“cunning as an Indian” and describing his men as “merciless, implacable, and in deadly
32

earnest.” An expedition led by Frank McCoy, Wood’s aide, killed Ali in October 1905. On
Jolo, disturbances to colonial order occurred frequently and were suppressed ruthlessly.
District Governor Hugh Scott led men against Panglima Hassan in late 1903, destroying
cottas and settlements in the area around Lake Siet. Hassan was eventually cornered and
33

killed in March 1904 near Bud Bagsak.

The violence of the Moro Province’s early years

peaked at Bud Dajo, an extinct volcano southeast of Jolo town. Here, hundreds of Tausūg
peasants unhappy with taxation and other colonial impositions fortified themselves and
prepared for confrontation with the Americans. The resulting battle left between seven
34

hundred and nine hundred Muslim men, women, and children dead.

Leonard Wood left the Moro Province in 1906 and was replaced by Brigadier General
Tasker Bliss, a more conciliatory figure. The Bliss years were marked by a variety of
initiatives aimed at bringing Muslims into the colonial fold. Authorities toyed with the idea of
using preexisting educational structures to meet their goals, and placed greater emphasis on
commerce as a civilizing agent. This coincided with a push to settle Mindanao and develop
its resources. Districts like Cotabato and Davao advertised themselves in the Northern
Philippines and elsewhere as areas of great abundance, where the enterprising capitalist could
make his fortune. In Davao and the Zamboanga Peninsula, a class of American planters
began growing abaca and other products, a development viewed favourably by the
authorities.
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Bliss’ diplomatic approach, alongside battle exhaustion from the Wood years,

caused a decrease in violence, although some feared Muslim depredations would go
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unpunished.

Both Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes, the Governor General of the

Philippines from 1909 to 1913, were critical of Bliss’ performance, with Forbes calling him a
“misfit.”
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The final head of the Moro Province was John Pershing, who, after a meteoric rise
through the ranks, had gone from captain to brigadier general. His tenured lasted from
November 1909 until the transition to civilian rule in December 1913. Pershing hired more
civilian officials, increased public works spending, and pushed the expansion of public
schooling in Mindanao and Sulu. Beginning in 1911, Pershing oversaw a contentious
disarmament campaign. Residents were required to turn in unlicensed firearms to the
authorities by December of that year, and were prohibited from publicly carrying a barong or
kris. Firearms licenses being notoriously difficult to obtain, in effect this meant that nearly all
Moros in possession of guns had to turn them over.
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Pershing believed disarmament was one

of the final roadblocks to pacifying the Southern Philippines. “The long list of murders and
assassinations committed by armed Moros since the establishment of provincial government
[has] brought discredit upon the Province,” he wrote in 1913, “The possession of arms by
these wanton villains [has] nullified the most earnest efforts towards civil rule, and…left the
39

peaceably inclined inhabitants at their mercy.”

The climax of the disarmament campaign occurred in June 1913 at Bud Bagsak on
Jolo, where a group of defiant Tausūg Moros retreated after opposing the new laws. Ten
kilometers from Bud Dajo, Bagsak was a natural fortification for Tausūg peasants resisting
colonial rule. The group’s leader, Datu Amil, refused surrender and during a four-day battle
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around five hundred Moros were killed.

With major resistance movements destroyed and

disarmament completed, Pershing recommended to Major General J. Franklin Bell, military
commander of the Philippines, that army rule conclude in Mindanao and Sulu. Cotabato was
under the firm rule of Datu Piang and had had no serious disturbances since Datu Ali’s death;
Lanao was further pacified in a series of campaigns between 1908 and 1912; the Zamboanga
Peninsula experienced only the occasional millenarian uprising amongst the Lumad
population; and Pershing’s actions on Jolo had ended the threat there. In addition, Pershing
told Bell, “schools have been established; villages have been located and settled hitherto
nomadic families; roads, bridges, and wharves have been built; markets and trading stations
opened up; and a general advancement has been made that surpasses in many respects the
41

boasted progress of more civilized provinces.”

In Manila, the recently appointed Governor General Francis Burton Harrison was
receptive to Pershing and Bell’s recommendations and during his first months as head of the
Philippines he pushed through the suggested changes. Harrison was an appointee of the new
Wilson Administration – the first time the Democratic Party had secured the presidency since
Grover Cleveland in the 1890s. Anticipating eventual independence, Harrison shared the
Democrat inclination to scale-down the American presence in the Philippines. After an
inspection tour of the South in 1913, he wrote to Secretary of War Lindley Garrison that
“wonderful progress” had been made there and that he agreed with Pershing’s assessment that
42

American troops could be replaced with Philippine Constabulary companies.

On December

15th that year, Frank W. Carpenter replaced John Pershing as governor. In the Philippines
since America’s arrival, Carpenter had served in a variety of governmental roles culminating
in a posting as Executive Secretary of the Insular Bureau. Admired by Republicans and
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Democrats alike, he was, according to Bell, “by long odds better qualified than anyone
43

else…to assume the important obligations of Governor of the Moro Province.”

The Moro Province officially became the Department of Mindanao and Sulu on 23
July 1914. Although Carpenter had been in office for over half a year, the name change and
subsequent reorganization marked the terminal point of military rule in the Southern
Philippines. Old districts like Cotabato, Zamboanga, and Lanao became provinces, and Act.
No. 2408 of the Philippine Commission, put into effect on 1 September 1914, brought with it
extensive administrative reform. The Organic Act, as it was referred to, aimed to move
Mindanao and Sulu towards rapid integration into the rest of the Philippines. Provincial
boards were restructured, and limited democratic structures implemented. By 1915, Christianmajority provinces were electing their provincial board members through popular vote,
although in Muslim regions these appointments were made through the votes of political
elites only. The municipal district replaced the tribal ward system, and in 1915 there were
twenty-one municipalities and 178 municipal districts across Mindanao and Sulu. Finally,
state bureaucracies merged with Insular Government departments in Manila. Tax collection,
the court system, prisons, public works, and education were all increasingly integrated into
the national center between 1914 and 1920. Created as a transitional entity, the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu was designed to synchronize the new provinces with the rest of the
country. In conception and practice, the Department was a nation-building exercise.
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The reordering of Mindanao and Sulu coincided with the larger process of
‘Filipinization.’ Governor General Harrison and his administration undertook the gigantic
task of moving Americans out of government bureaus and replacing them with Christian
Filipinos. Aiding the process was the First World War, which increased prospects in the
private sector, and voluntary retirement packages offered by the government. There remained,
however, a strong contingent in Washington and Manila who felt that the Americans who
helped build up the colonial Philippines were being treated unfairly, and that the Filipinos
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themselves were unfit for leadership. The Jones Law of 1916, which created a fully elected
Filipino legislature, further entrenched the changes. By the end of Harrison’s tenure in 1921,
Filipinos directed nearly all the government bureaus, although there were some notable
exceptions where Americans remained in charge.

45

In the South, Filipinization meant an influx of Christian Filipinos in government
positions, even in predominantly Muslim areas. Inevitably, there was tension. Many Moros
detested the Filipinos, viewing them as martially incapable yet also fearing the imposition of
a monolithic national culture that would dissolve existing bonds of ethnic and religious
kinship in their communities. Harrison and Carpenter, supporters of the Filipinos, described
the period as one of increasing “good-will and confidence” between Christians and Muslims.
However, Moro petitions disseminated in the 1920s and 1930s pleading with the Americans
46

not to be incorporated into an independent Philippines suggest more complex realities.

Nationalist Filipino politicians like Sergio Osmeña attempted to frame the “separation and
differences” between Christians and non-Christians as political. The problem, he wrote, was
that “the non-Christian peoples think that the Christians are allied with the foreign dominators
and anxious to pervert them by a change of religious beliefs.”
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Willful or not, this was a

misreading of Muslim anxieties about cultural subsumption in an independent Philippines.
The Carpenter years also marked the end of the Sultanate of Sulu as an acknowledged
political entity. In March 1915, Carpenter negotiated an updated treaty with Sultan Jamalul
Kiram II wherein the ruler forfeited his “pretensions of sovereignty.” Kiram was recognized
as the “titular spiritual head of the Mohammedan Church in the Sulu Archipelago,” a
designation that granted him the comparably limited powers of an ecclesiastical authority in
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the United States. In the Carpenter Treaty, the Sultan acknowledged the sovereignty of the
United States “without reservation or limitation whatsoever” and gave up any right to
48

adjudicate legal matters.

Carpenter’s administration was also instrumental in continuing the

development work begun by the military authorities, increasing commercial trade links
between the Southern Philippines and Southeast Asia, and expanding lumber and mining
operations. The teaching staff of the region increased sevenfold between 1913 and 1919, and
49

many new hospitals and dispensaries opened.

Notably, authorities began aggressively

promoting the South as a settler zone and established subsidized agricultural colonies to
incentivize potential homesteaders from the populous north. “Mindanao-Sulu no longer is a
frontier attractive only to the adventurous, but has now progressed to a state warranting the
favorable attention of the capitalist and the home seeker,” Carpenter proclaimed in his 1916
annual report.

50

The Jones Law reconstituted the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in 1916 to “continue
the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by non-Christian
Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner
51

the moral, material, economic, social and political development of those regions.”

Frank

Carpenter was appointed as bureau chief in 1918 and continued in the position until his
retirement from government service in 1920. His deputy, the jurist and politician Teopisto
Guingona, was acting head of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu during these years and
replaced Carpenter after his departure. The Department itself was abolished on 5 February
1920, with ultimate authority over non-Christian areas handed to the Bureau.
The road to Philippine independence was disrupted by American domestic politics. In
March 1921, newly elected President Warren G. Harding, a Republican, sent a group led by
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Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes on a fact-finding mission to assess the effects of
Filipinization on the colonial state. Both Wood and Forbes were acknowledged Anglo-Saxon
supremacists who questioned the Filipino capacity for self-government. In the report of the
Wood-Forbes Mission, the authors lambasted transfers of power during the Harrison years.
The document was a compendious accounting of how the colonial government had failed
since 1913 and a sustained critique of both Democratic appointees and the Filipino political
class. Wood and Forbes concluded by stating that they were “convinced that it would be a
betrayal of the Philippine people, a misfortune to the American people, a distinct step
backward in the path of progress, and a discreditable neglect of our national duty were we to
withdraw from the islands and terminate our relationship there without giving the Filipinos
the best chance possible to have an orderly and permanently stable government.”

52

In other

words, Filipinization needed slowing. Harding and his cabinet agreed with the conclusions,
and subsequently appointed Wood as the Governor General of the Philippines.
Leonard Wood’s return to the Philippines lasted from October 1921 until his death in
1927. During this time, he was deeply unpopular with pro-independence Filipino politicians
who found his crusading outlook and paternalistic attitude jarring after the comparatively
amiable relations of the Harrison period.
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In the Muslim South, communities continued to

resist education and taxation schemes. Lanao and Cotabato witnessed an ongoing series of

52

Report of the Special Mission on Investigation to the Philippine Islands, 8 October 1921, Box 1. Dean C.
Worcester Papers, 1887-1925, BHL.
53

This is not an understatement. Take for example, this quote from Wood during his time as Governor General:
“We cannot think of this Philippine question without thinking of civilization as a whole. And civilization, to us,
is Christian civilization. We are a stone, if not the keystone, of the arch of Christian civilization in the Pacific.
Filipinos, as to all but a tenth of the population, are Christians. Christianity’s humanizing influence shows in
their faces and is recorded in their steady moral advance. Paganism and non-Christianity can be broken down
only by the impact of spiritual and cultural influences, and these will be projected from the base of a highlydeveloped Christian Philippines as they cannot be projected from the distant bases of America and Europe.
America in the Philippines, in other words, insures the effective deployment of Christianity for the regeneration
of the world. These are solemn obligations and great opportunities. We can be false to them only at the cost of
treason to that faith which we believe to be essential to the highest human development. Let us go out of the
Philippines only when we can leave the force of that faith in strong hands. If we and those who believe as we
believe can Christianize the world, in the full psychic and ethical sense of that phrase, we shall rid it of injustice,
of human degradation, of social cleavage and conflict, and of international slaughter. I attach immense
importance to developing the Philippines as Christianity’s great peaceful outpost in the Pacific.” From
“Conversation with Major-General Leonard Wood, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands,” Box 217,
Folder 1. Leonard Wood Papers, LOC-MD.

59

disturbances over compulsory public schooling in 1923. Constabulary forces repeatedly killed
scores of Maranao and Maguindanao holdouts in violent encounters. In the late 1920s, more
than twenty schools in Lanao were burned to the ground in protest, and public education in
the province ceased almost entirely.

54

In the Sulu Archipelago there were similar clashes.
55

One occurring on the small island of Pata in late 1920 left more than thirty Tausūg dead.

In

1927, a local leader on Jolo named Datu Tahil rebelled against taxation carried out by
56

Governor Carl Moore.

Outlaw bands, especially in Lanao, were a reoccurring issue for the

Constabulary.
For their part, the Muslim political elite courted both pro- and anti-independence
supporters. Westernized leaders like Gulamu Rasul, Hadji Butu, and Arolas Tulawie worked
inside government to agitate for Muslim rights, and advocated for the American presence as a
solution to the problems facing the Southern Philippines. In the 1920s and 1930s, Moros sent
numerous petitions to American political figures in Manila and Washington imploring
intervention against political domination by the Christian Filipinos. Prominent figures in
Lanao, Sulu, and Cotabato all warned of strife should the Americans leave, playing into the
57

“myth of Muslim ungovernability.”

In this dynamic, American colonial authority was

considered less objectionable than Filipino colonial authority. A 1934 petition to Governor
General Frank Murphy from a group of datus in Lanao read: “We would request you to
separate Mindanao and Sulu from the Independent Philippines because we do not want to
leave sway from the rule of the Americans until we become educated.”
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Another group of

datus, gathering in Dansalan in 1935, wrote directly to President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
stating that they feared for the future of Islam in the Philippines from ever-increasing
Christian Filipino cultural hegemony. They too requested partition.
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this tactic played into the paternal concerns of Americans who believed the Moros needed
continued foreign patronage to thrive. Patricio Abinales observes that the actions of Muslim
elites during this uncertain period were rarely consistent. Hadji Butu and Datu Piang, for
example, played both sides of the independence debate. These vagaries of allegiance, writes
Abinales, “were less the actions of slick operators or small-time conspirators than of a local
elite unsure of its fate.”

60

A bill tabled in the United States Senate by Representative Robert Bacon in 1926
suggested that the Philippines be partitioned and the South governed separately under direct
American rule. While Leonard Wood and others advocated for it, the bill failed and after
Wood’s death the notion was cast aside as the colonial state moved inexorably towards an
independent Philippines that included Mindanao and Sulu.

61

The penultimate step in this

direction was the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, which set the terms for independence. A
transitional commonwealth period of ten years began with the drafting of a national
constitution and the election of the country’s first president, Manuel Quezon, in 1935.
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In

the South, a younger generation of Muslim leaders trained in the schools and institutions of
the colonial state reconciled themselves to the realities of Filipinization and began identifying
as ‘Muslim Filipinos.’ They swore fealty to the Philippine state yet retained their religious
identity as a means of promoting themselves as a specific interest group within a diffuse
political landscape.
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A small but influential number of Americans remained in Mindanao and Sulu after
1935. In 1936, a parliamentary committee seeking the normalization of Muslim regions
within the nation-state abolished the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. Manuel Quezon
replaced the Bureau with a special commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu. That same year, the
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death of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in Sulu created an opportunity for the government to end all
recognition of customary titles in the South. Thus, “the ranks of sultan and dato were
cancelled according to the principle that all Filipinos were equal before the law and in their
treatment by government agencies.”

64

Christian settlers, enticed by state promotion of

Mindanao as a fertile utopia, increasingly moved south, changing the demography of the
region. The government responded enthusiastically, beginning large infrastructural projects.
Trans-provincial highways, hydroelectric dams, airfields, and rail lines became physical
manifestations of the new connectivity between north and south.

65

These developments,

eagerly covered by the Manila press, masked lingering conflicts. Lanao remained a hotbed of
resentment and when the Constabulary proved ineffective in quelling resistance, the
Philippine Army was brought in. This occurred repeatedly throughout the 1930s, with Moro
66

cottas subjected to aerial bombing, artillery barrage, and even the use of chemical weapons.

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines in late 1941 temporarily halted the tense integration
process, forcing Christian Filipinos and Muslims alike to decide how to negotiate the rule of
yet another colonial power.
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Chapter Two / Imagining the Moro
Ethnographic and Geographic Fantasies on the Colonial Frontier

A sense of mission imbued the speeches and writings of American colonials in the Southern
Philippines. “Let not the future historian say that the American nation has travelled half-way
around the earth in order to degrade and debase a people instead of exalting it,” proclaimed
Tasker Bliss, Governor of the Moro Province, at the 1907 Zamboanga Fair. He explained to
the assembled crowd that Mindanao and Sulu could only be transformed “under the guiding
hand of a nation strong enough and just and wise enough to now impose upon all what in the
remote future an intelligent majority of all will impose of its own free will.” To the
Americans and Europeans present, he urged that they “always remember that you are in the
position of exemplars and mentors of the people among whom you live. What you say and do
will be considered by them as more or less authoritative, and you thus have in your hands an
1

immense power for good and evil.” The people Bliss spoke of mentoring were Muslims and
Lumads, and it was they who a variety of American actors described – sometimes for an
audience, as in newspaper reports or published travelogues, and other times privately, in
letters or journal entries. Such descriptions, categorizations, and fantasies comprise the
backbone of this chapter.
There is a large body of work on the connections between fantasy and practical
knowledge in the construction of colonial regimes. Famously, Edward Said demonstrated that
occidental ethnographic knowledge production was beholden to a wide variety of sources –
novels, travel diaries, poems, paintings – in its attempts to create composite sketches of the
2

world’s peoples. Susanne Zantop and George Steinmetz have illustrated how precolonial
fantasies, with all of their concomitant desires, helped condition Germans for empire in the
late nineteenth-century through everything from popular fiction to advertisements. Like the
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Speech at Zamboanga Fair, February 1907, Box 43, Folder 5. Tasker H. Bliss Collection, 1829-1956,
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Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Press, 1977), 50.
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Germans, Americans also entered the colonial arena late and as such came “equipped with
well-wrought images of the colonized cultures, images that were derived from earlier writers
3

and artists.” Writers have also examined how inscribing landscapes with unitary identities
was a way for colonizer and colonized alike to make sense of unfamiliar and alienating
4

environments. Many of the Americans in Mindanao and Sulu were travelling abroad for the
first time, and a creative ordering of the space and peoples they encountered was a simple
method of explaining away the fearful and unknown.
Through the popular press, adventure novels, lecture tours, and other cultural
products, Americans participated in a transcolonial economy of ideas even before they
5

acquired colonial empire, and were enthusiastic participants in “racial-cultural mappings and
6

classifications” when they arrived in the Southern Philippines. As we shall see, the majority
of commentators on the peoples and landscapes of Mindanao and Sulu were hardly describing
what they saw in a rigorous, empirical manner (although there were exceptions), but rather
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drew upon well-worn tropes about ‘uncivilized’ peoples in the United States and elsewhere.
Perception met practice in the idea of transformation. Depending on the writer, savage
peoples could either be civilized or else justifiably put to the sword; likewise, unoccupied or
underutilized land was free to be developed according to Western standards. The result of this
work in the world’s far-flung regions, according to evangelizers like Josiah Strong, would be
a nation infused with greatness, and one ready to take a place of preeminent global
leadership.

7

‘Experts’ like the academic Dean Worcester were a bridge between the precolonial
and the colonial for a fascinated American public. Worcester, trained as a zoologist at the
University of Michigan, made two extended research trips to the Philippines, one in 1887-88
and the other from 1890 until 1893. While Worcester’s travels in the Philippines mainly
focused on the zoological aspects of the archipelago, he became known as an expert on the
8

peoples there. With war looming in 1898, Worcester published newspaper articles attacking
Spanish colonial rule in Asia, and describing unfair taxation, the destruction of property, and
9

senseless warfare against the Moros. The publishing of The Philippine Islands and Their
People cemented his authoritative status, and the book was “reprinted four times between
10

October 1898 and January 1899.”

An enthusiastic supporter of the American mission in the

Pacific, the McKinley Administration considered Worcester invaluable as it established
colonial government in the Philippines.

7
8

Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 37.

Mark Rice, Dean Worcester’s Fantasy Islands: Photography, Film, and the Colonial Philippines (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2014), 5. For a thorough account of Worcester’s time in the Philippines, see
Rodney J. Sullivan, Exemplar of Americanism: The Philippine Career of Dean C. Worcester (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1991). Expressing domination through photography was commonplace in U.S.
colonial possessions. See Lanny Thompson, Imperial Archipelago: Representation and Rule in the Insular
Territories Under U.S. Dominion after 1898 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2010).
9

“Spain in the Philippines,” New York Times, 18 March 1898, 3. On Spanish corruption, see Dean Worcester,
“Spain in the Philippine Islands,” The Independent, 14 April 1898, 5. Wrote Worcester in the piece, “If the
enormous sum thus raised expended even in part in the improvement of the colony there might be some
justification for its collection. While the laws in regard to its disposition are not entirely bad, in actual practice it
for the most part finds its way into the pockets of the Spanish officials, an annual surplus amount to not more
than eight or nine millions.”
10

Rice, Fantasy Islands, 5-6.

65

While Worcester’s work on the archipelago would assume a broader significance in
the following years, his early observations on the Moros and other inhabitants of the Southern
Philippines set the tone for American colonial visitors to the islands. Worcester worked in the
tradition of the German ethnographer Ferdinand Blumentritt, who also attempted to map the
various peoples of the Philippines in the late 1800s, and much of the zoologist’s book was
taken up with basic accounts of what he observed when he was travelling.

11

Yet he also had a

flair for the dramatic in his writing, something evident in his descriptions of the Moros. In
The Philippine Islands, Worcester often used his literary license to sensationalize stories for
his audience, especially when they related to the history of Muslim-Spanish relations. The
book described the “fanatical passions of the fierce Moro warriors,” who attacked the
Christian Filipinos in “hordes,” carrying off women and having the men “butchered in cold
blood.” Worcester noted that the “special delight of the grim Moslem warriors was to capture
the Spanish priests and friars toward whom they displayed the bitterest hatred.”

12

Elsewhere

in his account, the “typical” Moro was described as being “inordinately fond of bright
colours” and “a very bad marksman” with firearms. Muslim cuisine was so repugnant to
13

Worcester’s party that he claimed, “never were stomachs or morals more severely tried.”
The zoologist’s blending of travel narrative, ethnographic description, and editorial

commentary under the umbrella of dispassionate academic study would not dull with age, and
after over a decade of government service in the Philippines he still spoke of the Moros in
near-mythological terms. “I have known one of these indomitable fighters, with both legs
broken and his body pierced repeatedly by rifle bullets, to drag himself forward by his hands,

11
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holding his kriss between his teeth, in the hope of getting near enough to the enemy to strike
one more blow for the Prophet,” Worcester wrote in 1913.

14

At the same time as they were disparaging Spanish colonial rule as decadent and
decayed, the American military personnel responsible for the occupation and pacification of
the Southern Philippines also drew upon Spanish accounts of the Muslim character. General
John Pershing’s personal papers include an untitled translation of a Spanish book that
attempted to map the human and physical geography of the Southern Philippines, much as the
Americans would during the four decades they were there. Spanish descriptions of the Moros
as “rebels of the worst character” and possessors of a “ferocious barbarism” by Jesuit
15

missionaries found their successors in the writings of the Americans who replaced them.
Pvt. Walter Cutter, a soldier and amateur reporter in the early years of the military
occupation, kept with him a translation of the Jesuit priest Francisco X. Baranera’s
Compendio De La Historia de Filipinas, which systematically described Mindanao and
16

Sulu. American writings on the Moros looked to Spanish colonial antecedents consciously
and unconsciously, and, taking direction from men like Dean Worcester, mixed observation,
praise, and moral condemnation freely in their attempts to understand the nation’s new wards.
The bedrock upon which colonial empire was legitimized in Mindanao and Sulu was a
series of descriptions, comparisons, and imaginings about the Moros and the landscapes they
inhabited. Almost all extant writings on the topic use the apparent barbarism of the natives or
the untapped potential of the land (or both) as justification for control. Behind these concerns
were potent imaginative linkages between the Muslims and the Native Americans, and U.S.
colonials in Mindanao and Sulu debated the capacity of the Moros by drawing from previous
national – and often personal – experiences on America’s frontier. For some, mistakes made
with the Natives could be redeemed through work among the Moros. Others had bleaker
outlooks, like that of Frederick Palmer, who thought “the Moro we can never educate to
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work, any more than we did the American Indian.”

The land itself, especially the vast

Mindanao interior, was envisioned as a frontier space and an area, according to the
anthropologist Carl Eugen Guthe, of “romantic potentialities.”

18

The Americans self-

identified as reluctant imperialists forced to assume the mantle of empire by the
irresponsibility of the Spanish, and felt that their “practical tendency” and “keenness of
intellect” could be used to raise benighted peoples to levels of civilization previously
unknown in the European colonies.

19

Like all colonial powers, they saw in themselves an

exceptional ability to understand and transform subject populations.

Describing “The Moro”
When the missionary socialite Caroline Spencer arrived on Jolo in early 1914 she felt she was
“entering into the realm of imaginative fiction.” Living amongst the “descendants of pirates
and even pirates themselves,” Spencer saw the Moros as something out of a colonial
adventure story. The danger of primitive racial exoticism comingled with the romance of the
20

unknown and the perilous duty of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant to spread civilization.

Her

reactions to the Moros encapsulated a range of American perceptions about them, which ran
the gambit from roguishly picaresque to criminally and racially vile. Wherever imperial
visitors fell on this spectrum, they tended to describe the Moros in literary terms and in sum,
as one might lyrically describe the essential qualities of a particular breed of animal. Even
sympathetic writers resorted to blanket reductions of the Moro ‘character’, an act in keeping
with common manifestations of race-thinking.
First impressions were important and lasting. Many colonials arriving in Mindanao
and Sulu were experiencing a foreign culture for the first time, and were awestruck. To
process their impressions for audiences in the United States, they tended to blend pseudo-
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anthropological observation with the sensationalism of the dime novel narrative. Pvt. Walter
Cutter, serving with the 17th Infantry in Jolo in 1901-02, adopted a decidedly low view of the
island’s inhabitants after surveying the island. The Tausūg Moros were “religious fanatics,
and it would be hard to find a more ignorant and filthy set of savages anywhere.”

21

Cutter

viewed them as “filthy in their habits and dress, and the odor of decaying fish and other
refuse around their houses would put the average white man to instant flight.”

22

Still, they

were fearsome warriors who would “fight to the last gasp, secure in the belief that they will
go straight to the arms of the Prophet.” To Cutter, the Moros were “fanatics” of the same
stripe as those who “composed the Mad Mullah’s forces, and in the Soudan the gallant
23

Gordon met his fate at their hands.”

Using Charles Gordon’s stand against the Sudanese

Mahdi army at Khartoum, Cutter collapsed space and time to draw direct comparisons with a
well-publicized imperial encounter. Facing the Moro at the fringes of empire was, in Cutter’s
estimation, in the grand tradition of the colonial army as a bulwark against savagery.
Similarly grandiose terms were used to describe settlements. The 6th Cavalry officer
Charles Rhodes reminisced in his diaries about encountering the environs of Jolo for the first
time in a style mimicking Western orientalist fiction:
JOLO, fabled in song and story with the glamour of romance and
adventure! JOLO, where American soldiers momentarily courted death at
the hands of crazed fanatics, and fired fruitless shots in mystic darkness at
shadowy forms, consecrated on the KORAN and seeking the GATES OF
PARADISE over the gory bodies of unbelievers. JOLO, where swaggering
dattos, colorful in red fezzes and gold tinsel, rattled jeweled daggers in the
face of the American governor, and where, betimes, innocent farmers,
denied admission to the twice-guarded gates of the miniature walled-city,
drew forth the bloody heads of hunted criminal outlaws as guarantees of
good-faith and loyalty…But the ‘STARS AND STRIPES’ of American
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authority were kept a-flying, and in the end that symbol of justice to all
24

peoples, triumphed!

The Moros, in Rhodes’ telling, were templates of literary savagery, colourful yet exceedingly
dangerous barbarians who served as excellent adversaries for those brave Americans risking
their lives for liberty in the Southern Philippines. At points, Rhodes slipped into the noncorporeal in his descriptions of them. They were “shadowy forms” in the “mystic darkness,”
vague and unknowable in their foreignness. Within a single paragraph the Moros are
colourful and immediate, yet infinitely distant. Captain Matthew F. Steele Jolo in similarly
fantastical terms, noting that it was home to “60,000 of the most hostile, unconquerable,
dangerous savages the American army has ever met” and observing the habit of every boy
above the age of twelve to carry a barong, which he deemed “the most deadly hand weapon
25

since the Roman short sword.”

Resistance to colonial occupation during these early years was often explained via the
cataloguing of imagined racial characteristics. Military officers spoke with a grudging respect
for the fighting prowess of Moro men, yet were also exasperated that these same qualities
made them bullheaded and resistant to the developmental prerogatives of the state. Serving as
Leonard Wood’s aid, Frank McCoy noted the general unruliness of the Moros. In an
interview with Wood’s biographer Hermann Hagedorn, he claimed that most Moros were
friendly but “in each tribal region was a handful of chiefs who wouldn’t obey any orders
except for their own.” McCoy compared the Moro leadership with the “fierce individualism
of chiefs of the highlands of Scotland” and marveled at how the Lake Lanao region alone had
26

an estimated 219 sultans during the pacification campaigns of 1902-03.

The perceived

willfulness of the Moros was considered both a virtue and a weakness, depending on the
context.
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The unruly nature of America’s Islamic wards was most evident in their supposed
addictions to piracy and the slave trade. As evidenced in the work of Michael Salman, the
slavery question – and the role of piracy in facilitating slaving – was integrated into broader
ideological and religious debates. The United States, less than forty years removed from
chattel slavery when it acquired Spain’s colonies, sent its agents forth with designs to remap
labour and social relations in the Southern Philippines. The colonially generated ‘Moro’ did
not have his own constellation of societal structures, and primarily existed as a degenerate
slaver, pirate, and polygamist. Slavery under the American flag was, to borrow from Salman,
an “embarrassment” and one that needed challenging. Eliminating the slave trade and
‘piracy’, the latter often used to describe any form of maritime commerce existing outside of
colonial regulatory networks, was seen as a national duty by a variety of military officials,
politicians, religious figures, and antislavery activists.

27

In his popular history of the Southern Philippines, Vic Hurley placed special emphasis
on the role of piracy in Muslim cultures. Hurley’s book, The Swish of the Kris, trafficked in
common stereotypes about the Moros, yet also pitied them. While they engaged in “murder
and rapine” as “lighter amusement,” the “bloodthirsty pirates were not lacking in sympathy.
They waged a just war according to their lights and they were beset upon all sides by land
28

grabbing aggressors.” The Moro pirates fought with fanaticism against a similarly fanatical
foe – Spanish Catholicism. In Hurley’s rendering, the Moro resisted in “defense of the
religion and customs of Islam against the militant priests of Spain” and as a result his culture
survived. This contrasted with the South American indigenous civilizations, whose cities
“remain desolated sepulchers of an ancient civilization which melted before the fanaticism of
29

the conquistadores.” So the Moros were cruel and warlike, but this strong martial character
allowed them to stave off the cultural and religious obliteration of an Iberian colonial regime.
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Their piracy – considered a “profession of gentlemen,” according to Hurley

30

– was

legitimated by their religious traditions and the threats they faced.
As the first military commander of the Tawi-Tawi island group near Borneo, Sydney
31

Cloman claimed he recognized the “ancestral microbe” of piracy in the Moros.

In Myself

and a Few Moros, Cloman devoted a chapter to recounting his tense standoff with a local
datu who was sheltering the pirate Selungan on the island of Siminul. After backing down the
natives, Cloman met Selungan, whom he declared was “certainly the finest specimen of the
Malay race that I had seen. Tall, well-built, dignified, and fearless, he either spoke the truth or
remained silent.”

32

Like Hurley, Sydney Cloman admired the “fierce and reckless” Moros for

their virile independence, yet also saw the need to tame their wildness through carrot-andstick measures that often relied on the firepower of the U.S. military to change “the rules of
the game.”

33

If piracy could be suppressed through sheer force, slavery was more difficult

because of how it was “concealed under all sorts of guises,” and far less systematized than it
34

was in the Americas.

For longtime Constabulary officer John R. White, the Moros were steeped in “piracy,
35

slavery, and superstition.”

White saw them as unwilling to bend to “any form of

government that curbed piracy and slavery and operated for the rights of man as opposed to
36

the privileges of petty chiefs.” The Constabulary, operating as a roving guarantor of
American and Filipino rule in Mindanao and Sulu, was the wedge with which to displace
these unfortunate tendencies. Writers like White, Cloman, and Hurley admitted that the
Moros practiced a milder form of slavery than what had existed in the American South, but
all noted that resistance to its abolition was a constant. In the case of the Maguindanaos of
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Southwestern Mindanao, where White had extensive experience, tendencies towards piracy
were less pronounced, yet the datus there still “held almost as tightly to their ancient
privileges of slavery and control of the pagan tribes.”

37

White viewed these practices as “a

necessary outlet of individual and racial emotions” and compared them to resistance against
Prohibition on America’s Eastern Seaboard. His solution was to channel the violent energies
of the Moros in other directions, namely by enlisting them in the Constabulary and having
them suppress disorder in the South.

38

If the spirited nature of the Moro could not be

eliminated, it could at least be redirected.
Islam presented a challenge to the Americans attempting to understand Moro groups,
and often created contradictory portrayals. In the florid descriptions of men like Walter
Cutter, religious practices were parceled together with the Moros’ supposed savagery as a
character that amplified their deadly and fanatical natures. This was most vividly displayed,
chroniclers argued, when a Moro decided to ‘go juramentado,’ an act of publicly executing
39

non-believers in the name of the faith.

In popular accounts, the monotheism of Islam

simultaneously raised the Moros above their animist neighbours in the Southern Philippines
yet also relegated them to a state of retarded civilization. The Boston Globe summed up this
view, observing that “the questions of religious fanaticism are here added to those of
barbarism, for the Moros, although they are Mahometans, are little better than savages.”

40

To

some Americans, the Moros were not even properly Islamic, and the religion’s syncretism
with preexisting indigenous beliefs was interpreted not as an explanation for why it was so
successful but as evidence of incomplete Islamization. A government report from 1914 noted
the “inclination of mysticism and pretense to magic” in the local pandita schools,

41

and

Philippine Scouts officer Charles Ivins estimated that “the veneer of Mohammedanism lays
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only lightly over a base of animism and superstition.”

On an expedition in the Mindanao

interior, Constabulary officer Sterling Larrabee commented on local Moro belief in the
spiritual qualities of “trees, stones, and wood spirits,” and compared them with the Lumad
tribes of the region.

43

To others, religious affiliation implicated Moro groups in broader struggles between
the Christian and Muslim worlds. Charles Brent, the longtime Episcopal Bishop of the
Philippines, saw the fight against the “semi-savagery and mad fanaticism” of the Moros in
terms of the moral mission to bring the civilizing influences of Christianity to them. In
Brent’s eyes, the Moros were the inheritors of the worst elements of global Islam, and the
juramentado was heir to the “fatalism” of the Sudanese Mahdi army that fought the British (a
recurring point of reference for Americans). The Muslim world was a “unified and sensitive
organ” and through the perfidious influence of the “Arab priests” present in Mindanao and
Sulu, the Moros were acquiring a deep-seated hatred of the Americans. Brent claimed he
advocated freedom of religion, but thought the government should draw the line at
“polygamous or murderous cults,” and suggested that all Arab immigration to the Philippines
44

be restricted.

Henry O. Dwight, a long-time journalist in Turkey, lacked the heated pulpit rhetoric
of Brent, but also saw the question of the Moros as intimately connected to global Islam.
Citing long passages from the Qur’an on jihad, Dwight thought that the real danger of the
Moros arose from the “pan-Islamic revival” of the era. That the Moros were “imperfect and
ignorant Mohammedans” made them easier prey for foreign religious teachers. Dwight
suggested that counteracting the militant attitude Islam instilled in the Moros would require
Americans to take lessons from past instances of colonial exterminism, and from the Moros
themselves: “It is to look at your enemy as untamable…to have an overwhelming force, and
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then to strike without conscience; literally killing every living thing when the battle occurs,
and destroying everything that cannot be carried away after the victory is won. The expense
of such a policy will be great, the bloodshed terrible; but a few successful encounters
conducted on this principle will secure abject submission and peace for a generation.”

45

The

forthrightness of these passages is jarring, but they stemmed from Dwight’s sincere belief
that the fanaticism of the Muslim Moro could only be met in kind. In his outlook,
disproportionate displays of violence ensured future stability in the region.
Americans were also fond of contrasting the Moros with the Christian Filipinos. The
latter were depicted as both blessed and burdened by the legacy of Spanish colonialism. The
Filipinos had Christianity, but it was of a degraded Catholic variety looked down upon by the
American Protestant elite. They were also passingly familiar with Western modernity,
although the Spanish iteration of this was viewed as inadequate when compared to feats of
development found in Northern Europe and the United States. Alternately, the Moros had no
such baggage. Although savage and premodern, they had long maintained their independence
in the face of Spanish colonial conquest – making them, in the eyes of the Americans, nobler
than the Filipinos. According to Vic Hurley, it was the Moros who had bested the Spanish in
only allowing them small footholds in the Southern Philippines. “The conquistadores met
46

their masters,” he wrote.

Christian Filipinos were seen as typically ‘Oriental’ by the Americans, at once more
servile and sensuous than the Moros. A 1911 article in Outlook magazine used music as an
entry point for comparing the peoples. In the North, the music was “in a minor strain, soft,
plaintive appealing, and pathetic.” In the South, “the major note is struck…dominant and
thrilling and characteristic of the people.” To the writer, the music was an extension of the
Moro’s martial masculinity. The Moro male “towers physically on a level with the American,
meets him squarely in the eye, and gives a curious sense of brute force as his smile reveals
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teeth filed to sharp points” while the Filipino “beats his pony, but cringes to his superiors.”

47

General J. Franklin Bell, then military commander in the Philippines, reiterated this
dichotomy, wondering how the Filipinos thought “that a brave, proud, warlike, independent,
non-submissive people like the Moros [were] going to voluntarily submit to domination by a
race which they [held] in contempt and against which they [were] antagonistic for
48

centuries.”

The Moro had more natural honesty than the Filipino, according to the botanist H.H.
Bartlett, and there was “much to be said” for him. While the “Christian politico and cacique”
would “conceal his antisocial behaviour,” the Moro would at least be “openly bad.”

49

John

Pershing was also unfavourable in his comparisons, claiming that the Filipinos had “neither
the cunning, the fanatical courage, nor the morale” that the Moros did.

50

The Filipinos, wrote

Pershing, regarded the Moros as savages, “while the Moro thinks the Filipino an inferior, fit
only to be his slave. They are in no sense brothers, but are irreconcilable strangers and
51

enemies in every sense.”

Pershing was unequivocal in his view that the Moros, being the

stronger of the two peoples, “would make short work of local Filipino government” were it to
exist without America’s guiding hand.
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H.H. Bartlett even made the proposition that the
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Moros were more progressive when it came to gender relations, citing a Moro village
presidenta as evidence of their being “more advanced and open-minded than the majority of
Christian Filipinos, who have made the astoundingly reactionary step of disenfranchising
women.”

53

Moro women were alluringly foreign, repugnant, threatening, or some combination of
all three. Their perceived role in Muslim society varied dependent on who was writing about
them, with some observers apt to describe the women in a state of slave-like dependence and
others as dangerous warriors. William A. Kobbé, briefly military governor of Mindanao and
Sulu, made special mention of the women who danced for him while he was a guest of Datus
Piang and Ali in the Cotabato Valley, commenting in his diary that the women at the banquet
held in his honour all had on “a simple serong passing under the arm-pits and displaying
54

breasts and a good deal of their legs and many of them were very comely.”

At a later event

held by Datu Mandi in Zamboanga, Kobbé also remarked on there being “an uncommonly
fine looking lot of native women.”

55

A reporter for the Atlanta Constitution found the Moro

women equally captivating during his visit to meet the Sultan of Mindanao in 1900. Writing
in a suggestive manner, he noted how “most of the women were basically naked with
exception of one strip of cloth which each had tied about her chest…some of the women
merely held up the cloth with their hand. Now and then one would give her clothing a twitch,
and I several times feared it would slip to the ground.”

56

Often found in the pages of

respected magazines like National Geographic, this blurring of lines between ethnographic
description and the fetishization of ‘primitive’ sexuality was common.
Aside from being objectified, the women of the Southern Philippines were also
depicted as debased due to their physical appearance, habits, and dress – often in the same
article. The teeth of the Sultan’s younger wife, stained black from chewing betel nuts,
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repulsed the Atlanta Constitution reporter.

57

Americans thought the habit made Moro men

appear fiercer but were repulsed when females partook. Jokes about American women
coming to the tropics and ruining themselves with the habit even cropped up in popular
military songs like “My Yankee Girl in the Tropics,” which included the lines: “Wait till my
girl comes out to these isles / to be a ‘Philippine Belle’ / To eat betel nuts and stain her white
58

teeth / My goodness – but won’t she look swell?” The tendency to denigrate the Moro
women occasionally extended to their clothes. Florence Kimball Russel commented on how
difficult it was to differentiate them from men in a crowd because both sexes wore similar
clothes. When Russell did manage to get a closer look at the women she disparagingly noted
that they were “much less attractive than the men, being quite as unprepossessing in
appearance, and lacking the redeeming strength and symmetry which gave beauty to the
59

masculine figure.”

Another female American traveller to the Southern Philippines, the

writer Anna Benjamin, described the garb of the Moro women in detail and perceptively
60

noted how strange she, a white woman, must look to them.

The newsman Carl Taylor

reported Moro women fighting alongside their men, and dubiously suggested that when dying
they were known to “seize their babies and hurl them upon advancing bayonets,” such was
61

their antipathy towards subjugation.

Attempts to describe and categorize the Moros went far beyond sensational accounts
of their supposed warrior prowess or barbarism, however. Inspired by men like Dean
Worcester, a variety of American colonials took it upon themselves to study the Muslim
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Borderlands (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013), 60-65.
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tribes and document their findings. This was done for a variety of reasons that ranged from
casual interest to the collection of military intelligence. The urge to know the peoples of
America’s colonial empire was present in the popular press from the earliest days of the
Spanish-American War. In April 1899, the Chicago Daily Tribune ran an article entitled “All
the Facts Concerning Our New Empire” that sketched out a heterogeneous ethnographic
portrait of the Philippine Islands, from the “warlike, active, intelligent” Moros to the
62

“diseased and dying” Negritos.

Combining descriptions of the natural wealth of the lands

with the characteristics of the native inhabitants, the Tribune provided early evidence that
colonial fascinations with study, discovery, and collection would be hallmarks of the
American project in the Philippines.
An extraordinarily detailed report prepared by Lieutenant Edwin L. Smith, a West
Point graduate and intelligence officer for the 4th Field Artillery, shows the depth of
American anthropological interest in the Moros. Written in 1908 about the Tausūg people of
the Sulu Archipelago, Smith’s report ran over one hundred pages in length and covered
nearly every conceivable topic. Genealogies of the leadership of the Sultanate of Sulu dating
back to 800 C.E. appeared alongside detailed descriptions of the games played by Moro
children. Smith had the Sulu code of law transcribed in its entirety, and also gave an
extensive political history of the islands. Titles for Tausūg royal, religious, and tribal
officialdom were transcribed, as were popular superstitions ranging from monsters who ate
the stomachs of children to the best way for a divorced woman to bewitch her husband if she
wished to have him back. Smith inserted numerous drawings and photographs in his report
showing how the Tausūg dressed, how they were buried after they died, the mechanics of
their games, and the designs of their weapons, jewelry, agricultural tools, and housing.
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The sexual practices of the Tausūg Moros were detailed in near-voyeuristic detail.
The rituals surrounding intercourse, including which day was most auspicious to have sex
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(Friday), and the ablutions performed after the act had occurred.

The tract included

considerations of incest, “sexual perversions,” premarital sex, and abortion. Smith even went
so far as describe how the specifically prepared tree root was used to terminate unwanted
65

pregnancies.

Prostitutes were rare, but those who were caught were painted “half black and

half white” and then placed backwards on a horse, paraded through the streets and markets,
and stoned to death.
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In the chapter covering manners and customs, Smith listed dozens of

social practices, ranging from who a Tausūg woman could speak with to when, where, how
67

often, and with whom the Tausūg bathed.

While heavy in specifics, Smith’s report avoided

the usual moralism and alarm present in average American descriptions of the Moros. Aside
from a few small examples, the Tausūg and their societal mores were documented with
uncommon scholarly dispassion.
The intelligence-gathering schematic employed by Smith was also used in other parts
of the Moro Province. J.M Cullion, a lieutenant with the 2nd Infantry, copied out phonetic
versions of words used by the Tausūg, while E.V. Sumner Jr., stationed at Zamboanga, did
the same for the Maranao people of the Lake Lanao region.
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Stanley Koch, intelligence

officer with the 6th Cavalry, came closest to replicating Smith’s extensive study, providing his
superiors with a large volume of information on the Maranaos. As in Smith’s report, there
was a fixation on sex and sexuality. Koch, for example, observed that masturbation was
“often practiced by men and boys but, whenever detected, punished by one hundred lashes
with a bejuco stick on the bare back. As marriage is undertaken so early and by so many this
demoralizing vice is largely reduced.” Abortion, infanticide, and punishments for sexual
deviance also appeared in the document, suggesting, alongside other reports, a fascination
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with intimate areas of Muslim life.
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While the intelligence reports of Smith and Koch were thorough (at times bizarrely
so), the most systematic attempts to describe and understand the various Moro tribes came
from Najeeb Mitry Saleeby.
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Born in Beirut (then part of Ottoman Syria), the Protestant

army surgeon joined the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes as Assistant Chief and Agent for
Moro Affairs after his discharge from the military. He spent extensive time in nearly all parts
of the Moro Province as Superintendent of Schools. Saleeby, who also served under Leonard
Wood on the Provincial Board of the Moro Province, was fluent in Arabic and the various
Moro dialects, thus having a distinct advantage over other officials in the region. His writing
and translation work on the Moros of the Cotabato region (the Maguindanaos) and the Sulu
Archipelago (the Tausūg, Samal, and others) survives in two books, each commissioned by
governmental agencies studying ethnology – first the Ethnological Survey under the
Department of the Interior, and then the Division of Ethnology under the Bureau of
Science.

71

Unlike many other chroniclers, Saleeby was not interested in using the Moros as a
vessel for the portrayal of Oriental adventure and danger. Both books were sober affairs. In
1905’s Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion, Saleeby discussed matters of
transliteration, considered the mythologies of Mindanao, and translated numerous
manuscripts into English. Many of the these were genealogies, and, along with translating the
original text, Saleeby considered questions of authorship, dialect, history, and the textual
alteration over the centuries. He noted in his translation of the “Genealogy of Magindanao
and the Iranun Datus,” for example, that the reliability of the text changed from manuscript to
manuscript, but that his version still threw “considerable light upon the nature and tribal
72

characteristics of the datuships or Moro communities.”

Saleeby’s The History of Sulu,

published three years later, contained an extensive history of the archipelago from the preIslamic period until the Spanish evacuation in 1899. Written to “throw light on the actual
conditions of life among the Moros,” Saleeby wanted to write history “without prejudice or
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bias, and events are related as they appear in the light of facts, and by one capable of seeing
73

things from the standpoint of a Sulu as well as of a Spaniard.”

The History of Sulu, while

containing far more of a narrative than his first book, was likewise appended with a wealth of
translated letters, reports, protocols, and decrees related to the topic.
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In these books and his

other published work, Najeeb Saleeby offered a sophisticated consideration of the Moros that
was backed by deep research.

75

Both books were published by the Department of the

Interior’s Ethnological Survey Publications, suggesting governmental interest in
disseminating information about Moro groups. Their nuance stood in stark contrast to later
swashbuckling narratives that reduced Muslims to mere savages.
The desire to describe and catalogue Islamic cultures extended beyond monographs
and military reports, and scattered throughout Mindanao and Sulu were Americans seeking to
understand their surroundings through rudimentary ethnographic study. Spurred on in the
early years by officials like the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes’ David Prescott Barrows,
these part-time ethnographers came to know the Moros through what they observed and
collected. In the early 1900s, Robert Lee Bullard, then a major in the 28th Infantry,
accumulated genealogical lists of datus in the Lake Lanao regions that dated back hundreds
76

of years.
terror.
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He also compiled a Maranao vocabulary and took oral testimonies on slavery and

Major Guy O. Fort, who ran the Constabulary headquarters in Zamboanga during the

1920s, was also “something of an amateur ethnographer,” and at one point composed a
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manuscript over fifty pages long comprised of “questions of an ethnological nature” that he
intended to distribute to Constabulary posts around the Southern Philippines. Visiting with
Fort, the anthropologist Carl Eugen Guthe noted with approval that “both the questions and
his attitude seem very scientific.”
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Several works cataloguing the dialects and vocabularies of Muslim populations
appeared in print. Charles Winslow Elliot, a quartermaster with the 6th Infantry, published a
Maranao “vocabulary and phrase book.” Learning Maranao did not soften his opinion of it,
and he wrote in his introduction that the language was “a barbarous and incomplete dialect,
79

replete with inconsistencies, absurdities, and primitive modes of expression.”

The military

surgeon Ralph S. Porter compiled a vocabulary list used by the Maguindanaos of Cotabato
which generated enough interest to be printed in Washington.

80

Elsewhere, schoolteachers

were important conduits. At Zamboanga, Frances E. Bartter assembled and published a small
primer on the Samal dialect, and on Jolo Katharine G. Buffum did the same for the Tausūg.
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Interest in native language and culture was, however, limited among the Americans and
Europeans. While certain military men and schoolteachers attempted to bridge
communication gaps, most were content to limit their interactions with the Moros,
particularly when off-duty.
Descriptions of the Moros by civilian officials and observers during the civilian
period featured many of the tendencies of earlier accounts. Francis Burton Harrison,
Governor General of the Philippines from 1914 until 1921, thought the Moro were “men of
great personal valor” and so skilled in combat that they had “made as much trouble in the past
as ten times their numbers of more peaceful and tractable people could have made.” Their
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adherence to “Mohammedanism,” Harrison believed, rendered them “difficult to deal with,”
even if their understanding of the religion was limited. Like others, the colonial politician
used gendered language in his descriptions of the Muslims, observing that the men and
women were “often indistinguishable; the men have no beards nor mustaches, and both sexes
wear the hair long. Many of their fiercest warriors are slender men with a feline or feminine
countenance.” With this in mind, he took at face value Leonard Wood’s claim that the death
82

of women during the Bud Dajo massacre was due to an easy confusion between the sexes.
The University of Michigan political scientist J.R. Hayden, who became the Vice
Governor of the Philippines in the 1930s, wrote in a 1928 article for Foreign Affairs that

“Mohammedan and pagan Filipinos” living in Mindanao and Sulu “lack completely the social
83

and political organization upon which modern life rests.”

The Moros had a “backward

civilization…sustained by religious fanaticism, fierce racial pride, and stubborn adherence to
ancient custom.” Despite the best attempts of the Spanish and Americans, “the old Moro
civilization” was “still deeply rooted among this proud, ignorant, stubborn and highly
84

courageous people.”

That Hayden represented the liberal end of the spectrum gives the

reader an indication of how steeped Western thinkers were in notions of race and
civilizational capacity. The Filipinos who replaced American officials shared similar
concerns about the Moros. The writings of Sixto Y. Orosa, district health officer for the Sulu
Archipelago in the 1920s and early 1930s, featured long descriptions of the appearance of the
Tausūg Moros, their tendencies towards piracy, and the “fanatical” nature of their adherence
to Islam.
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The Manila Daily Bulletin regularly reprinted American editorials that questioned

the ability of the Filipinos to “civilize” the Moros, although one noted that the Christians now
had an advantage because the Moro “qualities of personal bravery” were of no use when met
with “high explosives.”
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Edward M. Kuder, an education official who fought alongside the Moros against the
Japanese on Mindanao, wrote on the eve of Philippine Independence of the heterogeneity of
the Moro tribes and educational efforts by Americans on their behalf, and ended with a plea
that the world not pass over “one of earth’s little peoples.”
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The sympathetic views of Kuder

were indicative of how the language of the civilizing mission had softened. It retained,
however, the same convictions about the characteristic merits and shortcomings of the Moros,
which were coloured by prevailing ideas on topics ranging from the anthropological qualities
of the Malay race, to the role of Islam in Moro culture, to how women figured into Moro
society. However, imagining the Moro also involved situating them against the backdrop of
American history.

Racial Comparatives Across Empire
In a 1906 article for Collier’s Weekly, the journalist Richard Barry wrote about the killing of
Datu Ali, a member of Maguindanao royalty in the Cotabato Valley who fought against
American rule. “It marked all but the last phase of that war of extermination which the
American race has waged for nearly three centuries against first the red and then the brown
race,” Barry wrote, “which has taken our arms from the rock-bound roar of Penobscot across
ten thousand miles to the soft lull of the Pacific within five degrees of the equator, and which
has added to the long list of dusky heroes beginning with King Philip a name worthy of rank
88

with the bravest and shrewdest – Datto Ali!” The passage is rich with allusion. In Barry’s
estimation, the battles waged against the Moros could be placed on the same continuum as
those fought on the Atlantic littoral during early European settler colonialism in North
America. The “dusky heroes” found among the Native Americans who held out against
westward expansionism were kin to the Ali, despite being separated by language, culture,
religion, and an ocean.
Richard Barry’s description of how the U.S. Army stalked and killed Datu Ali was
written in a curious manner that at once venerated the savage nobility of Ali while

87
88

Edward M. Kuder, “The Moros in the Philippines,” Far Eastern Quarterly 4.2 (1945): 126.
Richard Barry, “The End of Datto Ali,” Collier’s Weekly, 9 June 1906, 17.

85

simultaneously arguing that his very existence impeded development on Mindanao. Ali was
described in terms of his supposed Arab heritage – “audacious, indolent, royal, supreme” –
and the tale of his downfall was a fantastical tribal romance (betrayed by a lesser datu whose
wife he stole!) straight from popular fiction. Ali’s resistance to American rule was brave, but
ultimately futile, and for all Barry’s admiration for the fallen leader he still ends his piece
with a toast given by an American judge in Zamboanga after his death: “A royal good fellow
that unfortunately got in the way of progress, and had to have a hypodermic injection of gray
89

matter.”

Americans arriving in the Southern Philippines at the turn of the twentieth-century
were familiar with the references Barry made in Collier’s. His comingling of savagery, futile
heroism, and inevitable white racial dominance were the narrative touchstones of reportage
on the previous century’s warfare against Native American populations on the Western and
Southern frontiers. While paternalist condescension towards the Natives predated the
formation of the republic, their integration (or lack thereof) into the nascent state was a
concern from the founding onwards. Thomas Jefferson, embracing the grand Enlightenment
narratives, saw the Natives as savages whose only redemption was through the guiding hand
of a more developed civilization. Since the European empires had failed in this task, it stood
that “the only hope for the individual Indians was that they follow the arduous path toward
republican civilization; they must abandon political pretensions that made them dependent on
corrupt imperial patrons and retarded their moral development.”
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In this worldview, the

Natives could become ideal American citizens if they adopted Anglo-American landholding,
farming, and gender norms. Once this occurred, the ‘savage’ would be freed civilizational
darkness and become a primitive subject of the state, ready to imbibe the fruits of Western
91

modernity.
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The tragic practical outcome of this racial idealism was patterns of frontier violence,
epidemic, coordinated deracination, and mass dislocation. Emergent discourses in the mid
nineteenth-century essentialized races and gave ‘scientific’ impetus to colonial regimes,
including that on the American frontier, to carry out projects of conquest against ‘lesser’
92

races.

Instances of ethnic cleansing like the Indian Removal Act of 1830 were justified, in

more punitive calculations, as the necessary marginalization of cultures scientifically-marked
for extinction, or, for more religiously-inclined Americans, as examples of divine will and
93

opportunities to save heathen souls.

Slogans like “Kill the Indian, Save the Man” stemmed

from ambitious projects of deracination, typified at sites like the Carlisle Indian Industrial
School in Pennsylvania, which utilized Christian education to remake Native youth into
model Americans.
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Punctuating all of this was “prolonged and brutal fighting” in frontier

spaces “that led to dehumanization of the enemy and ample opportunity for atrocities directed
at a population of ‘savages’ in which civilians were indistinguishable from combatants.”
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Sporadic colonial massacres, such as that occurring at Wounded Knee in 1890, became the
backdrop against which the United States expanded in the nineteenth-century.
For most white Americans in the latter half of the nineteenth-century, frontier
encounters represented the most immediate experience of alien cultures. After the Civil War,
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it was on the frontier where American masculinity was proven and where newspaper
correspondents wrote of the strange repugnance and allure of indigenous customs for their
audiences back east. Indigenous peoples were paradoxically vilified for their savagery yet
held up as examples of peoples who had resisted the coercive force of European imperialism,
and whose primitive warrior cultures were “pure” or “noble” in their freedom from the
complications of modernity. These contradictory impulses – exterminationist, assimilationist,
and fetishist – were manifest in popular culture, where the “dime novels and stage shows of
the late nineteenth century” anticipated and inspired later cinematic expressions of the
frontier myth, and in the ethnographic kitsch that reduced the cultural history of North
American peoples to a series of flattening visual tropes (the teepee, the headdress, the peace
96

pipe, and so forth).

As Ter Ellingson demonstrates in his study of the discursive construct

of the “Noble Savage,” the “negativizing forces of Enlightenment sociocultural evolutionary
progressivism and nineteenth-century racism” alongside the “dialectic of vices and virtues”
generated a complex of approaches to Native Americans that were sentimental and curious,
yet rooted in an epistemology of violence.
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It is unsurprising then that U.S. servicemen and civilians carried this cultural baggage
98

to the Southern Philippines . Many of the leading American military figures in Mindanao
and Sulu had significant experience during the Indian Wars of the late nineteenth-century,
pacifying indigenous populations and ensuring the safety of white settler populations.
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Leonard Wood, the first Governor of the Moro Province, served as a surgeon and line officer
in the U.S. Cavalry and saw action against Geronimo and the Chiricahua Apaches. John
Pershing likewise served in the cavalry, participating in campaigns in the American
Southwest against the Apaches and in North Dakota against the Sioux. Hugh Scott, the most
influential military governor of Sulu, “served with distinction as a cavalry lieutenant in
expeditions against the Sioux, Nez Percé and Cheyenne peoples. He was also an avid student
of Native American lore and authored the most authoritative book on Native sign
99

language.”

While U.S. military historians have yet to provide us with any definitive figures,

it can be safely assumed that in the early campaigns against the Moros many lower-ranking
officers and enlisted men had had previous experience fighting on the American frontier.
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Exploring the lives of some of these men is a salient reminder that transfer points between the
American West and the Mindanao interior were not only by way of comparable rhetoric, but
also through the lived experiences of those serving.
The career of the military surgeon Charles MacDonald is a useful example of how
personnel developed their skills through intra-imperial transit. Born in New York City in
1873 to a prominent family, MacDonald ran away at fifteen to join the Navy, but was
discharged after six months at his father’s request. At eighteen, he enlisted with the 22nd
Regiment of the New York National Guard, and over seven years of service helped suppress
the Brooklyn streetcar riots and quell labour unrest in Buffalo. After qualifying as a surgeon,
MacDonald served in Puerto Rico at the tail end of the Spanish-American War, where his
regiment suffered the depredations of the environment and “tenacious resistance by the
Spaniards.” He was then transferred to Fort Yates in North Dakota, where service “had been
of the old-time frontier character, with much riding of the plains and more adjusting of Indian
outlaw tangles and efforts to keep them on the Agency Reservation.” Moving on to the
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Philippines, MacDonald served a stint as Sanitary Inspector of Manila before being sent to
Mindanao, where he fought the Moros under Leonard Wood. His brief biography described
his time there in unpleasant terms, noting that “the command had many deaths occur as the
result of combat service against the enemy, from deadly tropical diseases…for nine months
the forces with which the lieutenant was serving lived in mud, ruin, and water holes, and
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endured hardships that destroyed even their animals.”

Charles MacDonald never rose to

national prominence like John Pershing or Leonard Wood, but in many ways he was a typical
American colonial in how he shuttled between conflicts, foreign and domestic alike. Along
with those he served with, MacDonald filled a wide range of coercive roles – quelling strikes
at the Buffalo rail yards, mopping up resistance after the conquest of Puerto Rico, managing a
regime of surveillance and control over the indigenous peoples of the Black Hills, supervising
everything from water quality to prostitution in Manila, and seeing active duty against the
Moros in Mindanao. His was a truly imperial career that blurred lines between metropolitan
and colonial service.
The civilians who took over Mindanao and Sulu were also liable to have had
experience with Native American populations, as was the case with Governor Frank
Carpenter. Writing to the U.S. Army Adjutant General in 1932, Carpenter mentioned that his
service to the country had included work on the American frontier. “I participated in the
‘Cattle War’ in Johnson County, Wyoming, which was the result of efforts of the Stock
Association to drive out homesteaders and others in the winter of 1891-92; Operations at
Butte and other points in Montana on account of labor troubles; And believe I am entitled to
notation in my record in connection with operations against hostile Indians on the Pine Ridge
Reservation in South Dakota, during which the Wounded Knee fight occurred.”
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Carpenter

directly linked his later work in the Philippines, which was non-military, with previous
service in the American West.

101
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Connections between the Moros and the Native Americans were a constant in letters,
diaries, government reports, and news reports originating from Mindanao and Sulu. En route
to Lanao, the army surgeon Charles Hack wondered about the Moros. “They are said to be
something like the Sioux Indians,” he wrote. Commenting on the inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands, Hack believed that “such complete ignorance and superstition is only equaled in our
103

lower types of American Indians.”

Hugh Drum, who served as an aide-de-camp to General

Frank Baldwin in 1901, likewise described the Moros by way of familiar enemies. In his
unpublished memoirs, he said of the Moros: “With an ancestry tracing to the 13th century they
have the characteristics of a combination of Malay and Arab and even in some ways the
American Navajo Indian.” Further on, he discussed how “as a warrior the Moro resembled
the Apache Indian, fleet, courageous with a fatalistic spirit, physically strong and with a
confidence resulting from past victories over the Spaniards and Filipino,” and noted that
“Baldwin quickly perceived the Indian characteristics and methods in the Moro mode of
104

warfare.”

Attributing Native characteristics to the Moros made them knowable to incoming
Americans, with racial comparison giving those fighting the Moros a frame of reference for
what they could expect. It also likely provided some comfort. To colonials, the Native
Americans were fierce warriors, but ones who ultimately submitted to the moral and material
superiority of the expanding nation-state. Speaking at a dinner given by the Harmony Club in
late 1913, Dean Worcester emphasized the importance of this colonial knowledge base, using
Major Hugh Scott as an example. “He has had wide experience in dealing with the Indian in
our own country,” Worcester noted, “and knew just how to attack the Moro problem.”
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During his time on Jolo, Scott not only utilized his previous experiences with the Apaches but
also kept abreast of occurrences with Native populations back in the United States,
corresponding with the future Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Francis E. Leupp, about

103

Journal of Charles W. Hack, 22 March 1902, Box 1, Folder 7. Charles W. Hack Papers, 1800-1926, LOCMD; Journal of Charles W. Hack, 21 December 1901, Box 1, Folder 7. Charles Hack Papers, LOC-MD.
104

“Chapter 1: The Dato of the Malanos,” Unpublished Memoirs, Box 11, Folder 3. Hugh Drum Papers,
USAHEC.
105

“Says Square Deal Will Win Moros,” New York Times, 26 December 1913, 7.

91

Geronimo and the Bedonkohe Apaches under his leadership in the area of Fort Sill,
Oklahoma.

106

Comparisons were also raised when Moro or Lumad groups organized resistance
movements. As Omar Dphrepaulezz observes, when John Pershing noticed the millenarian
tendencies of the Lanao Moros he conflated them “with the Ghost Dance phenomenon of the
Plains Indians whom he had fought in the continental United States more than a decade
107

earlier.”

Likewise, when Edward Bolton, Governor of Davao district, was murdered by

Manobo tribesmen in 1906, Tasker Bliss attributed it to unrest inspired by a movement “not
108

unlike in principle the Ghost Dance craze among the American Indians.”

American

officials chose not to view this sporadic millenarianism as expressions of “feelings of
deprivation and a sense of disorientation” brought on by colonial rule, but instead used
familiar cultural references as a means of explanation.

109

Even in the later years of the American period, the press was eager to equate the
Moros with Native Americans. In Luzon, the Manila Daily Bulletin reported in 1933 how the
Solicitor General, Serafin Hillado, referenced American precedents for dealing with tribal
marriages when adjudicating on the trial of a Moro woman accused of bigamy.
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York Times was even more explicit in their comparisons, and in an article entitled “Fighting
Moros Are Like Our Indians” commented on the “strange and not very kind prank of fortune”
that saw America acquire the Moros as wards. Reordering the colonial hierarchy, the Times
reporter saw it as America’s mission to protect the Moros from the Filipinos, and described
the former in terms of “noble savages,” stating that “the Moros are in many respects like the
American Indians – fine, upstanding, self-respecting people, courageous unto ferocity,
111

fearless and relentless enemies…and yet they face a sad end.”

No reference was made of

the role the United States played in shaping the power structures at play in the archipelago.
The pervasiveness of the idea of Moro-as-Indian was bequeathed to the Filipino
ilustrado class in cosmopolitan Manila. In his column “Common Sense,” Juan F. Hilario
argued for a punitive solution to the ‘Moro Problem’, claiming that “Moros who defy the
government and murder its duly appointed representatives deserve no conciliation or
condescension…to me, the fate and lot of the Moro are the same as those of the American
Indian. Whatever may be the outcome of the present agitation for Philippine independence,
112

steps must be taken right now toward the solution of the Moro problem.”

Even among pro-

independence Filipinos, the non-Christians of the archipelago were equated with the Native
Americans. In a pamphlet printed in the United States and distributed to American politicians
and journalists, the journalist José P. Melencio railed against arguments using non-Christian
populations as justification for continued American rule. “It is not fair to predicate Filipino
capacity for self-government on the looks, attire and backwardness of those mountain
people,” he wrote. “They are to the Philippines what the Indians are to America – no more,
113

no less.”

Melencio even got in a subtle shot at the Americans, claiming that Filipinos were

men. See also: “New Doctrine on Mohammedan Marriages is Written by Recto,”Mindanao Herald, 2 October
1935.
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doing their best to civilize the non-Christians while not relegating them to reservations.

Questions of Filipino independence aside, what is fascinating here is how the experience of
the American frontier, brought to the Philippines by way of American colonial personnel in
the early 1900s, still served as a salient point of comparison decades later.
The experiences of John Park Finley provide further linkages between the Moros and
Native Americans in the colonial imagination. Finley is best remembered for his
contributions to climatology, which derived from studying extreme weather patterns in
remote outposts on the Great Plains for the U.S. Army Signal Corps. He wrote a pioneering
book on how one should observe tornados.

115

Finley transferred to the Southern Philippines

later in his career, and was the longest-serving district governor in the Moro Province,
running Zamboanga and its environs from 1903 until 1913. During his time on Mindanao and
after, Finley was preoccupied with the development of the Moros and their civilizational
capabilities. Perhaps taking the advice of David P. Barrows, Finley dabbled in ethnography,
116

publishing a study of the Subanon people after leaving Mindanao.

Like Barrows, Finley saw nineteenth-century policies towards the Native Americans
as gravely flawed, and believed that “administrative and social engineering policies in
Mindanao would require a much more nuanced and tactical approach to colonial tutelage than
117

the austere requisites of crude submission.”

Writing for the Army and Navy Weekly, Finley

gave a third-person account of a trip he took to Constantinople as an emissary of the Moros of
the Zamboanga Peninsula. Editorializing towards the end of the article, Finley claimed “we
have a history connected with the American Indian that has been rightly called ‘A Century of
Dishonor,’ at which every American should bow his head in shame.” He asked the reader
rhetorically: “Are we going to repeat that dishonor upon a people who worship the same
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omnipotent God that we do, simply because they fail to salaam in our particular manner?”

118

The comparative between the Moros and the Native Americans still stood, but colonial rule
over the former, in Finley’s view, was a chance to correct the mistakes made when
‘civilizing’ the latter.
Finley further elaborated his ideas in an essay he wrote for the Journal of Race
Development in 1913, where he claimed that developmental failures in the “great Northwest”
of the United States resulted from the “control of elements” who exploited the situation for
“the maximum of immediate personal benefit, regardless of either the general welfare or the
119

rights of others.”

His comparisons were most forcefully expressed in his belief that “the

lack of true appreciation of the science and art of cooperation, influenced by the adverse
elements of speculation, has greatly retarded the industrial and commercial development of
our Indian wards in the states, and under similar conditions is experienced as an unreasonable
restraint upon a like development of our Indian wards in the Philippines.”

120

By studying the

data the Indian Bureau accumulated about the problems in the Western United States,
colonial administrators could avoid “serious errors…in conducting the regeneration of our
Indian wards in the Southern Philippines.”

121

When compared to others, Finley’s views on

the Moros and other non-Christians were progressive, yet he viewed them almost entirely as a
corrective to the imperfect administration of Native American populations. The conflation of
the term “Indian wards” was purposeful. If managed correctly, the Moros could escape the
fate of the Native Americans and become “self-supportive productive agents rather than
122

continue as vagrant parasitic nomads.”
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Finley also participated in intra-colonial discussions on how to ideally manage
‘dependent peoples.’ At the annual Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian and
Other Dependent Peoples, held at an expansive Victorian castle ninety miles upstate from
New York City, the Anglo-Saxon doyens of American colonialism avidly debated
civilizational imperatives. The conference was started in 1883 by the resort’s owner, the
Quaker philanthropist Albert K. Smiley, as a means for those men designing and
implementing Indian policy to discuss pertinent topics that affected its formulation.

123

After

America’s acquisition of overseas colonial empire, it expanded to include the “other
Dependent Peoples” found in its title. Thus, at the same conference one could hear Leonard
Wood speaking on the Philippines, the associate editor of the Manila Daily Bulletin giving
his “observations on race contact,” the prominent eugenicist Charles B. Davenport reflecting
upon “good and bad heredity in relation to dependent races,” a multi-denominational panel
considering missionary work among the Native Americans, and the climactic determinist
124

Ellsworth Huntington speaking on “climate as a factor in colonial administration.”

Discussions about the Philippines and the Moros at Lake Mohonk were of a selfsatisfied sort. Hugh Scott, reflecting on his time as the Governor of Sulu, told those
assembled that “the United States [has] had a much more altruistic purpose than any other
colonizing nation in the Orient and has held consistently to the purpose of governing the
Islands in the interest of their inhabitants.” The “fearful condition of anarchy” found in
Mindanao and Sulu when the Americans arrived was ameliorated by teaching the Moros “the
125

meaning of justice.”

Bishop Charles Brent spoke similarly of the “magnificent” work done

by the British in India and Egypt, the Dutch in Java, and placed the American occupation of
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the Philippines alongside these noble colonial projects.

Portraying American colonial

acquisition passively, Brent stated he was “of the opinion that our nation would never have
been shaken out of its placid self-conceit and serene ignorance of the Orient if a direct
127

responsibility in the Far East had not been thrust upon us.”

The speeches of Scott and

Brent, both of whom had extensive experience in the Moro Province, were presented to
audiences of officials devising policy for the Native Americans, the Puerto Ricans, and the
Hawaiians, and those men likewise spoke of their experiences to Scott and Brent. These
discussions represented a dense interplay of intra-imperial knowledge that travelled in
multiple directions: from metropole to colony and vice-versa, and between the colonies
themselves.
John Finley made direct comparisons between the Moros and the Native Americans
during his speech at Lake Mohonk. The role of the U.S. Army in the Southern Philippines
was analogous to “that which it has long performed in relation to the Indian tribes in the
western part of the United States.” This “close general analogy” indicated “a duty, for the
present at least, of limited supervision and control, operating upon the tribal governments of
the Moros, rather than an attempt to substitute an American or Philippine government acting
directly upon the individual Moros.”
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Citing a speech by William McKinley to the

Philippine Commission in 1900, Finley noted that “in dealing with the uncivilized of the
islands” Americans should “adopt the same course followed by Congress, in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government…such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm
regulation, and without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be
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exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.”

To Finley, the
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Moro ought to be raised up not through direct missionary efforts but rather “industrial
proselytizing,” a belief in alignment with the aims of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School and
other institutions created to recast Native Americans as U.S. citizens. This belief in
transformation through Western modes of education and commerce underpinned civilizing
efforts in the Southern Philippines.
The linkages white Americans made between the Moros and Native Americans were
byproducts of a century of continental conquest. Not only were many of the personal
biographies of those serving in the Southern Philippines linked to frontier warfare against the
Natives, but dominant Anglo-Saxon ideas about Native savagery and their capability of
attaining civilization were easily transferred across the Pacific to the Moros, another
problematic group who, by virtue of their centuries-long resistance to Spanish rule, shared no
common cultural touchstones with the Americans. The rhetorical framing of Moros-asIndians was not idle comparison, but represented a strong current in intra-imperial discourse
that captured the imaginations of American officials and helped guide policy in the Southern
Philippines.

The South as Tabula Rasa
In its triumphal celebration of a decade of American rule, the editors of the Mindanao Herald
described the Southern Philippines as a vast unexploited space. Rich in resources, the land
was ready for brave captains of industry to develop it and become fabulously wealthy in the
process. “The world is growing older and unexplored lands are becoming fewer each year,”
the Herald proclaimed. “The heart of Africa and other interior lands will still hold out their
attractive uncertainties to capital, but Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago lie out in the
open.”
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Conjuring visions of the “ancient glory of the spice markets of Mindanao,” the

editors urged the American people to establish “Mindanao’s industrial supremacy” through
development of nearly every sort, from the extraction of gold and oil to the establishment of
vast agricultural estates.
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The entire issue reads as an advertisement for would-be American
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settlers, and cites the benefits of plantation labour for children, how “the necessity of better
food inculcates a spirit of good house-keeping” in women, and how sound colonial
government leads to profit for the American patriarch.

132

A section on the Lake Lanao region in the same paper is even more explicit about the
transformations brought by the colonial regime: “The lamented fate of the noble red man has
long since ceased to inspire our bards. The forces that set to work on the bleak Atlantic coast
have slowly worked their way around the world. They are here, and it is only a question of
133

how long, until the map is re-made.”

Situating Mindanao within a colonial process that

started with the settlement of Eastern North America Atlantic by European settlers, the
Herald linked the occupation of the Southern Philippines to the larger projects of mapping,
settlement, and economic exploitation that came to define the late colonial period. In the
American colonial imaginary, the inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu had forfeited their rights
to the land through under-utilization. The Herald briefly lamented this certainty, pausing
“long enough to record a lingering regret for the vanishing point of ancient customs and laws,
wholly inconsistent with our method of thought, but fraught with much of the simple joy of
134

living.”

If the Moros and other non-Christians were objects of fantasy and comparison, so too
was their land. For American officials, missionaries, and businessmen, the South was a place
of economic and human potential left largely untouched by a Spanish colonial culture unable
or unwilling to develop them. The disappeared frontier that Frederick Jackson Turner so
famously said marked the end of “the first period of American history” simply shifted across
the Pacific, and rugged individuals looking to sate desires for new ventures in virgin
135

territories just needed to travel a little further now.

In this formulation, the uncivilized

inhabitants of the Southern Philippines posed little problem. Their lands were “seen as fertile
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and rich in natural resources but woefully underdeveloped, with vast tracts of rain forest wild
and uncharted and inhabited only by ‘savage’ peoples whose slash-and-burn agricultural
patterns were deemed primitive and destructive.”

136

As with the Native Americans before

them, the Muslims and Lumad tribes forfeited their right to the land by virtue of their
inability to settle and develop it. This was hardly a novel development in the global colonial
landscape, as European empires were likewise using the idea of tabula rasa – the blank slate
– to describe away indigenous development and culture.

137

To reshape the colonial spaces of Mindanao and Sulu, American officials and their
collaborators first needed to map the territory. As Thongchai Winichakul notes in his study of
the creation of the Thai geo-body, for this to happen there needs to be a suppression or
138

suspension of the “premodern hierarchical polity and the nonbounded realm.”

In other

words, preexisting forms of cultural and geographic knowledge and organization need to be
overlooked or actively ignored, replaced by the panoptic gaze of the modern map and its
territorial demarcations. Beginning with the purchase of Jesuit maps and the formation of
government organizations like the Geodetic Survey, American officials in the Philippines
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engaged in a sustained campaign of mapping, which helped direct the “territorial knowledge
139

construction” used to transform the Philippines.

Concerns about the inhabitants of the

lands under scrutiny were pushed aside, as the guiding hand of colonial science would rescue
them from their primitive state of non-productivity.

140

From 1899 onwards, American officials and scholars, in the words of Michael
Hawkins, “took great care not only to explore and survey the land technically but also to seek
out opportunities to penetrate the mysterious, demythologize the terrifying, and scientifically
141

secularize the various mythological aspects of Mindanao’s geography.”

The documents

left to men like John Pershing by the Spanish described the Moros as incapable of mastering
their surroundings and the Americans viewed the Spanish themselves as only slightly better
in their own attempts on the edges of the Mindanao vastness.

142

The intelligence-gathering

trip of Lieutenant G. Soulard Turner in the spring of 1903 was typical of early American
efforts. Sent out from Cotabato, Turner conducted a vigorous survey of the physical
geography along the coast to Lebak, describing in detail water sources, edible vegetation, the
density of forests, and the quality of the trails he traversed. Turner also gathered information
on the composition of local Moro and Tiruray villages, taking notes on population figures,
local politics, recent outbreaks of cholera, and the relative disposition of the inhabitants
towards the Americans. Appended to the report were Turner’s extensive observations on the
Tiruray people, whom he thought were “good and generous” but “physically inferior to the
143

Moros.”

Combining the work of military intelligence gathering with geographic survey,
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demography, and ethnography, Turner’s journey encapsulated the broad imperatives of
Americans in their quest to know the landscape.
During the military period, acquiring cartographic knowledge was of preeminent
concern in spaces like Jolo, where knowing the land meant easier suppression of resistance to
American rule. Writing to Hugh Scott in 1903, Edward Davis, adjutant general at
Zamboanga, ordered that as soon as the punitive expedition against the Moro leader Panglima
Hassan concluded, Scott should “resume the topographical survey of the central section of the
island, seeing to it that the surveying party consist of at least 200 men.”

144

At this time,

clearing trails and mapping the spaces of greatest Moro resistance was of primary importance
to the authorities in Jolo.

145

Elsewhere, the need to establish lines of communication between

posts necessitated hard surveying trips into the Mindanao backcountry, such as that taken by
Lieutenant Roderick Dew of the 23rd Infantry in 1909. Travelling overland on previously
unknown (to the Americans) trails from Davao to Fort Pikit, Dew and his men faced the
indignities of leeches, blistered feet, and treacherous paths in order to ascertain whether a
telegraph line could be placed between the two places and whether mounted travel between
146

them was possible.

When American troops were not fighting they were often on expeditions. “The work
of exploring and mapping the area included in the Department of Mindanao is proceeding as
rapidly as the limited number of suitable and available officers will permit,” wrote Tasker
Bliss in 1906. “It is a work of very great difficulty and to accomplish it properly requires a
regularly organized bureau, the detail of a large number of officers and liberal
expenditure.”
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Bliss also boasted of work done in the “little known Mt. Malindang region,”

where a party that included a U.S. Army surgeon and an official from the Philippine Bureau
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of Forestry summited the nine thousand foot peak and took “photographs… topographical
drawings, clinometer sightings, altitudes of peaks, barometric and thermometric readings” as
well as discovered “a number of new genera and species of birds and mammals…together
with a botanical collection of 1,000 specimens.”

148

Understanding the Southern Philippines

through scientific observation was of great concern. In his 1907 annual report, Bliss cited the
need for three companies of engineers to create a progressive military map. With these men,
he claimed the entirety of the Moro Province could be mapped within a few years, something
149

necessary if development of the region was to proceed at optimal speed.

At the end of 1913, Frank W. Carpenter took over as the first civilian governor in the
150

soon-to-be Department of Mindanao and Sulu.

He viewed the region in terms of its

developmental potential. Its unknown spaces had been mapped under the direction of Wood,
Bliss, and Pershing, and were now ready to be rationalized by civilian experts. Carpenter
reflected expansively that “this vast territory, greater than many of the kingdoms and
republics of Europe and the Americas” was “capable of supporting fifty millions of people.”
It also contained “the great undeveloped natural resources of the Philippines” that would
151

serve as the engine for the development of the national body.

The maps were made, but

there was still much hard work to be done harnessing the land’s productivity. Mindanao in
particular was thought to hold “practically all first-class agricultural land remaining in the
public domain of the Philippine Islands.” In a 1914 report, Carpenter described it in grandiose
terms:
One may travel directly from north to south or from east to west, on foot or
even on horseback, for days together traversing such areas which are
obviously capable of irrigation for which an abundance of water would
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seem to be easily obtainable from near-by rivers. When the practically
uninhabited areas are cultivated at all the soil is rarely plowed or more
seriously disturbed than by the point of the sharpened stick or jungle knife
with which the seed is planted between the grass roots after the grass itself
has been cut closely to the ground by these same knives. With even this
very primitive method of planting and practically without subsequent
cultivation, rice yields a hundredfold under ordinary climactic
152

conditions.

In the American view, any problems were not with the quality of the land – thought to
be unbelievably fertile and nearly limitless in its potential – but with the natives themselves,
mired as they were in a state of unproductivity. If the Moros could be convinced to settle in
model agricultural colonies then they would evolve “from their present state of almost nonproductiveness to one of great economic value to this country, this aside from the beginning
of a great forward movement toward their general betterment and civilization, with the
certainty that the next generation would compare favourably with any producing community
153

in the Islands of the Orient.”

The transformation of the land and the transformation of the

people were inextricably connected, and each needed study and reconfiguration. As we will
see, settling and resettling Moro, Filipino, and Lumad populations was an issue that occupied
the minds of American policymakers throughout the colonial period.
Surveys were a constant source of tension, with Moro villagers often fearing
(correctly) that they portended the appropriation and re-purposing of their lands. In 1914, the
annual report for the Department of Mindanao and Sulu claimed that survey parties in the
Mindanao interior were facing widespread opposition from Moros. The report gave no
indication of why such opposition existed, but did note that the surveying parties were to be
commended as they had used “amicable discussion” and “the patient demonstration of moral
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force” to persuade the Moros to allow them to continue their work and thus saved the
154

government from embarrassment.

James Fugate, Governor of Sulu in the 1920s and 1930s,

was less complimentary of the surveyors, complaining to the district engineer that the parties
were too readily given permits for firearms (which they then used recklessly), cut down
plants with impunity, and planned roads haphazardly. Such recklessness encouraged Moros
“to the hazard of their life in the protection of their property,” while the presence of so many
firearms “provokes attitudes inviting attack rather than protection.”

155

Fugate, who

sympathized deeply with the Moros (often to the chagrin of Americans and Filipinos), saw
the drive for development taking place with its own frenzied logic – one that could not or
would not take into account those already living in these supposedly empty lands.
Opening up the Southern Philippines became a prerogative of the entire colonial
polity, and from 1914 onwards Mindanao and Sulu were advertised enthusiastically as sites
for settlement and business. The Department of Mindanao and Sulu had a booklet printed for
the Second Annual Philippine Exposition which acted as an extended pitch aimed at potential
homesteaders and investors. “The Department of Mindanao and Sulu, with its unoccupied
areas suitable for agricultural investments, eagerly welcomes immigrants and capitalists,” it
read. “There is an abundance of work for such labor as may choose to immigrate from the
more crowded provinces of the north…If you are a prospective investor, if you wish to
establish an agricultural enterprise in the most prospective, most salubrious portion of the
tropics, it will be well for you to communicate with the authorities of the Department at
Zamboanga.”

156

When not reporting sensational stories of Moro banditry, Manila newspapers

advertised the South as a place where Filipinos could make a better life, simultaneously
aiding national unity by settling the Southern Philippines with productive Christians who
would integrate far-flung areas and tap into the wealth of the region’s resources.
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American-approved Muslim leaders like the Sultan of Sulu and Datu Piang of Cotabato were
featured in news stories advocating these goals as a way to show that Muslim inhabitants of
158

the South were on board with the intended transformations,

and the spread of air travel and

other new technologies were heralded as means to develop the land more rapidly.

159

The new provinces (formerly districts) of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu
actively promoted themselves to settlers. In a 1920 pamphlet, Cotabato advertised itself as the
“largest and most fertile province in the Philippine Islands.” It was “the paradise of the
160

homeseeker from over-crowded Luzon and Visayas.”

The pamphlet further claimed that

any crop would thrive in Cotabato, and that low population density (18 inhabitants per square
mile) made the province excellent for settlement. The Maguindanao population was depicted
as ignorant yet harmless. When a Moro evaded the orders of the government and was caught
161

“he meekly [submitted]” and considered it “a joke on himself when punished.”

The valley

surrounding the Rio Grande was praised at length, and the writers of the pamphlet claimed
that “the great agricultural possibilities of this magnificent valley which if only partially
cultivated would not only prove the granary of the Philippine Islands but would produce
sufficient rice, corn and other food crops to create a large export trade.”

162

For American and

Filipino colonial elites in Cotabato, advertising the benefits of the unsullied land meant an
increase in settlers from the North, who were thought to be more amenable to agricultural
labour than the Muslims. The crowded North, with its over-tilled and pestilence-stricken
lands, would be forgotten once they moved south where “thousands of acres in the great

the natural resources of Mindanao in ten years. So that at the minimum expense of the Commonwealth
government, the present administration expects to see Mindanao fully developed and wealth-producing land by
the end of the Commonwealth transition period, when the Filipino nation finally acquires its complete and
absolute independence.”
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province of Cotabato were lying idle waiting, even begging for but a little attention to make
163

thousands of happy and prosperous homes.”

For some Americans, the interior of Mindanao was also a potential dumping ground
for unwanted peoples closer to home. John Tyler Morgan, a six-term U.S. senator and onetime Grand Dragon in the Ku Klux Klan, viewed America’s colonial possessions as ideal
spaces for the relocation of Southern blacks. In 1902, he went so far as to propose this idea to
Secretary of War Elihu Root, who dutifully passed it on to General Adna R. Chaffee, then
commander of the Department of the East. The idea was taken seriously enough that Chaffee
forwarded it to General George W. Davis, the military commander of the Southern
Philippines, who considered the plan in a remarkable twenty-three-page response. Senator
Morgan believed that the “easily controlled surplus blacks” of the American South could be
induced to resettle in “three or four islands remote from Luzon.” The benefits of this would
be two-fold: racial tensions in the continental United States would be eased, and domestic
opposition to colonial empire would dissipate as white troops would no longer bear the brunt
164

of maintaining the far-flung possessions.

Black regiments served effectively in the Philippine-American War, and some officers
like Hugh Drum, who commanded a Negro Company in the 25th Infantry, commented
favourably on the “racial harmony” between the black troops and the Filipinos.
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Morgan

also predicted that race relations between the natives and the permanent African American
settlers would be harmonious.

166

In his response, Davis agreed that Mindanao was in need of

settlement, stating that in its undeveloped state “the world would not be poorer if the ocean
waves rolled where now are those unoccupied and savage islands.” He compared the

163
164

Ibid., 7.

Letter from George W. Davis to Adna R. Chaffee, 17 April 1902, Box 1, Folder 1. George W. Davis Papers,
1896-1902, USAHEC.
165

“Chapter 1: The Dato of the Malanos,” Unpublished Memoirs, Box 11, Folder 3. Hugh Drum Papers, LOCMD. Drum’s experiences speak to broader issues of race that arose from the conquest of the Philippines, and the
conflicted feelings of many African American soldiers who fought there because of their own histories with
racism and racial violence in the American South. See Brian G. Shellum, Black Officer in a Buffalo Soldier
Regiment (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010).
166

Letter from George W. Davis to Adna R. Chaffee, 17 April 1902. George Davis Papers, USAHEC.

107

potentialities of Mindanao favourably to the British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia,
167

and listed the various labour schemes used in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya.

Davis’ plan modeled labour contracts on those used by planters in the West Indies and
the British authorities in Calcutta for Chinese coolie labourers. Louisiana sugarcane
producers could relocate to the Southern Philippines, and sign African American men to
contracts. They would bring their families, and once their contracts had expired “would have
an opportunity of bettering themselves by engaging in abaca, coffee, cacao and rice culture.”
Davis was frank in his dismissal of using black troops in this scheme, and claimed that there
was “no modern precedent now recalled of an attempt to utilize a regiment for a time as
soldiers and then to transform them into tiller of the soil they have occupied and guarded.” He
viewed the “colored troops” as “aristocratic” and incapable of transitioning to tropical
agriculture. The non-military black contract labourer or settler, Davis thought, would best
populate the readily exploitable lands of Mindanao.

168

The fantasies of men like Morgan and Davis were little more than frameworks for
ethnic cleansing, although Davis saw his plans in keeping with the great migrations of
Europeans to America in the nineteenth-century. However, because the Philippines was
environmentally unsuitable for the white man, it would be American blacks who would take
up the mantel of developing the archipelago – and conveniently leaving the United States.
Davis saw Spanish, Portuguese, English, French and Dutch colonial success stories in the
Caribbean and South America as the result of the importation of African slave labour, and the
same successes could be had in the Philippines if African Americans could be induced to
settle there. “When Mindanao is thus occupied with industrious immigrants from our
southern states, when its sugar lands are in use, its hill and mountain slopes are in abaca,
coffee, and cacao, when cultivation is as general as it is in Cebu, then there will be a
population of several millions where are now found only the native aborigines and savage
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Moros who would as soon think of suicide as of being without a rifle, kris or spear.”

169

Morgan and Davis’ schemes for relocating the Southern blacks to Mindanao never came to
fruition, but are evidence of the ways American domestic politico-racial prerogatives
commingled with the idea of the Southern Philippines as an unsullied space where colonial
empire could inscribe itself.
The possible migration of African-Americans to Mindanao was considered as late as
1909. That year, the Mindanao Herald ran an article claiming Booker T. Washington, the
famed educator, was considering a proposition to bring a “large negro colony” from America
to develop the resources of the Cotabato Valley. The newspaper believed that this was a
“good proposition from Washington’s point of view” but pointed out that indigenous labour
should be developed first. When these natives got “started right under the white man’s
guidance” the entire province would flourish. The Herald also favoured a plan to bring in
50,000 Chinese labourers, noting that Datu Piang – “the brightest man the valley has
170

produced in years” – was “half Chino.”

In the waning years of the American presence in the Philippines, Mindanao was
likewise seen as a space of settlement for another maligned population: Germany’s Jews. In
the face of increasing persecution from the Nazi regime, Jewish refugee organizations
scrambled to find countries willing to accept immigrants. The response from Western nations
was lukewarm, and at times outright hostile. The United States adjusted their yearly quota of
German and Austrian Jewish refugees to 27,000 but this was not enough. With no entry
quotas, and as a territory run by the United States, the Philippines “represented a ‘back door’”
171

to America.

After the failed Evian Conference, Presidents Roosevelt and Quezon both

spoke positively of Jewish refugees settling in Mindanao. In early 1939, a team known as the
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Mindanao Exploration Commission assembled to travel to the island and report on the
172

possibility of Jewish settlement there.

From the start, there was opposition to Jewish immigration. Before the committee had
even reached the Philippines, the revolutionary hero General Emilio Aguinaldo spoke out
against the plan, claiming that all the Filipinos who wanted to settle in Mindanao should be
given priority before any foreign population. Underlying this relatively benign nativist
argument was a deeper vein of anti-Semitism. Aguinaldo explicitly blamed the Jews for their
problems in Germany. “If cultured, highly industrialized, strongly organized Germany could
not stand the Jews,” he stated, “how can we expect primitive Mindanao to do so?”

173

The

Boholano people, ten thousand of whom wished to settle in Mindanao, likewise used antiSemitism in their opposition to Jewish migration. At the eighth annual Bohol Young People’s
conference, board member Agapito T. Hontanosas claimed that Jews were “dangerous” to
have around, and that they had “succeeded in predominating and absorbing the people in the
places they settled because of their natural abilities [and] temperament.”

174

In Santo Thomas,

La Union, the municipal council passed a resolution opposing Jewish migration to Mindanao,
claiming that if they were allowed entry “very soon racial prejudice and other troubles similar
175

to those arising from the Japanese problem would break out.”

The concerns of the Santo

Thomas, and their racial tinting, were the same as those of the Boholanos and Emilio
Aguinaldo: permanent colonization of the empty spaces of the Philippines should be reserved
for Christian Filipinos first and foremost.
The Mindanao Exploration Commission’s impressions of the island were similar to
those of Americans in decades prior. According to the Commission’s report, “the fertile soils,
magnificent scenery, immense virgin forests and splendid climate of Mindanao” made it ideal
for settlement. The commission was “greatly impressed with the possibilities of settling a
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large number of Jewish refugees in Mindanao”

176

The sparsely populated areas of Mindanao

were, in the eyes of the commission, a space of refuge and potential transformation for the
persecuted Jews of Germany. Philip Frieder, the Cincinnati businessman spearheading the
plan, tried to assuage Filipino fears by claiming that only the most qualified immigrants
would settle in the Philippines, with an emphasis placed on experts in fields that were
177

underdeveloped to avoid labour competition with the natives.

Still, as Frank Ephraim

emphasizes in his account of the settlement plan, native resistance and “lukewarm support”
from the U.S. State Department meant that there was “little chance of success” for a large
178

Jewish settlement in Mindanao.

Developments in Europe and the onset of the war with

Japan crushed the plan altogether, leaving it as yet another incomplete attempt to settle the
South.
The colonial fascination with intra-colonial comparison and the remaking of
Mindanao’s ‘empty’ spaces continued well into the Commonwealth Period. In 1938, the
missionary educator Frank Laubach described the island as the “Golden West” of the
Philippines, and said it was “in exactly the same situation that America was in when settlers
were flocking toward the western states and were taking up homesteads.” Laubach spoke
with excitement about the massive settlement plans being developed in Manila. “I cannot
think of any other colonization project in the world today that is being planned on such a
grand scale,” he wrote to the contributors to his mission. Up until the final years of the
179

colonial project, Mindanao remained a realm of fantasy projection.

What Was and What Could Be
“The Moros or Pagans who have come in close contact with our civilization in the public
schools or otherwise, are frequently found to be anxious to improve their standards of living,”
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reflected John Pershing in 1913, “and, to a certain extent, are inclined also to adopt our
180

manners.”

Pershing’s favourable opinion of these developments aligned with broader

colonial ideas about potential and transformation. Americans who fought, administered,
taught, and conducted business in the Southern Philippines imagined the Moros in a wide
variety of ways: as irredeemable primitives, as religious zealots, as pirates and slavers, as
exemplars of a formidable martial spirit, as picturesque survivals of a bygone era, as objects
of curiosity and study, as victims in need of protection from Filipino predation, or as some
combination of all these things. With some notable exceptions, the Moros were conjured as
American writers saw fit, and their portrayal was at times paradoxical.

181

They were barely

cognizant of Islam, yet fanatically religious; they had an admirable fighting spirit and
compared favourably to cowardly Filipinos, yet were doomed to extinction if they did not
182

completely transform; they managed their land well, or hardly at all.

While the more

sensitive and curious among the Americans were able to differentiate between the various
Muslim ethnic groups in the region, many adopted the Spanish custom of viewing the Moros
as a monolithic religio-cultural entity.
When imagining the Moro, Americans in the Muslim South looked to their nation’s
troubled relationship with the Native Americans. Many who served in Mindanao and Sulu
had personal experience fighting and administering Natives in the United States. Even those
who did not still used the American frontier and its peoples as a reference point when
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discussing the inhabitants of the Southern Philippines. For officials like John Finley, the
“Mohammedan wards” of the nation presented the opportunity for a do-over – to succeed
where nineteenth-century Indian policy had failed to develop the Moros with the most
rigorously modern colonial methods available, with the eventual goal being their frictionless
incorporation into the Filipino national body. When met with opposition from Moro groups,
the colonials could likewise draw from histories of colonial violence against Native American
groups.

183

All of this played out on a landscape that, like the people, was viewed in terms of
potential and transformation. The Spanish were unable to properly map or control the ‘empty’
spaces of Mindanao and Sulu, and the native Muslims and Lumads lacked the necessary
Western models of private property, settlement, and industrial / agricultural development. As
such, the Southern Philippines became a space for Americans to harness, first through
cartography and surveying, and later through large colonization, infrastructural, and
agricultural schemes. They bequeathed these tendencies to Christian Filipinos serving in state
bureaucracies during the 1920s and 1930s. The land was also imagined as a dumping ground
for African Americans, and, decades later, as a safe haven for Germany’s Jews. While neither
of these plans came to fruition, they demonstrate the extent to which military and civilian
officials viewed the South as a place of possibility. Perception, imagination, and fantasy met
with ambitious plans for transformation. The colonial project in the Muslim South, from the
beginnings of the military period until independence, was ambitious in its goals and sought to
transition people and space into an idealized modernity. American and Filipino attempts to
accomplish this goal are where we turn next.
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Chapter Three / Civilizational Imperatives (I)
Courtrooms, Clinics, Markets, and Agricultural Colonies

In Mindanao and Sulu, civilizational fantasies became civilizational imperatives through a
spectrum of state-building projects aimed at refashioning the human fabric of the region.
Muslim populations in Sulu, Zamboanga, Lanao, Cotabato, and Davao were oppressed,
Americans thought, by their own societal constructs and needed guidance from ignorant
darkness towards a state of material and moral productivity. Those who devised and
facilitated these plans did not shy away from framing them as grand colonial endeavours.
District Governor John Finley of Zamboanga was remarkably forthright in his descriptions,
writing that “colonial work is rough and hard, and the results are necessarily slow, yet no
work is more intensely interesting because of its creative possibilities for good to the human
kind.” For Finley and others, labouring in the Southern Philippines was both a duty and a
problem-solving exercise. “To colonize is to civilize races that need our protection and
instruction,” he continued, “to bend our wills to the exigencies of new conditions and new
surroundings, to exercise our mental strength on the complex problems of the infinite
diversity and infinite possibilities of unknown life, affected by unknown physical
1

conditions.” The imperial metaphysics of men like Finley suggested that civilizing projects
could master the “infinite” and “unknown” through discovery and reconfiguration. The minds
and bodies of racially othered foreigners could be modernized, while colonized geography
would become economically productive.
To American colonials, life for the average Moro was hellish. Almost nothing could
be salvaged from what existed before the arrival of U.S. troops, and Muslim populations
needed to have their objectionable traditions transformed by instruction, force, or both
(depending on whom one asked). Governor Tasker Bliss gave the clearest expression of this
mindset in 1909, when he described life for the pre-American Moro:

1
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From the datu there was no appeal and in general the people were living in
a state of bondage to their feudal lord, suffering from all the diseases that
man in a tropical clime is heir to, and living in rude, squalid nipa huts with
no property other than a few earthen cooking pots, a buyo box, and chest of
striped sarongs to sometimes cover their nakedness. Add to this a group of
small children, a few chickens and a camote patch, and you complete the
sad picture of the average Moro home. Such a thing as public institutions
were unknown among them. No roads or docks were ever built to promote
intercourse and further trade, no schools or other public institutions to
disseminate knowledge. An occasional mosque, hardly distinguishable from
the other mean shacks, was now and then singled out by the presence of a
2

huge tom-tom that called the Moslem worshipper to prayer.

By reducing the heterogeneous cultures of the Southern Philippines into a single debased
visual scape, Bliss gave rhetorical justification to the forced erasure of tradition that resulted
from societal reorganization. As Michael Salman and others have observed, the Moros were
viewed as inveterate pirates, slavers, polygamists, murderers, gamblers, religious extremists,
and thieves who were averse to honest labour, disinclined to learn hygienic or sanitary
3

practices, and uninterested in public initiatives. What, then, was worth preserving? This was
a convenient precolonial narrative. The Moros, too fierce to be dominated by the indolent
Spanish yet unable to progress independently, could only be redeemed by the guiding hands
of Americans and, later, their Christian Filipino protégés.
Consciously and unconsciously, those working to reshape the Southern Philippines
tapped into the global logics of high imperialism. Racial progress, medical-hygienic morality,
the linkage of colonial agriculture with world markets, the limits of education in the colonies,
and the role of emergent technologies in facilitating state power were all considerations that
stretched well past metropole-colony binaries and constituted transnational and transcolonial
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conversations about conquest and control. In Asian colonies, British, Dutch, and French
officials struggled with educating the natives in ways that did not encourage proto-nationalist
5

independence movements. Elsewhere in Asia and Africa, empires experimented with
settlement and agricultural projects aimed at making their colonies more profitable.

6

Throughout the Global South, colonial elites grappled with medical issues and looked to
climactic and racial determinist concepts for guidance on how to approach health in the
7

tropics. In every colonial state, conflicts arose over how to administer justice in
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environments that were characterized by vast power differentials. The United States did not
operate in isolation from these conversations, but rather contributed their own colonial
models to them.
Whereas the previous chapter dealt with how and why Americans formed ideas about
the Southern Philippines and its peoples, what follows concerns practical and impractical
applications of those ideas in a colonized space. If the Moros were, like the Native Americans
before them, uncivilized peoples who failed to utilize their own land, then how could
Americans correct them? The ways that foreigners in the Southern Philippines, in and outside
of colonial government, answered this question informs the following analysis. The term
‘civilizational imperatives’ refers to the underlying impulses of the colonial mission. The
clearest expression of these impulses was found in the institutions established in the Southern
Philippines. In the language of American power, civilization was best represented in the
achievements of white Anglo-Saxons – specifically, in the patrician enclaves that many of the
colonial elite hailed from. The colonial mind standardized notions of progress and modernity,
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mapping gradients of civilization across time and space. Muslim inhabitants of the Southern
Philippines, lagging somewhere behind the Christian Filipinos when Westerners ranked the
inhabitants of the archipelago, could be partially or fully civilized only through the
replication and dissemination of American institutions. In these two chapters, I explore how
Americans operating in official and unofficial capacities conceived of their duties to
transform the Moros, and the structures they created to do so.
This section of the project begins by examining American plans for implementing
new legal structures in Mindanao and Sulu and the development of healthcare infrastructure.
Next, it assesses efforts to train Moros in the basics of market capitalism, and attempts,
through settlement schemes, to render Mindanao agriculturally productive. The next chapter
focuses on the diverse array of educational projects started by government officials and
missionaries in the Southern Philippines. All of these endeavours were driven by utopian
notions of what vigorous stewardship could draw out of the Islamic ‘wards of the nation.’
“The United States Government guarantees to you protection from enemies without your
borders, assures you peace within,” Governor Frank Carpenter told a crowd assembled to
mark his inauguration in 1914. “It brings to you the greatest good that can be given to any
people; opportunity to use your krises to harvest golden grain, to build towns where cottas
have been, to make the trails through the forests of your mountains and valleys the highways
of commerce and all that makes the civilization of today.”

10

As happened elsewhere, the

stated intentions of civilizing agents entering the Southern Philippines collided with a range
of cultural factors. These collisions inform much of what follows.
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The Courtroom and the Dispensary
i.) Competing Systems of Justice
In 1907, Governor Tasker Bliss summarized the dominant view of Americans towards Moro
legal structures. “If anything was found that even a loose and superficial writer would call
law,” he opined, “it rested upon no commonly accepted authority even among people of the
same section and was accepted or rejected according to the will of him who applied it.” The
average Muslim, he thought, had a “notion of government [that was] a dim reflection of
theocracy as interpreted by the prophet and reinterpreted by ignorant, corrupt, and
superstitious local teachers.” Crimes that “in civilized countries” would receive the harshest
punishment were addressed with fines, and ones that “with [Americans] would be no crime”
were punished “with ridiculous, degrading, and inhuman penalties.” Bliss believed that
transforming Lumad groups merely required eliminating “certain vague, ill-defined notions
out of which “their practices grew, but saw the Moros as a greater challenge. The tenacity
with which they clung to “corrupt and degraded” manifestations of Islam, and the American
promise of noninterference with religion, made overhauling their concepts of law and justice
delicate work. Bliss’ solution to the problem faced by American colonials was partially
explained through inter-colonial cultural comparisons. If the Moros could be raised to the
standard of “the civilized Mohammedan of India or the civilized Hindoo” their opposition to
colonial imperatives would ebb. The codification of “sensible and humane” laws representing
a “civilized interpretation” of Islam was Bliss’ goal, although he admitted that even if his
plan were accomplished it would still “in many aspects…be repugnant to Western ideas.”

11

Major efforts to bring the Moros under a unified legal framework began three years
before Bliss filed his report with the passing of Act No. 39 of the Legislative Council of the
Moro Province in February 1904.

12

The act provided for the organization of the five districts
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of the Moro Province into municipalities and tribal wards. Regional hubs like Zamboanga,
Iligan, Cotabato, and Jolo were designated as municipalities, while the small indigenous
communities of the hinterlands were folded into the tribal wards. There were fifty-one of
these tribal wards – eighteen in Cotabato, thirteen in Lanao, nine in Sulu, six in Davao, and
13

five in Zamboanga.

George Langhorne, Moro Province secretary, described the purpose of

the wards as transitional. Ideally, colonial authorities would control non-Christian settlements
through collaborating native elites, and these populations, slowly introduced to the benefits of
modern governance, would in time decide to become “full citizens of a municipality.”

14

In October 1905, the first tribal ward courts were established within larger
governmental compounds. Tribal Ward No. 1, outside of Zamboanga, had a model farm, a
15

court, a headquarters building, a jail, a Moro Exchange, a rest house, and a hospital.

The

courts attempted to nudge non-Christians towards modernity without the appearance of
completely discarding customary practices. The intended effect, of course, was just such an
overhaul, but one that took place incrementally so as not to foment resistance. The sultans,
datus, and local religious figures adjudicating criminal and civil matters, who often relied on
the levying of fines for their income, would gradually see their powers erode as the
government expanded. To do this, military officials at first co-opted many of these leaders to
be representatives of the district governor in their respective wards. Moro headmen would in
turn appoint their deputies to act as local policemen. The tribal ward courts tried civil and
criminal cases between non-Christians, with the exception of first-degree murder. Attacks on
Americans or Filipinos were tried in regular courts in the municipalities. Flaws in this system
were soon evident. Tribal ward courts’ reliance on the very men whose revenue stream they
were abolishing – the datus – meant cases often went unreported. Traditional processes for
settling disputes remained prevalent. Tasker Bliss complained that the only way that the tribal
ward courts system could be enforced was if every part of the country had a strong garrison.
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This undermined the entire reason for bringing Muslim leaders onside, which was done so
that the province could avoid administering justice at the end of a barrel. He recommended
giving limited legal powers back to native leaders, including the right to collect fines in
certain cases (rather than having them go to the provincial treasury), and also to establish
16

small native courts for judging non-violent crimes.

Administering an American brand of justice in the tribal wards could be tedious.
Coordinated resistance was addressed by military force, while high profile murder cases were
sent to the municipalities. Still, those operating the tribal ward courts did so in the belief they
were indispensable to the civilizing project. In Lanao, District Governor John McAuley
Palmer oversaw courts at Marawi (soon-to-be Dansalan), Iligan, Camp Vicars, and Malabang.
Problems brought before the courts often sprung from “the changing labor market” around
the lake, which Palmer attributed to a slackening of traditional authority. The labour pool,
mainly young and unmarried men, was increasingly mobile as the power of local datus
waned. These itinerant labourers, moving between communities looking for the best pay,
disrupted local rhythms and were unresponsive to threats from the datus. The related rise in
property crimes and thefts, unwittingly facilitated by the tribal ward system’s remapping of
economic and social relations, was evidenced in the courts. During 1906, tribal ward courts
convicted Maranao Moros for theft, bootlegging, assault, resisting arrest, and trespass. During
the same year, eight Maranao men were convicted of slave trading, with a further six cases
awaiting trial.

17

The Sulu Archipelago presented its own unique challenges for lawmakers. There were
communities of various sizes spread throughout the nearly nine hundred islands, and
maintaining a consistent governmental presence in all of them was nigh impossible.
Successive district governors experimented with travelling officials – justices of the court, for
example, who made scheduled trips to the outlying islands. On islands with permanent
Constabulary stations, the officer in charge generally served as the justice of the courts.
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Transferred from Lanao to the remote island of Cagayan de Sulu in 1911, Sterling Larrabee
took on the combined role of head policeman and judge for the island. He worked to gain the
population’s trust, and met with chiefs to discuss disarmament. His men were mostly
Christian Filipinos, some of whom married local women. Writing to his parents, Larrabee
explained where Cagayan de Sulu was located and described his legal powers. “The power of
the Tribal Ward Court justices has lately been increased so that in criminal cases, I can
imprison a man for 20 years. I cannot give a death sentence, however.” New to the job,
Larrabee had only tried four cases when he wrote to the letter. The most serious of these was
a rape case where he sentenced the perpetrator to three months jail time. Living in a spacious
tin-roofed house with plenty of books and good food to eat, Sterling Larrabee was content in
his temporary role. “I am practically a king here,” he told his parents, “and so like it very
much!”

18

The justice system as manifested in the tribal ward courts was problematic until the
first years of civilian rule. The authority of the datus troubled Americans, yet they reluctantly
understood that attempts to enforce the Philippine legal code and strip traditional leaders of
their power had the potential to create violent unrest. Writing in 1913, John Pershing
illustrated the tension between co-opting the datus and rejecting customary practices outright:
Naturally, the majority of datus have always been opposed to our criminal
code, not only because it really punishes crime, but more especially because
it removes the administration of justice from the arbitrary control of the
mercenary datus and places it in the hands of a disinterested judiciary. As
our criminal code replaces the Moro code the power of the datu is gradually
being superseded. However, the unsettled condition of society produced by
their low standards still remains and the Mohammedan sanction of their
immoral practices still exists. The condition must be met, and we must
endeavor to discover some path by which all classes may emerge. The
unaided initiative of the individual can hardly be expected in the face of the
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authority of tribal law and custom reinforced as it is by the power of the
Mohammedan hierarchy…In the development of the individual, control by
datus whose authority is founded on Mohammedanism must eventually be
abolished. Their system can never be successfully used as a basis of
municipal organization, since government by datus accustomed to arbitrary
action is inconsistent with enlightened consideration for personal rights. To
19

attempt to restore datu rule would be to go backward a hundred years.

Pershing’s dismissal of Islam-inspired Moro legal traditions was an expression of a strongly
held belief that pre-American cultural survivals needed to be rooted out and eliminated if
civilization were to flourish.
Other military officials were not as extreme. General J. Franklin Bell thought the
strength of the tribal ward courts lay in the fact that they helped maintain government control
while enjoining “upon all that the customs of the people should be respected in so far as this
could be done consistently with the dictates of humanity and well recognized principles of
civilization. It is in the Tribal Ward courts and in the subordinate Kali courts that Moro
customs have been permitted to enjoy the fullest opportunity for continuance.” Allowing state
rule to retain some local variances, Bell believed, would make governance easier as the Moro
20

Province transitioned into the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.

The abolishment of the

tribal ward courts in 1915 mooted this line of thinking. They were replaced with justice of the
peace courts, which functioned in a similar capacity and included provisos about taking local
customs into consideration. Importantly, these new courts also sought to integrate law and
order in the Southern Philippines into the bureaucracies of the insular government in Manila.
To the chagrin of American, Filipino lawmakers, and Westernized Moros, traditional
methods of settling legal disputes persisted. The Tausūgs of the Sulu Archipelago, for
example, continued relying upon religious figures and members of the royal family to judge
matters rather than going through secular channels. Law in the archipelago was enshrined in
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the Sulu Code, a series of articles that combined customary and Qur’anic laws to delimit
punishments for lawbreakers. The code, transcribed in 1878 in the wake of the Spanish
Treaty of Peace and updated in 1902, was a sophisticated document “promulgated with
general consent of all the datus, panglimas, and subordinate officers of the state.” The code
covered a wide range of offenses. The murderer of a free man, for example, was required to
pay blood money as restitution to the victim’s family, and if the murderers were unknown or
hidden an entire village would be culpable. Fines were imposed for marriage by “abduction,
elopement, marriage of slave, seduction” and women who committed adultery would become
“a slave to her husband” except if she were raped. The 1902 version of the code was more
extensive and covered in detail theft, murder, adultery, opprobrium, unwitnessed purchase,
false claims, unlawful exactions, debt, and unjust decisions. Anyone not adhering to the
articles of the Sulu Code was threatened with the “calamities” that befall those who swore
falsely on the Qur’an. Although Sultan Jamalul Kiram II and the datus of the Sulu
Archipelago were initially allowed to adjudicate legal matters between Moros, the abrogation
of the Bates Treaty by Leonard Wood in 1904 marked the beginning of a progressive erosion
21

of the legal authority of the datus.

The so-called Carpenter Agreement resulted from a series of conferences between
Governor Frank Carpenter and Sultan Kiram over the course of ten days in March 1915. In
the document, Kiram foreswore any claim to legal authority and accepted his position as a
mere spiritual and symbolic head of the Tausūg people. As such, he agreed to cease the
operation of religious (agama) courts, and the collection of fines or taxes from the people to
support the sultanate. In effect, the agreement enshrined the separation of church and state in
Sulu and forced the Sultan to recognize “the sovereignty of the United States [in Sulu], and
by His Excellency the Governor General and the representatives of that Government in
Mindanao and Sulu of all the attributes of sovereign government that are exercised elsewhere
in American territory and dependencies, including the adjudication by government courts…of
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all civil and criminal causes falling within the laws and orders of the Government.”

Governor General Francis Burton Harrison relayed news of the agreement to Secretary of
War Lindley Garrison the following month, claiming that it was a victory for the United
States. The troops had put an end to “organized resistance” to colonial rule in Sulu, and now
the agreement marked “the extension of the peaceful functions of the Government”
throughout the region.

23

Customary law survived in Sulu despite the Carpenter Agreement. In the late 1920s
and early 1930s, colonial officials struggled with the issue of the agama courts. Although
legal matters were ostensibly the territory of the government, the operation of ecclesiastical
courts by Kiram and his followers constantly tested what could acceptably be adjudicated
outside of state institutions. Some governors were more tolerant of the agama courts, but the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes under Ludovicio Hidrosollo and later Teopisto Guingona
viewed the arrangement as unsatisfactory. There was a fear that the Sultan and other leaders
in Sulu were punishing residents for taking their issues to the government, and had instituted
a thoroughly corrupt system of fines. A report on the problem that crossed the desk of Vice
Governor J.R. Hayden claimed that the agama courts had “retarded the political progress of
the people” of Sulu. The Tausūg were “trained in the belief that they can bring before the
agama court even those cases covered by laws and regulations. Its effect upon the people is
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that the Government Court to their own thinking is not the only court where they can bring
their cases for settlement or seek redress.”

24

Kiram and his coterie denied running a parallel legal system, claiming that they were
acting entirely within the purview of the 1915 agreement and only overseeing matters of a
religious nature. Evidence suggests this was likely untrue, and that they were playing a
double game. For their part, Americans and Filipinos failed to recognize that the spiritual and
the legal were inseparable in the Islamic worldview. Representatives of the state were quick
to accuse the agama courts of being a simple extortion racket, but these courts did provide a
social function in areas where governmental presence was slight or nonexistent. Addressing
disputes through traditional avenues allowed the average Tausūg to resolve their issues
through culturally familiar processes, rather than taking them outside of the community to
justice of the peace courts. Gulamu Rasul, a justice of the peace at large and staunch
modernizer in Sulu, reported that by 1931 there were approximately thirty agama courts
operating in the archipelago. These courts generated ₱3000 per month, of which between
₱1000 and ₱1500 went to Sultan Kiram. Rasul despised the courts, and called the Sultan’s
agents “ignorant and unscrupulous,” saying they were “not interested in the welfare of the
people” but rather simple profit. He bemoaned the resurgence of the agama courts in the
1920s, as during the Carpenter years they had been suppressed. The coexisting legal systems
in Sulu, Rasul argued, were one of the “great stumbling blocks” to progress in the region, and
created confusing situations where aggrieved parties bounced back and forth between the
government and agama courts – racking up fine in the process. “Conditions here are like an
open sore,” Rasul wrote.

25
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A government memorandum from 1934 was more measured in its analysis, claiming
that the agama courts gained prestige from the sluggish response of the state. When justice of
the peace courts were “quick to act” and provided a “fair and public hearing” residents were
more likely to utilize them. The conflicting legal structures sometimes created violent
confrontations. On occasion a man who had committed a serious offense would be brought
before the agama courts and forced to pay a fine. When he discovered there was a warrant for
his arrest from the government, he would be incensed, as he believed the matter concluded.
“He may then decide to defy the government and induce relatives and friends to sympathize
and join him” in resistance. Inevitably, this led to clashes with the Philippine Constabulary
and lives lost. The memorandum concluded that strengthening the justice system in Sulu was
the only way to decrease such scenarios because it made agama courts less appealing.

26

The issue was serious enough that the Governor General of the Philippines Frank
Murphy wrote a stern letter to Sultan Kiram about it the same year. Murphy demanded that
Kiram, by this time a senator in the Philippine Legislature, “refrain from infringing upon the
rights of the civil authorities” in the Sulu Archipelago. The governor general cited the 1915
Carpenter Agreement as well as subsequent affirmations by the Sultan (with Teopisto
Guingona in 1920 and Murphy himself in 1934) that “the supremacy of the government must
be unquestioned.” Kiram, who had complained to Murphy that Governor Fugate and others
were impinging upon his religious rights, was ordered to participate in a conference with the
leading figures on Jolo to yet again demarcate spiritual and temporal authority. Murphy’s
tone throughout the letter is exasperated, as he likely knew that the isolation of Sulu and the
lack of government resources available for allocation there meant that the situation would
27

persist.

The death of Sultan Kiram in June 1936 temporarily solved the problem of the agama
courts. A succession struggle ensued that monopolized the energies of the Tausūg elite. The
recently established Philippine Commonwealth, in the meantime, used Kiram’s passing to
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further delegitimize the Sultanate. The tensions between indigenous sources of local authority
and the state-building goals of American and Filipino colonials subsided in the years prior to
the war, but reemerged violently afterwards. During the entire American colonial period,
military and then civilian agents attempted to displace the authority of the datus and sultans
through the implementation of a modern legal apparatus. At times they were successful, but
overestimated the appeal of imported concepts of justice in spaces with their own longestablished legal systems rooted in Islam and local tradition. The assumption that legal norms
could be overhauled completely in the Southern Philippines within a generation was one of
the more glaring examples of colonial hubris, and one that came to haunt the postcolonial
28

Philippine state.

ii.) “The Moro Does Not Take Naturally to Cleanliness…”
“I don’t think there is anything that we have on hand more important than to develop the
Filipino physically,” Secretary of War William Howard Taft wrote to Dean Worcester in
1907. “I know it can be done if the improvements in the water supply, and in food, and in
proper hygiene can be given proper application. The school therefore in spreading an evangel
of decent, healthful living through its graduates is more of a sanitary than it is of an
educational character.”

29

The marriage of education, physical development, and modern

hygienic practices espoused by the secretary was mirrored in colonial policy. Taft voicing
these concerns to Worcester was not by chance. Worcester was then Secretary of the Interior
in Manila, and as such responsible for the Department of Sanitation and other health-oriented
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governmental bodies. Alongside tropical medical experts like Victor Heiser and Paul Freer,
Worcester helped define a moral approach to medicine within the colonial state. This
approach borrowed heavily from racialized discourses surrounding the ability of non-white
populations to civilize themselves through the adoption of Western medical advances: proper
personal hygiene, inoculation, the sanatorium and the leprosarium, and the suppression of
epidemic disease. In creating moral-medical standards in the Philippines, men like Worcester
positioned themselves within networks of medical knowledge that circulated throughout
30

colonial empires.

Even prior to Worcester’s appointment as Secretary of Health in 1901, military
officers in the Southern Philippines recognized the importance of medical infrastructures in
cementing the nascent colonial body. In 1900, General William Kobbé and Major James
Pettit worked to establish better sanitary conditions in Zamboanga. This was partially as a
means to protect American troops from real and perceived tropical environmental threats, but
also tied to state-building. Kobbé wrote about it in his diary alongside the opening of schools
and hiring of civil officials.

31

District Governor of Jolo Hugh Scott maintained

correspondence with the “sanitary engineer” George Barbour, who served Leonard Wood in
Cuba and followed him to Manila. Heading the “sanitary part of the Board of Health,”
Barbour kept Scott abreast of the latest developments in the fight against “rotten esteros,
filthy moats, and vacant spaces here and there throughout the city where filth is permitted to
accumulate and generate disease.”

32

Scott, fearing epidemiological crises on Jolo, read with

interest Barbour’s accounts of his struggles with the residents of Manila and native authorities
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to instill new sanitary standards. Concerns about epidemics were real and constant in the
Southern Philippines. A cholera epidemic in the Sulu Archipelago killed five thousand in
1902. The same year, several areas around Lake Lanao were affected, a situation exacerbated
by the series of running battles between local sultans and John Pershing’s troops. The
following year, Cotabato was afflicted, and in 1905 parts of Davao were quarantined.
Leonard Wood, visiting a Maranao leader soon after he arrived in the South, refused to eat
33

any food given to him besides the yolks of hard-boiled eggs for fear of contamination.

Allocating funds to public health initiatives during the military period was difficult.
The provincial treasury ran on a tight budget, and efforts to establish boards of health in 1905
were frustrated by limited personnel and resources. Although authorities in Manila wished to
incorporate the South into national health strategies, it was “the sense” of the Legislative
Council of the Moro Province that finances “were not sufficient to support such an elaborate
organization.” Instead, the council recommended that officials already serving in other
capacities be given the added task of staffing provincial health boards, and medical doctors be
hired part-time as consultants to give recommendations.

34

During Tasker Bliss’ first year as

governor, his reports on medical issues focused mainly on the health conditions of troops
stationed there. He fretted about incidences of venereal disease brought by soldiers previously
stationed in the Visayas (where sexual contact with natives was more common) and the rise
in cases of malarial fever despite the use of mosquito bars and quinine.

35

Writing to Bliss in

1906, the surgeon Charles Ewing also focused on the curing of venereal disease, the
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destruction of mosquito breeding sites around army posts, and compiling statistics on “days
lost” to sickness per month among the troops.

36

In some areas, private endeavours outpaced those of the government. Episcopal
Bishop Charles Brent opened up a hospital in Zamboanga with the intention of tending to
Moro patients. Moro children lived “in huddled fashion in one or two-room shacks where
filth and vermin abound,” Brent explained in a newspaper column some years later. He
outlined a plan to first cure Muslim children of “physical ailments – hookworm, malaria, skin
disease – which are common in tropical countries” and then educate them towards
conversion, or, at minimum to “emulate Christian conduct, citizenship and virtue.” Among
adults, Brent believed that “medical work [was] the most powerful avenue of
approach…without whose confidence we shall never be allowed to handle the children.”

37

The conduit for this work was the Zamboanga Hospital, operated and financed by the
Episcopal Church. Like government social projects, it often lacked funds, but remained
steadfast in its objective of attracting Muslim patients. Contract surgeon C.H. Halliday,
formerly posted elsewhere in Mindanao and at Augur Barracks on Jolo, was director of the
hospital during the First World War. He expressed astonishment that Moro men were coming
to the hospital of their “own free will” to request operations, and that Moro women had begun
38

staying in the facility overnight.

Still, the Samal Moros populating the Zamboanga

Peninsula remained skeptical of the hospital. In the second half of 1918, Moros represented
only 38 of the 421 in-patient treatments. The following year the hospital reported that 11
percent of in-patients were Moros. Muslim communities were more receptive to the hospital’s
dispensaries and in-home visits, and in 1918 Moros represented one-third of such
treatments.
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During the military period, government health initiatives came primarily in the form
of dispensaries. These small outposts provided basic medicines, limited treatments, and
information to communities, and acted to “bring the government into closer contact with the
people in a way that must impress them with its high motives.” By 1913, there were thirtyseven of them throughout the Moro Province. There were regional hospitals in Zamboanga
and Jolo, and the following year two more opened in Dansalan and Cotabato. Programs to
promote health and hygiene extended far beyond these modest facilities, however. The Board
of Health distributed literature to expectant mothers on how to care for their newborns, aimed
at “reducing the high rate of infant mortality among both civilized and uncivilized people of
all classes.” In provincial schools, district health officers distributed instructions on how to
treat and prevent communicable diseases. Reports were compiled on sanitary conditions of
school buildings, the effects of light and heat, and “the relation between health and
intellectual progress in the individual pupil.” Elsewhere, midwives were trained in “the most
recent sanitation and birthing practices,” and in Zamboanga daily collection and disposal of
human waste occurred.
In Jolo, residents used a special refuse pail designed by the Bureau of Health in
Manila, with the result being, according to government officials, a town that was probably
“the cleanest and most sanitary…in the Archipelago.” The government also began actively
tracking, capturing, and deporting lepers. Those identified as having the chronic infection
were quarantined at the San Ramon Penal Farm before being shipped to the Culion Leper
Colony. “The Moro does not take naturally to cleanliness, but it must be thrust upon him,”
declared John Pershing. “Recourse to arrest and even imprisonment is often necessary to
enforce sanitary rules among the uncivilized population.” Indeed, apart from the leper
population, the regime instituted medical surveillance schemes that occasionally led to
martial measures. An outbreak of surra among horses in Zamboanga, and local refusal to
abide by quarantine, caused the military to place guards in the affected district and forbid the
40

movement of animals within the city “until the danger had passed.”
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Government hospitals at Cotabato and Dansalan opened as planned in 1914, and that
year treated 749 and 192 patients, respectively. Governor Frank Carpenter claimed that
suspicious or hostile reactions to these facilities “rapidly changed to one of popular
acceptation and appreciation of hospital facilities, even to the surprising degree that women
of good families apply for admission.” Most medical work in Mindanao and Sulu, however,
was still done at dispensary stations or by roving personnel in the hinterlands. Carpenter
believed the work performed in these remote locations was important not only “from the
standpoint of medical and surgical relief” but also because it established “amicable contact
and control by the government over the Mohammedan and pagan communities within the
department.”

41

Medical work was an extension of the larger societal reconfiguration effort,

and although enforcement of sanitary regulations occasionally inspired resistance, in general
the emphasis on expanding the number of hospitals and dispensaries was accepted – this in
contrast to the oft violent responses to educational policies. Frank Carpenter, like the military
officers preceding him, viewed medical imperatives as part of a holistic approach to
civilizational transformation that included hospitals, schools, public works projects, sanitary
measures, and “other governmental operations…carried as far as the meager financial
42

resources would permit.”

The ambitious medical and sanitary agendas of colonial administrators during the
latter years of American rule were belied by the banal realities of governmental resource
allocation. In 1921, newly elected President Warren Harding sent a fact-finding mission led
by Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes, two of the staunchest Republican colonials, to
assess the effects of Filipinization on the state of the archipelago. Wood and Forbes from the
outset sought to push back against what they viewed as a hasty transition towards
independence implemented under outgoing Governor General Francis Burton Harrison. As
such, the two were inclined to dismiss developments in the Philippines between 1913 and
1921. Nevertheless, they also compiled a forthright report on the real shortcomings of
colonial projects. Citing statistics from the Philippine Health Service, they observed that
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cases of preventable diseases like typhoid, malaria, and tuberculosis were rising, and that
shortages of trained doctors, nurses, and sanitary personnel aggravated this. “Outside of the
largest towns,” the report stated, “hospitals are so few and far between that they are a
negligible quantity.” The Wood-Forbes Mission deemed care for the mentally ill (called
“insane” in the report) to be at a “medieval” level, and noted that there were only around 930
nurses in a nation of 10.5 million people.

43

Although Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes had a proverbial axe to grind,
reports on health conditions from Sulu and Lanao in the 1920s and 1930s confirm some of
their claims. On Jolo, for example, vaccination campaigns progressed incrementally and a
lack of medical surveys meant that a planned agricultural colony was placed in an area where
rates of malaria where astronomical (448 cases out of a total population of 1831). Sanitary
conditions at markets around the island had improved, but in places like Parang food was still
44

displayed on the ground.

A powerful typhoon that swept through Sulu in 1932 exacerbated

conditions, killing 175 people and leaving numerous families homeless.

45

The following year,

a report on schools called the lack of medicine in Sulu “pathetic.” Skin diseases were
rampant, and the only medical attention Tausūg youth received was when the division
46

supervisor visited their village or if one of their teachers had first aid training.

George

Dunham, a health advisor to the Governor General, toured the Sulu Archipelago in 1934 and
noted that the sheer number of outlying islands made travel difficult and time-consuming for
medical officers. He recommended that more female public nurses be hired to staff the
dispensaries and make “house visits to women and instruct them on health matters.” Decades
after Frank Carpenter wrote of using health measures in the pacification of non-Christian
populations, Dunham stressed the same idea: “Good public health work could be made a very
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effective means of promoting the acceptance of government by the Moro people. The benefits
accruing to the individual are direct and immediate and not conferred by force. Public health
work, especially public health nursing, always promotes a sympathetic understanding
47

between the people and a government.”

In Lanao, public health work also moved slowly. The vast majority of doctors and
nurses in the region, as elsewhere in the South, were Christian Filipinos, and this meant that
the local Maranaos were frequently suspicious of their motives. The early 1930s saw
successive campaigns against cholera, intestinal parasites, and malaria. The last of these was
stymied by a lack of quinine. Officials also complained that a policy of “attraction” resulted
in “slow attainment” of health objectives, but admitted that pursuing them by “force of law”
was likely to backfire. Maranao children had high incidences of measles and many also
48

developed bronchopneumonia from living in poorly ventilated spaces.

In 1933, the district

health officer for Lanao reported that the Maranao population represented the “most
discouraging difficulty” for medical personnel there. He claimed the Maranaos were
“intolerant and conservative in their mode of living” and as such were slow to adopt the latest
medical-sanitary technologies. Water contamination, resistance to the vaccination of children,
and a lack of properly constructed toilets contributed to the incidences of illness among the
Maranaos.

49

The Congregationalist missionary Frank Laubach, living amidst the Maranaos during
the 1930s, viewed health, hygiene, education, and morality in interactive terms. In 1933, he
brought groups of Maranaos from the area surrounding Dansalan together to discuss “the
filthy condition” of Lake Lanao. The people of the area had no toilets and used the lake,
contaminating it in the process. They then bathed in the lake and contracted skin diseases.
Laubach wanted them to begin using toilets, but understood that the process had to be
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“approached with tact” lest there be “revolt and trouble.”

50

He encouraged leading datus to

install modern toilets, and published letters from the public health officer Juan Fernando in
his newspaper. “As District Health Officer,” wrote Fernando in the Lanao Progress, “I wish
to push on the work of my predecessors on vaccination and immunization against smallpox,
cholera, typhoid and dysentery. I wish to diminish, if I can, the ravages of hookworm and
other intestinal parasites. This problem cannot be solved without sanitary disposal of human
waste. In other words, more sanitary toilets should be constructed throughout the province.”

51

Youth attendees of Laubach’s school in Dansalan began taking local doctors and nurses back
to their communities to explain the “laws of health,” and Laubach arranged for the visit of a
nurse-representative of the Nestlé and Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Company to
demonstrate “how to use the various kinds of canned milk” to fifty nursing Maranao
mothers.

52

Spurred on by Laubach, a minor health panic broke out in 1933 over the proposed
opening of a dancehall in Dansalan. The municipal council of the town voted to grant the
business a cabaret license at the cost of ₱600. Town counselors told Laubach that they were
embarrassed when they attended events at the home of the provincial governor or the
Officers’ Club because they did not know how to dance, and thought the new hall would
remedy this. For Laubach, the desire for a dancehall illustrated “the danger of
misunderstanding what a high civilization is” and believed the Maranaos only wanted the
establishment because it would help them “become acceptable members of the aristocracy of
Dansalan.” The threat of the dancehall was moral and existential. Laubach saw Protestant
ethics as a bulwark against the ethically bereft aspects of Western civilization. “If you take
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missions out of the Orient and out of Africa,” he wrote to his father, “civilization is likely to
be very much more of a curse than a blessing. The people are likely to be attracted by the
clamor of its gaudy evil and to reject the more difficult aspects of civilization like
53

education.”

To counteract support for the dancehall, Laubach enlisted his “trusted” Maranao
worker Hadji Pambayo to speak to municipal counselors and other supporters of the business.
Laubach, his wife, and his employees used venereal disease as a scare tactic, claiming that
“half of the girls” who visited cabarets were “immoral and that the diseases of vice spread
quickly wherever they are.” Pambayo informed the counselors and local panditas that an
“epidemic of venereal disease” would likely follow the opening of the dancehall, and that the
establishment would bring in prostitutes. Lecturing to the Moros, Laubach and his wife
warned that a certain sexually-transmitted infection (tellingly they did not specify which one)
was “the most killing disease on earth, worse than tuberculosis, pneumonia, cholera, or
smallpox or any other disease and that according to statistics, it claims more people…this
54

disease has not yet gotten a start in Dansalan but this dance will bring it in.”

Speaking about

the moral-medical effects of the dancehall, Laubach and his supporters drew from entrenched
anxieties of the diseased and sexually licentious female corrupting morally weak men.
Tapping into fears of difference and aberration from gender norms, Laubach spoke of “a
woman dressed like a man, who has for many years been trafficking in girls and supplying
them for cabarets” as being one of the principal parties behind the new dancehall. These
tactics worked, and the pandita who was bankrolling the project withdrew his support.
Laubach, in a subsequent letter to his father, expressed relief that “the evil thing” was
55

banished.

Colonial dialogues during the period folded public health measures, personal hygiene,
municipal sanitation, moral and ethical considerations, and education into a larger narrative
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that defined a perceived unclean past against a present rigorously sanitized through the efforts
56

of official and non-official Western actors.

For Frank McCoy, the years prior to the

American arrival in the Southern Philippines were ones of cholera and bubonic plague
epidemics, “roaming lepers,” malnutrition, and a general lack of public sanitation. Writing in
1925, he argued that “sanitary organization,” at first “bitterly opposed,” had succeeded in
suppressing plague, smallpox, cholera, malaria, bubonic plague, dysentery, and “reduced the
death rate, and greatly improved health conditions in which its rules have been respected and
57

enforced.” In Mindanao and Sulu, medical and sanitary infrastructures had developed by
the early 1930s. Each province had at least one hospital under the supervision of the
Philippine Heath Service (PHS). Zamboanga, for example, had three PHS hospitals, one
supervised by the Bureau of Prisons, one military hospital, two private hospitals, and twenty
dispensaries scattered around the province. The Sulu Archipelago had a lone hospital, but
nineteen small dispensaries throughout its islands.

58

As small as some of these facilities were,

the above numbers still represented an impressive expansion of medical services and modern
medicines into areas previously unreached. The unpleasant grammar of colonial medicine,
awash in notions of racial and civilizational capacity, was moderated by some of its objective
practical benefits: the construction of small clinics in rural areas, increased access to
medicine, decreased mortality rates from preventable disease, and the dissemination of useful
health information.

The Marketplace and the Field
i.) The Moro Exchange System
On 14 June 1904, the Legislative Council of the Moro Province passed into law Act No. 55,
bearing the comically ponderous title: “An Act Appropriating the Sum of One Thousand
Eight Hundred and Fifty Pesos, Philippine Currency, or so Much Thereof as may be

56

See Anne McClintock’s writing on the connections between imperial notions of racial hygiene and the
development of a global consumer capitalist order in the late colonial period. See Chapter Five, “Soft-Soaping
Empire: Commodity Racism and Imperial Advertising,” in Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather, 207-231.
57
58

Report on the Philippines, 1925, Box 82. Frank McCoy Papers, LOC-MD.

Report from Teopisto Guingona to Frank Murphy, 23 February 1934, Box 29, Folder 8. J.R. Hayden Papers,
BHL.

138

Necessary, for the Construction in the Municipality of Zamboanga of a Public Market for the
Especial Use of the Moro and Other Non-Christian Inhabitants of the District of Zamboanga,
59

and Providing for the Administration Thereof.”

This piece of legislation marked the

founding of what was soon called the Moro Exchange, an experiment in the moral effects of
commerce on the non-Christian residents of the Southern Philippines. Ideologically aligned
with industrial-educational projects aimed at transforming schooling in the region, the Moro
Exchange system represented the victory of the modern marketplace over the stifling dictates
of indigenous traditionalism. When combined with access to vocational training, officials
believed the Moro Exchange would free the peasantry of Mindanao and Sulu from the
oppressive yoke of the datuship and the exploitation of the Chinese merchant. By
participating in the Moro Exchanges and other limited forms of market capitalism the Moros
were, in the words of Michael Hawkins, “entering the universal narrative of progress from
which they had been excluded for thousands of years.”

60

The Exchange at Zamboanga was

opened in early September 1904 with a colourful inauguration ceremony. Visiting the
Exchange two months later with Datu Mandi, Samal leader on the Zamboanga Peninsula, W.
Cameron Forbes observed people flocking “to the place by thousands” and “delighted to find
they can get good prices themselves…Datu Mandi told me they were contented, extending
61

cultivation in all directions and well pleased generally.”

The Moro Exchange system was a product of John Park Finley, the meteorologist
turned civilizing agent whom we encountered at Lake Mohonk in Chapter Two. As District
Governor of Zamboanga, Finley controlled the main hub of commercial activity in the
Islamic Philippines. Zamboanga was also the seat of colonial power in the region, allowing
for close monitoring of the initial Moro Exchange. The project’s first building was a tall
thatched-roof structure, open at its ends and lined on either side with the booths and stalls of
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vendors. Finley and his crew organized the space into sections for the different types of
products sold. The fish department had forty stalls where local fisherman displayed their
daily catch, small farmers and foragers sold “jungle produce” like coconuts and camotes, and
local artisans peddled their brass work. A small restaurant staffed by Samal Moro women and
children sold prepared foods. Adjacent to the Exchange’s main building was a lodging house
where travelling vendors could spend the night for a small fee. The entire complex was
surrounded by a wooden stockade, and had its own security officers. When journalist
Atherton Brownell visited the Moro Exchange, he noted that trading methods “well known”
to Americans were for the Moros “an absolute revelation.” Brownell, a staunch supporter of
Finley in the press, praised the “civilizing influence” of the district governor’s
“experiment.”

62

The Exchange was run by an executive board, led by Finley and Zamboanga District
Secretary John R. Proctor, whose officers included local leaders from the peninsula and the
nearby island of Basilan. This included Datu Mandi, Datu Hadji Nuno, and Datu Pedro
Cuevas. The board met regularly to deliberate over organizational matters and settle disputes
arising from the operation of the Exchange complex, with a particular emphasis on matters
63

involving Chinese traders.

Finley believed that if the Moros and Lumads of the Southern

Philippines were to be uplifted they needed simultaneous discipline and protection. The
punitive nature of military rule provided the former, while the latter was strictly enforced by
“regulations in the conduct of Moro Exchanges as will protect the non-Christians against
exploitation in the sale of their property, products of their labor, and in the purchase of such
supplies as may be needful for them.” Here Finley had in mind the injurious debt
relationships that local Samal Moros often had with the Chinese merchant class, who
controlled commerce in the small communities of the Zamboanga Peninsula. To remedy this,
he created strict guidelines that set fixed rates for market licenses, forbade bartering within
the Exchange, prevented the undervaluation of native labour, provided for the construction of
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new buildings should expansion occur, and assigned a series of superintendents and
supervisory agents to carry out these measures.

64

In 1905, Secretary of War William Howard Taft visited Zamboanga on an official
tour. While there, Finley provided carriages for Taft and his delegation to travel to and from
the Moro Exchange, where they were encouraged to buy local manufactures and shown how
the marketplace had an inherently civilizing effect upon the colonial subjects.

65

Taft saw “the

actual proof of what had been suggested and undertaken in the face of incredulity” and
although the traders had some trouble breaking the large twenty-peso bills used by the
delegates, Atherton Brownell reported that there was “little suggestion that these merchants
were business infants of less than one year of age.” The Samal had “quickly learned the law
of supply and demand” and doubled their prices when Taft and the congressmen of the
delegation arrived.

66

Finley became so convinced of the effectiveness of the Exchange that he started using
it in conjunction with the suppression of anti-government movements. On Basilan Island, just
off the coast of Zamboanga, a revolt broke out in late 1907, led by a local religious figure
named Salip Agil. At issue, predictably, was the imposition of government taxes. After the
killing of two American lumbermen and a Chinese merchant on the island, Finley led a force
of six hundred U.S. Army and Philippine Constabulary troops to confront Agil. Cordoning
off the island and conducting thorough searches, Finley’s men captured Agil and killed some
67

of his followers. To quell unrest, Finley and his men immediately setup Moro Exchanges at
the Rancherias of Bojelebung, Amaluy, Cambingbing, Guiong, LeMut, Malusu, Lunpinigan,
Lamitan, Panigayan, and Lahi Lahi. Many of these were tiny settlements and the Exchanges
acted as the primary state presence in them. Finley claimed that they were opened by the
express request of the Yakan Moros who inhabited Basilan’s interior. He boasted in a
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memorandum that the Yakan were now paying taxes and visiting Zamboanga. “All of this
changed now,” Finley wrote, “and prosperity, peace and contentment reigns among these
thousands of picturesque savages. The Moro Exchange is the industrial and commercial
school that opens a hopeful future to these benighted people, once the ignorant and
68

downtrodden slaves of a Mohammedan satrap.”

At an estimated 110,000 residents in 1908, the Zamboanga district was one of the
most populous in the Southern Philippines. By that time, twenty-five Exchanges had opened
up around the peninsula and business was brisk. Figures from 1907-08 show total sales had
grown to ₱573,875.05, up from ₱102,747.66 in the inaugural year of the Exchange. Although
global decreases in the price of hemp and copra hurt profits in the year the report was
compiled, the Exchanges had an admirable number of products on offer. Fish comprised the
largest share of sales, at ₱134,319.00, with Moro-run restaurants coming second at a distant
₱31,848.26. Eggs, copra, dry fish, chickens, shellfish, rice, cattle, and fruits all sold well, and
other items on the list included firewood, agricultural implements, mats, vegetables, calapia,
palay, bejuco, and beeswax. In the same report, Finley commented that conducting a
“righteous colonial policy” meant respecting “the beliefs, the customs, and the traditions of
the subjugated or the protected peoples, so far as such consideration is not repugnant to the
requirements of human good, as measured by the judgment of the Christian nations of the
69

earth.” In the Moro Exchange system, indigenous customs were respected so long as they
coincided with the moral standards of Anglo-Saxon culture.
Atherton Brownell again reported on the Moro Exchanges in 1911 for Outlook,
rehashing some of the material from six years prior but also adding new observations. A
picture of the stalls at the main building in Zamboanga, now more solidly built, was
captioned “The Market of Civilization” and Brownell praised Finley for channeling the skills
of Moro tradespeople into a productive system. Property rights were respected, according to
Brownell, and murder had ceased. This in a place where a “human life could be valued at six
spittoons and where property rights never existed.” The Exchange complex at Zamboanga
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expanded to ten buildings, with “cattle sheds, [a] tool-house, wood and lumber yards, chicken
70

pens, goat pens, latrines, dormitory, and water supply.”

The number of Exchanges in the

region rose to thirty-two, although the volume of business never again reached its 1906-07
high of ₱795,768.00, something Finley attributed to fluctuations in the demand for hemp and
71

forest products.

Brownell observed these developments and declared to Outlook’s

readership that the benefits of the Moro Exchanges could not “be estimated entirely in dollars
72

and cents or in pesos and centavos. Its moral effect is the factor of greatest value.”

Despite Finley’s incessant promotional efforts, opposition to the Moro Exchange
system grew within the government of the Moro Province. Governor John Pershing
personally disliked Finley and removed him from office in April 1912. Finley’s subsequent
communications with representatives of the Sublime Porte in Constantinople and refusal to
excuse himself from the politics of the Southern Philippines further strained relations
73

between the two.

In his 1913 annual report, Pershing described a “full investigation” of the

system of Exchanges that had taken place the previous year. The findings of the investigation,
contrary to Finley and Brownell’s boosterism, reflected negatively upon the Moro Exchanges.
“The people of Zamboanga district are decidedly opposed to the continuation or
reestablishment of Moro markets or Moro exchanges as they were formerly conducted,”
wrote Pershing. District Governor George A. Helfert, brought in to replace Finley, was
quoted extensively, and believed that the Exchange system “did not bring forth beneficial
results either for the non-Christian inhabitants of the District of Zamboanga or for the
government, but even worked hardship on the farmer, and had the opposite effect upon the
74

hill people from that which was desired.”
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At the beginning of 1913, the operation of the Exchanges was given to Charles R.
Morales, the new head of the Industrial Office. Morales was even more emphatic than Helfert
in his condemnation of Finley’s development of the Exchanges:
The Moro exchange agents compelled the people of the surrounding
country to take their products to such a market; even though they could sell
such products elsewhere to better advantage than in the market where there
was no demand or prospective buyers for their products. Such requirements,
together with the fee of one per cent that was charged at these markets for
every peso or part of a peso’s worth of products that was sold at the Moro
exchange, have made these institutions very unpopular among the Moro and
Pagan people of this Province.

75

A portion of this negative assessment undoubtedly arose from Finley’s ignominious exit from
the Moro Province, although the swift dissolution of the Exchange system after his departure
suggests merit to the claims of Helfert and Morales that it was genuinely unpopular amongst
those it was meant to serve. Convinced of the righteousness of his civilizing endeavour,
Finley enforced, through his agents, a system of commerce that became coercive and
unresponsive to local conditions.
John Finley’s zealousness continued after his long term as District Governor of
Zamboanga concluded. In September 1912, he had Leonard Wood, an early supporter of his
work, pass along his observations about the industrial transformation of the Moros to
President Taft. In his report to Taft, Finley credited the Exchanges for an array of beneficial
effects. They had, he wrote, created a sense of civic duty among the Moros. More schools had
been opened, public works projects completed, and contacts between communities facilitated
because of the Exchange system. Modern “sanitary methods of living” and the use of Western
medicines had increased, and on farms the latest agricultural techniques were adopted. Falling
crime rates and the success of the disarmament campaign could likewise be attributed to the
effects of the Exchanges. In the previous decade, the marketplace, as imagined by Finley, had
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“developed a new idea of life among all classes, a spirit of toleration, a respect for the rights
of others, opportunities for development, new relationships, new acquaintances and a broader
76

field of view.”

Excluded from a role in the government of the Southern Philippines, John Finley took
his commercial evangelism to the pages of scholarly journals in the United States. Unlike
Pershing and his subordinates, Finley believed the Exchanges were an unmitigated success –
an “awakening” of peoples previously slumbering in primitivism. In the North American
Review, he contrasted the religious proselytism of the Spanish with his own commercialindustrial proselytism. An “indefinite period of military control” was necessary to completely
transform the region, Finley wrote, while in the meantime the Moro Province was already
being transitioned to the civilian-led Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Likely unaware that
his grand project was at that moment being dismantled, Finley provided his clearest statement
of purpose in this article: “The Moro Exchange System has become the active agent for
wakening the commercial spirit of the uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, has become a
powerful instrument for peace and unity among Moros and Pagans, and is serving the public
by materially aiding in the collection of public revenues, and thus providing for the general
77

progress of the community.”

Despite his exile, John Finley’s vision for the Moros and Lumads of the Southern
Philippines remained the purest articulation of the missionary capitalist spirit that drove many
of the colonials in the region. The concept of redemption and transformation through labour
and the marketplace did not simply vanish when the Moro Exchange system was abolished in
1913. Industrial and agricultural education remained the linchpin in efforts to develop
Muslim populations. Outside of the schoolhouse and marketplace, Americans and Christian
Filipinos applied a similar moral outlook on commerce and development in their efforts to
populate and render productive the interior of Mindanao.
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ii.) “Model Colonies”
Writing to Tasker Bliss in early 1908, John McAuley Palmer outlined plans for a model
agricultural colony on the northern side of Lake Lanao. Although his military tour was over
and he had returned to Fort Douglas in Utah, the former District Governor of Lanao believed
that his designs for turning the Maranao Moros into productive agriculturists could still be
used by the colonial authorities. The proposed colony would have fifty Maranao Moro
families, each with a forty-acre homestead where they would grow crops. An initial outlay of
resources and funds by the government was necessary, but the colony would quickly become
self-subsisting as each colonist family raised the crops required to feed themselves. Certain
minimums would be allotted for export crops like coffee, cacao, and tobacco, which the
families would grow to pay off their debts to the government and, later, make profit.
McAuley had planned the colony extensively enough to provide Bliss with monetary
estimates for the costs to pay for seed, carabao, rice and food, plows, and small farming
implements in the early stages of the experiment. He also provided a chart with estimated
monetary results, which suggested that after five years the colony could be profitable, and
that its successes would generate replications of the model elsewhere in the region. The
“security and prosperity” of these government colonies would allow for the expansion of
small industry like cloth and metalwork. Public works projects would likewise benefit, as
settlers were assigned mandatory periods where they would labour for the government. “The
greatest advantages of the colonies,” according to Palmer, “would be political. The success of
78

the settlers in the colony would be an object lesson to other Moros.”

Letters, reports, newspaper articles and other materials from this period illustrate the
extent to which authorities believed that the colonial domestication of space in Mindanao was
crucial to civilizing efforts. The experimental farms and agricultural colonies envisioned by
officials like John McAuley Palmer were the final stage of an educational model oriented
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towards creating small landholders. With fields to oversee and produce to sell, the nonChristians of the Southern Philippines would be rendering previously ‘useless’ territory
productive and tying their own fates to the success or failure of the colonial project, thus
lessening the likelihood of resistance. Mindanao was seen as so bountiful that its insufficient
population needed supplementations of Christian settlers from Luzon and the Visayas. At the
top of the settlement pyramid was a planter class of Americans and Europeans (and later
Japanese) who oversaw vast commercial farming operations, many of which were located in
the Davao region. Land and questions of economic productivity, so central to the American
colonial imagination, became the crucible of the civilizing project and, later, the quest to
create a coherent Filipino national identity.

79

As illustrated in Chapter Two, Mindanao was subject to a variety of settlement plans
in the early years of the American era. Most of these were fanciful – like one call in 1906 to
populate the island with Italians and Greeks – and amounted to nothing.

80

However,

Mindanao still drew a fair number of Westerners to it. Patricio Abinales and others have done
excellent work on the American planter class in the Southern Philippines. These men and
women represented a small but important presence in Mindanao throughout the first-half of
the twentieth-century, although the Filipinization of the South and the influx of Japanese
migrants gradually displaced them in the two decades prior to the Second World War.

81

Vic

Hurley, author of several popular books on the region, spent time as a planter in Mindanao
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during the 1920s and 1930s, and his memoirs provide insight into how he and other ambitious
young Americans pursued wealth on the colonial frontier through the growth of hemp,
82

coconuts, abaca, rubber trees, and other tropical products.

It was not uncommon for

officials from the government, military, and Constabulary to transition into plantation work
after their service ended. For example, Luther R. Stevens, one-time Governor of Lanao and a
colonel in the Constabulary, became a manager of a sixty thousand hectare coconut plantation
83

at Malabang.

The fortunes of the planter class, mentioned elsewhere in this dissertation, can

be read alongside much larger attempts to repurpose land and peoples in the region through
agricultural colonization.
Land reform and settlement were priorities during the period of American military
rule, although large colonization schemes did not gather speed until Frank W. Carpenter
became governor. Correspondence between Leonard Wood and Tasker Bliss from 1906
indicated an unease shared by both men about introducing non-Christian settlers into
predominantly Muslim and Lumad areas, although Wood did discuss his attempts to induce
Moros to claim up to sixteen hectares of land from the government for cultivation.
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Bliss,

writing in 1907, was skeptical of any expansion of white colonization in Mindanao, stating
his belief that “the white man will never come here in such numbers as to make even a
beginning of ousting the native from his occupation of the soil.” Bliss thought that in time the
natives would “fully occupy the soil as to leave no room for the white man should the latter
desire to come, except as he comes with the limited number and the limited purposes with
which he has come to other Eastern countries.” First the “greater part of the Cotabato Valley”
and later most of Mindanao was being designated as public land, and through its regulation
and development the region would flourish.
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The civilian officials replacing the army men believed that the settlement of
undeveloped or underutilized tracts of land was of preeminent importance. This sentiment
grew as the colonial administrative class was Filipinized. Christian Filipino settlers from
Luzon and the Visayas would be used to people Mindanao’s virginal frontier spaces, while
Muslim and Lumad populations could themselves be induced to enter into similar schemes,
albeit semi-segregated from the influx of new migrants for security reasons. The first major
settler colonies were located in the large valley running along the banks of the Rio Grande,
about ninety kilometers upstream from the town of Cotabato. Two settlements began
simultaneously, one for Christians and one for Maguindanao Moros - the latter group being
86

settled near Datu Piang’s homestead at his request.

Authorities transferred an additional

five companies of the Philippine Constabulary to Mindanao to assist in the “protection and
87

regulation” of the colonies.

The colonies, established by two separate governmental acts

(2254 and 2280), were comprised of settlers vetted by colonial authorities for suitability
before assignment. The colony itself was a “practical school of agriculture” where the
settlers, under the tutelage of instructors, were trained in selecting the best land for certain
crops, cultivating that land, planting and harvesting their crops, and marketing those crops.
Colonists were encouraged to participate in the maintenance of public order, and their
children attended local schools that focused exclusively on training future farmers.

88

The small colonies in Cotabato were part of a larger scheme to draw the “partially
nomadic inhabitants” of the South into sedentist lifestyles, and help ease population pressures
in the Northern Philippines. Brought into proximity with one another through well-organized

appreciate and benefit by the homestead privileges of the Philippine public land act. The homestead of 16
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colonies, planners hoped the two populations would blend “into a homogenous whole.”
Agricultural colonies were the forge upon which formerly landless and culturally suspect
groups could be reshaped into ideal Filipino citizens: land owning, economically productive,
and politically quiescent. In 1914, Frank Carpenter observed that Christian and Muslim
colonists were beginning to trade with one another, attend each other’s festivals, and compete
in field sports. These displays of social harmony demonstrated, Carpenter believed, the
wisdom of using the colonies to cement national identity. The Maguindanao Moros would
“consciously emulate the higher type of civilization” and the “more constant and diligent
89

directed labor” of their “more civilized Christian fellow colonist.”

As at Bishop Brent’s

school or John Finley’s Moro Exchanges, proselytism occurred in the field and the
marketplace rather than at the pulpit. Carpenter was careful to discourage active religious
missionary work in the colonies lest the Muslims consider the missionaries government
agents. In letters from the period, Carpenter stressed that the government should tread
carefully on matters of religion, as he correctly assumed conversionary overtures would be
90

met with hostility.

In the colonization plans, Christian settlers were shipped from the “sterile mountain
sides” of Cebu to the Cotabato Valley. Male settlers had to be married and willing to bring
their families with them, and were required to stay for a minimum of five years. After signing
a contract, the government helped colonists pay off their personal debts, and advanced them
an interest-free loan to cover travel expenses to Mindanao. Upon arriving in Cotabato, the
colonist was given basic survival tools, building materials, a carabao, and a plow for
cultivation. The proceeds from the sale of his first year’s crops were kept entirely by the
colonist, after which the government took 35 percent of income derived from agricultural
products until the colonist’s debt amortization ended. Experts were brought in to speak with
the colonists about land management practices, recent scientific advances in agricultural
practices, the marketing of their products, and the establishment of schools and hospitals.
Christian colonists were provided sixteen hectares of land per family, while the Moros
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received eight hectares. At the time of Carpenter’s report, there were forty Moro families
living on the colony near Dulawan under the supervision of a sherif, although the governor
claimed a further 1,500 were eager to be integrated into the program. “Had I the necessary
funds with which to pay for surveys, and purchase work cattle and implements,” wrote
Carpenter, “I could place more than ninety-five percent of the Mohammedans and pagans of
the Cotabato District on homesteads in the most fertile and easily cultivated portions of the
district within the next twelve months, transferring them from their present state of almost
non-productiveness to one of great economic value to this country.” The “great forward
movement” of the colonization scheme would contribute to the “general betterment and
civilization” of non-Christians, and within a generation they would “compare favourably with
91

any producing community in the Islands of the Orient.”

Life in these remote colonies was far from ideal. Although Carpenter and other
officials had expansive plans, in 1914 they were still in their infancy. The headquarters of the
Cotabato Agricultural Colony #1 was a solidly built two-storey structure, but all the homes of
colonists were rudimentary nipa-thatched huts of one or two rooms. Mainly built along river
flats, where there was easily cleared wild grass but little forest, they were prone to damage
from flooding. Colonists relied upon the irregular visits of government steamers for supplies,
and lived an isolated existence in a foreign environment.

92

The system of share tenancy and

the reliance on purchasing supplies from the state led some critics of the program to argue
that Carpenter was overseeing a system of peonage wherein colonists were trapped in a cycle
of endless debt. Skeptics also claimed the settlement schemes stifled private investment in the
region by limiting land sales and prohibiting individual merchants from operating in the
colonies. Carpenter responded by saying he was protecting the colonists and native
inhabitants of the region from predation, citing a case he encountered at Sarangani where an
independent American trader was selling natives “six peso rice for seventeen pesos.” The
colony system, he claimed, would be more beneficial than any other tenancy system in Asia
“or in fact anywhere in the United States of which I am informed.” Colonists, quickly free of
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debt, would make Mindanao productive. If his plan were given a chance, Carpenter would
stake his life “that the so-called ‘Moro Problem’ would not be one of public order, but of
93

securing markets for our produce.”

Many of Carpenter’s statements come from correspondence with Dean Worcester, the
University of Michigan academic who shaped American notions of the peoples of the
Philippine Archipelago. In 1913, Worcester bitterly resigned as Secretary of the Interior for
the Insular Government to make way for Democrat-aligned administrators seeking to
accelerate the process of Filipinization. Worcester, who railed loudly against Filipinization in
the American press, went into private business in the Southern Philippines, focusing on
coconut growing. He remained active in political intriguing, and wrote Frank Carpenter a
long letter detailing his problems with the colonization scheme. Worcester’s criticisms
derived from the deep racial-paternalist skepticism he and other old guard Republican
colonials felt towards Philippine independence. Allowing Filipinos to run their agricultural
colonies without strict long-term oversight, Worcester believed, guaranteed failure. The
Filipinos would not pay their debts, and if they did they would mismanage their land to the
point of collapse. Moving into even grimmer territory, Worcester argued there was also the
possibility that “some Moro fanatic will break loose in one of your colonies some day and
chop up the population.” The agricultural colonies were doomed to failure because they put
too much faith in the Filipino. “This is a white man’s job, and it will take a mighty good
white man to do it,” Worcester wrote. “I have tackled similar jobs and I know what I am
talking about.” The Moros could only be controlled through decades of strong Anglo-Saxon
tutelage, and failing this the agricultural colonies were doomed to failure. At the end of his
letter, Worcester told Carpenter that he had the “opportunity to become a second Rajali
Brooke,” citing the example of the British sovereign of Sarawak, if he managed the region
properly.

94

Contrary to expectation, the Maguindanao people of Cotabato did not clamor to leave
their homes for the agricultural colony. Residents of Moro communities in the region were

93
94

Letter from Frank Carpenter to Dean Worcester, 13 May 1914, Box 1. Dean Worcester Papers, BHL.
Letter from Dean Worcester to Frank Carpenter, 7 August 1914, Box 1. Dean Worcester Papers, BHL.

152

settled among kin and already had livelihoods. Why should they uproot themselves and move
to some lonely patch of land where their mode of living would be dictated by the ‘scientific
methods’ of government administrators? During the first year of operation in 1914, the
colonies had 774 families, and in 1915 this grew to 940 families. More than half of the
residents in 1915 (2,682) were Moros, while the rest were Christians from the North. During
the following five years, the colonies suffered a variety of misfortunes. According to Peter
Gowing, in 1918-1919 “a great flood occurred in the Cotabato Valley, destroying most of the
crops growing in the colonies. The plants which survived the flood were soon killed by a
severe drought. Added to these calamities were smallpox and influenza epidemics among the
colonists. The colony at Glan also suffered an earthquake in 1918 which was followed by a
malaria epidemic.” Rinderpest-infected cattle and locust swarms further decimated the
settlements. In 1919, the number of families (943) remained nearly unchanged from five
years earlier, contradicting government projections that the colonies would expand rapidly.

95

Moro settlement schemes fizzled, but settlers from Cebu and other islands in the
North continued arriving independently, a trend that only increased as more Filipinos
replaced American officials. Datu Piang, once an enthusiastic supporter of the colonization
project, became disillusioned with it. In 1927, he wrote to President Calvin Coolidge to give
“the great American people…a clear conception of our situation.” What followed were a
series of fevered entreaties. The Americans, Piang asserted, had created a system wherein
Moros fell victim to the predominantly Filipino officer class of the Constabulary. Moro
homes were “violated,” their altars “desecrated,” entire families were “wiped out,” and
“bribery, fraud, [and] chicanery” had “marked the whole period.” Moro lands had been
“parceled out and granted to Filipinos” through colonization schemes, and places of worship
96

converted into “pig walls or grog shops.” The anti-Filipino vitriol of Piang’s letter was
extreme to the point of race hatred, although also a clear indication of just how alarmed – and
fearful – Muslims in the Southern Philippines were about Filipino migration to the region.
Piang correctly saw the system as rigged. Administrators from state bureaucracies dominated
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by Filipinos aided incoming settlers. When Muslim populations were considered, it was in
terms of marginalizing the threat they posed to the settlers. Those Moros who gained a spot in
government were expected to orient themselves towards nation-building, and an important
part of that agenda involved settling the Southern Philippines.
Reports from Manila in the 1930s illustrate the importance of colonization schemes to
the idea of Philippine nationhood. The Bureau of Lands worked alongside the Bureau of NonChristian Tribes to make the process as frictionless as possible. “Homeseekers” from Luzon
and the Visayas entered into tenancy agreements with the government similar to the ones
provided to the early settlers in Cotabato – travel and start-up costs covered by a small loan, a
tract of land and agricultural guidance, and a short debt repayment window. The Bureau of
Lands indicated to the settlers where they could settle, and once they arrived in Mindanao the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, then responsible for overseeing the Southern Philippines,
steered them in the “right direction.” In terms of non-Christian populations, whose lands were
being encroached upon by settlers and large corporations, a committee established to examine
infrastructure in the South recommended they be settled onto reservations reserved
exclusively for them.

97

A separate report from the same period was even more proscriptive in its
recommendations. Compiled by Inocencio Elayda, an agricultural specialist, and Director of
Prisons Paulino Santos, formerly the District Governor of Lanao, the report claimed earlier
settlements failed because of poor surveying, an underutilization of natural resources to
furnish food and building materials, and a lack of proper guidance for incoming settlers. This
inevitably led to crop failures, impoverished living conditions, and the abandonment of
colonies. Through the selection of suitable colonists, sound agricultural training, and
expedient town planning, the colonization of the South could expand rapidly. Elayda and
Santos were convinced that there was a “need” for “Christian immigrants from the North to
balance its Non-Christian population.” Achieving this manufactured notion of balance would
be “highly effective in stimulating the Non-Christians to greater effort for their advancement
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in educational, social, and moral, as well as in material things.”

Teopisto Guingona, director

of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, agreed with Elayda and Santos’ assessment. In his
1934 annual report, he stated that such “peaceful penetration of new settlers, their diligent
industry and their good conduct [have] a great influence on the Mohammedans and Pagans of
Mindanao-Sulu in the latter’s attitude towards their neighbors and towards the government.”
Echoing Frank Carpenter two decades earlier, Guingona claimed that settlement and
development in the Southern Philippines were “a great factor in the solution of the so-called
Moro Problem.” New colonies were financed and supervised by government agencies in
99

Cotabato, Sulu, and Zamboanga.

Civilizing agendas continued to find expression through colonization plans during the
transitional Commonwealth period. The Government of the Philippines enthusiastically
promoted settlement and infrastructural advancement. In March 1936, the new President of
the Commonwealth Manuel Quezon toured the “fertile unexplored lands” of the Cotabato
Valley and urged Christians and non-Christians alike to “take advantage of the opportunity
being offered them by the government for the development of the region.”
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That same year,

over eight thousand new vacant lots were created through the subdivision of lands in
Cotabato, Lanao, and Davao. Secretary of Lands José P. Dans encouraged settlers from areas
like Cebu and Bohol to move south.
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Plans were made to settle six thousand families along

the district boundary between Cotabato and Davao, facilitated by the massive expansion of
second class roads on the island that stretched from Misamis in the North to the Davao Penal
Colony in the South, and passing through Bukidnon, Lanao and Cotabato. Families would
settle along these roads. Long-term goals included railroad lines, the harnessing of several
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waterfalls for power generation, and legislation to expedite access for agricultural, industrial
and mining concerns looking to exploit the resources of Mindanao. “At the minimum expense
to the Commonwealth government, the present administration expects to see Mindanao fully
developed and wealth-producing land by the end of the Commonwealth transition period,
when the Filipino nation finally acquires its complete and absolute independence,” reported
102

the Manila Tribune.

The Maranao, Samal, and Maguindanaon populations living in the vicinity of
settlement colonies had little interest in uprooting their lives when they already had access to
the benefits of the Mindanao environment by virtue of birth. Nevertheless, the rapid influx of
Christian migrants and settlements in the Commonwealth period caused some Moros to apply
for homesteads, fearing that “public lands in Mindanao [were] rapidly falling into Christian
103

hands.”

The Moros could not combat the sheer scale of the migration from the North

through land applications, however. Government officials in Manila saw Mindanao as a
demographic steam valve that mitigated issues of overcrowding and resource allocation, and
readily said as much. Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce Eulogio Rodriguez stated in
1937 that
in Japan, Italy and Germany, all densely populated and where, figuratively
speaking, there is no elbow room to accommodate excess population, a
fundamental reason exists for these social problems. But in this country
there should be no such problems. We have excess lands and manpower and
force to develop these lands. What we need are no philosophers but a
practical grasp of the situation and actual migration work. We need strong
pioneering spirit; strong will and the national-spirited decision to develop
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our country, to move from place to place, to spread out and occupy our own
agricultural lands a patrimony which God has given us as a gift.

104

Reminiscent of those who settled the American frontier, Rodriguez legitimated the project of
internal colonization through religiously inspired rhetoric that envisioned the islands of the
archipelago as a historically immutable national entity.
The colonization of Mindanao never became the bedrock of cultural harmony
American colonial officials believed it would be when the settlement projects were first
launched. Nevertheless, the settlement boom that engulfed Mindanao after the Second World
War was made possible by the emphasis placed upon migration and transformation by the
Americans and Filipinos responsible for allocating land and resources in the colonial state.
Although the early agricultural settlements floundered, a reorganized settlement plan under
the Interisland Migration Division of the Bureau of Labour, which operated from 1919 until
1939, managed to attract 30-35,000 people to agricultural colonies by the mid-1930s. More
significant, the aggressive marketing of Mindanao in the press, first by Americans and later
by Filipinos, intensified independent migration to the island. During the entire colonial
period, Mindanao was “considerably above the national average” in population growth, and
since there was little migration from outside of the country (apart from the Japanese in
Davao, who constituted a small but important demographic) a “sizeable in-migration [was]
indicated.”

105

Demographics shifted accordingly. In Cotabato, for example, 113,875 residents

of a total 125,875 were Muslims and the remaining 12,000 were Lumads, according to the
1903 census. The 1939 census showed a total population of 298,935, of whom 162,996 were
Muslim and 70,493 Lumad. This indicates a significant influx of Christian settlers into a
region where previously none lived.

106

In Lanao, a province considered comparatively hostile

to settlement by Christians, there was still a net migration of 163,990 people between the
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1903 and 1939, and in Christian-majority regions like Davao and Misamis the numbers were
also statistically significant.

107

If the agricultural colonies, with their dreams of integration, did not become the
standard for settlement, the exaggerated success stories promulgated in the North instilled in
many Christian Filipinos, especially in the Visayas, the idea that Mindanao was a place for
personal reinvention and financial gain. This, alongside real population pressures and wealth
disparities in Luzon and the Visayas, generated a natural migratory momentum. Between
1946 and 1960, there occurred what Patricio Abinales calls “the most massive movement of
Filipinos in the history of the nation.” Mindanao’s annual growth rate, at 7.4 percent, was
double that of the rest of the Philippines, and its population reached over five million by
1960.

108

At this time, one quarter of the residents of Mindanao (1,200,000 people) reported

being born outside of the island, and a further 365,798 people had moved between provinces
within Mindanao. Combined, this meant that one third of the inhabitants on the island could
109

be considered migrants.

Settlement and commercial development throughout Mindanao

were a lasting legacy of American colonialism, and were enthusiastically embraced by
110

Christian Filipinos.
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Chapter Four / Civilizational Imperatives (II)
The Classroom and the Mission House

In the Islamic Philippines, U.S. colonials encountered forms of education divergent from
those in the Christian North. In the Visayas and Luzon, Catholic religious orders had
overseen a process of educational acculturation in line with Spanish colonial objectives. The
partial and unstable colonization of Mindanao and Sulu by Spain meant that in the South
preexisting indigenous educational structures were able to operate with little interference.
This inability to conquer the Muslim regions of the Philippines led the Spanish to concentrate
their resources on the military and political subjugation of these areas, when they were
focusing on them at all. In short, the conditions necessary to develop and operate school
systems on Mindanao and Sulu were not present. Jeffrey Ayala Milligan observes that
nineteenth-century Spanish census records from Muslim areas showed either no school
enrollment records or, as was the case in Zamboanga and Cotabato in 1866, enrollment as
1

low as 4-5 percent of eligible youth.

Islamic education came in the form of the pandita school, so-named after the religious
2

figure in the community who administered it. Here, the local youth learned the Arabic
alphabet, studied the Qur’an and other Islamic texts, and gained knowledge of the complex
genealogical histories that anchored their kinship networks. They were also instructed on
general issues of comportment, such as the proper way to greet an elder and the rituals that
3

accompanied prayer. The pandita schools provided, in essence, a roadmap for ways of living
within one’s family, community, ethnic group, and Islam itself. Although the form and
content of the schools varied between Moro groups, all focused on what Milligan describes as

1

Milligan, Islamic Identity, 41-42. Milligan’s work on education in Mindanao and Sulu connects the Spanish,
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“cultural reproduction through the socialization of Muslim youth into the traditions and
4

values of Muslim Filipino ethnic communities.” Such were the structures that the Americans
attempted to displace once they conquered the South.

The Tribulations of the Public School System
Civilization by way of education was a priority from the first. Negotiating with the Sultan of
Sulu in the summer of 1899, John Bates was given directives by General Elwell S. Otis,
military governor of the islands, to emphasize to the Tausūg ruler the benefits of imported
forms of education. Instructing “the rising generation of Moros in industrial and mechanical
pursuits through the medium of schools” was to be “impressed upon the Sultan and his
principal advisors.” Select Americans would be assigned to “go among and associate” with
the Tausūg people and “impart constant valuable information” through practical instruction.

5

The emphasis on industrial and agricultural skills remained a constant through the entire
American colonial period, as officials believed such training was the most expedient means
of civilizing their wards. During his time in the Sulu Archipelago, John Bates studied
regional histories and gave special attention to the British colonial presence in Malaya. He
noted that the British were able to curb rampant piracy and slaving partially through the
establishment of industrial schools, wherein promising Malays received training in a
6

colonially mediated setting.

Until the formation of the Moro Province in 1903, public schools operated in an ad
hoc fashion. Although officially run by the Department of Public Instruction in Manila, the
state of education varied by community. The operation of schools in areas with Catholic
populations was initially left to the religious orders, as was the case in Zamboanga. When the
army took over public education, they faced resistance from religious figures. William
Kobbé, military governor in the South, disciplined a Catholic priest, Father Vitrian, for
sermonizing against the secular school there. Kobbé also tried to assuage Vitrian’s fears by
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announcing that preexisting Spanish school laws allowed for the teaching of religion in public
7

schools. In some areas, providing education was left entirely to military men and their
relatives. At Malabang, on the coast of Ilana Bay southwest of Lake Lanao, J.H. Sutherland,
an army chaplain attached to the 23rd Infantry, established a school attended by forty pupils.
The mother of an infantry lieutenant, one Mrs. White, volunteered her services as a teacher
there alongside Sutherland. The two worked on a voluntary basis in a rented building, but
forwarded requests to Zamboanga “begging that a school-house be built, that it be furnished
with modern fixtures and that a teacher be sent [there] to direct the work along systematic
lines.” Stephen O. Fuqua, the officer in charge of Moro Affairs at Malabang, believed that the
Moros were beginning to understand that the American military had “a moral right” to be in
the Philippines and “in exercising that moral right it [was] striving to give the Moro light, to
educate his brain, to cultivate his habits, to polish his morals and to raise him from the state
of the semi-savage.”

8

The first concerted attempts to rigorously organize and operate schools in the
Southern Philippines came in 1903. Within months, Governor Wood and the Legislative
Council passed an act providing for “the establishment and maintenance of a public school
system in the Moro Province.” By the end of Wood’s tenure in 1906, the council had also
legislated disciplinary powers over students, including “reasonable corporal punishment,”
and, more importantly, and Act No. 167, which made school attendance compulsory for all
children between the ages of seven and thirteen. Parents failing to comply with the ordinance
were forced to pay a fine of between three and thirty pesos, and proof was required for an
absence to be excused. In passing the act, Leonard Wood and his legislative council
unknowingly created the legal foundation of a source of lasting tension between Moros and
the government.
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In a 1907 speech, Governor Tasker Bliss described the objectives of the public
schools. “We have no room in Moro Province for an idle class,” Bliss declared, “and we are,
therefore, going to teach your children not only the knowledge which comes from books but
the knowledge which comes from training in industrial and agricultural schools. The laborer
who produces something to add to the wealth of his country is to be far more respected than
the man who simply lives upon the production of others.” Bliss’ vision was of a Moro
Province transformed into a capitalist ideal, with development being driven by mines, forests,
and plantations. Its roads, he believed, would throng “with an industrious population bringing
this wealth to the market.” The governor admitted in his speech that “perhaps one tenth” of
the estimated thirty thousand eligible children in the province were attending schools, but was
confident that this number would soar when people realized “the value of the free gift which
10

the government holds out to you.”

As shown, American colonials frequently imagined

Mindanao as space of untapped potential, where myriad natural resources could be exploited.
Accomplishing this required not only ambitious white men to establish and oversee
operations, but also a pliant and well-trained indigenous labour force. Here the emphasis on
industrial and agricultural education met broader developmental agendas for the province.
These grandiose plans for the public school were at odds with realities at the local
level. Schools were frequently underfunded, as the government in Zamboanga assigned
resources to maintaining order and building transportation infrastructure. Posts outside of
built-up areas were difficult to get to and suffered from poor lines of communication. Most
importantly, the largest groups being targeted for education – Tausūg, Maranao,
Maguindanao, and Samal Moros – proved resistant to government agendas for their children.
Although the school system was not geared towards religious conversion, as some Moros
feared, it did operate as a tool of deculturation. Being educated in public schools meant
foregoing the traditional cultural knowledge provided by the pandita schools in favour of
colonially mandated values. The schools were the frontline in producing a generation of
quiescent Moros whose ideas and ambitions gelled with those of the Americans and Christian
Filipinos. As such, being a schoolteacher in the Moro Province meant risking one’s life.

10
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American and Filipino teachers, the latter particularly, were targets of violence, but the
handful of Moros teaching for the government also feared for their own safety. Arolas
Tulawie, later a prominent political figure on Jolo, requested the government provide him
with a revolver for his protection while teaching. Tulawie, an early adopter of Western
fashions, could not properly fit a barong into his suit. District Secretary James H. Reeves
wrote to Governor Bliss that the problem lay in the fact that nobody travelled outside the
11

walls of Jolo unarmed.

The state of public education in these early years was catalogued in reports from
Superintendent Charles R. Cameron, who in June 1906 replaced Najeeb Saleeby as head of
education in the province. During his tenure as superintendent and afterwards, Saleeby was
sympathetic to the idea of carefully managed datuships, wherein indigenous secular and
religious authorities were co-opted instead of being bypassed or dismantled.

12

Saleeby’s ideas

on the topic deeply influenced Cameron, and where funds were unavailable to establish
schools he donated “books and materials to Islamic schools” and encouraged them to
13

“modernize their techniques.”

First Saleeby and then Cameron devised and distributed

Tausūg and Maguindanao literacy primers that utilized Arabic script, antecedents to Frank
14

Laubach’s later efforts to teach the Maranaos to read without the use of English.

Cameron

estimated that before the arrival of the Americans literacy rates were 2 percent among the
Samal, 4 percent among the Tausūg, and 8 percent among the Maguindanao (he did not give
15

figures for the Maranaos).

11

Letter from James Reeves to Tasker Bliss, 1 August 1906, Box 15, Folder 65. Tasker Bliss Collection,
USAHEC.
12
13
14
15

Saleeby, The Moro Problem, 29-31.
Milligan, Islamic Identity, 66; Bliss, Annual Report 1907, 36.
Milligan, Islamic Identity, 62.

Charles R. Cameron, “The Schools of Moroland,” Mindanao Herald, 3 February 1909, 35. Cameron
followed his predecessor Saleeby’s lead in attempting to document various aspects of Islamic culture in the
Southern Philippines. In 1917, he published a compendium of Sulu-Arabic script. See Charles R. Cameron, Sulu
Writing: An Explanation of the Sulu-Arabic Script as Employed in Writing the Sulu Language of the Southern
Philippines (Zamboanga: The Sulu Press, 1917).

163

Figures from the period speak to the difficulty Americans had bolstering Muslim
enrollment. Between 1903 and 1907, total enrollment in public schools for the Moro Province
jumped from 2,114 to 5,394 (although average daily attendance for the latter was only 2,968).
Of the 1907 figures, 4,414 were Filipinos, 793 Moros, 165 Lumads, and twenty-two
Americans. Cameron was satisfied that the Filipinos were, given their population, meeting
expected enrollment numbers. This was due to their “greater natural friendliness” towards the
school system and their tendency to concentrate around American garrisons along the
coastlines of Mindanao. Enrollment numbers in Muslim communities, for reasons already
explained, were incredibly low. The 793 Moro students throughout Mindanao and Sulu came
from a pool of over fifty thousand eligible to attend school. Of those students enrolled, it is
unlikely that all of them attended classes regularly. Cameron blamed “ancient migratory
habits” and impermanent settlements for the Moro reticence to send their children to school.
These issues could be corrected, he believed, if Muslim populations were encouraged to
16

develop industrially and adopt modern notions of property accumulation.

Tasker Bliss took

this corrective pedagogical outlook even further in an article published in the Mindanao
Herald in 1909, comparing the Moro intransigence to “the willful child or the idle schoolboy
who was never taught obedience and never made to do anything which of his own free will he
was not included to do” before launching into a tirade about the state of Moro communities
17

prior to the arrival of the Americans.

Beyond basic arithmetic and literacy, even the primary schools emphasized practical
training. This began in the first grade, where the children learned “sticklaying, slat-plaiting,
paper-folding, block-building” and other basic skills. They advanced to weaving hats and
mats in the second grade. In the third and fourth grade they were gender-segregated, with the
boys learning to work with rattan and the girls focusing on needlework. Upper year boys also

16
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received one hour of instruction in carpentry per day. The curriculum was flexible, and
incorporated materials and training suitable to an individual locality. Ever conscious of their
budgets, colonial education officials desired that the material produced by the children be
“artistic” and “salable.” Charles Cameron admitted that many of the Filipino and American
teachers were unfamiliar with industrial education, but that great strides were being made in
creating a uniform curriculum through “rigid inspections.” There was, he added, a “great
economic value” in “even a limited amount” of industrial training. In 1907, there were fiftyeight schools operating in the province. Of these, fifty-five were primary, two were strictly
industrial, and the final was the provincial high school at Zamboanga. Teaching at these
schools were twenty-one Americans, fifty-six Filipinos, and nine Moros. Most taught in
18

English, although two Filipinos taught in Spanish and four Moros taught in local dialects.
Resistance to mandatory public education among Muslim populations extended

beyond mere non-participation. Enforcement of Act No. 167, the compulsory school law, was
uneven, and the U.S. Army and Philippine Constabulary officers tasked with carrying it out
often did so in a tactless manner that alienated native populations. Colonel E.Z. Steever,
serving on Jolo, wrote to Tasker Bliss in 1906 that he was unclear about enforcing school
attendance. He asked Bliss for clear instructions, “that is whether you wish me to enforce it
notwithstanding whatever opposition may arise, or whether its enforcement is to be left partly
19

to my judgment.”

Enforced public education generated violence. Primary schools at Parang,

Maibun, and Bongao closed due to “dangerous conditions” and a planned school for the
education of the Moro elite never advanced past the conceptual stage. In 1909, a frustrated
Charles Cameron contacted David Barrows, outgoing educational head for the Philippines,
and complained that the colonial authorities in the Moro Province were discrediting native
rulers without providing any comprehensive alternative to them. The nature of military
service meant that the government was in a constant state of flux, with endless cycles of
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arrivals and departures. This made developing long-term relationships with native leaders
20

difficult, and, consequently, stymied support for industrial education.

At the end of direct military rule in 1913, total enrollment in provincial schools
reached 7,568 pupils (with an average daily attendance of 4,535). Filipinos represented 5,111
students, Moros had risen to 1,825, Lumad tribes were at 525, and the remaining one hundred
or so students were Chinese, American, and Spanish. Governor John Pershing’s annual report
boasted that the number of Moros attending school represented a 47 percent increase from the
year before, although it was still only a fraction of school-age children in the total population.
The report touted the Zamboanga Provincial Normal School, where teachers trained in
industrial education, as evidence of progress. Here a “heterogeneous mass” of Visayan,
Tagalog, and Moro teachers were “welded into greater homogeneity” under the supervision
of Americans, and departed the summer program a “more loyal and better trained body,
believing thoroughly in the mission of the public schools and with a clearer idea of their duty
toward the expanding civilization of this Province.”

21

The Cotabato Moro Girls’ School was

also lauded. Run by Anna Dworak, wife of the district governor, the boarding school taught
Maguindanao girls the domestic arts under “the elevating moral influence of the American
Christian woman.” An understanding was reached with concerned Maguindanao parents that
no religious instruction would occur at the school, but Cameron suggested that the “lived”
Christianity of the teachers would “influence the lives of these young girls.”

22

Najeeb Saleeby and Charles Cameron’s desire to have indigenous cultural institutions
melded with the colonial state never came to fruition. John Pershing resisted the idea of using
the pandita schools as a means to acculturate Islamic populations to American-Filipino rule,
writing that the schools were being “superseded” by public institutions “as fast as funds will
permit and competent teachers can be found.” The use of panditas in the public school
system was “almost beyond belief” to Pershing, who argued that the “occult inspiration” of
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Islamic teachers had caused unrest in the past. It was only “civilizing forces” like the colonial
23

school system that would lead to the “social evolution” of the students.

This meant a

curriculum heavily geared towards the ‘practical’ industrial and agricultural arts. Moros
allowed to teach at public schools were invariably those who were amenable to state
objectives and had received training at Zamboanga.
Pershing departed in late 1913 and was replaced by Frank Carpenter. Under civilian
rule, educational objectives remained consistent with those already in place. The emphasis on
vocational training – agriculture in the interior, and “the development of marine resources” on
the coast – continued, and in larger towns some students received more advanced skills
training in wood and ironworking. The teaching staff in what was now the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu expanded greatly, reaching 239. Of these, two hundred were Filipinos,
sixteen Moros, and fifteen Americans. In Zamboanga, missionary educational initiatives of
the Episcopal Church were underway, and Rev. D.O. Lund of the Christian and Missionary
Alliance, alongside his wife, ran schools for boys and girls. Governor Carpenter was as
skeptical of indigenous teaching practices as his predecessors, and dismissively observed the
“decided inclination to mysticism and pretense to magic” among Islamic teachers. Enrollment
numbers continued growing, although Carpenter admitted that an estimated 107,000 children
of school age in the province did not receive primary education.

24

Establishing schools in isolated communities remained delicate work. Even in
pacified areas there still existed a great deal of suspicion regarding the aims of the
government. In the Cotabato interior, the supervising teacher, James McCall, visited the
community of Maganoy to negotiate with its leader, Datu Ampatuan. The datu, advanced in
age and religiously conservative, expressed his skepticism to McCall that mandatory
schooling in the community would work, and requested soldiers be posted there to chase
down those who refused to send their children. At the meeting, McCall met a Tiruray leader
who told him that his people were afraid of the Americans and would hide if they came into
his territory. Talking to an Indian trader known as “Bombay” afterwards, McCall was told
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that the only people in the area who came into contact with the colonials were those living
along the banks of the Rio Grande. In the interior, Bombay claimed, the only sustained
interaction with outsiders was when Constabulary troops retaliated for the killing of an
American or Filipino. Datu Piang, the longtime leader of the Maguindanaon Moros, asked
McCall to tell Carpenter that he would “have to be firm in order to enforce obedience.”

25

McCall returned to Cotabato without much to show for his efforts.
The Jones Bill, passed by United States Congress in 1916, increased the rate of
Filipinization. Christian Filipinos already represented the vast majority of schoolteachers in
the South, but upper-tier education positions remained in American control. Those Filipinos
promoted to the upper echelons of the colonial administration were quick to assume the same
civilizing impulses towards the Moros enshrined by the Americans. Teopisto Guingona, head
of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in the 1920s and 1930s, mimicked his American
predecessors perfectly when he told Arolas Tulawie that the government had “a moral duty
and obligation to give instruction to the Mohammedan people.” Guingona wrote to the
Tausūg politician that the government wanted to open the eyes of those living in the Sulu
Archipelago and “show them the way that leads to civilization.” Education, according to him,
was “the basis of the greatness of peoples” and “when the Sulu men and women [had]
26

received the enlightenment emanating from education” they would thank those providing it.
Tulawie denied that he was against public education, but was campaigning in opposition to

the “Filipinization of education which is against our Mohammedan Culture, and civilization.”
The Tausūg people, Tulawie claimed, had no issue with the school system but wanted to be
rid of “any Spanish religious influence.” He believed that Christian Filipinos, bearers of this
influence, eroded the traditional customs and values of the Tausūg people through the schools
and threatened them with the Constabulary.

25
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From 1914 onwards, a prominent method of shaping Moro youth was providing them
with scholarships to study outside of their communities. In the first year of Carpenter’s rule,
authorities distributed twenty-eight scholarships to Moro boys who demonstrated promise.
They were transferred to Zamboanga where they lived “under the immediate observation and
influence of department officers” and trained as teachers. That same year, a number of
schools in Manila awarded scholarships to Moros. This included the Training School for
Nurses, the Philippine School of Arts and Trades, the Philippine General Hospital Training
School for Nurses, the School of Commerce, and the Philippine Normal School. The students
travelling north were often the children of Moro elites, such as the niece of the Sultan of
28

Sulu. When administration of Moro lands transferred to the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
in 1920, the educational patronage model became solidified in official scholarships. These
were distributed with the aim of educating non-Christians to become employees of the
Bureau and further government development schemes among their people.

29

Student pensionados had difficult lives. Poor communication between the far-flung
islands of the Sulu Archipelago and the Bureau created circumstances where the young men
and women arrived in Manila believing they had funding when they did not. Funds available
to sustain the scholarships were limited and strict quotas were set.

30

Students who made it to

Manila were frequently impoverished. Some petitioned high officials for financial aid. Gowa
Mohammad wrote directly to Vice Governor Hayden. Mohammad was enrolled at the
Columbian Institute and studying “Police and Detective Science.” He was destitute and
worked menial jobs to pay for his tuition and matriculation fees, which amounted to ₱68.
Mohammad begged Hayden to help him with his costs to save him “from committing
suicide” and told the Vice Governor that he had “strong faith and confidence” in him as a

always held their heads high because we are proud of our religion and morals. We see our morals breaking now
and blame it on education by Christian influences.”
28
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“great sympathizer of the Moro people.” Hayden replied tersely that all available funds for
scholarships were spent for the year. In a subsequent memo, he observed that Gowa
Mohammad travelled to Manila after Governor General Frank Murphy displayed interest in
him on a visit to Zamboanga.

31

Public education remained in a state of flux as Filipinization progressed. In the mid1920s, there were a spate of school-burnings around Lake Lanao and attendance dropped to
new lows. Officials attempted to correct this by filling teaching positions with qualified
Muslim candidates, but attendance remained meager. In Tamparan in 1932, the performance
of the students was so “poor” and their attendance so “irregular” that officials began fining
the parents of delinquent children, engendering opposition to the government in the area.
Attacks on teachers continued to be an issue.

32

In Sulu, Governor Fugate sarcastically

observed that “malicious rumors” had revived “an old and odd superstition that parents dare
allow their children absent themselves from home, lest they be devoured by a blood-sucking
vampire.” He also lamented the lack of sympathy the Christian Filipino teachers had for the
“conditions and situations” of the people of the archipelago and the long classes that small
33

children in rural districts attended.

Qualified teachers were difficult to find. Figures from Sulu show that in 1931, only
1.56 percent of teachers there had any sort of professional training, although the number rose
slightly to 7.95 percent the following year. Even with this jump, Sulu still ranked sixth from
the bottom in the entire Philippines. Educational authorities at the time, under the direction of
Superintendent of Public Instruction K.W. Chapman, pushed to have Muslim boys sent to the
Zamboanga Normal School, where they would receive more advanced vocational training
than was available in the other regions of the Southern Philippines. There was also an
emphasis placed on training Muslim women to be schoolteachers, although this also faced
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resistance.

34

In 1932, Edward Kuder, a long-serving education official in the South, replaced

Chapman. Kuder’s experiences in Sulu, Lanao, and Cotabato convinced him that Moro
populations were being preyed upon by the Filipino officials, and, in particular, the
Constabulary. He aimed to remedy these predations by training a class of Muslim men who
could assert themselves in the language of Western governance. They would identify
themselves as part of the Filipino national body, yet maintain an ethnoreligious identity
separate from it. They would, in short, become Muslim Filipinos and be thusly integrated into
the nascent state. “The Commonwealth was preparing [the students] to fit harmoniously into
the world,” Kuder recalled in an article he wrote after the Second World War, “when the
Japanese pestilence swept across them.”

35

Kuder’s dreams of an equitable role for the Moros in an ethnically-diverse-yetnationally-unified Philippines were ambitious but went unfulfilled. Reports from Mindanao
and Sulu from the mid-1930s show that educational authorities still struggled. Far from
creating a unified elite who could protect Muslim communities within a national framework,
Kuder and his subordinates more often faced the same roadblocks as their predecessors: little
funding, poor attendance figures, resistance to the educational objectives, and a lack of
schools in remote areas. Muslim youth who received advanced education often found that
there were no openings for them in white-collar positions, leading Teopisto Guingona to
report that this “intellectual unemployment” could be remedied if young Moros “only make
up their minds that while there is dignity of labour in an office there is as much dignity of
labor in the field – in a homestead.” Elsewhere, a development plan for the Southern
Philippines urged the government to place emphasis on vocational training so that Moros
36

could be “trained for the household industries to which they are naturally inclined.”

Blocked from positions of authority, Muslims were encouraged to transform themselves into
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sedentary agriculturalists, fishermen, and producers of small manufactures that respected
state power without playing a role in its generation.

37

Charles Brent, Caroline Spencer, and the Moro Educational
Foundation
While the military and civilian governments in the Southern Philippines struggled in their
efforts to transform Moro youth through education, American missionary groups also
operated in the region. The colonial Philippines was founded on a centuries-long missionary
project spearheaded by Spanish Catholic orders who in the process became powerful
38

landholders in the archipelago.

Aware of this legacy of Christianization, American

missionaries from a variety of Protestant denominations arrived in the Philippines shortly
after the second colonial conquest in 1898. Different missionary groups divvied up territory
through a comity agreement that year. The Baptists, for example, had ‘rights’ to Western
Visayas, while the Congregationalists claimed most of Mindanao. These men and women
hoped to win over ‘savage’ tribes to Christ, combat Catholic corruption, and push the colonial
authorities to embrace agendas of moral reform by confronting issues like prostitution, human
trafficking, and narcotics use. Missionaries in both America and the Philippines approached
questions of colonial morality and mission from both pro- and anti-imperialist positions,
although most agreed that the Filipinos would be well-served by the presence of social purity
advocates. Well-placed social reformers with the ability to generate press and tap into Anglo-
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American missionary networks often swayed policy in the Philippines, and the colonial
39

government there searched for ways to co-opt these impulses towards official ends.

Ostensibly independent, the missionaries who ministered to Islamic populations in
Mindanao and Sulu nevertheless received substantial support through state channels, more
often than not working in tandem with the civilizational prerogatives of the state. From the
earliest days of the occupation, missionaries understood that attempting to spread the gospel
of Christ to the Moros through conventional proselytism was doomed to failure. An 1898
opinion piece in the Hartford Courant that explored the possibilities for Protestant
missionaries in the Philippines concluded that America “could perhaps leave those fierce
40

followers of Mahound to their own society and devices.”

Both the secular authorities and

American missionaries were keenly aware that Spanish attempts to convert the Moros to
Roman Catholicism had been greeted with stiff resistance. The resilience of Islam as a
transnational bulwark against the hegemonic designs of colonial proselytism was evident
from a variety of other contexts, ranging from French experiences in the Maghreb to British
ones in Malaya. Spanish histories of the Philippines, quickly translated into English to aid
newly arrived Americans, were categorical that the Moros were “so obstinate to God’s grace,
41

that it is impossible to convert them to Christianity.”

Cognizant of these Spanish failures, incoming missionaries tried spreading
Christianity through indirect means. This idea – “Christian religion expressed in work” –
dovetailed with the educational and industrial proselytism favoured by secular authorities.
“The school, the hospital, [and] the playground” represented “the pulpit” in missionary
endeavours amongst the Moros. In Mindanao and Sulu, the “bodies, hearts, minds and soul of
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a half a million Mohammedans” could be “reached, inspired, empowered” by American
42

Protestant missionaries “as nowhere else.”

For district governors, often short on funds and

hard-pressed to achieve civilizing goals, the missionary willingness to fund and run schools
and medical dispensaries, while avoiding the unrest that direct attempts at conversion
generated, made them welcome visitors. The most significant example of this phenomenon
occurred on the island of Jolo in the village of Indanan. There Bishop Charles Henry Brent
and Caroline Spencer, two important members of the Episcopal Church, operated a school, a
medical station, and a small press.
Charles Brent was the most influential foreign religious figure during the formative
years of American colonialism in the Philippines. A Canadian who studied at Trinity College,
University of Toronto, and was ordained in the Anglican Church of Canada, Brent moved to
the United States in his late twenties, spending time living in a monastic order and serving at
churches in impoverished areas of West and South Boston. By 1901, he was prominent
enough within the church to be considered for several prestigious positions, including dean of
the General Theological Seminary in New York City. These opportunities did not come to
pass, however, as Brent was offered and accepted the position of missionary bishop of the
Philippines that same year, a post complementary to his belief that “through baptism all
Christians [were] called to be missionaries.”

43

Prior to travelling to the Philippines, Brent

conducted a fundraising tour, in the process developing friendships with men like Theodore
Roosevelt and William Howard Taft.

44

This ability to cultivate relationships with the

powerful served him well in the Philippines. Brent’s early projects included a school at
Baguio, where the sons and daughters of the colonial elite were educated, and extensive
missionary efforts among the Bontoc Igorots. He was also an outspoken advocate of opium
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prohibition, a subject of great concern to early twentieth-century social reformers.

Later

hagiographic accounts of Brent’s missionary work heralded his “little team” for plunging
“intrepidly into the vastnesses of the mountains” and there finding “the Church of Christ in
46

the most inaccessible villages of the head-hunting Igorots.” The diplomatic historian
Stephen P. Duggan, who did consulting work at Baguio and saw Brent’s projects elsewhere
in the Philippines, believed him to be “a great social force” who “represented the Twentieth
47

Century.” In the second decade of his service, Brent turned his attentions southwards to the
Moros.
The work of the Episcopal Church in the Southern Philippines during the military
period was limited to Zamboanga, where the Church of the Holy Trinity ministered to the
faithful and opened the Zamboanga Hospital. In 1914, with the region under civilian control,
Caroline Spencer arrived. Born Caroline Berryman, she was an East Coast socialite who split
her time between New York City and Newport, Rhode Island. Spencer was married to
Lorillard Spencer, a prominent social presence in New York City and the commissioner for
Rhode Island at the Chicago World’s Fair, until his death in 1912.

48

Newly widowed, she

made a trip around the world and, stopping in the Philippines, became “intensely interested in
the work Bishop Brent [was]…doing among the heathen tribes.” After returning to the United
States, Spencer committed herself to returning to the Philippines to teach “the children of
fanatical Moros.”
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Reporting on the socialite’s decision, the New York Times emphasized the disconnect
between Caroline Spencer’s privileged life and the inability of the Moros to understand “that
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a knowledge of simple sanitary laws and that the rudimentary arts of peace and a disposition
to live in love and charity with one’s neighbors make for civilization and happiness.” The
Times reporter covering her departure fixated on the dangers she faced, but Spencer insisted
that her work among the Tausūg would show them they could live amicably with the
Americans. “The Moros of Jolo have so far come into contact with hardly any other
Americans than soldiers,” she told the paper. “We are going to try to show that Americans
50

possess other traits than an ability to fight.”

Accompanied by a companion, Deaconess

Virginia Young, Spencer sailed for Jolo by way of England, Singapore, and Zamboanga. On
the final leg of her journey she crossed paths with Sheikh Sayid Mohammed Wajih ul-Gilani,
51

the Ottoman envoy who features prominently in Chapter Eight.

“We are not going to

attempt to force Christianity down the throats of the people,” she said before leaving the
52

United States. “But we want to teach the Moros some of the principles of right living.”

In Zamboanga, Bishop Brent parlayed his connections with Governor General Forbes
and John Pershing to lay groundwork for the initiative.

53

Still, when Caroline Spencer arrived

at Jolo in the spring of 1914 the reception was chilly. Rumours in the walled town had it that
juramentados planned to kill the missionary, and members of the officer class and their wives
felt her presence was generating needless tension between the authorities and the local
Tausūg population. Accounts from these early days are limited to fawning journalistic
profiles written later in Caroline Spencer’s life. One, published in Survey Graphic in 1939,
described how she and Brent acted as mediators between the authorities and an outlaw named
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Salihudin. The writer described Spencer having a mesmeric effect upon his band: “They
seemed aware of the contrast between their dark, fierce chief and this fair and fragile woman
54

who stood beside him.” Colonial femininity pacified the savage in its own soothing way. A
separate telling of the same encounter, written shortly after Brent’s death in 1929, described
the Bishop as a saintly figure who disarmed the bandits by shaming them for meeting “an
55

unarmed white man and a defenceless white woman” while “armed to the teeth.”

Caroline Spencer ingratiated herself to the locals by establishing a medical dispensary
where Tausūg villagers were treated for minor health complaints and received smallpox
inoculations. Although Virginia Young soon left due to illness, Spencer continued her work
on Jolo, becoming friendly enough with its inhabitants that she travelled the island freely,
attending Tausūg weddings and birth ceremonies, while further developing her “settlement
work.” The dispensary outside of Jolo town, under the supervision of the U.S. Army Medical
Corps, “gave medical and surgical relief to several hundred indigent Mohammedan natives
each month.”

56

The primary focus of Spencer and Brent’s work, however, was on the

establishment of an agricultural school. Land for the proposed school was acquired when the
government relinquished its property at Camp Indanan to the missionaries. Located eight
miles from Jolo town, adjacent to a Constabulary station and near a market, the Indanan site
sprawled across sixty-eight acres.

57

The school, initially called the Willard Straight Agricultural School for Moro Boys
but later changed to the Bishop Brent Moro School, was opened on 12 January 1916 with a
ceremony attended by 750 people. Local and regional dignitaries like Hadji Butu and
Governor Frank Carpenter attended the event, which included games and a tree-planting
ceremony. Initial enrollment was low at just over thirty boys, but in following years it grew to
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more than one hundred.

58

The school focused almost entirely on training Tausūg boys in

industrial and agricultural arts in the hope they would become, in the words of Brent, “a
higher type of Moro.” The Bishop was at his most paternal when he spoke of the project. The
goal was “to train the head, not to fill it; to develop muscle, not merely to harden it; to
develop a useful, moral citizen, not a bigoted, clever one.”

59

Regional educators like J.W.

Light, who supervised for the Department of Public Instruction in Sulu, saw the school as an
important component in turning Southeast Asia Muslims into producers. “I have studied
intensely the Sulu phase of the Moro problem for two years and I think the Moro Agricultural
School has before it the greatest possibilities for development that I know of in the Orient,”
Light wrote to Caroline Spencer, noting that Sulu’s close connections with Borneo meant the
institution could expand and “develop into a college that will be looked upon with yearning
hearts by the youths of the Malay Mohammedan World.”

60

Photographs from the period show a modest two-storey school building with long
porches on both levels where the students slept. Indoors were classrooms, offices, and even a
bowling alley. On the surrounding grounds, students grew a variety of crops year-round and
61

had facilities where they processed rice and corn for cooking.

Press photographs displayed

Moro boys playing baseball and were captioned “The Moro Boys Love Our American
62

Games.” By the early 1920s, the school had expanded to seventy-five acres and Brent
hoped to continue growing it until it reached five hundred. Each student was taught farming,
building, and road maintenance, while the girls in the area learned basketwork and
housekeeping. The Moro Educational Foundation [MEF], which oversaw the school, argued
that such education was “a powerful influence against insurrections among the Moros.”
Students were also instructed on modern notions of hygiene, a subject of particular interest to
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Caroline Spencer, who believed that learning the “rules of sanitation” aided in the civilizing
63

process.

Press reports were glowing. The New York Times Magazine published an article on

the school almost entirely comprised of John Pershing’s praise for it and Brent’s own
descriptions. The academic Eleanor Crosby Kemp, writing for International Interpreter,
deemed the experiment to be “anthropologically sound” in its teaching of English, arithmetic,
and hygienic living.

64

Spencer and Brent also planned to establish a similar institution for Moro girls,
although they faced reticence among the Tausūg. A charitable fund for the proposed girls
school managed to raise $37,700 in 1924, five thousand of which came from the prominent
65

New York City philanthropist Mary Williamson Averell.

A girls’ dormitory in Jolo staffed

by Filipino teachers operated for several years, but was opposed by men like Arolas Tulawie,
the former schoolteacher now involved in the island’s politics, who thought Moro girls were
being prepared to “marry Filipinos or else become prostitutes and I do not believe they will
marry Filipinos.” Tulawie thought girls educated at the dormitory turned away from Tausūg
customs and learned “to despise their own people.”

66

There were also fears that the girls,

under American and Filipino tutelage, would renounce their Islamic faith. The concerns had
some merit. An Episcopalian report from 1937 mentioned Moro girls attending school in
Zamboanga being “won over to Christianity by constant association with it in a way that so
far the dormitory has been able to give,” and the missionary writer Claude Pickens observed
“girls from Basilan and the Sulu Archipelago have passed through the school and caught the
67

Christian spirit.”

Spencer was successful in having some Tausūg girls sent north for training

as nurses, but found most lacked a primary education. She had the famed architect Whitney
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Warren draw up plans for a girls’ school in the 1920s, but the project did not progress further.
In the late 1930s, Bishop Frank Mosher, Brent’s replacement, reported minor successes in
getting paying residents at a girl’s dormitory, although at the this time the ravages of the 1932
typhoon and the Great Depression meant that all missionary activities on Jolo were
68

struggling.

One of the MEF’s most important projects was the Sulu Press (alternately referred to
as the Moro Press). Brent believed that literacy was key to bringing the Moros onside, and
disagreed with former officials like Najeeb Saleeby and John Finley who wanted to establish
control over the Moros by means of “hopelessly corrupt” traditional hierarchies. Ordering a
printing press from Baguio and Arabic typeface from Beirut, he established the press at
69

Indanan alongside the school.

It was housed in a small building and was, according to

Brent, the “only Moro type in the world.”

70

Governor Frank Carpenter’s 1914 annual report

spoke of the Sulu Press as “of an instructive and generally beneficial character affecting the
material well-being and indirectly the spiritual welfare of the Mohammedans of this
71

region.”

The chief product of the press was, from the 1920s until the end of the 1930s, a
newspaper called The Student Weekly and, later, The Moro Outlook. The Weekly provided an
opportunity for students to hone their English skills, but also operated as a subtle outlet for
proselytism. In March 1925, for example, it ran an article extolling the virtues of “Christian
motherhood,” claiming that there was “nothing so sacrificial as that attached to motherhood.
It is so close to the sufferings of Christ.”

72

The paper encouraged students to practice their

English skills by reading the news from Jolo town. Births and deaths were recorded, as was
lighter fare, such as the sufferings of one Palili, who had a rotten tooth removed, or the
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competition to see which classroom was the cleanest, which was won by the seventh grade.

The Weekly occasionally reported on the outbursts of violence in the area. In 1926, an article
appeared about an “insane” man named Ijasani, who had attacked two people, before walking
to Indanan and attempting to break into the Constabulary barracks there. The paper reported
that he was shot in the “small of his back,” but that an investigation by a Filipino judge,
Mariano de Leon, afterwards cleared the Constabulary of culpability as Ijasani was “killed
74

while juramentado.” The students writing in the newspaper were at the time the only Moro
voices in the Sulu Archipelago being regularly published.
During its first decade, the school operated under the supervision of Educational
Director James R. Fugate, whose remarkably varied career in the colonial Philippines
spanned over three decades. After a brief stint at the University of Michigan, Fugate travelled
to the archipelago as a sergeant with the California Volunteers, and was first a schoolteacher
before being appointed Governor of Siquijor, a small island in the Central Visayas region
75

north of Mindanao.

W. Cameron Forbes saw him as “an ordinary man” in the way “Lincoln

was an ordinary man,” and admired his ability to “steer the people of Siquijor towards better
76

things.” Officials in Manila admired Fugate’s successes on the island, which included
building roads, making potable spring water available to all, and implementing sanitary and
77

hygienic measures to limit disease.

In 1916, looking for new opportunities, he was scouted

by Bishop Brent and Caroline Spencer to run the boys school at Indanan.
Fugate was, by all accounts, efficient and energetic. Caroline Spencer spent stretches
of time on Jolo as overall authority at the school, but was also away for long periods. Charles
Brent acted more as a distant patron, and while he did visit Jolo on multiple occasions most
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of his work on the school’s behalf was through revenue generation in the United States.
Fugate was there to make sure day-to-day operations ran smoothly, and, when she was on the
island, cater to the whims of the imperious Spencer. His views on the Moros were more
liberal than Brent’s or Spencer’s. Fugate believed in integrating the cultures of the Sulu
Archipelago into structures of education and governance rather than attempting to replace
them entirely with unattainable ideals. A tireless worker, by the early 1920s Fugate exhausted
himself and became increasingly exasperated by the state of affairs at Indanan, where he was
constantly scrounging for funds and battling with the Rileys, an American couple appointed
78

by Spencer as teachers.

In a series of fevered letters to Brent in June 1924, Fugate spelled out all of his issues
with the running of the school. He was being pressed to expand operations yet had no money.
His personal relations with Spencer were strained. The Sulu Press had to be temporarily
shuttered. He was working eighteen-hour days. The last of these letters approached delirium,
with Fugate digressing into a rhetorical fit. “True goodness needs no motive to prompt its
bounty,” he wrote. “What are the motives that impel the supporters of the school? Are they
imbued with the idea that it is just a place for laudable missionary endeavor? A place for
outpouring of sentiment and generosity of soul? Giving because ‘it is more blessed to give
than to receive’!” In biblical language, Fugate scoffed at the donors for not understanding
“the finer and broader principles of philanthropy” before continuing on about the “pain of a
benighted brown baby, born in depravity to be brought up in darkness” and the “Divine plan”
79

for missionary activity.

Curious orthography aside, Fugate’s letters were those of an overworked and
lonesome man in the midst of collapse.
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Brent’s terse reply acknowledged the school’s

financial issues, promised to send out “1000 appeals” for funds, and expressed anxiety over
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Fugate’s welfare.

By early 1926, Fugate was unable to continue at the school and resigned,

petitioning Governor General Leonard Wood for work elsewhere. In a scathing letter to Brent
the following year, he excoriated the Bishop for failing to appreciate his mental, physical, and
financial sacrifices, and for standing idly by while Spencer and others planned to have him
“humiliatingly eliminated.” Fugate speculated that if he had “belonged to the hierarchy” with
his “address gilding the Social Registry of Manhattan” his contributions would be better
appreciated. “A dog-like service and meekness brings the dog’s reward,” he fumed.
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Ending

his relationship with Brent, Spencer, and the school, Fugate once again sought work with the
colonial government and in 1928 was appointed District Governor of Sulu.
Fugate was replaced by Leo Meyette, who also worked diligently to keep the school
running, if not with the monomaniacal focus of Fugate. When not at Indanan, Meyette
travelled to the United States to promote the school. During a visit to the Faculty Club at
Columbia University in 1930, Meyette described the successes of the school “in changing the
fierce Moro pirates into business men, mechanics, and policemen.” Former students had
become teachers, government administrators, mechanics, and farmers, he claimed.
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Despite

its apparent successes, the school suffered some setbacks during this period. The death of
Charles Brent in 1929 left it and the foundation needing a figurehead. His replacement, Curtis
J. Mar, was one of the founders of the MEF but hardly of the international stature Brent was.
Donations to the fund decreased as the American elite felt the effects of the Great Depression.
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As a final indignity, a typhoon in the spring of 1932 ravaged Jolo and destroyed the school.
“The buildings were almost completely demolished, while the water pipe line was broken at
virtually every joint and the entire place wrecked beyond recognition,” reported a letter to the
Washington Post.
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Before his death, Charles Brent expressed to his friends that if they “felt him worthy
of a memorial that the Moro School he founded be made that memorial as that undertaking
was very close to his heart.”
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The school struggled to rebuild after the typhoon and was

closed for a time, but reopened in the mid-1930s under the direction of W. Carr Cooper.
Brent’s connections to the political, military, and religious elite on the Eastern Seaboard were
parlayed by the MEF through a series of fundraisers and, in December 1939, an expansive
memorial dinner in the late Bishop’s honour. Held at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City,
the event was hosted by the illustrious lawyer and politician George Wharton Pepper, and
featured speeches from W. Cameron Forbes, Frank McCoy, the writer Katherine Mayo, and
other figures involved in missionary-educational endeavours. John Pershing, who could not
attend, had his speech read by Remsen B. Ogilby, head of Trinity College in Connecticut.
Forbes delivered the longest address, situating Brent’s school within a larger history of racial
reformation in the islands. The work at Indanan taught “the Christian spirit rather than the
tenets of the Christian Church” to a people “recently redeemed from savagery.” Forbes
praised the work of Caroline Spencer and James Fugate, whose recent murder had made him
86

“one of the many martyrs of the great cause of pacification and betterment of these people.”

Attached to the proceedings from the evening was a series of testimonials for Brent’s
work from a laundry list of Americans, living and dead, who influenced policy in the
Southern Philippines: Leonard Wood, Dean Worcester, Elihu Root, Najeeb Saleeby, Herbert
Hoover, Warren G. Harding, William Taft, Frank Murphy, Dwight Davis, J.R. Hayden, Frank

84

A.C. Hudson, “Bishop Brent’s Moro School, Wrecked by Typhoon, to Be Restored,” Washington Post, 2
December 1932, 6.
85

“Proceedings of the Memorial Anniversary Dinner Held Under the Auspices of the National Committee for
the Moro School, Jolo, Philippine Islands and the Bishop Brent International Memorial Committee,” 17
December 1939, 28011, Box 1277. General Classified Files 1898-1945 (1914-1945 Segment), RG 350.3, NACP.
86

Ibid. See conclusion for an account of Fugate’s death.

184

W. Carpenter, Henry Stimson, and J.G. Harbord.

87

For these men, the work that Brent and

Spencer performed on Jolo was a corollary of their own efforts fighting against, and then
developing policy for, the Moros. Brent himself had compared the hardships of missionary
88

work to those faced by the “founders of empire” so would have likely agreed.

There were

also reports from students, to show potential donors the benefits of the school. Juli Samsialam
wrote of all the different vegetables being planted in the school gardens, the smallpox
vaccinations given to students and their families, track and field events, and the popularity of
baseball among the boys. Another, Ahmaraja Dadjiliul, related a movie-screening put on by
the new headmaster, Robert Dickson, that nearly one thousand people attended.
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Despite the mythologizing of Brent and continued elite patronage, the school
continued to struggle financially. By the early 1940s, the school’s trustees were searching for
ways to ensure its continued operation without a wholesale reliance on donations. W.
Cameron Forbes cabled President of the Philippines Manuel Quezon in late 1940 requesting
that his government make an allowance of $10,000 or $20,000 towards the school – with
equivalent funds to be raised in the United States – as it was “a very helpful civilizing
90

agency.” He further appealed to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to press for the Bishop
Brent Moro School to be merged with the public school system, but in a manner where it
retained “its character as a memorial to Bishop Brent.” Forbes admitted that the MEF had
exhausted its funds and assured Stimson that the school was “purely non-sectarian” (unlike
other church schools).
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In January 1941, Stimson had his aide contact Richard R. Ely, who

headed Philippine Affairs at the State Department, and was told that the Filipinos were not
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amenable to the request. If the school became a publically-funded institution “it would retain
the name, but in the final analysis…that is about all they would retain.” Ely said that the
Filipinos feared that the special status of the school would “drive a wedge between the
Christian Filipino and the Moros” and suggested that the trustees of the school not “trade
their birthright for a very doubtful mess of pottage.”
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The matter of funding resolved itself

within the year as the Japanese occupied Jolo. The school remained, although after the war it
became a public institution, and was no longer a site where American philanthropists could
93

channel their desires for the civilizational reform of the Tausūg Moros.

Frank Laubach Among the Maranao
Cautious missionary efforts also took place on Mindanao. In the Christian areas along the
northern littoral and around Zamboanga, Congregationalist and Christian & Missionary
Alliance members had proselytized since the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. In
predominantly Muslim areas like Lanao, however, missionary work was often viewed as too
dangerous, and colonial officials in those places – be they American or Filipino – were
reluctant to encourage religious groups. Their presence further unsettled the already tense
relationship between the government and the local Maranao Moros, raising fears of forced
conversion and stoking support for anti-government Islamic preachers. Lanao remained an
especially unstable region. After the departure of U.S. Army forces in 1914, the Philippine
Constabulary took over the enforcement of law and order, engaging in running battles with
groups of Maranaos hostile to state agendas. The burning of schoolhouses, killing of teachers,
and massacres by the Constabulary occurred sporadically throughout the first fifteen years of
civilian rule.
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Frank C. Laubach settled in Dansalan, at the northern end of Lake Lanao, in
December 1929. The Congregationalist missionary had been in the Philippines since 1915,
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and visited Lanao that year. Surveying the tense situation, he determined “the time was not
ripe to attempt any religious work among the Moros” and moved north to minister to the
Christian Filipinos of Cagayan de Oro. Laubach returned to Lanao most years, spending a
month or two in the area and finding the Maranaos there “more and more peaceful and even
eager to know something about Jesus.” The mid-1920s were a time of increased violence in
the province, but as hostilities receded towards the end of the decade authorities in Dansalan
began considering new avenues for educating the Maranaos. In 1927, while Laubach was
visiting the town, the district governor offered him a reduced rate on a building if he decided
to open a mission there. Two years later, leaving his wife and son in Baguio (where the latter
95

was attending Bishop Brent’s school), Laubach returned to Dansalan to establish his school.

The ambitious missionary’s interest in Mindanao began during his college years. The
son of a dentist from Benton, Pennsylvania, Laubach attended Princeton University, where he
completed a degree in sociology. Drawn towards missionary work, in 1913 he studied at the
famed Union Theological Seminary in New York City, writing a paper entitled “Problems in
Religious Education on the Island of Mindanao.” After considering the prospects for drawing
the Visayan population of Mindanao away from Catholicism, Laubach focused on the Islamic
inhabitants of the island. At this early stage his views lacked the sophistication and nuance of
his later writings on the Maranaos, and he concluded that American efforts with the Moros
were fruitless. “One thing is certain,” Laubach wrote. “We must either abandon these people
entirely, so far as political control is concerned, or enter upon a war of extermination.” Citing
low school enrollment numbers for Moro children, Laubach viewed them as an example of
“all the hopelessness of the Mohammedan world every where” and believed “only the faith
that they who go in the strength of the Lord can do all things, will send a man among these
worse than savage peoples.” The fate of the Moros was destined to be the same as “the
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American Aborigines” as they came “into contact with Christendom.”
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Laubach did not

moderate his early views on the irreconcilability of the Islamic and Christian worlds for
nearly twenty years.
In 1915, Laubach completed his doctoral work at Columbia University, was ordained
as a Congregationalist minister, and departed with his wife for the Philippines. First
ministering to the Christians of Cagayan de Oro, Laubach then moved to Manila in the 1920s
97

where he taught and published.

During this period, his thoughts often returned to Lanao,

and, more broadly, the issue of Islam in the Philippines. He petitioned Frank W. Carpenter,
the former governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, to spearhead a campaign to
bring the Muslims of the Southern Philippines to Christendom and send them forth into the
world to convert their coreligionists. This plan was mere fancy, and the militancy of
Laubach’s conversionary zeal stood in stark contrast to the viewpoints he developed while
living in Lanao.
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Once in Dansalan, Laubach started work on several projects, foremost among them
the establishment of a school and the opening of a printing press. He became friendly with
datus in the area, particularly Datu Pambaya, who became Laubach’s closest Muslim ally.
From speaking with these Maranao leaders, he learned their ideas about Islam were not so
different than his notions of Christianity. Laubach’s views on the “Mohammedan religion”
soon moderated and it became evident to him “that we Christians live in a glass house. If we
oppose war in the Mohammedan religion have we not made wars innumerable in the name of
Christ, and are not the Christian nations at this moment armed for war a hundred times more
than all the other religions put together?” He noted that vices ascribed to Islam were as
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pervasive in the United States, and began to read the Qur’an so he could look “at Mohammed
with a fair unprejudiced mind.”

99

Muslims, Laubach came to believe, were misled about

Christianity in the same way Christians were misled about Islam. He found the Islamic
concept of submitting to God’s will entirely compatible with his own religious outlook, and
began “wondering whether an open minded teachable attitude toward Islam would encourage
100

all Christians to live in constant listening surrender to God.”

These insights came in the

midst of a personal experiment with intercessory prayer, where Laubach tried to be in
constant communication with God. In letters home to his father, he recorded his results and
reflected on his spiritual development.
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Constant discussion with friendly and open-minded Maranaos along with an internal
spiritual journey mellowed Laubach’s outlook on Islam, allowing for a more inclusive
understanding of the ways in which an individual could perform religious service. This
contrasted substantially with the views of many other missionary figures during the American
colonial period, for whom work among the Moros was a mere illustration of Christians
selflessly devoting themselves to the uplift of peoples of lower racial-civilizational stature.
Laubach’s newly liberalized outlook generated in him a concern that inroads being made by
the Americans and Filipinos in Mindanao would dismantle Maranao culture:
I fear that the Moros as a separate civilization will be almost a forgotten
thing in less than three hundred years, not to mention a thousand. One can
see the inroads of civilization in the adoption of western clothes, in the
breaking down of customs, and in the advent of the public school. The
public school system which Americans introduced is an intellectual
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steamroller, which ultimately will leave less in its path from the past than
did the fanatical Spanish priests three centuries ago. There is perhaps not a
great deal that deserves preservation – if ONLY something better and not
102

something worse replaces what the Moros now have!

Evident in the above, Laubach’s reconfigured ideas about working among the Maranaos
retained a paternal character, yet also critically engaged commonly held wisdom among
officials and missionaries that the civilizing project was difficult but fundamentally virtuous
work. The complicated legacies of his labour both eschewed and upheld the tropes of the
103

colonial missionary.

After securing a building, Laubach and his assistant Donato Galia, a Columbiaeducated Visayan, set about articulating their vision for the school. It was to be a hub of
learning for the entire region, an ever-expanding space where Laubach’s educational and
developmental goals for the Maranaos would be fostered. Soon after arriving in Dansalan,
Laubach witnessed a disturbing incident where a mob beat a Moro Constabulary officer who
104

was trying to compel a child to attend school until he “was near dead.”

The missionary

took it upon himself to provide schooling acceptable to the Maranaos. What began as a single
schoolhouse in 1930 was, by 1934, a complex of nine buildings spread over sixteen hectares
of land. Besides the school, there was a library with thousands of books “classified under
history, geography, sociology, education, psychology, business, law, civics, fiction, drama,
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poetry, biography, music, [and] religion.” There were also “three encyclopedias, dictionaries
in several languages, children’s books, [and] twenty-five newspapers and magazines.” A
nursing station dispensed basic medicines, sent medical workers to visit the sick, and worked
with the hospital in Dansalan. There was a recreation center, a church that had “classes for
Moslems as well as for Christians,” classes for women that taught “reading, writing, sewing,
weaving, and hygiene,” and dormitories for the students. Ten hectares of the land was
dedicated to plant nurseries and experimental crops, which ranged from soybeans to durian to
six hundred California orange trees.
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Underpinning the entire operation in Dansalan was Laubach’s fervent belief that
literacy could help the Maranao people avoid cultural and demographic elimination as the
Southern Philippines integrated into the national body. With this end in mind, he decided to
transliterate the Maranao language using the Roman alphabet. Until his arrival, literacy was
limited to panditas and local elites who had the ability to read Arabic script, which they used
to interpret the Qur’an to the locals. Laubach estimated that one in every five hundred
Maranaos could read the Arabic alphabet. During his tenure as Superintendent of Schools,
Najeeb Saleeby introduced a primer on Moro languages written in Arabic script into the
public education system but it was removed after his departure as the government shifted its
106

focus to the teaching of English.

Laubach concluded both English and the Arabic alphabet

were insufficient, and dedicated himself to compiling Maranao words in a series of
dictionaries and then phonetically translating them into the Roman alphabet. Soon, he was
able to find three words which together contained “every consonant in the alphabet, but
[contained] each consonant only once.”
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These were Malabanga (or Malabang, a town in
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the area), karatasa (paper), and paganada (to learn). Together, they represented the ‘key’
108

words in the language, hence the name Laubach gave his method: the Lanao key system.

The small staff at newly-christened Maranao Folk School started teaching as many
Maranaos as possible to read via the Lanao key system using a series of charts that broke
down how the method worked. Laubach believed that literacy through the key system was
best taught through one-on-one training with a teacher who was familiar with the chart.
Advocates of the method claimed that the Maranaos learned to read and write their language
– as phonetically interpreted by Laubach – in as little as one hour. Convinced of the
revolutionary character of his techniques, Laubach began training men and women to spread
them in outlying areas of the province. Literacy teachers were paid ten dollars per month,
which Laubach admitted was low. He believed these teachers did not take better paying work
because they wanted “to have the honor of sharing this service for their people.” Proponents
of the key system thought that the literacy rate in Lanao, which stood at 3 percent in the early
109

1930s, could be as high as 80 percent by the decade’s close.

Writing to Vice Governor J.R.

Hayden in 1934, Laubach claimed his literacy work represented the “best way” for Moros to
“catch up with the rest of the world” and that his supporters in Lanao were “willing to do
110

anything and to yield anything in order to succeed.”

News of the project reached the United States in 1931, and appeared in the Boston
Daily Globe. The paper informed its readers that the Moros, who constituted “the most
difficult problem under the American flag today,” were “mad” for education after exposure to
the key system. Laubach told the Globe that a “bright” Maranao already familiar with Arabic
script could learn the Roman alphabet in only “fourteen minutes,” but that the staff at the
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school liked to “experiment with morons” who took longer to train. Claiming that the
missionary’s successes were “like a fairy tale,” the article concluded with a plea for
Americans to send as many books as possible to Lanao: “It would take a million books to
fulfill these requests. Everything from religious volumes to geographies, scientific books and
dictionaries is desired.”
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Objections to the literacy campaign arose from both Maranao and government circles.
While many Maranaos praised Laubach’s efforts, there were some who feared it masked a
broader project of converting Muslims to Christianity. These concerns were not groundless
(Laubach was a liberal missionary but a missionary nonetheless), and they were significant
enough that the Maranao Folk School released an unusual public statement in 1932. In it,
Maranao backers of the endeavour argued that “infidel” Christian Filipinos were convincing
Moros that the campaign was a conversion effort. Situating the campaign in opposition to the
Filipinos, against whom many Maranaos harboured prejudices, the public statement promoted
literacy as a way of combatting Christian cultural incursion. “We inform them that we are
Islams as we were born by our Islam parents,” the notice read. “We do not want them to have
the least idea that we have been converted to Christianity: no, not even unto death! We have
112

willingly joined Dr. Laubach in his work for it is beneficial to us all.”

Laubach was well regarded among other Americans in Dansalan, although some
officials found his teaching methods at odds with the mandates of the public school system.
The Bureau of Education in Manila aggressively promoted the learning of English (and,
increasingly, Tagalog) as a means of creating a unified Filipino culture, yet Laubach was
openly advocating Maranao as the primary conduit for literacy. Governor of Lanao J.J.
Heffington attempted on “several occasions” to “explain to Mr. Laubach the necessity of
teaching the Moros to read after a fashion that would give them access to the literature of the
country, but for some reason the tried and established method of teaching people to read by
the regular use of the Roman alphabet in the same way that the public schools are giving
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them a little education…fails to appeal to him, and he prefers to use his own system which
may, to the malformed, appear more spectacular.”

113

Visiting Lanao in 1935, the University

of Michigan botanist H.H. Bartlett was gentler in his criticisms, observing that Laubach’s
original Maranao dictionary was riddled with errors but that subsequent editions were more
114

reliable.

Laubach himself admitted that his methods were peculiar and that “sticklers for
115

orthodoxy in education” would likely criticize them.

Similar to Bishop Brent’s school at Indanan, the Maranao Folk School’s endeavours
were bolstered by a small newspaper, The Lanao Progress. One of Laubach’s first acts in
Dansalan was shipping in a secondhand printing press from Cagayan de Oro. An early
iteration of the Progress was printed in February 1930, only three months after his arrival. By
1933, the press printed new editions of the paper biweekly. English and Maranao versions of
each story were printed side-by-side, the latter transliterated phonetically into the Roman
alphabet according to Laubach’s key system. The paper usually ran eight to twelve pages
(later expanding) and featured an eclectic mix of local, national, and international news.
Local news focused on positives such as the progress of the literacy campaign, the natural
beauty of the Lanao region, and the strengthening of infrastructure, but also avidly tracked
the latest stories on criminal outrages. In 1933 and 1934, the outlaw Dimakaling and his
followers appeared multiple times in the pages of the Progress, which described how they
robbed Christian Filipinos and played cat-and-mouse with Constabulary forces.
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The

Progress was also used as pulpit for social issues, as apparent in one article from 1941
encouraging the Maranaos of Dansalan to abstain from alcohol. Written by a Christian
Filipino, it argued that alcohol was “an invention of the devil” and complained about Moro
boys returning to their dormitories drunk at nights. “I should rather a thousand times see the
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Maranaws remain good Mohammedans,” the author wrote, “than become gambling, drinking,
immoral lazy people.”

117

International news was culled from the twenty-five newspapers and periodicals the
Folk School’s library subscribed to, which were translated into Maranao by Laubach and his
staff. An idiosyncratic variety of stories were chosen to enlighten the Maranaos on global
affairs, and subscribers read about strained relations between Russia and Japan or the
expansion of Italian colonialism in North Africa. Locals fluent in English were encouraged to
write opinion pieces, such as one that appeared in 1940 urging citizens of the Philippines to
resist despotism lest the archipelago “sink into a black slavery and extermination worse even
than the darkest hours of the Spanish regime.”
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The paper also used stories from other

countries, Islamic and non-Islamic alike, to illustrate the growing role of women in public
life. In 1933, it published an article about how women in Turkey had “discarded the veil”
under the secular Ataturk regime, and in Egypt how they demanded the right to vote and were
“clamoring to secure the same privileges as men.” The newspaper transparently aimed to
move the Maranaos away from polygamy and gender segregation by providing selective
examples of how women in the heartlands of Islamic culture were “taking up professions,
and…entering into business just as they are in western countries.”
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When not preoccupied

with the cultural refashioning of the Maranaos, the paper occasionally veered into the bizarre,
publishing observations on the outcome of a shark vs. octopus fight and speculating pseudoscientifically that murders could be solved “by developing the last picture taken on the eye of
a dead person.”

120

The paper was reoriented towards youth in the late 1930s, and in 1941

began publishing a special school news supplement advertised as “wholesome, uplifting,
educational, and cultural” and free of “scandal, vice, obscenity, [or] salacious articles.”
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Laubach and employees of the press were also active in collecting, translating and
printing Moro oral histories and myths. The first of these, titled “An Odyssey from Lanao” by
Laubach, was published in the periodical Philippine Public Schools in late 1930. Written in
epic verse, it followed the mythical Moro warrior-prince Bantugan as he traversed the
temporal and spiritual realms and warred with the Spanish.
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The press published other

stories in pamphlet form, such as “The Lanao Belief About the Hereafter,” and “The Story of
the Vagrant Boy.” H.H. Bartlett received a copy of Laubach’s translation of the Bantugan
myth, now referred to as the Darangen epic. Reading the missionary’s “florid and
grandiloquent” prose he thought him guilty of “literary faking,” but after becoming more
familiar with Maranao culture determined that Laubach had “done the cause of Philippine
ethnology and literature a very great service in bringing to light a large body of traditional
123

poetry.”

In his writings, it is evident that Laubach was fascinated and moved by the oral

traditions of the Maranao people, and his efforts in compiling them came from a genuine
preservationist instinct.

124

Yet his missionary impulses remained, and alongside his work

translating Maranao epics he also published the New Testament in Lanao so that, in his
words, “the Gospel of Christ will tell its own story.”
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To this end, he had one of his

employees, a Maranao named Kampong Basman, working late into the night to translate the
126

Christian bible.

The initiative spearheaded by Laubach extended to the petitioning of authorities for
new infrastructural projects, the construction of a high school, the establishment of a
teacher’s college, and a group for teenagers called the Society for English-Speaking Youth
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run by Laubach’s son, Robert.

But while Lanao was a hive of activity, Laubach’s

ambitions expanded. He believed his literacy techniques could be just as easily applied
elsewhere in the world. In 1934, Laubach began a letter-writing campaign to missionaries,
academics, colonial officials, and native leaders around the globe, sending off more than five
hundred missives. This included leading colonial educators like Arthur Mayhew, a longtime
India hand who returned to England and was editing Oversea Education, and Samuel T.
Moyer, an enthusiastic American missionary in India who wanted Laubach to speak at a
conference he was organizing. In the United States, Laubach corresponded with Elaine
Swenson of the Language Research Institute at New York University, who recommended he
128

contact Ernest Boas, son of the famed anthropologist Franz Boas.

In Dansalan, a visual indicator of Laubach’s growing transcolonial purview was a
large map of the world, hung in the middle of the schoolroom, “with silk threads running
from Mindanao to many points in other lands, especially Africa, Asia, and South America.
These lines radiate to every country where we have been corresponding with anybody about
129

literacy or where we have prepared charts.”

In 1933 and 1934, Laubach travelled to other

regions of the Philippines to teach his literacy method in anticipation of a world tour in 1935.
Setting off in February of that year from Iligan, Laubach and his family stayed in India for
several months and created literacy charts there. In the Middle East, Robert Laubach wrote a
130

letter published in The Lanao Progress that updated readers in Mindanao on the journey.

In the Dansalan classroom, a blue line on the world map marked the family’s progress. The
Laubachs returned to Lanao in 1936 and stayed on until 1941, although during this time

127

Minutes of the Society of English-Speaking Youth, July-August 1934, Box 131, Folder 4. Frank Laubach
Collection, SCRC.
128

Letter from Arthur Mayhew to Frank Laubach, 12 March 1934, Box 28, Folder 11. J.R. Hayden Papers,
BHL; Letter from Samuel T. Moyer to Frank Laubach, 22 March 1934, Box 28, Folder 11. J.R. Hayden Papers,
BHL; Letter from Elaine Swenson to Frank Laubach, 28 March 1934, Box 28, Folder 11. J.R. Hayden Papers,
BHL. For further information on Arthur Mayhew, see Clive Whitehead, Colonial Educators: The British Indian
and Colonial Education Service, 1858-1983 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 149-170.
129

“The Literacy Laboratory in Lanao,” Philippines Literacy Material, 1930s, Box 131, Folder 5. Frank
Laubach Collection, SCRC.
130

“Letters,” Lanao Progress, 1 July 1935, 3.

197

Frank’s attentions turned increasingly towards the global implications of his literacy
program.

131

Frank Laubach was in many ways a more liberal character than Charles Brent, yet
paradoxically more energetic in his efforts to convert the Moros. He used his sensitivity and
understanding of Maranao culture to find areas where Christian and Islamic scriptures
overlapped, then exploited these openings with receptive young Maranaos and drew them
towards Christianity. Lanao was a “laboratory” for hybrid approaches to proselytism, and
Laubach openly wondered in pages of The Muslim World, a journal published by the Hartford
Seminary on Christian-Islamic relations, to what extent Christian practices could be married
to Islamic ones. “Should we make our church look like a mosque, have a large drum (tabu) to
call people to prayer, invite panditas and imams to share the service with us, have a place for
washing their feet and hands before entering the church, and perhaps even use prayer rugs
instead of chairs?” he wrote. “These are revolutionary ideas we are turning over in our
minds.”
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Laubach believed that if Maranao rituals and customs were preserved people

would be more receptive to the Christian gospels. In the pages of the Progress, articles
described the deeds of Christ, and Laubach developed a Christian church service in Maranao
for the handful of Moros who converted. In his accounts to other missionaries, the literacy
program was a conduit for Christianity.
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When Laubach’s “finest” Moro convert died of tuberculosis in 1938, he wrote to
mission contributors in the United States that he had afterwards looked upon a picture of the
young man and it seemed to say to him: “I am depending upon you to do the thing which I
wanted to do for my people and which I was prevented from doing by being taken from the
134

flesh. I am still with you in spirit and plead with you not fail.”

With far fewer links to the

upper echelons of colonial power, Laubach’s project in Lanao did not benefit from the self-
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congratulatory galas in New York City that the Bishop Brent Moro School did, and was less
steeped in the cultural imperialism and nationalist sense of duty of earlier educational efforts.
In the 1930s, Americans concerned with the welfare of the Moros watched independence
loom with trepidation, and reoriented their efforts towards simultaneously protecting Islamic
cultures and transforming them so they could better weather the storm of incorporation into a
nascent Philippine national identity. A sensitive and perceptive missionary, Frank Laubach
was a missionary nonetheless, and, while doing work of real benefit to the Maranaos, also
retained conversion as the ultimate signifier of success.
The work at Dansalan and around Lake Lanao continued until the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines. In 1941, Laubach operated the Madrasa High School, opened
to “meet a crisis in public education,” and the Lanao Library had swelled to five thousand
books. Christian students comprised the majority at the high school, but some Maranaos also
attended and scholarships were occasionally given to do post-secondary work at Silliman
University on the island of Negros.
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Laubach was convinced that educating the Maranaos

was the only way for them to avoid a demographic and cultural catastrophe. His writings at
the time were preoccupied with the fate of Moros in an independent Philippines. Migrants
from the North were “constantly pressing in upon our Province and taking land by hook or
crook,” and Laubach thought that for the province to be “saved” the Moros had to become
“intelligent and united” through education.
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For the Moros to survive integration they

needed to catch up with other areas of the archipelago, and the lands in the South had to be
transitioned into “regular” provinces. In a forthright letter to the United States in 1937,
Laubach admitted to a grim belief that there were “only two possible alternatives: First, that
responsible young Moros will appear in sufficient numbers to remake their Province; or
second, that the whole Moro race will be wiped out by the Filipinos.”
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He was not present

to witness the struggles of the Maranaos post-independence, as a brief trip outside of
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Mindanao in October 1941 became permanent after the Japanese invasion. Frank Laubach
turned his attentions elsewhere, dedicating the remainder of his life to refining the literacy
techniques that he developed at Dansalan in other regions of the world and becoming famous
138

in the process.

The Ambiguities of Colonial State-Building
Advocating a continued American presence in the Philippines, former Governor General
Henry L. Stimson reflected on the successes of his nation in a 1932 letter to the explorer and
politician Hiram Bingham. “Under enlightened leadership we framed our policy along no
selfish lines of colonial domination, but from the beginning undertook the courageous
experiment of trying to establish among an Oriental people the practices of Western
economic and social development and principles of political democracy,” Stimson wrote.
Although the Europeans had “scoffed” at American plans early on, time had proven that the
inhabitants of the archipelago had “made progress in achieving a uniform language, a
Western system of education, [and] a hitherto unknown national feeling.” The Philippines in
1932 represented an “islet of growing Western development and thought surrounded by an
ocean of Orientalism” and its people were “the interpreters of American idealism to the Far
East.” The republican virtues of American democracy served to build a unique and admirable
139

colonial state in Southeast Asia.

As shown, many colonials in Mindanao and Sulu shared Stimson’s vision of the
American Philippines. In the South, dreams of transformation were driven by a combination
of racial, political, and religious motives grouped here under the rubric of civilizational
imperatives. These imperatives – establishing systems of law, healthcare, education,
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agriculture, and commerce – stemmed from a conviction that Western modes of living needed
replication in order for the peoples of the Islamic Philippines to ‘progress’ towards
modernity. Such motivations for rule remained remarkably consistent throughout the
American colonial period in a broad sense, although methods for achieving them varied.
While the number of American officials progressively decreased after 1914, those remaining
often occupied important positions where they dictated policy. This was especially true in
education and law enforcement. The Filipinos who replaced them, inculcated into colonial
norms, often took even more aggressive stances towards ‘civilizing’ their Muslim wards.
Elites like Teopisto Guingona viewed Moro areas as problematic in much the same way as
Frank Carpenter or John Pershing had before. The ‘Moro Problem’ remained a social and
political feature in the minds of Filipino politicians well after the Americans departed.
In nearly four decades, the Americans managed to mold a handful of Westernized
Muslim elites. These men and women eschewed traditional customs, dressed in American
suits and dresses, spoke and wrote English well, and advocated public schooling for Muslim
children. Mostly, they were drawn from elite families like that of Datu Piang in Cotabato or
Sultan Jamalul Kiram II on Jolo. Even those onboard with the civilizing mission, however,
were skeptical of it. Arolas Tulawie, the schoolteacher and politician we met earlier in this
chapter, worked to modernize institutions in the Sulu Archipelago, yet blamed colonial rule
for the “deplorable condition[s]” that existed in the South by the 1930s. A functional form of
localized government – the datuship – had served to keep the Sultan’s power in check, but it
was replaced by inconsistent colonial policies that were implemented with little regard for
individual communities. Slavery was abolished and replaced, according to Tulawie, with a
type of “wage slavery” that was little better. Tulawie prophesized that in one hundred years
time the Muslims of the Southern Philippines would remain in the same disenfranchised state
they were in 1933. He estimated that in thirty-five years of American colonial rule seventy
thousand Muslims were killed by authorities, or an average of six per day, and adopted the
140

language of President Franklin Roosevelt in calling for a “new deal” for the Moros.
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What then are we to make of the civilizing mission in the Southern Philippines? It was
undoubtedly generated by deep veins of cultural and racial supremacism, especially
pronounced at the beginning of the twentieth-century as American and European politicians,
bureaucrats, and educators sought to put a humane and scientifically rationalized face on
projects of colonial domination. One could turn to nearly any page in this project and find
these colonial logics at work. Yet any sustained engagement with the personal writings of
men like Frank Laubach or James Fugate complicates the teleological urge to dismiss every
white actor who served in a colonial setting as an agent of oppression. Laubach, for example,
contained multitudes. He covertly attempted to convert Maranaos and described them in
nakedly paternalist language, but also ran extensive literacy campaigns, opened clinics and
schools, and established a newspaper that catered to the newly literate around Lake Lanao –
often at financial detriment to himself. Fugate was a product of his time in the way he
described the Tausūg, yet fought against Americans and Filipinos who wanted to see the
citizens of Sulu play a subordinate role in their own homeland. The moderating tendencies of
certain state and state-affiliated actors problematizes arguments depicting the colonial
experience as one of unremitting coercion, adding deeper texture to our narrative.
Understanding resistance to and collaboration with colonial state objectives by
Muslim populations also requires us to consider individual and local specificities.
Collaboration brought with it access to power for those outside of traditionally influential
lineages, a chance to reap the limited material benefits brought by the colonials, and a means
by which to avoid state-generated violence. Resistance often occurred under the mantle of
authenticity. To resist the civilizational imperatives of the Americans meant reaffirming one’s
belief in precolonial communal structures and hierarchies, the teachings of Islam, and other
established customs. Tensions between sites of authority (government and traditional)
frustrated the state’s efforts to transform the Moros and their land into models of colonial
modernity. Conflicting power structures within government, financial shortages, and local
variabilities further complicated the implementation of civilizational imperatives.
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Chapter Five / Corrective Violence
On Fear, Resistance, Massacre, and Punishment

In August 1923, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported a disturbance near Lake Lanao. The
Philippine Constabulary, responsible for law and order in the region, had clashed with a band
of Maranaos led by a man named Guarin. Leonard Wood, then Governor General of the
Philippines, claimed that the Moros were radicalized by their travels to Mecca, which caused
them to lash out at Filipinos and Americans upon their return to Lanao. Guarin’s group
threatened to destroy telephone lines and burn schoolhouses if their demands were not
acknowledged. An old hand in the Muslim South, Leonard Wood took special interest in
what happened there. He speculated to the press that Guarin’s influence over “the fanatics”
was growing, and asserted that because “influential Moro priests” were unable to quell them
that a more punitive approach should be taken. “I believe the opportune time has come to cut
short their fanatical activities by means of force,” said Wood. “If we postpone action until
later, we will have to kill a larger number than now.” The Tribune reported that in the
subsequent battle fifty Maranao warriors and three members of the Constabulary died.

1

The encounter in Lanao featured a number of elements found in many of the larger
confrontations between Moros and government forces. Deaths were asymmetrical, with the
Moros routinely suffering casualties many times higher than the authorities. Resistance to
civilizational imperatives (schooling, health programs, land reform, and so on) was
interpreted as evidence of fanaticism by government authorities. Finally, officials portrayed
the overwhelming force used to pacify the Moros as a necessary corrective – both to amend
Muslim behaviour and avoid greater bloodshed. Violence as envisioned and practiced by the
colonial state in the Islamic Philippines was at its heart an exercise in correcting those Moros
unwilling to collaborate in the transformation process designed for them by Americans,
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Filipinos, and their own elites. As such, it represented the coercive underbelly of the colonial
state-building project detailed in the previous chapter.

2

Corrective violence finds its closest conceptual parallel in the work of Michael G.
Vann, who writes on the “pedagogic execution” in French Indochina. According to Vann, the
violent spectacle of the guillotined criminal was “a cheap and effective way of
communicating the colonial order of things” and evidence of how “violence saturated the
colonial encounter.” The punishment served not only a penal function but was “a pedagogical
3

tool to discipline the colonial subject who might consider an act of rebellion.” While Vann’s
concept focuses mainly on the maintenance of racial supremacy, the idea of corrective
violence as deployed by the Americans and Filipinos moves into broader explanatory
territory. The relationship between violence and racial demarcation was, as shown by Paul
Kramer, an important one in the Philippines.4 However, punitive acts by the colonial state in
the Southern Philippines married this conservation of hierarchy with pedagogical goals. In
other words, authorities believed violence ushered in civilizational transformation when
dialogue failed. Beyond this, many Americans saw corrective violence as a form of
communication the intrinsically savage Moro character understood. Force, as such, was a
language the Moro appreciated when he could not be brought into the colonial fold by more
diplomatic means. Sporadic slaughter served an important function in refashioning ‘Moros’
5

into ‘Filipino Muslims.’

2
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This chapter is indebted to a number of works on violence and discipline in Asian colonial states. Karl Hack
and Tobias Rettig’s edited collection on colonial military forces in Southeast Asia gathers multiple studies on
the exercise of coercive power in the region, including one on the Philippine Scouts. James Hevia’s scholarship
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Connected to this violent reconstruction was the penal system, where experimental
techniques were implemented to teach prisoners how to become model citizens of a distinctly
colonial mold upon release. Practices of surveillance and reform through labour, most evident
at the San Ramon Penal Farm outside of Zamboanga, can be viewed in a particularly
Foucauldian light in their attempts to operate “at every level of the social body and by
6

mingling ceaselessly the art of rectifying and the right to punish.” Officials who believed in
the beneficial effects of the “punitive mechanisms” at play envisioned an ideal penal system
that would correct errant Moro behaviour while simultaneously operating as a self-supporting
7

“apparatus of production.” Inclinations towards panoptic control and reformation, however,
were often belied by the reality of conditions in the municipal and provincial jails. Here, we
take cues from another study of French Indochina. In Peter Zinoman’s work, he observes that
“power relations marked by the pervasive circulation of disciplinary processes throughout the
social body” were undermined by the failure of “modern methods of prison administration” to
8

be effectively implemented throughout the colonial carceral system. A litany of
inefficiencies and indignities in the Southern Philippines – from corruption, to prisoner abuse,
to a lack of funding – meant that incarceration was characterized by petty brutalities as much
as moral reform. In this sense, the variegated realities of imprisonment in the Southern
Philippines included both the modernist fantasies of officials and more banal institutional
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realities, speaking to what Zinoman calls “the hybridity of power in colonial and postcolonial
societies.”

9

Underpinning the corrective violence of the colonial state was the belief that the use
of force and incarceration countered the innate ability of the Moro to unleash their own
spectacular displays of violence. This, they thought, was manifest in the juramentado, a term
describing practitioners of ritualized religious suicide that took on elastic definitions.
Although the military-civilian diarchy in Manila created ongoing tension between the U.S.
Army and the Philippine Constabulary in the first decade of colonial rule, the institutional
friction did not cause the Constabulary to move away from the use of force after the transition
to civilian rule at the end of 1913.

10

If anything, the government of the Department of

Mindanao and Sulu continued the policy of mixing law enforcement with administration, as
did the provinces run by the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in the 1920s. Seven of fifteen
11

provincial governors between 1913 and 1930 were Constabulary officers. These structural
continuities meant that Moros continued to be viewed in terms of their capacity for violence
and responses to resistance were severe throughout the colonial period. The consistent use of
force after 1913 meant that the “normalization” of the Southern Philippines officials boasted
of never really occurred. While the frequency of violence waxed and waned, it remained a
key tool used by the government throughout our period of study. This chapter explores
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interconnected histories of fear, violence, and incarceration in the Southern Philippines to
better understand the use of corrective violence by the colonial regime and assess its impacts.

Fixating on Juramentados
In August 1934, on the small island of Tabawan in the Tawi-Tawi group, a double homicide
12

occurred.

On the 8th of that month, the wife of a Moro named Asnol died giving birth to

their child. Wracked with grief, Asnol decided to forfeit his own life. Because of Islamic
prohibitions against suicide, he would accomplish this through ‘going juramentado’ – or
‘running amuck’ – in the neighbouring community of Laum, where the Bureau of Education
ran a four-teacher school. The teachers at Laum were Christian Filipinos, which to Asnol
meant they were foreigners tasked with imposing alien customs on Moro children. Dying in
the act of killing them, therefore, would be considered an honour. Asnol approached the
school armed with a bolo and cut down two teachers, Felipe Collante and Ruperto Rosos,
13

before being shot dead by a retired teacher, Ignacio Aguilar, with a shotgun.

Included in official reports of the murders were photographs of the deceased teachers,
whose bodies were sent to Jolo for medical examination. The pictures show arms nearly
severed and deep gashes to the heads of the victims. K.W. Chapman, Acting Division
Superintendent of Schools in Sulu, observed that the extent of the injuries was “not
exceptional but simply an average case after an amuck has finished with his victim” and
suggested that the American and Filipino authorities adopt a more punitive approach to
dealing with the problem. “When a man in Borneo runs amuck,” he wrote, “the whole village
is held responsible. The British promptly burn the whole village. The Dutch cut off the head
of the offender and place it on a pole in the market.” Chapman was bitter that two of his

12
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teachers were dead while in the meantime Asnol had “covered himself with honor and glory”
and that his grave had become a spot of gathering for the people of his village. In arguing for
greater punishments to Bureau of Education officials in Manila, Chapman darkly observed
that Muslims did not appreciate kind treatment unless it was “tempered with the kind of
justice they understand.”

14

The phenomenon of the juramentado or amuck during the American colonial period
was inherited from the Spanish. Juramentado, which in Spanish means “one who has taken
an oath,” was a form of ritual suicide derived from earlier calls for jihad (the Qur’anic
concept of ‘Holy War’) against sources of authority viewed as illegitimate by the Moros.
During the Spanish occupation of Sulu, the Tausūg people referred to the act as parang sabil
(roughly translating to ‘war in the path of God’) and used it to denote “an individual decision
and action, sanctioned and even encouraged by the panditas as a form of resistance against
15

the Spanish.” In this private act of jihad, the juramentado engaged in a series of ritualized
practices before attack, including “washing, prayers, and purification that customarily readied
a body for burial…other procedures function to give his body strength and endurance and
involved amulets and incenses, shaving his head and plucking his eyebrows, and binding his
penis in an upright position.”

16

The establishment of a pervasive colonial regime throughout

the Southern Philippines by the Americans meant that individual acts of violence by mujahid
(the person intent on ‘going juramentado’) became more common than group resistance to
colonial rule.
American military authorities were cognizant of the juramentado from the first,
drawing information on the phenomenon from the Spanish. A translated Spanish history in
the possession of John Pershing spoke of the juramentado as those who decided to “vanquish
or die rushing against the enemy’s forces, no matter how strong they may be without ever
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drawing back, till they fall dead.”

17

Writing to his mother, Frank McCoy told a mythologized

story of how the Spanish Governor of Jolo in the 1880s, General Juan Arolas, stopped the
practice. When Arolas asked the Sultan of Sulu to call a halt to juramentado attacks, the
Sultan told him he had no control over such matters. Arolas then sent a gunboat to shell the
Sultan’s capital at Maibun, and when the Sultan complained he replied, “The gunboat is
running amuck, the Captain is juramentado. What control have I over such?” The attacks
18

stopped shortly thereafter.

The tale was popular enough to enter into common lore, as later

chroniclers used the same sequence of events but attributed the disciplinary lesson to Leonard
19

Wood or John Pershing.

McCoy went on to describe how the “old Arolas regulations” at the

gates of Jolo were still in place. Every person passing into the walled town was disarmed
first. Despite this precaution, on three different occasions in 1903 juramentados slipped past
the guards. “Once the barongs were concealed inside bamboos and twice in baskets of fruit.
As soon as they were past the guards, out came the barongs and they ran amuck, cutting and
slashing at everybody in sight till finally riddled by the guards.”

20

The Samal Moro leader Datu Mandi helped establish his bona fides with the
Americans in 1900 by relating how he was awarded the Medal of Merit for Valor by the
Spanish for assisting in the killing of a juramentado who attempted to run amuck in 1895.

21

Likewise, Sultan Jamalul Kiram drafted a public letter urging the people of Sulu not to
engage in the practice against the Americans, warning them “if you love yourselves and your
country avoid coming to blows with the Americans, because they are like a matchbox – you
strike one and they all go off.”

17
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Pershing figure that he had no control over the juramentados contained some truth. As
colonial control tightened under the Americans, ritual suicides were more commonly a
private matter rather than a means of coordinated resistance. Considering this, Moro leaders
in Mindanao and Sulu were likely being truthful when they claimed that the attacks took
place without communal foreknowledge. Besides receiving a blessing from their parents and
perhaps a local pandita, the juramentado’s intentions were not widely known outside of their
home village until they struck. General John Bates was emphatic that running amuck not be
viewed as a religious act, and that “a juramentado would be hanged along with the pandita
who gave him his oath, the barber who shaved his head and anointed him, the person who
made his white robe for him, and anybody who should know of his vow without sending
warning to the Americans.”

23

The Americans explained the phenomenon in a variety of ways. The Mindanao
Herald, in a 1914 article, suggested that the practice was a holdover from Spanish times and a
remnant of the jihad waged during that period. Quoting Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, a
sixteenth-century Spanish military officer who travelled to Sulu to exact tribute from the
Sultan, the paper suggested that early iterations of jihad against foreign occupiers were
legitimate as they responded to a direct threat to Islam. Acting as interpreter of Qur’anic
doctrine, the Herald deemed pre-1878 juramentados as legitimate actors because they were
sanctioned by the Sultan of Sulu, and thus “fulfilled the principle requirements of a true
24

jihad” which needed to have a “national character.”

After the treaty between the Sultanate

and the Spanish was concluded in 1878, ritualized suicide in combat was delegitimized
because it was no longer “an act of war performed thru the cooperation of large bodies of
men actuated by religious motives,” and became “little different from murder madness in
other parts of Malaysia as ‘running amuck,’ which drives individuals, despondent because of
personal grievances, to an almost indiscriminate slaughter of their fellows.” Although
reflective in its treatment of Spanish-Muslim relations, the paper made no attempt to
understand the role of the juramentado during the American period. Because their actions
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lacked the aforementioned “national character” they did not qualify as true expressions of
25

jihad, and therefore were “pseudo-juramentado.” To the editors of the Herald, the rational
actors fighting colonial rule from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries became madmen
unworthy of study after 1878, and a threat to colonial order after 1899.
Like most Americans, John Pershing interpreted running amuck as something other
than an act of protest against the colonial status quo. To Pershing, the Moros could not “in
any sense be called true believers” and therefore the religious implications of ‘going
juramentado’ were also nullified. The Moros were pagans whose culture was Islamized to a
minor degree, and the only religious authority figure of note that they had, Sultan Jamalul
Kiram II, was “licentious” and ill regarded. Pershing blamed the social order of Moro
communities for fomenting the attacks. The “degrading slavery of concubinage and
polygamy” allowed wealthy Moro men to accumulate wives while those with little in the way
of money or power were continually “denied the privilege and the natural right of having a
wife” due to being outbid on dowries. Denied a partner, the discouraged Moro male took it
upon himself to become a juramentado and attack Christians. Although Pershing
acknowledged that running amuck could be an act of war against enemies, he saw the
principal cause as unequal social relations within Moro society. “A code which recognizes
plurality and authorizes concubinage,” he wrote, “can not prevail against civilized standards
of morality. Its baneful influence encourages sensuality and lust with all their degrading
effect upon Moro character.” The “fully established” links between juramentados and
polygamy meant that suicidal attacks on the American authorities were an entirely internal
problem and could only be fixed if Moro culture was overhauled entirely.

26

Other explanations for juramentados included that given in a report by a
representative of the American-Philippine Co., based out of New York City, who visited
Mindanao and Sulu in 1913 to survey commercial prospects there. The report explained that
attacks against Americans on Jolo were linked directly back to the presence of “Arab
Panditas or Priests” who were preaching “death and destruction for Christians” to the locals,
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and interpreted the Qur’an to the Moros “in such a ways that the Moro feels it often his duty
to kill as many Christians as possible and if he should die in the act, immediately he will join
27

Allah in Heaven there to live in luxury with from six to twelve wives.”

Elsewhere, cases of

juramentado were described as mental health issues. A Moro student newspaper from Jolo
described a scare that happened in 1926 near Indanan, where a man named Ijasani, who was
being treated for insanity, confronted Constabulary guards and was shot dead by them.

28

A

policy memorandum on Sulu from 1934 likewise described running amuck as the result of a
brooding mind, and suggested that the resulting frenzy had nothing to do with killing
Christians, or true juramentado at all, but was simply a matter of bypassing the religious
prohibition on suicide. Once the Moro was determined to die, the memorandum stated, who
29

he killed – “even his own friends and relatives” – was not “very material.”

The famous

muckraking journalist Charles Edward Russell took this line of thinking further, and claimed
that the Moro mind “in a state of nature” was “capable of strange fits and starts.” Russell
compared the Moro to a carabao that “after years of plodding patience, may be seized all of a
sudden with temporary madness,” and suggested that the only way to alter these animalistic
30

qualities was educating Moros on their civic duties.

Newspaper accounts of juramentados were predictably sensational. For the press, the
juramentado functioned as the ultimate iteration of Islamic fanaticism, and a source of
constant danger for Americans in the Southern Philippines. That an American soldier or
civilian could be cut down at any moment by a frenzied warrior in a state of religious ecstasy
made for good copy, and most longer articles on the region made some mention of the
phenomenon. In 1912, the Washington Post reported on the murder of one Lieutenant Walter
H. Rodney, killed in the town of Jolo by a “fanatic, dashing down the street, slashing right
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and left with his bolo.” The New York Times reported on Colonel W.H. Wallace’s novel
approach to punishing juramentados and their families on Jolo. Wallace and his men began
burying pigs in the graves of juramentados to warn other Tausūg off engaging in the activity.
Because of the Islamic admonition against pork, military officers believed that the Tausūg
would worry about their soul being contaminated by the presence of a hog in their grave.
Wallace described the interment, done before a large crowd, with some relish, noting that
“news of the form of punishment adopted soon spread” and that “the method had a
wholesome effect” in establishing order on the island.

32

Colonel Alexander Rogers repeated

this approach some years later in an even more gruesome fashion. Dead juramentados were
33

laid out in village marketplaces and would have slaughtered pigs placed above them.

It is difficult to overstate the extent to which the juramentados, who represented a tiny
fraction of the Muslim population in the Southern Philippines, played into the American
colonial psyche. Many Americans writing about their experiences recounted in lurid detail
attacks they witnessed, or, more often than not, had heard about from others. Often times, the
accounts emphasized the sheer unpredictability of the amuck, as was the case in the memoir
of the Constabulary officer John R. White. He told the story of two Yakan Moros from the
island of Basilan who were travelling by sea to the market at Taluksangay, just down the
coast from the town of Zamboanga, to sell unprocessed cocoa pods. Their boat capsized in a
storm en route and their goods were lost. Washing up on shore, they decided to run amuck in
the nearest Christian town. On arriving there, they attacked whomever was closest, or in
White’s vivid description: “Slash, cut, slice, a child’s head here, a woman’s arm there, and in
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as many seconds as it has taken words to tell, the peaceful village street became a place of
massacre and wailing.” Eventually, they two were overwhelmed and cut down by Filipino
34

townsfolk, and afterwards their dismembered bodies were strung up publicly.

In another of

White’s stories, a Tausūg ran amuck after his friends had made fun of his hiccups while they
were all sitting around a campfire.

35

A Moro, it seemed, was liable to explode into a

murderous frenzy at the slightest provocation.
Distinctions between juramentado and amuck shifted. The stories just related,
according to White, were garden-variety cases of Moros running amuck, something he and
others thought was an innate trait in those with Malay blood. He likened this form of violence
to “spontaneous combustion,” where an “apparently sane and respectable citizen” suddenly
became a “dancing, frenzied, fiend rushing frantically about to slay, blindly, and
indiscriminately.” The proper juramentado, on the other hand, was an “amuck with religious
and other frills” who worked himself into a state of religious frenzy before stealthily entering
36

a Christian settlement and cutting down as many as possible.

Most other accounts did not

make a distinction between the two practices. William B. Freer, who wrote of his experiences
as a teacher in the Philippines, described the amuck and juramentado interchangeably, while
others saw juramentado as merely the Spanish word to describe the Moro religious variant of
a practice they believed to be common amongst Malays in Southeast Asia.

37

Vic Hurley distinguished between the two practices, claiming that to run amuck was
“prevalent among all Eastern peoples” but had “no religious significance.” Essentializing
racial characteristics, he claimed the Malay was “prone to brood and linger over imaginary
ills and this culminates in the seizure of a kris and a mad slashing of every person in the
amuck’s path.”
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practiced the private form of “constructive self-destruction” known as juramentado.

Despite taking pains to distinguish, he spent numerous pages on the Moros using the term
juramentado to describe Moro attackers of every stripe, from those who waged open war
against the Spanish in the Sulu Archipelago during the 1800s, to those who performed
guerilla attacks against army posts in the Lake Lanao region, to the lone amuck who cut down
civilians in a crowded marketplace. His timeframe was likewise vast, and he claimed the
40

“terrible period of juramentado attacks” lasted from 1509 until 1913.

In collapsing all Moro violence into the phenomenon of the juramentado, Hurley
mimicked a prevalent tendency among the colonial class. It was commonly held that the
innate volatility of the Malay melded with a distinctly Moro version of religious fanaticism to
create the juramentado, a suicide warrior of such frenzied strength that even men with
lengthy experience in the Philippines like Dean Worcester and Frank Laubach were wont to
discuss them in near-mystical terms. Laubach claimed that to injure “the fanatic could not
stop him…if bayonetted he would often seize the barrel of the rifle and push the bayonet
further into himself in an effort to bring the soldier at the other end of the gun near enough to
41

cut him down with his barong.” Some claimed, however, that no actual juramentados had
existed since the Sultanate’s treaty with Spain in 1878. Others saw the specter of amuck in
even the most routine murders involving Moros. Florence Kimball Russel, writing in 1907,
believed that the attacks no longer took place because the Moros had “taken most kindly to
the Americans” and did not view them as Christians in the same way they did the Spanish
Those Americans who wrote or spoke about their experiences in the Southern Philippines
later in life generally made some mention of juramentados and their fearsome reputation.
Charles Ivins claimed in his unpublished memoirs that the juramentado would continue
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attacking until he killed multiple soldiers, even though his heart had been “shattered by
43

several bullets.”

Americans were uncertain what Moro violence meant. Religious fanaticism, mental
illness, racial traits, and honour were all ascribed or disavowed as explanatory factors. Those
who served in the Southern Philippines were often genuinely perplexed that these outbursts of
violence continued to happen. Stephen F. Dale argues that individual religious suicide attacks
by Asian Muslims continued after coordinated resistance to colonial rule ended because of
44

feelings of defeat and dispossession. If the Moro could not meet the foreign occupier –
American or Filipino – on equal military footing, he could at least express his displeasure
with the colonial regime by dying in a blaze of glory. The civilizational overhaul that came
with American rule also had a disorienting effect on Muslim societies. As Michael Adas
shows, the innovations of empire “undermine customary beliefs, institutions, and patterns of
human interaction so rapidly that viable replacements often cannot be developed quickly
enough to cushion the perilous transition to a new order.”

45

The arrival of the Americans

brought new modes of societal organization that undermined the institution of the datuship,
rearranged Moro business practices, and attempted to secularize education, among other
changes.
In this dizzying atmosphere of reconfiguration, violent resistance became more likely.
While the larger attempt to remake Moros cannot account for the granular context of each
case of amuck – the petty jealousies, the grief, the outrage – it helps explains linkages
between a destabilized society and violent outbursts. Americans at the time were infuriated
by the phenomenon. Although there were variations in explanations of juramentado and
amuck, colonials shared a common belief that the irrational and violent character of the Moro
could only be contained and corrected if met with punitive action. Paranoia about
juramentados, as well as indignation that some Moros were not grateful for the benefits of
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colonial rule, helped establish a relationship of ongoing violence between Muslims and the
colonial state.

Resistance and Massacre
General Adna R. Chaffee believed that violence needed to be strategically applied in
controlling the Moros. Writing to Adjutant General Henry Corbin in April 1902, he stated his
belief that “we must not fail duty which demands application of Mosaic law, ‘An eye for an
eye,’ when dealing with savages who know no other way of obtaining redress for wrong.” He
feared that Mindanao would “remain in terra incognita” and thought it best for the Moros if
the “army press into their settlements in friendly spirit than stand barred out at their gates and
46

lose their respect.”

Other Americans in the Southern Philippines, who saw the language of

force as a prerequisite for successful civilizing projects, echoed Chaffee’s concerns. Armed
with the certainty that they understood the Moro ‘character,’ military officials initiated a
violent dynamic that continued long after their departure.
Early confrontations with the Moros took place around the southern shore of Lake
Lanao. Lacking unifying figures and riven with internecine conflicts, the Maranao Moros
there were believed to be especially unruly. Their relative isolation, ferocity in combat, and
knowledge of the local environment meant that Spanish incursions in the previous three
centuries were limited. With this in mind, punitive expeditions, most famously those led by
John Pershing in 1902-03, demonstrated the power of the U.S. military. At the beginning of
May 1902, Colonel Frank Baldwin led a force of some twelve hundred men against Moros
holed up in fortifications at Bayan and Pandapatan. Two days of bloody fighting, some of it
hand-to-hand, saw between four hundred and five hundred Moros killed with American
losses of only eleven killed and forty-two wounded. General Chaffee commented in a terse
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cablegram afterwards that the battle at “Bayan caused much astonishment; was extremely
47

necessary wholesome lesson, which don’t think will have to be repeated.”

Bayan established a pattern that continued until Philippine independence: ‘obstinate’
Moros who refused to submit were met with considerable force and decimated in the process.
A sub-headline from a Manila newspaper following Pershing’s expeditions was typical:
“Victorious American commander attacks the recalcitrants of Mindanao, losing not a single
man in the course of the advance.” In the article, an anonymous staff officer in Manila was of
the opinion that “the Moros have not forgotten the lesson given them in Bayan,” and that
48

“opposition to Pershing’s men has been desultory.”

When the Americans did take losses

they were small in comparison to the Moros. Through the spring of 1903, Maranaos “who
rejected the tenders of friendship” were violently suppressed. In the wake of the Battle of
Bacolod in early April 1903, the Chicago Evening Post reported that the defeat of the Moros
there would “lead all Moros to acknowledge American sovereignty.”

49

This did not happen. Resistance continued under Panglima Hassan on Jolo and Datu
Ali, a rival of Datu Piang, in Cotabato. Hassan, a powerful Tausūg leader, urged other datus
to take up arms against the Americans. District Governor of Jolo Hugh Scott figured Hassan
to be “probably the strongest chief on the island” and reckoned he could raise “500 well
50

armed men in an hour, and many more hundreds in a day.” In November and December of
1903, Scott led the 14th Cavalry against Hassan’s supporters. “Wherever we met resistance,”
51

he wrote to his wife, “we killed them and burned the houses.”

Hassan, whose opposition

stemmed from opposition to taxation and a fear of American interference with Moro cultural
traditions, was tracked down at Bud Bagsak in March 1904 and killed alongside two
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companions.

Datu Ali, the Sultan of Buayan in the Cotabato region, was at first on good

terms with the military authorities in Cotabato, particularly Colonel Lea Febiger, the district
governor. In friendlier times, the two made “tentative arrangements to send [Ali] on an
educational tour to the United States.”

53

Ali’s relations with the Americans broke down over

familiar issues of taxation, slavery, the changing of the common currency from the Mexican
54

to American dollar, and the reordering of power structures in the region.

Attempts to bring Ali in peacefully by men like the Syrian-born regional expert
Najeeb Saleeby, who visited the datu’s camp, came to nothing.

55

By 1904, resistance to

American rule in the region had transformed into running battles between Ali’s men and U.S.
Army forces and Philippine Constabulary in the jungles of Cotabato. After an initial
confrontation at Ali’s cotta at Seranaya, combat became increasingly decentered as the Moros
realized they had greater success against the superior weaponry of the Americans if they used
familiarity with the environment to their advantage, attacking patrols quickly and then
vanishing. These guerilla tactics frustrated the Americans, who adopted punitive
reconcentration policies for Maguindanaon communities in areas suspected of harbouring or
supplying Datu Ali and his men. Shoot-on-sight orders were given for any Moro male acting
suspiciously, and structures outside of designated reconcentration areas were burned. Even
Vic Hurley, no great opponent of colonial empire, admitted “there was some criticism
directed at this engagement due to the numbers of women and children killed by the artillery
56

and rifle fire of the American troops.”

When the Constabulary failed to capture or kill Ali, Governor Wood sent a hunting
party led by one of his closest aides, Captain Frank McCoy, to track the datu. In late October
1905, McCoy and his men located Ali and shot him dead on the porch of one of his
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hideouts.

57

Despite the violence and displacement brought to the Rio Grande Valley by the

conflict, after his death the Maguindanao Moros mythologized Ali as a folk hero. Unlike
Datu Piang, a self-made half-caste who readily supported the Americans, they saw Ali as a
brave warrior who fought a courageous but suicidal war against a far stronger enemy.
Rumours quickly spread that the Maguindanao leader had not even been killed, gaining
enough currency that enterprising journalists printed them and the colonial authorities were
forced to open an investigation.

58

Ali remained a popular folk hero in the region, and as late

as 1914 his son and nephews were resisting foreign rule in the Cotabato region.

59

The violence of the first years of the American occupation of the Southern Philippines
peaked at Bud Dajo, an extinct volcano five miles outside of the town of Jolo, in early March
1906. Hundreds of Tausūg Moros fortified themselves in its crater to protest the unpopular
cedula head tax, and more generally how the Americans and colluding Moro elites robbed
them of their earnings. The imposition and collection of taxes was a perennial source of
friction between the residents of Jolo and the colonial government. A series of encounters
between the American military and resisting Moros occurred in the previous two years,
60

including one where 226 Moros were killed in a single afternoon.

District Governor Hugh

Scott was forced to conduct a series of meetings where he repeatedly explained the cedula
and “made a speech declaring that this tax in no way interfered with the eleven tenets of the
Mohammedan religion.”

61

Americans co-opted local elites to collect the tax from their

followers, but widespread allegations of corruption during the process further alienated the
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average Joloano. In the months leading up to the massacre, the Americans were also
confronting unrest in other parts of the Sulu Archipelago, including the depredations of a
pirate named Pala and the assassination of the American commanding officer on the island of
Siasi.

62

Although Scott argued for a measured approach to the holdouts on Bud Dajo, he
departed for medical treatment in the United States and was replaced by James Reeves.
Reeves’ inexperience played into the designs of the provincial governor, Leonard Wood, who
believed punitive action was necessary. Having already assured his superiors in Manila and
Washington that the Moros were nearly pacified, Wood desired a solution to the Dajo
situation more expedient than negotiation. In the words of George Langhorne, an aide to
Wood and Secretary of the Moro Province, “the Moros on Daho Mountain” would “have to
63

be exterminated.”

Without Scott acting as a tempering force, the American leadership in

Sulu was in agreement about how best to approach the Dajo situation. Colonel Joseph W.
Duncan of the 6th Infantry, who had little experience in the region, was assigned an assorted
group of soldiers from the 6th Infantry, the 19th Infantry, the 4th Cavalry, and the 28th
Artillery, along with some members of the Philippine Constabulary and a handful of U.S.
sailors.
In a long report, Duncan recounted the events of early March 1906. Meeting with the
th

4 Cavalry at the Schuck family homestead near Jolo town, he and his men marched towards
Bud Dajo, destroying ‘suspicious’ food supplies and structures. Fighting on the mountain
broke out on March 6th, but it was not until the following day that the Americans reached the
summit crater. Although the Moros had previously put up resistance to the advancing
Americans, the final confrontation at the top of Dajo was a massacre. Using Krag-Jorgensen
rifles and Colt Automatics, American troops cut down a mixed group of Tausūg men,
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women, and children. Captain Edward P. Lawton, commander of one of three attacking
columns, noted the “desperate resistance” of the Moros, who were “shot down in their tracks
with terrible slaughter, so that their cotta and lip of the crater were soon piled up with the
dead, several bodies deep.” Lawton then sent detachments into the mouth of crater “to burn
the shacks and destroy all Moros who might be alive there, which work was thoroughly
accomplished.” The following day, March 8th, the final Moro cotta was taken by the
Americans. Inside they found “a mass of bodies piled up, some fifty in number.” Clean-up
work commenced immediately, with Duncan and Wood ordering that all structures and food
supplies be destroyed.

64

Estimates of the number of dead at Bud Dajo vary. Major Omar Bundy, leader of one
of the attack columns, noted in the wake of the massacre that the Moro interpreters “who
were acquainted with the conditions and were best able to form a correct estimate, stated that
65

about 1000 Moros were living in the crater, and that of this number nearly all were killed.”

Official army estimates place the number around six hundred, while Robert Fulton suggests
the actual figure to be somewhere between seven hundred and nine hundred. Twenty-one
members of the attacking force, Americans and their Moro allies, were killed, along with
seventy-three wounded.

66

In his concluding remarks, Colonel Duncan lamented the fact that

“some women and children were inadvertently killed during the fight on the summit of the
mountain.” He used the example of the medical attention given to an injured Moro woman
who came down the mountain with her child as evidence of the humane inclinations of the
Americans. “It is not believed that a woman or child was intentionally killed by anyone,”
Duncan reported, “even though in many instances the women are said to have fought like
demons; for the American soldier is of that superior type of manhood that would never
willingly lift an avenging hand against woman or child.” Further on, he blamed the Moros
themselves for the deaths of their women and children. These explanations, given a mere two
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days after the events at Dajo ended, anticipated some of the subsequent outrage in the United
67

States.

Limited means of long-distance communication allowed U.S. military authorities to
stage-manage information about the slaughter. Many early newspaper reports included long
quotations from Leonard Wood’s official report to the War Department, which framed the
massacre as the lamentable result of fierce Moro resistance to the civilizing designs of the
Americans. Using tropes familiar to the American reader, Wood claimed that the problem
arose from the Moro tendency to fight to the death against insurmountable odds rather than
68

slink off into the jungles, as the Filipinos would.

A variety of explanations for the

shockingly high casualty figures were provided, nearly all of which attempted to explain
away the killing of women and children. Some officials, like Colonel Duncan, claimed that
the Moros had forced their women and children to stay with them, and that the group
presented itself to the Americans as an undifferentiated mass. A Lieutenant Madsell of
Plainsville, Connecticut wrote to the Hartford Courant that “a number of Moros rushed out of
a trench, each with a woman on his left arm, using her body as a shield and with a kris in his
right hand hacking away right and left at our men. Of course, some of these women got killed
but it couldn’t be helped.” Madsell speculated that the reason for this behaviour could have
69

been due to Islam, or because the Moros did “not wish their wives to remarry.”

Governor

General of the Philippines Henry Ide claimed that any deaths of women and children were the
result of “preliminary shelling at distance” and that “there was no killing of anyone except
such as was indispensable to end intolerable situation.”
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When the women at Bud Dajo were not portrayed as victims of their menfolk, they
appeared in print as fierce combatants. In his memoirs, Hugh Scott parroted reports in the
press, claiming Moro women fought “as hard as the men.”
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casualties among non-combatants were unavoidable and sincerely regretted by the troops
although there was no way of avoiding such result, as the women in many instances took a
bold and active party in the action.”

72

Analyzing the gendered dimensions of the massacre,

Michael Hawkins contends that by participating in the battle “Moro women…were thought to
have violated a reciprocal relationship between femininity and chivalry that existed in
civilized society.”

73

Whatever the case – women as victims, participants, or, more likely,

some combination of both – American military figures, politicians, and supportive press
outlets looked for ways to explain away the carnage on the mountaintop.
Critics of the Roosevelt administration seized the events at Bud Dajo as a
characteristic example of how empire corrupted American ideals. The social reformer Rev.
Charles Parkhurst railed against the administration in a fiery oration on March 18th, declaring
the saddest aspect about Roosevelt’s congratulations to Leonard Wood on Bud Dajo was
“that it contained not one word of sympathy, one note of tender distress, in view of the
indiscriminate slaughter perpetrated ‘in honor of the American flag.’” The bombastic oratory
continued, with Parkhurst claiming he preferred to think of Roosevelt’s cablegram,
“composed as it was in the presence practically of mangled men, torn women, armless and
headless children,” as not “being the expression of the man Roosevelt, but of the President
Roosevelt, in whom officially the heartlessness and greed of unregenerate nationality are
74

functionally represented.”

The Nation thought the slaughter indicative of America’s

inability to decide on a ‘Moro Policy’: “If there is any definite policy being pursued in regard
to the Moros, the country is not aware of it. There seems to be merely an aimless drifting
75

along, with occasional bloody successes and now and then the report of a victory of peace.”
In Congress and the House of Representatives, Democratic politicians condemned the
violence as “wanton butchery” and “spoke of the battle as a massacre.”
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The Anti-Imperialist League, formed in 1898 in opposition to the acquisition of
Spain’s colonies, held up the massacre as proof the nation’s eroding moral fabric. League
president Moorfield Storey questioned the official narrative in a pamphlet distributed by the
organization shortly after the events at Bud Dajo. Why were no prisoners taken? Why were
American and allied Moro loses so low if the cotta at the top of Dajo had been
“impregnable”? Why were women and children slain alongside the men? Storey used
comparison in an attempt to shape public opinion about the killings: “Suppose we had heard
that the British had dealt thus with a Boer force, that the Turks had so attacked and
slaughtered Armenians, that colored men had so massacred white men, or even that 600 song
birds had been slaughtered for their plumage, would not our papers have been filled with
77

protests and expressions of horror?” Bud Dajo, Storey argued, was merely the latest in a
string of incidents comprising America’s “bloody record” in the Philippines. His indictment
reached its crescendo when he declared that “the spirit which slaughters brown men in Jolo is
the spirit which lynches black men in the South.” Situating the racialized violence of the
Southern Philippines alongside that of the Southern United States, Storey hoped to shock the
78

sensibilities of his East Coast readership.

Mark Twain, a vociferous opponent of empire and a member of the Anti-Imperialist
League, had his own thoughts about the events in the crater. Comparing casualty statistics at
Bud Dajo to those of the “great battles of the Civil War” he sarcastically commented that the
slaughter was “incomparably the greatest victory that was achieved by the Christian soldiers
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of the United States.” Twain tore into Roosevelt’s letter of congratulations to Leonard Wood,
saying that the President “knew perfectly well that our uniformed assassins had not upheld
the honor of the American flag, but had done as they have been doing continuously for eight
years in the Philippines – that is to say, they had dishonored it.” He similarly lacerated
Leonard Wood, whom he called President Roosevelt’s “fragrant pet.” Wood’s cablegrams
were contradictory to the point of vile comedy, Twain suggested, and a mere smokescreen for
murder. Curiously, the great writer’s opinions on Bud Dajo were not published during his
lifetime. Twain felt they were too controversial and excised them from his autobiography.
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Leonard Wood countered the criticisms of Storey and others, maintaining that
“sensational cables sent to the United States relating to the Bud Dajo fight were made up in
Manila. There has been no reference in any cable from Mindanao to the killing of women and
children…the reporters here had no other information than was contained in my report to
80

Colonel Andrews and supplied sensational features.” Behind the scenes, however, colonial
officials scrambled to contain the scandal – especially potential photographs of the massacre.
In May 1906, the Secretary of Public Instruction for the Philippines, William Morgan
Shuster, sent Leonard Wood a letter marked “personal and confidential.” It relayed claims
“that a school-teacher named Miller, now in Japan on leave, has a photograph in his
possession of the Dajo fight, in which is shown a half naked female corpse, with a gash in the
breast, and lying near the bodies of several infants. American soldiers are standing near,
gazing at them, and due to light and shade the female corpse looks like that of a white
81

woman.” Republican defenders of the massacre feared the public backlash should the photo
surface. If the image, which showed the slaughter directly following its grim apotheosis, were
published in the major East Coast dailies, it could damage the credibility of the colonial
project in the Southern Philippines as well as have a detrimental effect on the electoral
prospects of Republicans that autumn. That the “female corpse [looked] like that of a white
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woman” created its own set of problems, with the light skin making the victims that much
more relatable to Americans of European descent. Even those opposing Moorfield Storey’s
views appear to have shared his belief that Americans weighed tragedy relative to race.
Shuster’s contact, a “Mr. Cairns,” suggested that it might be possible to “destroy” the
photographs and an “attempt should be made [to do so] upon [the] return of Miller” to the
Philippines.

82

Taken after the frenzied killing on the afternoon of March 7th, the photograph is of
Captain A.M. Wetherill and his men standing above a trench lined with Tausūg corpses.
Many of the Americans pose as if for a formal portrait, but their faces are serious and some
wear haunted, battle-weary expressions. In the foreground, the heaps of bodies in the trench
are nearly undifferentiated by their proximity to one another, although if the viewer looks
closely enough the faces of dead children can be identified. Most striking is the
aforementioned “female corpse,” who, in the center of the shot, draws the viewer more
readily than the Americans. Her right breast exposed, she appears to have been struck in the
neck with a bullet or bayonet. Against her stomach is a dead infant with a bullet wound
through its cheek. A second photograph of the atrocity, labeled ‘Six Weeks After the Battle of
Dajo,’ shows a group of American soldiers posing by a trench, this time as tourists to the
battle site. Across the trench runs a tree trunk, where the Americans have lined up the skulls
of the dead, which have quickly decomposed in the tropical climate. If there was unease
evident among the American soldiers in the first photograph, here there is none. Bud Dajo
was swiftly transformed into imperial kitsch – a site for visiting, photographing, and
describing to family in letters home.
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In taking the photographs, the Americans were

establishing their masculine prowess through the transcolonial penchant for hunting trophy
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shots and predicting a darker turn in the practice.

84

The increasing availability of the personal

camera twinned with the wars of annihilation later in the twentieth-century history meant that
such photographs, with their explicit “imposition of degradation” and cheapening of tragedy,
became common.
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Rhetorically pondering the American public’s reaction had the massacre been
perpetrated by another colonial power, The Nation summed up negative responses to the
events at Bud Dajo by saying that they had “yet to hear any one speak of that bloody work
except with misgivings and disgust” and that even within the military there was “sharp
criticism of Gen. Wood for flinging his troops needlessly against fortifications that might
86

have been taken in a less spectacular and murderous fashion.”

Military leaders and

Republican politicians conceded that the violence had been unpleasant but was a necessity
nonetheless. For them, the people at the summit of Bud Dajo represented a threat to the
colonial order. Their violent elimination was a warning to other potential transgressors.
American public interest in the story waned within a few weeks, and the Southern Philippines
did not capture the popular imagination in the same explosive way again until the Second
World War. Nevertheless, Jolo continued to be a restless place. Although a second massacre
at Bud Dajo was narrowly avoided five years later, in 1913 a similarly asymmetrical
confrontation at another inactive volcano on Jolo called Bud Bagsak left between four
hundred and five hundred Moros dead.

87

In the wake of Bud Dajo, violence in the region persisted despite repeated claims by
the civil-military authorities in Zamboanga that each action against oppositional Moros was
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the decisive one.

88

In 1909, fears that the Moros would return to their criminal ways

crystallized around the outlaw Jikiri, a Samal who had previously served as a bodyguard for
the Sultan of Sulu. Jikiri’s outlaw career began in the early 1900s with the hijacking of small
merchant ships that plied their trade between Basilan and Jolo. He exploited the power
vacuum that developed after the death of Basilan strongman Datu Kalun and acquired a larger
fleet of vintas and more followers. Jikiri drew the attention of the Americans after the
89

murders of two white lumbermen, George Case and J.H. Verment, in December 1907.

As a

result, the District Governor of Zamboanga John P. Finley led two battalions of U.S. Army
infantry, as well as two companies of Constabulary, to Basilan. They focused not on Jikiri but
instead an anti-American preacher named Salip Agil who was urging his followers to resist
American attempts to collect taxes. Agil’s Rancheria at Ubung was razed, some of his
followers were killed, and Agil himself was taken prisoner.

90

Evading Finley’s Basilan dragnet, Jikiri remained at large in Sulu. After the murder of
Pvt. Albert L. Burleigh, a schoolteacher at Maibun, the Mindanao Herald commented that
“Jikiri has evaded the authorities so long that the Moros are beginning to entertain a great
respect for his prowess, and unless he is accounted for soon, he will be the cause of serious
91

disorder.” Ranging from Basilan to British North Borneo, Jikiri and his band attacked
American and English planters, a Constabulary outpost at Siasi, the British Constabulary in
North Borneo, and a variety of merchant vessels. The story of the manhunt for Jikiri was
eventually notable enough to feature on the front page of the New York Times, which spoke of
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the pirate being “on a rampage” and detailed the efforts of the government to track him
92

down. Captain Charles Rhodes, who helped direct the hunt for Jikiri and his followers,
dedicated an entire journal to the subject of the six months he spent scouring the Sulu Sea and
93

engaging in running battles with the outlaws.

Jikiri was ultimately located on Patian, a small island south of Jolo, by the military
authorities. Governor General W. Cameron Forbes, who was in Zamboanga when the final
battle with Jikiri’s band took place, described the mayhem surrounding it. The outlaws had so
firmly ensconced themselves in a mountainside cave that the soldiers had difficulties flushing
them out, going so far as to shoot a mountain gun (a small artillery piece used frequently in
the region by American forces) into the cave. After the barrage, Jikiri and his followers
finally emerged. According to Forbes, “the only effort of the outlaws was to kill as many as
possible before they were cut down, but the storm of shot was so fierce that everyone was
killed but a baby, who fell under his mother and over the bodies of others that had come out.”
Jikiri’s head was “literally shot to pieces at a distance of four feet, a charge of buck shot
94

entering his right cheek-bone and taking out one whole side of his head.”

Afterwards, Forbes publicly mourned the friends he had lost in the battle, griped about
Tasker Bliss’ refusal to use Constabulary forces to capture the outlaw earlier, and visited
Patian Island. There he hunted for wild boar and trekked to the cave where the battle
95

occurred, sketching it in his notebook.

Jikiri continued to appear in press reports. In 1911,

the Atlanta Constitution labeled him an “expert assassin” and noted that for a Moro pirate “to
kill a white man is always a commendable thing, but to torture him as a preliminary, cutting
96

him to pieces, bit by bit, or by other ingenious means, is better.”

In the pages of the

Washington Post the following year, Jikiri was compared to the Old West outlaw Harry Tracy
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for “reckless audacity and defiance of all the powers of the law.”

97

Two decades after Jikiri

was cornered and killed, he remained a favourite reference of both the Moros, who viewed
him as a brave holdout against colonial rule, and the Americans, to whom he was a
demonstration of how they had curbed the piratical tendencies of the Moros. In 1931, Islani
Sapal, a Joloano boy, recounted how his Boy Scout Troop, led by scoutmaster Wilfred E.
Seymour, made a trip to visit the cave where Jikiri, “the famous old outlaw of former years,”
was gunned down.

98

More routine were smaller encounters arising from the collision of colonial and native
prerogatives. Such was the case on the small island of Pata, where local resistance to the
99

imposition of secular schooling flared up in 1920.

Native police on the island visited the

homes of parents who refused to send their children to the new schoolhouses. In the village of
Sapa-Malaom, a local leader named Hatib Sihaban, brother of island chief Panglima
Dugassan, opposed the new school. Sihaban fortified his home, effectively making it a small
cotta, and those that joined him built adjoining structures. Talks with Moro leaders and
Governor of Sulu P.D. Rogers occurred in October and November of that year, but Sihaban
and his followers remained in their fortifications. On December 3rd, matters escalated when a
local Moro policeman named Adjalani visited Sihaban’s cotta and was murdered in murky
circumstances.
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The following day, the Philippine Constabulary, headed by Lieutenant P.C. Soriano,
arrived at Sapa-Malaom to confront Sihaban and his followers. In Soriano’s telling, the
Constabulary forces were met with determined resistance, and the women and children
refused to leave. In keeping with the common depiction of Moro women as warriors, Soriano
noted that when Constabulary troops attempted to approach the fortification the women
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forced them back with spears. Soriano’s account was vague in how exactly negotiations
collapsed, but they did and a short battle ensued. “Women showed more bravery than men
themselves,” Soriano reported, “the former dancing with their spears and ready to launch
them at us at any time…We put down 14 men, 11 women and 8 children killed. There were
some 30 women and children who escaped the shooting about ten of whom are wounded and
101

they are brought to Sulu Public Hospital for treatment.”

The Constabulary recovered six

krises, eight barongs, fourteen spears, two fish spears, ten bamboo spears, and five bolos
102

from Sihaban and his followers.

In the only detailed account of the events on Pata to appear publicly, the journalist
Charles Edward Russell parroted Soriano’s account and framed the massacre as the tragic but
unavoidable result of resisting colonial progress. He wrote that the other residents of Pata
were firmly on the side of the government, and those who had died in the massacre “had run
amuck and that was the end of the story.” Russell used the story to reflect more broadly on
colonial violence, noting, “civilization is more efficient in taming devils than in making
103

angels.”

The coming of “the school-house” to Pata and other small islands in the Sulu

Archipelago meant that there would be “no more ‘Moro peril’ and nobody with the hardihood
104

to assert it.”

In the wake of the massacre, Lieutenant Colonel John Tharp of the

Constabulary decided that after the killing of Adjalani reasoning with Sihaban’s group was
105

“entirely out of the question” and exonerated the actions of Soriano and his men.

The commanding officers of the Philippine Constabulary in Manila were not as
sanguine about the violence on Pata. In January 1921, C.E. Nathorst, future Constabulary
chief, wrote Colonel Ole Waloe, PC commander in Mindanao and Sulu, that he had it “on
excellent authority” that the events leading to the murder of Adjalani resulted from the
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policeman having an affair with Hatib Sihaban’s wife, implying far pettier factors underlying
the massacre. Nathorst went on to brush aside the answers provided to PC headquarters by
Lieutenant Colonel Tharp, which were mainly restatements of Soriano’s report. “The mere
fact that [Soriano] knowingly attacked 15 defenseless men with 29 soldiers and 3 officers
armed with rifles and revolvers, condemns him,” he fired back, “Please send us a report and
show the real cause for this unwarranted killing.”

106

The events on Pata led to an intense examination of the use of violence from within
the PC command structure. Nathorst continued pressing Ole Waloe about the sporadic
massacres taking place in Mindanao and Sulu, specifically those relating to the school
attendance question. In September 1921, he wrote that “a strong feeling seems to prevail
among the Constabulary of your district to ‘eliminate’ any Moro who causes trouble – trouble
oftentimes brought about by the Constabulary’s activity in forcing Moro girls, against the
wish of their parents, to attend school” and reminded Waloe that J.J. Heffington, then
Superintendent of Schools in Mindanao and Sulu, and Teopisto Guingona, head of the Bureau
of Non-Christian Tribes, both opposed the enforcement of mandatory attendance.

107

A string

of letters followed in which Nathorst, based on reports being received in Manila, suggested
moving or removing several PC officers known for using violence to solve disagreements
108

with local Moro populations.

“The killing of a Moro in that part of the country,” he

reflected acidly, “is evidently of no consequence and all in a day’s work…The idea, which
prevails in your district, to ‘eliminate’ the Moros must cease and the quicker the better for all
109

concerned.”

Despite such institutional soul-searching, asymmetrical clashes between Moros and
the Constabulary continued throughout the 1920s. The rapid Filipinization of government
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positions between 1914 and 1920, alongside the regular arrival of new Christian Filipino
settlers to Mindanao, meant that tensions remained high. In Lanao, for example, annual
Constabulary reports showed a pattern of resistance and massacre. A local Moro leader would
object to the compulsory education, the Constabulary would attempt to enforce the
regulations, the leader and his followers would retreat to a fortification, and slaughter would
ensue. Although the Constabulary was hopeful in early 1921 that “the worst period of our
educational campaign has passed,” the violence persisted. In August 1921, Datu Amai
Binanning, a longtime irritant to colonial authorities, fortified himself in his cotta with his
followers in opposition to compulsory education. He and several followers were killed by a
Constabulary attack.

110

The following year saw outlaw bands “of more or less importance”

appear in Sulu, Cotabato, and Lanao, and “an unusually large number of murders and
robberies” committed in these provinces, including the murder of teachers in January and
August. A report noted a persistent resistance to the imposition of the cedula tax.

111

In March 1923, Pata Island once again became the site of colonial violence. A Moro
named Akbara, whom the Constabulary labelled “a religious fanatic,” stood in open
opposition to the cedula tax, the establishment of a school on the island, and the conducting
of land surveys. When Akbara’s group of around 250 threatened the Constabulary, Lieutenant
Leon Angles and a detachment of seventeen men confronted the Moros, resulting in “25
112

killed without Constab. casualty.”

On May 19th, Hatib Sihaban reappeared in support of

Akbara, and with “about 400 armed fanatics” rushed a Constabulary detachment, resulting in
23 Moros killed. Ten days later another encounter caused a further forty-five deaths, again
with no recorded Constabulary casualties. Akbara was killed by a local government councilor
shortly thereafter and Hatib Sihaban surrendered in early June. The report relayed that he
“had brooded over the loss of his wife and children” in the massacre of 1920. “Collection of
taxes a part of the problem,” it added.
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nineteen schoolhouses were burned down in Lanao, government launches were fired upon on
the lake, and multiple murders occurred. The Constabulary responded in kind, and with four
U.S. Army Officers there “as observers,” bombed Moro cottas with hydroplanes, then
114

attacked them with mountain guns and Stokes mortars.

Throughout the second-half of

1925, a familiar pattern of burned schools, murdered teachers, and Constabulary barrage
ensured that Lanao remained in a state of violent unrest.
Although primarily compendiums of police actions in Mindanao and Sulu,
Constabulary reports occasionally segued into a more reflective tone. After relating the events
that took place on Pata Island in 1923, for example, the compiler of a report surmised that
violence against the government was caused by local Moro leaders whose “only chance to get
their followers to unite is to accuse the government of encroaching upon their religion.” The
report claimed that the Moro underclass, newly enfranchised by wage labour, could now
compete with the datu class in romantic affairs: “It is not infrequent that one hears of a sacop
who has left his master, gone to work, made some money, then returned to his home town
115

and beaten his former chief, or one of the datu class, in wooing a girl.”

It was jealousy on

the part of higher class Moros, in the report’s estimation, which caused them to incite
violence against the colonial authorities. The author unwittingly touched upon actual social
problems, as the state’s reordering of social relations in Muslim communities had created
very real tensions.
The premier example of resistance to late colonial rule in the 1920s and 1930s was the
outlaw Dimakaling. A Maranao wanted by Lanao authorities for murder as early as 1925,
Dimakaling only began regularly surfacing in Constabulary reports after 1929, when he
formed an outlaw band. Early attempts to capture the bandit were disorganized and
unsuccessful. During one, Dimakaling’s wife stabbed a Constabulary corporal. When the
outlaw was later enticed to visit the home of a local Presidente near his headquarters at Mt.
Gurain, he escaped by killing a soldier and wounding two others. During the subsequent
pursuit, a Moro guide and another soldier were also killed. After this, Dimakaling’s band
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became a regular concern for authorities, with J.J. Heffington mentioning it as one of the two
major sources of resistance to American rule in the province. Heffington was dismissive of
the group’s capabilities, noting that besides Dimakaling, who was armed with a revolver and
a carbine, the other twelve members of the band had only “paliuntuds, home made shotguns,
and bladed weapons.” He observed that the band was “roaming only at night from one place
to another trying their best to avoid arrest” and begging for food from sympathetic datus.
“The members of the band are not criminals. Some of them are Dimakaling’s relatives and
others are only mere sympathizers,” he noted, and any “handicap” to locating the band was
due to the unwillingness of datus to provide the government with information.

116

In the fledgling Lanao press, Dimakaling appeared repeatedly as a source of problems
in the region. In 1933, for example, he was reported to have robbed Sultan Sa Bara-as, a
Christian farmer named Mr. Bravo, and eight of their companions as they returned from
selling copra at a store in Malabang. Surveilling the party in town, Dimakaling’s band trailed
them into the woods and forced them at gunpoint to turn over the ₱1,090 they had received
117

for their merchandise.

In Heffington’s assessment, Dimakaling and his associates were a

nuisance to the authorities, but little more. They existed apart from governmental authority,
although posed no serious threat to it. This position shifted when the Lumbatan Agricultural
School was attacked in May 1934.
Located on the fractious southern shore of Lake Lanao, the school at Lumbatan was,
like other centers of higher learning in the region, meant to educate Moros in American
methods of agricultural and industrial development. Run by an American teacher named
Clayton Douglas, who lived on the grounds with his family, the school was “a symbol of the
118

attempt to ‘civilize’ the Muslim population and modernize its life.”

Two of Douglas’

servants were murdered and one wounded in the attack. His family was sick in hospital at the
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time and thus escaped unharmed. Douglas himself was in the school building during the raid
and was chased off by rifle fire when he attempted to confront Dimakaling’s band with local
Maranaos.

119

The attack mobilized the Americans and Filipinos, who now saw Dimakaling

and his followers as a threat to colonial order in Lanao. Superintendent of Education Edward
Kuder claimed that Dimakaling was “astute enough to salt his profession of motive with
whatever other reasons he may thinks may gain him favor, tolerations, or sympathy of people
disposed to give it,” indicating anxieties among American colonials that support for
120

Dimakaling ran deeper than previously imagined.

After another attack in Northern Lanao months later, the authorities in Manila took
notice but were unable to catch Dimakaling throughout the following year. Teopisto
Guingona mentioned Dimakaling’s band as one of the two outlaw groups “still at large,” and
121

referenced the 1925 murder he was wanted for alongside the incident at Lumbatan.

Vice

Governor J.R. Hayden visited the region in September 1935 accompanied by the botanist
Harley Harris Bartlett, who observed that “Dimakaling has committed numerous murders,
defies the authority of the Government, and appears to have some of the local datus on his
side, for they have refused now for some months to give any information about local affairs,
especially about anything concerning Dimakaling.” Bartlett remarked upon the “cupidity” of
the locals and their unwillingness to turn in Dimakaling, despite a large cash reward being
offered for information leading to his arrest.

122

Meanwhile, Heffington was furious at the fear and deference local Maranao leaders
showed Dimakaling. One, Muti Kurut of Saguiaran, was briefly in the same room as the
outlaw but feared for his own safety too much to attempt to kill or capture him. Kurut
claimed that Dimakaling’s network of informants in the region was vast, and that Moros
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would not make any effort to capture him unless the man who brought him down was
promised a deputy governorship. Talking to the vice governor, Kurut said that he had heard
the only way to join Dimakaling’s inner-circle was to kill a Christian in front of witnesses,
“so that the man will never try to escape…knowing that if he does, he will be punished by the
government.” He claimed that the murderers of the two servants during the Lumbatan attack
were initiates into Dimakaling’s gang. The outlaw loomed large in the imaginations of the
Maranao people, and rivaled the authorities in terms of his intelligence network and ability to
mete out punishment upon those who ‘betrayed’ his band of resisters.

123

In the summer and

autumn of 1934, Philippine Constabulary troops carried out multiple raids against suspected
hideouts of Dimakaling and his compatriots. During one, they killed Adaro Ompia as he
bathed with three other outlaws. One of the men, believed to be Dimakaling, was wounded,
but still managed to escape, leaving behind his trousers and a belt with eighty-six rounds of
124

ammunition.

Hiding out in Kapai, northeast of Dansalan, Dimakaling was surrounded by
Constabulary troops in late November 1935. The Philippines Free Press reported on the story
the following week, giving details of how “Lanao’s No. 1 outlaw” was “riddled by a dozen
Constabulary bullets” as he attempted escape. The paper gave a history of Dimakaling’s
various crimes, suggesting that had he lived longer he planned to assassinate a local sultan in
the Kapai area. It also conveyed the opinions of “certain Lanao datus” who claimed
Dimakaling turned to banditry to defend the principles of the Maranao Moros: “He disliked
the way the government was run. The Moros’ constitutional rights were not sufficiently
respected by the authorities. Constabulary soldiers, without regard for individual freedom,
would come to their house and ransack the place. False arrest and convictions on false
evidence, they claimed, had occurred from time to time…schoolchildren were heavily fined
for absenting themselves from school, the amount being usually ₱50.”
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That a Manila-

based paper, run and written by Americans and Christian Filipinos, aired these legitimate
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grievances intimates there was something to them, although the story predictably concluded
that Dimakaling’s death was entirely justified.
In her study of Dimakaling, Midori Kawashima writes that support for him on the part
of Muslim society in Lanao came from a variety of factors, including resentment towards the
abuses by the Constabulary, anger over compulsory education, and a hatred of fellow
126

Maranaos who abetted the authorities.

His contemporary status as a folk hero, as well as

the supernatural qualities attributed to him during his life, speaks to a belief among the Moros
of Lanao that he performed an important social function. Maranao society was undergoing a
series of seismic shifts as American and Filipino colonials attempted to remake the region. At
a time when traditional power relations, educational structures, and modes of labour were
being transformed, Dimakaling symbolized a vigorous indigenous refusal to be governed by
outside forces. Bandits are often the products of rural societies resisting dramatic changes
being brought upon them by alien rulers and local collaborators. The idealized vision of
127

Dimakaling fits into this conception of social banditry.

Elsewhere, relations between Muslims and the colonial state were often tense. The
Sulu Archipelago in particular saw a high number of attacks on officials, especially
128

teachers.

On the island of Sitangkai, near the coast of Borneo, the Deputy Governor-at-

Large F.G. Roth reported on the murder of a Filipino teacher named Sofronio Aquino by an
“amuck.” The incident ended in a shootout between locals and the Constabulary, which left
three Moros and two Constabulary soldiers dead.
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The aforementioned case of Asnol, on

Tabawan Island, was one of several incidents between Moros and educational authorities in
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Sulu in the summer of 1934, and the following years saw no cessation in attacks.

The

Muslim regions of the Southern Philippines continued to be a viewed as a lawless and
anarchic place by Americans and Christian Filipinos up until the eve of the Japanese
invasion. Throughout the late 1930s, the press in Manila reported on the various outrages
committed by Moros in the most sensational language possible – babies used as human
shields, cottas stormed, love affairs ending in massacres, decapitations, resistance to military
service, and so forth.

131

While coordinated resistance to outside rule did not reappear until

after independence, the Muslim South remained problematic to a colonial power with
totalizing aims, and refused to submissively integrate into the burgeoning Philippine nation.
The colonial state punished Moros extensively for their insubordination. In the late colonial
period, large Bud Dajo-style massacres were replaced by smaller armed encounters between
Muslims and the authorities that left the region in a state of perpetual disorder.

Colonial Discipline
While groups resisting state imperatives were met with military force, individual
transgressors were more often subject to imprisonment and reform through labour. In the first
years of military rule, punishment for crimes was often mediated through the local Moro
leadership. For example, a report was made to a local datu that a cattle theft ring was
operating in a certain area and that datu passed along the information to the district
governor.
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Smaller infractions that did not threaten the American presence were often

handled within a community by traditional authorities. In Zamboanga, Brigadier General
William A. Kobbé left the rule of the Moros to the local leader Datu Mandi and occupied
himself with matters related to the ongoing insurgency further north. Kobbé believed that
Mandi, representing “the cause of good order,” deserved to have his power and influence
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increased in the interest of stability.

133

Although the co-option and utilization of local Moro

leaders continued throughout the American period, approaches to crime and punishment
shifted as the colonial state consolidated itself in the Southern Philippines following the
cessation of hostilities in the North.
Evidence of increasing involvement in non-political crime by the Americans is
evidenced in a report submitted by Lieutenant Stephen O. Fuqua of the 23rd Infantry, who
was stationed at Malabang in Cotabato and put in charge of Moro Affairs in September 1903.
Apart from mediating with local leaders like Datu Ali (pre-insurrection), Fuqua claimed he
made “a rather broad and very elastic policy” towards disciplining the Moros, noting “the
Moro character although childlike in its composition, understands and appreciates right and
wrong.” Dealing with crime in the area, Fuqua and his men left certain matters to Moro
leaders while pursuing others directly. When a young Moro girl was raped the “case was
turned over to the Moro judge for investigation and trial. The man was fined one hundred
(100) pesos and the money turned over to the injured woman. This action was keeping with
the Moro custom and idea and produced satisfaction to all parties.” Alternately, Moros near
the mouth of the Marga River who murdered a man and wounded a woman were pursued by
a detachment of the 15th Cavalry, albeit without result. Fuqua fretted over being the “author”
of any definitive policy on law and order as one had not been provided to him at the
beginning of his assignment.
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Following the establishment of the Moro Province in 1903, authorities took greater
interest in using prison populations to achieve the infrastructural goals of the region. In 1904,
Leonard Wood contacted W. Cameron Forbes, then Commissioner of Commerce and Police,
and offered to take one thousand prisoners from Luzon to work on road building in
135

Mindanao.

By the following March, the prisoners had arrived and Wood informed Forbes

that he was confident that the Moro Province could “handle them all right and work them
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profitably.”

136

Wood and Forbes further discussed how to best delineate authority between

the military and the Philippine Constabulary (for whom Forbes was responsible) in the region
so as to present a united front to the Moro elite “who until recently have been practically
independent of all authority.”

137

Putting the prisoners to work on roads in the area around

Camp Overton, Wood tapped reform-through-labour schemes popular elsewhere and helped
defray the costs of a prison population that was growing as the colonial government assumed
greater control over non-military matters. During the first year of Tasker Bliss’ governorship
in 1906-07, the Legislative Council of the Moro Province enacted a compulsory labour
scheme for all able-bodied prisoners. They also legislated a similar act which decreed any
male inhabitant in the province subject to the payment of the cedula tax “shall labor on the
public highways, bridges, wharves or trails for five days of nine hours every calendar year or
pay the equivalent in cash of such days labor.”

138

An increase in policing and incarceration came from the widespread opinion among
the colonials, shared by Bliss himself, that criminals in Mindanao were “permitted their
liberty through laxity of civil officials and disinclination of the military to interfere,” as well
as being protected from incarceration by fellow Muslims.

139

By deploying prisoners on

public works projects, the Moro Province was able to maintain higher carceral rates while
defraying costs. In addition, officials believed that Muslim prisoner-labourers would benefit
from learning new skills. Such was the case with the capitol building at Zamboanga, which
was constructed by prisoners using a concrete block machine from South Bend, Indiana. The
prisoners, “none of whom had any previous knowledge of cement work of any kind,” also
learned how to lay stones and do plaster work during the project.

140

In the drive to connect
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the various regions of the province prison labour was an important tool. The use of prisoners
to maintain roads and public properties continued well into the era of civilian rule.
Nowhere was the meeting of labour, science, and colonial discipline more evident
than at San Ramon. Photographs of the San Ramon Penal Farm taken in 1913 show a series
of modern white single storey buildings, built in the tropical style with gently sloping roofs
and large open windows. Each of these concrete bunkhouses held 108 prisoners. In another
photograph, prisoners mingle in an interior yard amidst the tall palms. Although some appear
to be wearing the typical prison stripes, most are dressed in civilian clothes; if the photograph
were not captioned appropriately the scene could be easily mistaken as one from a boarding
school or community center. According to American officials, San Ramon was viewed as “a
perfect type of tropical prison.”

141

Surrounded by a wall of concrete and iron grill, the prison

grounds housed an administrative office, kitchens, storehouses, workshops, as well as the
bunkhouses where the prisoners slept. There was also a woman’s ward with its own small
hospital (in reality more of a dispensary), bake oven, dining room, and workshops. The
design of the prison was thought to afford “ample protection from the rain” but allow “plenty
of sunshine and a free circulation of air, so necessary to health and comfort in this climate.”
142

Upon the completion of a water system “the sanitary arrangement [would] be perfect.”

The

convicts spent their days harvesting coconuts, foraging crops, and raising cattle and carabao,
143

with the goal of making the institution self-supporting.

Located twenty-five kilometers north of Zamboanga, San Ramon was established by
the Spanish in 1870 and named after the patron saint of Governor General Ramon Blanco. It
was a place for deportados, prisoners from the North serving long sentences. “Christian
Filipinos regarded as socially undesirable [by the Spanish colonial state] for reasons of
political persuasion, criminal intention, or moral laxity were summarily detained and
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dispatched to the coastal sectors of Mindanao and Palawan,” writes Greg Bankoff.

Many

of San Ramon’s prisoners were serving life terms, and they toiled the plantation in an attempt
by administrators to make the venture profitable. High rates of disease, insect infestations,
crop failure, and a culture of corruption amongst prison officials ensured that prosperity was
never achieved. Local Yakan tribesmen were hired to help track down any escapees, which
occasionally led to summary executions of prisoners. San Ramon “was far more effective as a
prison than as an economic venture” because of its isolation.

145

As in the other remote penal

settlements that dotted the colonial world, the environment became as much of a jailer as the
prison guards.
The prison was destroyed and its prisoners released during the Spanish-American
War.

146

Americans took notice of the penal farm immediately and it fell under the control of

the Insular Government. Initially, the U.S. military grew hemp and other products there for
sale in Manila. One visiting journalist noted in 1900 that San Ramon’s fields were suited for
147

the production of all sorts of agricultural products, from coffee to tobacco.

Soon after the

establishment of the Moro Province in 1903, George Langhorne, aide to Leonard Wood,
wrote Hugh Scott that San Ramon could be used for tutelary purposes as a “model
institution” wherein Muslims and Christian Filipinos could be taught “to cultivate the soil in a
148

scientific manner.”

In late 1905, the Philippine Commission approved the appropriation of

the farm by the government of the Moro Province on the understanding that its primary use
would be as an experimental farm for the growing of “cocoanuts or hemp or other plants
likely to be of use.”
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For the remainder of the military period, officials floated ideas of how the farm could
be best exploited. Leonard Wood believed the farm would be of incredible future value.
Scientifically grown and managed crops could be sold, and the seeds could be distributed to
colonists to start their own farms. The effects of elevation on crop production could be tested
in the mountains that San Ramon backed onto. Moro boys would be able to learn about
150

American agricultural methods.

Tasker Bliss took Sultan Jamalul Kiram and other Sulu

dignitaries to San Ramon in April of 1906 and observed that they were “united in a common
feeling of interest and admiration at the working of the modern plows, cultivators, and
151

barrows, in comparison with their own antiquated implements.”

Officials undertook

experiments with lemon trees, Liberian coffee, vegetables, Para rubber, and cinnamon. The
government also promoted the furnishing of seeds and cuttings to planters in the Moro
Province to encourage the diversification of crops there.
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In 1908, a small annex to the

Calarian (provincial) prison, located in Zamboanga, was built at San Ramon. Two years later,
the Calarian was deemed “not well situated” and plans were made to locate the prison on the
153

site of the experimental farm.

By 1913, the experimental farm at San Ramon had become the provincial prison and
represented a unique example of colonial penology in the Southern Philippines. That year,
there were 500 prisoners. Bandolerism (130), robbery (130), and assassination (113) were the
three largest reasons for incarceration, and Tausūg Moros represented the largest population
group of inmates (191), followed by Maranaos (117).
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Dr. W.H. Dade, formerly a prison
155

official in Kentucky, headed the prison, and a company of Philippine Scouts guarded it.
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Governor Frank Carpenter noted in 1914 with some satisfaction that the prison system was a
space for “correction and education” and that the department prison at San Ramon merited
156

“classification as educational center rather than as a penitentiary.”

Carpenter claimed that

because roughly 80 percent of the inmates at San Ramon were Muslims the problems it faced
were “radically different” from those of prisons further north, but that “both from the
standpoint of reform and moral betterment of the prisoners and from that of economic
results” San Ramon was succeeding.
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In American accounts of the Southern Philippines, San Ramon was used as evidence
that a hybrid formula of education, commerce, and discipline could correct those Moros who
resisted colonial rule. In his Philippine travelogue, Charles Edward Russell told of a Tausūg
Moro, imprisoned at San Ramon for murder, who became a model inmate – “obedient,
industrious, willing and always polite” – and eventually gained the respect of the warden,
who made him a trustee. The man was allowed to fish freely on his own so long as he
returned to San Ramon each evening. One day while out on the water he encountered a
capsized Constabulary boat and helped to rescue its crew, despite the men being his “natural
enemies.” For this, Governor Carpenter was said to have pardoned the man in a ceremony
that “deeply affected” the spectators and caused the Moro to fall to floor in tears. Russell
wrote that the governor did two things thought impossible in causing both an old U.S. army
officer and a Moro to weep, and thus showing “with different-colored skins and under the
dour exterior that both assiduously cultivated, both were of the same old stock of the children
158

of the earth.”

In this sentimental rendering, U.S. readers were provided evidence that

through the most modern techniques, the Moro, previously irredeemably savage, could be
transformed into a productive member of colonial society.
Educator and missionary Frank Laubach was unstinting in his praise of the penal
colony. San Ramon was “greatly influenced by the modern idea of penology,” he claimed,
and was as charming as Zamboanga. For the prisoners “it is like sending a man to heaven for
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being wicked, for it is by all odds the most lovely and lovable spot they ever lived in.”
Laubach explained that San Ramon had the “finest record of cured inmates of any prison in
the world” and joked that the only danger that a released prisoner would reoffend was so that
he could return to the penitentiary. Laubach’s rationale for the apparent success at San
Ramon was that the Moro inmates, childlike in their notions of law and order, had to be
treated differently than prisoners in the United States. American prisoners were “simply
abnormal, morally defective, degenerate men” while the Moros committed crimes because
they had “not had a chance to catch up with the new age, an age of law instead of family
feuds.” This mixture of progressive idealism and racial paternalism was common among the
159

more liberal Americans in the Southern Philippines.

On visiting San Ramon in 1926, J.R. Hayden commented in a letter to his wife that
the “Filipinos are at least a generation ahead of us in their penology” and noted the presence
of a man he identified as Captain Sleeper, one of the few Americans imprisoned there.
Sleeper, whose crime Hayden did not mention, had a house with a large veranda on the
160

grounds, and, although an inmate, ran the forestry and land clearing departments.

Charles

Ivins, serving as an officer with the Philippine Scouts, encountered San Ramon when he was
tasked with returning some prisoners who had been loaned to Fort Pilar to do labour. Seeing
that the prisoners were generally free to do as they pleased, he thought it likely that none
were imprisoned for serious offenses. Before taking them back to San Ramon, however, he
discovered to his chagrin that were in prison for committing decapitations and thus drove
back to the penal colony at high speed.
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San Ramon was considered so successful that in 1931 a second penal colony was
opened in the Southern Philippines, this time forty-five kilometers outside of the town of
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Davao. Colonel Paulino Santos, Director of the Bureau of Prisons, organized the Davao Penal
Colony and chose model inmates from San Ramon and Bilibid Prison (in Luzon) to populate
it. The prisoners were referred to as ‘colonists’ and encouraged to start homesteads and raise
farm animals and crops. The Bureau of Prisons worked in conjunction with the Bureau of
Plant Industry to establish the colony, with the former contributing “available labor and
162

experience in establishing agricultural colonies” and the latter its agricultural expertise.

Santos brought in agronomists, specialists in rice culture, and mechanical engineers to advise
on how to best run the colony. The number of ‘colonists’ increased from four hundred to one
thousand in the first five years of operation. By taking the model of San Ramon and
expanding upon it, Santos claimed he was able to end escape attempts, run a carceral center at
minimal cost, and “teach erring men to use their hands to better themselves, always with a
hope that they will return to society as respectable citizens and better than what they entered
the prison gates.”
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Prisoner transfers to the North still occurred regularly. In November 1933, the Lanao
Progress reported that authorities had shipped thirty-eight provincial prisoners from Dansalan
to Bilibid Prison. Most were imprisoned for theft, with cattle stealing being a major problem
in the area. “While it is necessary for the government to put criminals where they cannot
repeat their crimes,” the paper moralized, “the hearts of all go out to the innocent wives and
children who have to suffer.” The story, very much the product of Frank Laubach’s moral
sensibility, claimed that each week the prisoners were mailed copies of the Progress “so that
they can keep in touch with their own province while they are in Bilibid.”
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Laubach’s

operation in Dansalan kept in contact with prisoners at Bilibid throughout the 1930s. Such
was the case with Hannah Taylor, an American woman who, along with her Filipino husband,
was sentenced to jail time for the murder of her father, an African-American who lived in the
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area. After spending some time in the provincial jail, Taylor was transferred to Bilibid, where
Laubach sent her oranges, cookies, and candy.

165

Although deeply engaged in experiments of racial transformation and moral reform,
the administration of justice in the Southern Philippines shared many of the problems found
in prison systems elsewhere. In a wide-ranging report given to the Wood-Forbes Mission in
1921, Assistant Judge Advocate General Major L.P. Johnson of the Philippine Department
reported that the large penal institutions at Bilibid, San Ramon, and Iwahig were “not
altogether free from political influence.” He cited the case of Jose I. Baluyot as evidence of
this. Baluyot, a political figure in Luzon, was imprisoned in 1918 and given a life sentence
for the murder of the Governor of Bataan.
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Upon transfer to San Ramon in 1921, he was

given his own house on the farm, where he and his family lived. He was also provided with
two servants, made a trustee, and not required to spend any time within the walls of the
prison. When the Wood-Forbes Mission visited San Ramon, Baluyot feigned illness so that
he would not be required to line-up with the other prisoners and the prison surgeon
accommodated the ruse.
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In its final report, the Wood-Forbes Mission tersely

acknowledged that provincial and municipal prisons throughout the Philippine Islands were
also problematic, with poorly trained staff and favoritism “shown to prisoners with influential
friends.”
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L.P. Johnson’s report also highlighted troubling discrepancies in how crimes were
prosecuted in the Southern Philippines, noting that Muslims were more likely to receive
harsher punishments. He made reference to Criminal Case No. 2671, which was brought
before the Justice of the Peace at Jolo. The case involved residents of the island who were
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caught gambling illegally (they were playing a variation of Monte). The Filipinos
apprehended were each fined fifteen pesos. A week later, Moros caught playing a lowerstakes game called Igud were charged fines of fifty pesos, despite the game not being
specifically listed on the anti-gambling ordinances like Monte was. The report noted that in
addition to harsher fines, Moros were often tried for gambling by the Justice of the Peace and
then tried again by the Court of the First Instance later on, thus receiving two separate
punishments. The Justice of the Peace at Jolo explained the harsh treatment as a byproduct of
trying to correct the savage behaviour of the Moros. The problem extended to more serious
cases, such as one where a Filipino had swindled a Moro out of four hundred pesos for a fake
land survey. Despite the evidence being “complete and sufficient to convict” the pseudosurveyor, the case was dismissed by the Filipino fiscal.
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Over a decade later in 1934, Vice

Governor J.R. Hayden wrote to Governor General Frank Murphy about similar problems he
witnessed on an inspection tour in Sulu, suggesting that Moro prisoners were having their
sentencing delayed due to official torpor.
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Even more serious were abuses of power by the Constabulary against Moro prisoners.
Johnson described this as a “vicious situation,” where young and inexperienced Constabulary
officers were appointed to deputy governor positions and therefore responsible for a
combination for executive, police, and judicial powers. These officers, often “inclined to use
force rather than discretion,” helped foster an atmosphere of mistrust and recrimination
between government officials and the Moros, and contributed to some of the violent incidents
described in the previous section.
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In the wake of the Pata massacre, Major Johnson visited

the island. There he found several Moro prisoners, “one of whom was handcuffed and
shackled.” When Johnson examined the guard book he found that no entry was made for the
prisoners, suggesting that they were being detained on unclear or false grounds.
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In Lanao, education official Edward Kuder frequently clashed with Governor J.J.
Heffington by protesting Constabulary violence. Kuder repeatedly accused Constabulary
officers of the killing of prisoners and a general recklessness with Moro life. Writing to
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes chief Teopisto Guingona in 1934, Heffington related the
story of the death of a Moro prisoner named Bogalong. Bogalong and another prisoner were
handcuffed together and asked their jailers if they could leave their holding cell to relieve
themselves. On the top of the stairs, according to Heffington, Bogalong attempted to escape,
fell down the stairs with the other prisoner, and died as a result. Kuder and one of his
subordinates, a School Inspector named Alug, claimed that the explanation provided by the
Constabulary was cover for a murder. Heffington believed that Kuder’s accusations were
evidence of his “remarkably prejudiced” view towards the Constabulary (which at times
approached “that of insanity”) and suggested he be relieved of his duties as superintendent.

173

To Vice Governor Hayden, Heffington claimed Kuder was suffering from a “complex that
causes him to accept, and possibly encourage, reports from Moros against Constabulary
officers and soldiers without taking the pains of ascertaining whether such reports are well
founded.” Nevertheless, Heffington pointed out in the same letter that Colonel Guy Fort of
the Constabulary was investigating abuses and one officer, Lieutenant Fred Belling, was
forced to take a leave of absence in the meantime. Despite Heffington’s antipathy towards
Kuder, it is not unreasonable to put stock in the superintendent’s claims against the
Constabulary. Kuder was not the only observer to notice the organization’s willingness to
174

mete out violence against Muslims at the slightest provocation.

Processes of arrest and detention, refined throughout the colonial period, never led to
the total pacification and transformation of Muslim recidivists, as intended. A lack of Moro
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representation in law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, and prison administration meant
that these organizations were compositionally alienated from the population they were
attempting to control. Heavy-handed tactics by the Philippine Constabulary, and violent
responses to them by the Moros, created a reciprocal mistrust that ensured cycles of massacre
and resistance continued long after the American military departed. Real and perceived
injustices – including harsher punishments for Moros and various iniquities within the prison
system – dulled the morally rehabilitative benefits Americans and Filipinos boasted were
inherent to their disciplinary regime.

Corrective Violence and Ambient Violence
Between 1899 and 1942, government officials and the press routinely declared that a
combination of violent discipline and the civilizing effects of colonial tutelage had ended
disorder in the South. Americans portrayed themselves as reluctant imperialists who used
175

force to pacify and correct the Moro of his “bestial exhibitions of religious frenzy.”

Annual

reports from the provinces noted ever-decreasing levels of banditry and rapid advances in
settlement, agriculture, infrastructure, and education. Many officials believed that
development would continue unhindered so long as, in the words of John Pershing, the
Southern Philippines was “governed and controlled permanently by American officials and
under American sovereignty.”
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Yet for all the boasting that the South was pacified and changed, the region remained
unstable. For each report that claimed banditry was at an end there was another indicating
campaigns against outlaws were at an all-time high.
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If threats during the military period

arose from larger armed bands, during civilian rule they were fragmentary and diffuse. Lines
between criminality and social banditry were blurred and the two often existed in tandem
within Moro outlaw groups. The separation between legitimate law enforcement and brutal
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coercion on the part of the Constabulary was likewise muddled. The periodization of the socalled ‘Moro Rebellion’ used by many sources dates its end at 1913, when John Pershing
‘completed’ the disarmament of the Moros. What this suggests is that any confrontations that
came afterwards could be understood as simple police responses to isolated lawlessness,
rather than indicators of a sustained relationship of violent reciprocity that mutated over time
but retained its core features. That massacres were still occurring, schoolhouses still burning,
and officials still dying throughout the 1920s and 1930s suggests that the popular notion of
the ‘Moro Problem’ ending by 1913 needs rethinking.
In the late 1930s, military expeditions against Muslim populations continued. In early
1938, the Philippine Army dispatched warplanes to Lanao, where they bombed Maranao
cottas around the lake. Ground forces shelled the fortifications and fought against resistant
groups. Minnie K. Schultz, working for Frank Laubach’s organization in Dansalan, wrote
home that the shelling of one of the cottas came during Ramadan, and that Laubach feared
this would suggest to the Maranaos that the government was purposefully attacking Islam.
Schultz noted with bitter irony that some of those fighting against the Philippine Army were
young Maranao men who had just completed their six months of government-mandated
military training.
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Several months later, Laubach himself complained that the army was

actively working against the interests of peace in Lanao, and that each time an “outlaw” was
killed by the military “his relatives [became] angry…the result is that instead of a dozen
outlaws which might have been found at the beginning of the campaign, there are now nearly
179

one hundred.”

Laubach’s grim observation about how counterinsurgency operations

radicalized the population was darkly predictive of the violence between state authorities and
Muslim communities in the 1960s and 1970s.
Encouraged by fear of the Moro juramentado, corrective violence was deployed to aid
in the transformation of the region. Rather than having pedagogic or quiescent effects,
however, it established the preconditions for ambient violence, which describes scenarios
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where central authority is simultaneously coercive and absent, and where state violence,
armed resistance, and criminality interact toxically. Far from being a lulling presence, the
ambience is characterized by murder and reprisal in spaces where brutality is normalized.

180

The resulting environment is one where predation is likely to occur. In the Southern
Philippines, Americans killed Moros, Moros killed Americans, Filipinos killed Moros, Moros
killed Filipinos, and so forth. We should be careful to avoid what Nicole Guidotti-Hernández
calls “facile deployments of the discourse of resistance/victimization” by collapsing historical
actors into simple roles as either victims or perpetrators, while acknowledging that state and
181

non-state violence was a reoccurring experience for many in Mindanao and Sulu.

The

paranoid leitmotif of the juramentado, patterns of massacre, and the colonial carceral system
give some explanation of the persistence of these deadly encounters.
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Chapter Six / Tropical Idylls
Maintaining Colonial Spaces and Bodies

“The Far East prior to World War II was definitely a white man’s heaven,” Charles Ivins
recalled. An American military officer attached to the Philippine Scouts during the early
1930s, Ivins reminisced how “the white man had a raft of servants, lived like a lord of the
1

manor, and demanded and usually got the servile deference of the native.” His unpublished
memoirs tell of a life in the tropics full of comic adventures, exotic locales, boozy afternoons,
and parties lasting until the early hours of the morning. They conjure idealized visions of how
Americans travelled and lived in the Southern Philippines when they were not busy storming
cottas or pondering the civilizational capacities of the inhabitants. Ivins’ writings also give us
a range of detail on colonial habituation processes in foreign environments. That he focused
so heavily on non-professional pursuits suggests colonial life in Mindanao and Sulu extended
well beyond official activities into the realm of the touristic. The following chapter considers
the stories of Ivins and his fellow colonials in the Southern Philippines, in the process
contributing to the growing body of literature that explores the interconnected worlds of
militarism, commerce, tropical medicine, and leisure.

2

Studies of the pleasures and fears of colonial agents are well-established in
historiographies of European empires, but are of recent import in cultural histories of the
American colonial realm. Much of the work has focused on intersections between climactic
thinking, racial categorization, and public health; here we add Mindanao and Sulu to that
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discussion. However, I expand the parameters of my investigation to include other key
considerations of colonial administrators, including architecture, urban planning, and the
replication of metropolitan leisure in the colonies. Examining the activities of colonials at
play sheds light on methods of ordering and familiarizing alien landscapes, strategies of
differentiation employed to culturally distance colonials from the natives, and the
fetishization and fear of tropical landscapes pregnant with hazard. If American colonials
fixated on controlling and reforming native bodies in their official lives, in their private time
they gave considerably more attention to their own. Balancing pleasure with caution, for
many, took on an obsessive quality, fuelled by inexact and nebulous formulations of how a
white man or woman should conduct themselves in the tropics. Colonial state-building in the
Philippines was led by Americans who believed in rationalizing nature according to the
progressive schemas of the homeland, yet these same people feared lacking the personal
fortitude to withstand hostile environments.

3

This section explores these issues by studying the interlocking relations between
colonial spaces, leisure and sociality, and colonial breakdown. In examining the pleasures and
anxieties of American colonials, we gain insight into why empire in the Southern Philippines
took the shape it did. Being largely rooted in American projections of self, and fears about its
collapse, this chapter is closely related to the chapter in this project on American perceptions
and representations of the Moro. The orientalist trope of “the other,” as Susanne Zantop
4

notes, is intimately linked to the construction of “self.” Americans living in Mindanao and
Sulu, vastly outnumbered by native populations, keenly internalized this understanding,
aware that in their behaviours they defined themselves by what they believed they were
(importers of superior civilizational values) and against what they believed the natives to be
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(members of degraded and savage cultures). As such, the same concerns about ‘uplifting’ the
benighted races of the Philippine Archipelago became motivating factors for American
strategies of differentiation: the social rituals around food and drink; the compulsion to
explore, photograph, and collect; and the urban scapes manufactured for Anglo-Saxons to
live ‘properly’ in tropical spaces. In acting as they did, Americans sought to simultaneously
demonstrate to the colonized ‘correct’ modes of living and reassured themselves of their own
cultural superiority. In other words, these aspects of colonial culture were both instructional
and assuaged latent anxieties.
Surveying the lived experiences of American colonials means slipping between
contextual zones, where measurements of threat and safety varied drastically. The clubhouse,
the deck of the steamship, or the veranda of the governor’s residence were all areas where
Americans mastered the chaos of the tropical environment and native spatiality. In such
environments, an American officer or businessman could drink his favourite scotch whiskey,
indulge in Western sporting activities, and swap the latest news with his colleagues. Outside
of these spaces lay the sensory overload of the indigenous village and marketplace, the
perilous fecundity of the overgrown jungle, and the threat of the invisible – whether that be a
sudden juramentado attack or the invasion of one’s body by endemic disease. The boundaries
of these constructed and regulated environmental dichotomies were less stable than many
Americans admitted to, and required maintenance lest transgression occur.
In this chapter, the Moros and Filipinos who lived in and around colonial control
centers appear spectral. This is by design, and mimics the tendency of American colonials to
exclude these groups from their non-professional lives. Acknowledgment of them during
down time came via the wave of the hand to get another drink at the Overseas Club, or
through playing the groups off one another in team sports, or by collecting their manufactures
as examples of the ‘natural’ environment. The natives were always present in accounts of
social outings, but they were narratively ephemeral – exiting the story as quickly as they had
entered, usually after having performed some practical chore or been used as an example of
local colour. It was only in narratives of control and transformation that indigenous actors
took center stage, a trend that reveals much about the anxieties of the colonizers. By barring
the natives from participating in their personal lives as equivalents, American colonials tacitly
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recognized that the intimate sphere was a place where power relations could be more readily
5

compromised. By socially and racially banishing those white men who married native
women, they openly acknowledged it.
Mapping the social environments of the colonizer and colonized involves examining
how agents of colonialism understood their environment, how they attempted to shape it, the
pastimes they pursued, and their anxieties. In exploring the experiences of Charles Ivins and
others like him during the American era, we see how fantasy, fear, and ideology played out in
the daily lives of American colonials. These lives contain some of the clearest illustrations of
how schismatic notions of the tropics and their inhabitants shaped the most intimate areas of
the colonial project. They also lay bare the tensions inherent in attempts to promote the
virtues of the modern democratic state while still operating in the racial-exclusionist manner
of ‘traditional’ colonial entities. Further, they allow us to better comprehend how Americans
fit into the intellectual vectors that shaped transcolonial approaches to the “indolent” tropics.

6

Creating Colonial Spaces
The journalist and playwright Atherton Brownell, writing in 1905, described Zamboanga –
“the city as well as the district” – as a “model of cleanliness and tropical picturesqueness. The
streets are dry and well made…a river runs through it, deeply shaded by tropical trees,
bordered by smooth and well-kept lawns. The houses are neat and orderly. Pigs do not roam
at large, as elsewhere. The Army and Navy Club looks out over a well-built sea-wall to coral
7

islands beyond, and the climate, though it is warm, has a distinctly genial touch.” In the
pages of Outlook, Brownell addressed some of the major concerns about the new living
spaces of Westerners in the Philippines. In depicting Zamboanga as a “model of cleanliness,”
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and praising its general organization, Brownell expressed to readers that the provincial capital
was a safe space for Americans to live, and perhaps even a desirable one.
Western discourses on urban planning, architecture and sanitation in the tropics
developed well before the United States acquired a colonial empire. The nineteenth-century
saw the rapid creation of European colonies in tropical environments, and officials sent to
administer these spaces brought with them the understandings of race, disease, climate, and
urbanization current in Europe at the time. Metropolitan alarm at the effects of chaotic
urbanization in the age of industrialization comingled with the miasmic theory of disease
transmission, and in the colonies these notions were further interwoven with prevalent
8

notions of race and the degenerative properties of the tropical climate. These complex
considerations, which were constantly evolving and competing with one another in the minds
of colonials, formed the backbone of how Europeans thought about space in the tropics.
Americans were by no means isolated from this global conversation, and after
acquiring their Pacific empire authorities dispatched an array of architectural and medical
experts to assess how the environment of the Philippines should be managed, and how
European models could be bettered. The most famous example of this dynamic at work was
in Baguio, for a time the colonial summer capital of the Philippines. Located in the highlands
of Northern Luzon and partially planned by the famed architect Daniel Burnham, Baguio was
an adaptation of the British hill stations created to help colonials recover their health after
extended periods in challenging landscapes. On the Indian subcontinent, the spaces “were at

8
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the heart of the British effort to define and defend the boundaries that set them apart from
Indians and that sustained their new identity as agents of a superior culture.”

9

For Americans, Baguio was likewise a site for practicing familiar cultural rituals and
where one went to regenerate after long periods in remote and environmentally difficult
locales. In his study of American visual culture in the Philippines, David Brody notes that
Burnham’s plans for Baguio were expressions of a larger “imperialist desire” to familiarize
foreign spaces by recreating American domestic norms within them.

10

Seeing the Philippine

landscape as primitive and Spanish colonial antecedents as imperfect, Burnham turned to
contemporary urban ideals, taking into account the views of prominent urban reformers when
planning for “sanitation, ventilation, lighting, and a wide range of other urban ills.”

11

As with

the British hill stations, Baguio represented both an escape from cultural and environmental
woes, as well as a projection of how American knowledge could ‘master’ the tropics.
Further south, the Americans inherited the colonial towns of Zamboanga and Jolo
from the Spanish. While administrators there never had access to the same level of expertise
that existed in Manila and Baguio, they shared many of the same concerns.
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This unsurprising fact speaks to a predictable center-periphery relationship within the Philippines. Since
Manila and Baguio were the primary residences of the American colonial elite, and the places most likely to be
visited by outside observers looking to get a sense of the colonial project, they received greater allocations. A
constant in reports from officials in the Southern Philippines are complaints about not having enough money.
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the seat of American power in the Southern Philippines, was singled out as a site in need of
fastidious maintenance. On arriving there in the spring of 1899, American military forces
found that fighting between the Spanish garrison and Filipino insurrectos had ravaged the
town. On May 24th, the day of the Spanish evacuation, further destruction occurred when a
large fire spread through central Zamboanga, damaging or ruining many buildings.

13

American military officials saw this not as an impediment but rather a chance to reshape the
town.
A year later, Zamboanga was already holding balls to celebrate the arrivals and
14

departures of colonial personages.

Writing in the Boston Globe, Frank G. Carpenter

described the town as a tropical idyll: “Every surrounding of the place, in fact, is picturesque.
It looks more like a botanical garden with the accompaniment of midway plaisance than an
everyday American garrison. Its houses are shaded with cocoanut trees. Tall bananas rustle
their leaves as you walk through the streets, and all about it is the most luxuriant tropical
vegetation.”

15

Carpenter’s romantic descriptions of the natural setting extended to how pre-

existing colonial architecture interacted with the environment. He was especially fond of the
old Spanish-built headquarters: “It is a big two-story house. Covering perhaps a quarter of an
acre, with balconies 10 feet wide running around it, all shielded from the rays of the sun by
oyster-shell windows. The house is floored with mahogany boards, some of which are two
feet wide and 20 feet long. Its ceilings are from 15 to 20 feet high. It is right on the beach and
it is a stiff sea breeze which blows through it all day and all night.”

16

Although miasmic

theories of disease transmission were waning by the turn of the twentieth-century, the
preoccupation with preventing ‘stagnant’ air continued as a medical-architectural concern
among American colonials.
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Reports from the Moro Province speak to a preoccupation with changing Zamboanga
into the ideal colonial town. George Langhorne wrote in 1904 about the state of public works
there and the efforts to reconstruct “the provincial building at Zamboanga, as well as the
streets of the town, building a provincial jail, repairing wharves, constructing schoolhouses,
repairing district and municipal buildings at the principal towns of the province.”

17

There was

an emphasis placed on erecting permanent buildings and roads of “a substantial and lasting
18

character” as an expression of the fixity of the American presence.

Meanwhile, locals were

encouraged to take “an interest in public improvements and [establishing] the municipality
19

upon a sound basis.” Construction continued through 1906, when six new sets of captain’s
quarters and four new sets of lieutenant’s quarters were built, as well as a new bathhouse,
paint shop, laundry, stables, and band barracks.

20

type of furniture desired for the officers’ quarters.

The governor’s report even detailed the
21

Bliss described Zamboanga as “entirely cosmopolitan in character” and as a place
where “commercial interests are developing under American, European, and Chinese energy
and capital.”

22

An extensive listing of American and European residents in the town compiled

during the period bears this out. It included engineers, missionaries, bookkeepers, teachers,
bartenders, a veterinarian, a dentist, numerous small business owners, public sector
23

employees, and even a man listed as a “money lender and capitalist,” among others.

The

Americans carried on the Spanish colonial practice of spatially and socially segregating the
Samal Moros of the area, who continued living on the margins of the community. The
Filipinos and Chinese of Zamboanga interacted with its Western residents in matters of

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Langhorne, Annual Report 1904, 15.
Ibid.
Ibid., 17.
Wood and Bliss, Annual Report 1906, 7.
Ibid., 22.
Tasker Bliss, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1907, 23.

This undated document was drawn from the papers of John Pershing and we can assume it originates from his
time as Governor of the Moro Province between 1909 and 1913. Interestingly, the document also lists those
Americans and Europeans who are married to non-whites - “American Residents of Zamboanga, Together with
Europeans,” Box 320. John Pershing Papers, LOC-MD.

262

commerce, or as servants, but (by design) inhabited their own social spheres apart from the
Americans and Europeans.
Being the hub of colonial power in the South and its major population center,
Zamboanga received an inordinate amount of funding, and some of the most extensive
civilizational experiments, like the Moro Exchange, were based there. The city advertised
itself as “the Key to the Orient” in promotional literature, and boasted that it led all other
areas in the Southern Philippines in commercial and industrial development. Zamboanga, the
pamphlet claimed, was on all major regional trade routes, including those trafficking goods
from Australia, China, the East Indies, and Singapore. Extensive plantations, cattle ranches,
coal deposits, and potential logging sites also surrounded it. Most importantly, according to
the literature, the community was “without question the most attractive little city in the
Philippines…The neatness, cleanliness, shade and ornamental trees and green lawns, ridges
of tropical plants and flowers, the unique mountains, sunken and hanging gardens in the
beautifully arranged parks, together with the well-paved streets and fine shady driveways
excite the admiration and afford comfort and recreation to all.” Looking to attract business
and tourists, the city self-promoted as the ideal colonial space: modern, hygienic, connected,
and economically productive.

24

The character of the town remained consistent throughout the American period.
Writing in the 1930s, Charles Ivins shared Frank G. Carpenter’s eye for architectural detail.
Ivins and his fellow officers lived in “large two-story frame buildings with wide porches all
the way around on both levels – the top one being screened. The architect had designed the
building for the tropics. The ceilings were tall, the doors and windows large, the kitchen and
servants quarters were separate from the main house but connected by a breezeway.”

25

As

Jiat-Hwee Chang and Anthony D. King observe, the wraparound veranda was a “structure
particularly symbolic of the colonial tropical lifestyle,” suggesting an American debt to
earlier colonial models (which in turn had fused European and native architectural traditions)
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in the design of their buildings.

26

Maintaining domestic standards meant not only living in

spaces designed for Westerners in the tropics, but also differentiating oneself from the natives
by rigorously enforcing a regime of cleanliness through proper management of the home. In
the Ivins household, this was the job of his wife Vivian, who “had previous experience in
27

running a home in Puerto Rico and in Panama…this tropical stuff was old hat to her.”
Drawing upon personal experiences of colonial domesticity, Vivian directed a staff of

servants in her attempts to stave off filth. Ivins wrote that many times he witnessed her
coming back from the commissary with very little food but “heavily laden with soaps,
scouring powder, waxes and cleaners of all types.”

28

The dichotomy between Western and native concepts of cleanliness and hygiene was
made abundantly clear in Walter Cutter’s descriptions of the walled town of Jolo, and the
Moros living outside those walls. Jolo, he noted, “has been called the garden spot of the
Philippines and it is no misnomer. It is an island paradise.” Cutter was taken with the Spanish
architecture, describing favourably the “Moorish doorways” and the “white beach sand and
ground corral” used for the streets. Where nature intruded, it did so pleasantly via sweet
smelling plants like ylang-ylang, or caged tropical birds in one of the local parks. Fresh
mountain water pumped into town and an ice plant ensured cool refreshments for the
29

Americans.

In Cutter’s imagining, Jolo was favourably exotic; tropical without being

threatening. This contrasted with his descriptions of nearby Tausūg settlements like Tullei
and Bus Bus, which he described as a visual and olfactory assault. To visit either was “an
insult to one’s sense of smell. The native race here are Moros and they are lower in the social
scale than anything I ever saw before. A Filipino is as neat as wax and highly civilized
30

compared with them. A Moro is a savage pure and simple.”
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Cutter used the Christian Filipino as a guidepost for just how degraded Moro spaces
were from the standpoint of a Westerner. In this continuum, Spanish antecedents were
imperfect but still highly refined compared to Filipino examples, which themselves were
more civilized than Moro ones. Mobilizing concepts of cleanliness to comprehend and
designate racial fitness was a well-established colonial phenomenon with roots in the
31

emergent bourgeois metropolitan domesticity of nineteenth-century Europe.

As such, the

domestic prerogatives of women like Vivian Ivins, utilizing cheap native labour to keep their
homes spotless, were attempts to negate the unpleasant aspects of the tropical environment
and create markers of racial and cultural separation from the peoples of Mindanao and Sulu.
If Zamboanga was the cosmopolitan colonial capital of the South, then Jolo was the
frontier town made exhilarating by its proximity to native life. J.R. Hayden, visiting as a
scholar in the 1920s, described the town as
one of the most picturesque places I have ever seen. The old walled Spanish
town is very much as it was when we took over…The most picturesque and
colorful parts of the town, however, are the Moro town, built on stilts over
the water, and the ‘Chinese Pier.’ The latter is a pier which stretches a
quarter of a mile out into the harbor and upon which are built two storey
frame houses occupied by the Chinese. A board walk runs along the front of
these houses and on it we passed representatives of almost every race in the
Orient. I never have seen such a gay and picturesque lot of costumes, not
even in Java.

32

Hayden continued in this vein, describing the array of seafood available for purchase at the
market, as well as “fruits of all kinds, for Jolo produces more varieties of fruit than any place
in the Philippines.”

33

Charles Ivins was less enthusiastic about the seaside settlement, and

described how “the whole town reeked of sweat, garbage and filth. Only in certain areas of
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China have I encountered any smells that could even approach the potent odors of Jolo.”

Far more isolated and intermeshed with the local Muslim population than Zamboanga was,
Jolo inspired a variety of opinions from Americans. J.R. Hayden saw the town as a vivid
Oriental tableau brought to life before his eyes. Walter Cutter had mixed opinions,
contrasting the orderly interior of the walled city with the squalor he witnessed outside of it.
Charles Ivins, stopping in Jolo briefly, had uniformly negative views, placing it beyond the
realm of civilized colonial space by virtue of its offending scents. This divergence of opinions
on the towns and villages of the Muslim South was common, and generally had to do with
how habituated the writer was to Zamboanga (the more they were, the less they liked other
places in Mindanao and Sulu).
The creation of the town of Dansalan represented a departure for the Americans. If
officials previously sought to reshape preexisting colonial spaces, in 1906 they decided to
plan and build a site that would encompass the paternalist agendas of the colonial regime.
Located at the northern tip of Lake Lanao some forty kilometers south of Iligan, Dansalan lay
across the Agus River from Camp Keithley and the Maranao settlement of Marawi.
Alongside the Sulu Archipelago, the Lanao region was the location of some of the fiercest
resistance to American rule. The Spanish inability to conquer Lanao meant that there was no
colonial hub like there was in the coastal areas. Reflecting on these problems, the government
of the Moro Province determined that creating Dansalan was necessary to effectively manage
the restive Maranao communities around the lake.
Tasker Bliss saw the incipient town as “probably the first and only instance in the
Philippine Islands of the establishment of an orderly and well-regulated community after the
manner followed by the Anglo-Saxon settlers of the United States.”

35

The Chinese, Japanese,

Filipino, and Moro inhabitants of the settlement would be placed under the guidance of the
Americans there, Bliss stated, and if more Americans “of the old sturdy stock” could be
convinced to settle in the province it would become an engine of economic growth in the
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Southern Philippines.

36

Marawi itself was filled with “squatters,” who surrounded Camp

Keithley (the main military base in the region) that were forced to “transfer themselves” by
the military authorities. Although Bliss scoffed at claims of Maranao ancestral-communal
37

ownership of the land, he admitted that paying off local datus was preferable to bloodshed.

District Governor John McAuley Palmer dealt with a variety of issues related to the creation
of a model colonial settlement, including the commissioning of land surveys, negotiating with
Moro grandees, divvying up lots, reimbursing of businessmen who raised money to pay the
Moros, and overseeing the “ejectment” of those left in Marawi.

38

Tasker Bliss worried about

the effects that the licensed saloons would have on the American residents of the new town –
particularly the soldiers – but admitted that “under the law” they could not be prevented. A
prohibitively high liquor license fee of ₱4,800 was imposed and a special liquor zone created
39

to address these concerns.

Dansalan was intended to civilize the region through the instructive example of
market capitalism. Palmer wrote letters to prominent traders in Iligan like Martin Geary,
mentioning that if enterprising Western businessmen could harness the “industrial capacity”
of the Lanao Moros everybody would prosper. He mentioned fabrics, brass work, and the
nascent coffee trade as areas ripe for exploitation. There was “a place here for somebody to
make money” Palmer told Geary, and making that money was inextricably linked to the
civilizational plans colonial officials had for the Moros.

40

Palmer suggested starting an

experimental colony near Dansalan to serve the interests of commerce and act as a guidepost
for Moro development. “While the idea of enforced labor is rather startling to Americans,” he
wrote, “its necessity in dealing with people like the Moros must be apparent to anyone who
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has had occasion to study them or similar peoples in Malaysia.”

As seen in Chapter Three,

officials believed that agricultural colonies would have a domino effect, organically
multiplying and encouraging Moros in the region to buy into Western modes of production.
As for other trade, Palmer suggested that travelling Moro middlemen could buy from more
isolated markets around Lake Lanao and, in turn, sell to Western businessmen operating out
of Dansalan.

42

Annual reports from the Moro Province for 1910-11 and 1912-13 related modest, but
steady, improvements to Dansalan, including the installation of a bridge across the Agus
River that linked the town with Camp Keithley, a new municipal building, a school building,
a municipal market, and a district jail. A small frame hospital and dispensary served around
seventy-five patients per day, and there were plans to build an industrial school.

43

By the

1920s, Dansalan was a vibrant place where missionaries and businessmen extended colonial
44

society to the remote interior of Mindanao.

Writing to his wife in 1926, J.R. Hayden

described meeting with local datus, dining with the governor, and shooting nine holes of
“poor” golf overlooking “beautiful scenery.”

45

Although Dansalan was designed with a

cultural fusion of commerce and tutelary uplift in mind, respectable Westerners kept mostly
to the city and socialized with their own. Adventures into the hinterland were normally done
in armed groups – and often for punitive reasons.

46

The grand agricultural and industrial

plans of John McAuley Palmer never materialized in earnest, and in many respects the town
remained similar to Jolo – an imperial outpost in a unstable land.
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Despite this, writers visiting Dansalan had a tendency to idealize it in the same
language they used when speaking about Zamboanga or Jolo. Writing for the Philippines
Free Press in 1941, S.S. Schier complimented the climate, and was delighted how in
Dansalan “the air itself was charged with animation and importance.” He went so far as to
call the town the “Mecca of Moroland” and described the Lake Lanao region as “a composite
of indescribable, scenic grandeur and Mohammedan art.” Schier believed that tourism could
be a major boon for Lanao, but that if it was not developed it would continue “slumbering
under the tropical sun” as it had for “many thousands of years” prior.

47

Characteristically,

Charles Ivins took a more blinkered view, writing that he would never place Dansalan in “a
contest for municipal achievement” and claiming the isolation of the Maranao Moros in
48

Lanao had made them more “war-like” and “less tolerant of infidels and unbelievers.”

Originally envisioned as a new type of colonial space, Dansalan came to resemble other more
established towns in written accounts.

Sociality and Leisure
Zamboanga was the hub of colonial life in the Muslim South. There members of white
society organized sports teams, ran a golf and country club, held dances, acted as amateur
scholars, took photographs, went to the cinema, entertained visitors, organized parades and
fairs, and went adventuring in the interior and out in the Sulu Sea. While most Americans
lasted only as long as their tour of duty, some managed to finagle extended stays at
Zamboanga, or else got posted there again later in their careers. Some grew sentimentally
attached to the place. When Leonard Wood visited his old governor’s residence there near the
49

end of his life “the tears were streaming down his cheeks.”

47
48

Through the permanent

S.S. Schier, “The Lake Empire of Lanao,” Philippines Free Press, 26 July 1941.

“The Monkeys Have No Tails in Zamboanga,” Unpublished Memoirs of Charles Ivins, 182-184, Box 1.
Charles Ivins Papers, USAHEC.
49

Interview with Mrs. Dorey, 1 May 1930, Box 15, Folder 2. Hermann Hagedorn Papers, LOC-MD. Dorey
expanded on Wood’s picturesque life in Zamboanga in another segment of the interview: “Wood was
wonderfully happy at Zamboanga. It was, in fact, his last really happy period. He loved the country, the climate,
the free and independent life. The Moros depended on him and he had the consciousness that he was needed and
had a job worth doing. He was with his children, playing tennis with them. There would be grand picnics miles
off in the hills. Or they would go paddling through the Mangrove swamps past caribou and the monkeys

269

presence of certain key families like the Worcesters and the continuity provided by the clubs
around town, Zamboanga maintained its own distinct character throughout the American
period. As early as 1902, military societies in Zamboanga fostered American colonial culture
in the region. One such was The Military Order of the Kris, which took its name from the
famed Moro weapon, and had John Pershing as its Vice-President. This group, formed as the
result of the early campaigns against the Lanao Moros, celebrated Christmas “with many
field sports, including baseball, horse-racing, and high-jumping. In the evening there was a
50

minstrel show.” By combining typically Western athletic pursuits with racialized forms of
entertainment, the Americans amused themselves while simultaneously encouraging the
maintenance of boundaries.
Military newspapers were important in establishing a sense of community among
servicemen and their families in Mindanao and Sulu. The Twenty Third Infantry Lantaka,
published in Parang by Hugh Drum and others, provided information about upcoming social
gatherings, baseball scores, the activities of officers’ wives, and poked fun at military culture.
Serious military issues received humorous treatment, presumably as a steam valve. The
outrages of the Moro outlaw Jikiri were described with levity. Jikiri was “abroad in the land
51

flaying the Chinese and flogging the fair women of the Southern Isles.” The Lantaka even
had its own spin-off, the even more satirical Twenty-Third Infantry Bolo. The Bolo was
devoted entirely to comedy, making light of everything from Hugh Drum’s erotic experiences
in Japan (it claimed he had written a book called Geisha Girls I Have Known) to
epidemiological conditions at Parang: “A large typhoid bug visited our little city recently. He
was extensively entertained, care being taken not to injure him in any way.”
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chattering in the trees, meeting now and then a Moro in his vinta, paddling slowly by with his knife beside him.”
Ibid., 1 May 1930, Box 17, Folder 4. Hermann Hagedorn Papers, LOC-MD.
50
51
52

“Order of the Kris,” Manila Times, 27 December 1902.
“The Yellow Peril,” Twenty-Third Infantry Lantaka, 20 November 1909, 6.
“Personals,” Twenty-Third Infantry Bolo, 9 April 1907, 2.

270

Similarly, the Jolo Howler provided a creative outlet for some of the men stationed in
the Sulu Archipelago. Created by an officer in the 17th Infantry with access to a typewriter, its
main goal was chronicling American military life in the tropics. The Howler made jokes
about nearly every major figure, American and Moro, on the island of Jolo at the time. The
Moros and their culture were mercilessly skewered in poems like “The Belle of Jolo,” where
each quatrain began in the style of a saccharine romance poem and ended with an insult to
Moro women. For example: “There’s a beautiful Sulu belle, / with a queenly, shapely head; /
There’s a mystic spell in her eyes gazelle - / And her teeth are betel-red,” or “Her nose is
gently retroussé / And mayhap, slightly flat; / I’ve often thought that once it caught / A
swinging baseball bat.”

53

The article “Spring Fashions for Jolo” gave an account of what

clothes were popular in Jolo that year in the style of a fashion magazine like Harper’s Bazaar
(“The Dowager Sultana recently imported from Sandakan a beautiful green cotton sunshade.
54

No doubt Sulu society women will lose no time in following royal example” ), the joke
being the juxtaposition between haute couture fashion reportage and the savage remoteness of
Jolo. Elsewhere in the paper were humorous observations about the Chinese penchant for
fireworks, inside jokes about the sporting abilities of a variety of American servicemen, and
advertisements for fake businesses on the island. While largely satirical, regimental
newspapers like the Lantaka and the Howler touched upon a variety of concerns shared by
the men stationed in Mindanao and Sulu, from disease to sexuality to isolation.
Many of the poems and songs originating among Americans stationed in the
Philippines eventually filtered back to the metropole. The soldier and journalist Damon
Runyon published a song in 1911 referencing the tendency of Moro females to fight
alongside men called “The Ladies in the Trenches: A Soldier Song of the Sulu Isles” or “If A
Lady’s Wearing Pantaloons.” Another song was inspired by the hunt for Datu Ali in Cotabato
after the Maguindanaon leader’s relationship with colonial authorities turned hostile. One
verse went as follows: “Oh, sing a song of hikers, / On Dato Ali’s trail, / On straight tips from
old Piang / Who ought to be in jail. / Three commands of dough-boys / And one of horseless
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horse, / Through mud and slime; / Through filth and grime; / We wend our way perforce.”
Yet others mixed sentimentality with racial humour, and spoke of Moro “romances,”
“queens,” “chiefs,” and “nights.” For many soldiers, interpreting their experiences through
music added levity and narrative form to what they witnessed in the Southern Philippines. In
the United States, songs about the Moros were sometimes the only familiarity citizens had
with their nation’s Pacific frontier.

55

The whites-only Army and Navy Club at Zamboanga was a hub of American sociality
throughout the colonial period. In 1905, native dancers greeted Secretary of War William
Howard Taft in front of the club, and ushered him inside for drinks and dancing. Later in the
evening, he and others watched from the patio as a native boat parade of some two hundred
vessels passed along the waterfront “with Serpentine movements.”

56

The Americans present

were thus able to witness the stage-managed and romanticized spectacle of primitive races in
their ‘natural’ environment while remaining ensconced within a familiar, racially demarcated
space. Seymour Howell, an officer with the Pay Department, wrote to his son of the Army
and Navy Club in 1902, describing its “broad covered gallery” extending out over the water
“and equipped with every kind of cane or bamboo lazy chair and lounge known to this
57

tropical climate.”

The club had a “ladies night” on Saturday evenings “where nearly every

officer and lady at the post [was] present, the charming native dance music keeping the
58

interested till a later hour.”

Howell’s time in Zamboanga mitigated the long and difficult

pay trips he took around the region, and the club, with its combination of curated exoticism
and Western familiarity, provided needed comforts.
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The anthropologist Charles Eugen Guthe and Charles Ivins – writing in the 1920s and
1930s, respectively – each described club life in Zamboanga in more raucous terms. While
conducting a multi-year anthropological collecting mission in the Philippines, Guthe stayed
in Zamboanga on numerous occasions. There he spent his time ambling about town,
negotiating with Frederick Worcester, son of the recently deceased Dean, for his father’s
photographic collection, and drinking with an assortment of local characters. Much of this
took place at the Zamboanga Overseas Club, a civilian companion to the Army and Navy
Club. In this “old house right in the centre of things” Guthe described dancing and imbibing
until the early hours of the morning, on one occasion nearly getting in a fist fight, drinking
leftover champagne from vacated tables, and ending the night drunkenly reviewing over some
disturbing photographs from a recent conflagration in the area.
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Charles Ivins recounted his days at the Zamboanga Golf and Country Club in a
similarly colourful manner. He spent afternoons at the clubhouse with Ian McDougall, the
resident manager of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, arguing over which
country was to blame for the Great Depression. The golf course itself was infested with pigs,
dogs, chickens, monkeys, cobras, and all other manner of local fauna. Ivins joked about the
religious aversion of the Moro caddies to the pigs, claiming “they would never in the afterlife
get to enjoy the limitless pleasures of the Perfumed Gardens” had they interacted with
60

them.

The drinking at the golf course was extensive and reckless, and at one point Ivins

found himself “testing the comparative merits of Johnny Walker and Grand McNish”
whiskies with Chuck Gamble, a representative for the local steamship line. “Eventually we
reached a state of exuberance that could only be quelled by an auto race back to town,” Ivins
recalled, going on to describe said auto race, which ended with Ivins spraying the car of
Gamble with carabao waste (whose explosive properties when hit at high speeds he remarked
upon) and emerging victorious.
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colonial rule in 1930s Zamboanga, where the white elite entertained themselves by drinking
their afternoons away and occasionally engaging in reckless behaviour.
Visiting Zamboanga in the earliest days of the Moro Province, Maud Huntley Jenks
wrote of the routine binge drinking in more unpleasant terms. Attending a military banquet in
1903, she observed men drink themselves into unconsciousness. Jenks found such behaviour
“pathetic” yet “understandable.” A lack of healthful pursuits in the area made drunken
escapades among the men stationed there inevitable. She connected such behaviour to
colonial environments worldwide: “The drinking is terrible over here in these Islands, as it is
in the tropics wherever the white man has gone in any numbers – whether American, British,
Dutch – and its results are more terrible.” Alcohol, it seemed, could speed the effects of
tropical degeneration on the mind and body. Jenks met one man on a steamer en route to
Manila who doctors claimed was “incurably insane…because of drinking” and lamented his
decline.
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Sport was another integral element of the social structures and strategies of
differentiation employed by American colonials. By participating in sports unfamiliar to the
natives, Americans distinguished themselves as bearers of a more sophisticated culture.

63

In

certain cases, Moros and Filipinos participated in these events, but only under strictly
controlled conditions. As with their social clubs, activities like hunting, polo, sport fishing,
and baseball were a means to replicate the comforts of the distant American homeland.
During his tenure as Governor General of the Philippines, W. Cameron Forbes actively
participated in sporting activities. In both 1909 and 1910, during inspection tours of
Mindanao, he and a host of officials hunted duck at Lake Liguasan in the Cotabato district.
On the first trip, Forbes described the watery paths through islands of reeds, the “incessant
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whir of birds,” and the “old, scarred, seamed, and hideous Moros with black teeth and juicestained red mouths and lips…silent, capable, and active pirates” who guided them to various
hunting spots. To Forbes, the trip was idyllic, and he found he could not “convey the charm
of the circumstances of this hunt – the bright sky, the mystery of the huge lake, unknown
64

depths underneath where may be were lurking crocodiles.”

These scenes repeated themselves on another trip to the region less than a year later.
Forbes took to paying the Moro guides to return the ducks as he suspected they had kept
some back for themselves on his previous outing. Forbes’ group bagged 475 ducks and
afterwards visited with Datu Enoch and his wife near Lake Buluan As he left the marshes,
Forbes reflected upon “the varying degrees of hominess which we felt on returning from one
condition of travel to another; getting back into the small vinta from mud and water being
first, to the large vinta with its drinks, edibles, seats, cushions, and companions” and onwards
to the larger ships with their staterooms and servants. His only regret on the trip was not
bringing Dean Worcester along to properly classify the various flora and faun encountered.
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For Forbes, what was ostensibly an inspection tour also doubled as a leisurely sporting
vacation on the fringes of the colony.
Baseball was both a leisure pursuit for American personnel and a means by which to
66

inculcate natives into Western team sports.

In the Southern Philippines, baseball was at first

used as an outlet for soldiers in between periods of fighting Moro insurgents. Regimental
newspapers like the Twenty-Third Infantry Lantaka went into great detail about the most
recent games, noting standout offensive and defensive plays,
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and teams from the various
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stations around Mindanao and Sulu visited one another when they were able to.

68

Military

commanders actively participated in these events, with men like John Pershing and Matthew
Steele acting as umpires in the hotly contested matches.
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Military clubs also played against

Filipino and Moro teams, and Moro and Filipino teams against each another. In one account,
the Visayan Regimental Team competed against the American team of Company D (23rd
Infantry) in Zamboanga “on two successive Saturdays.” The Twenty-Third Infantry Lantaka
reported that “the native has a natural aptitude for the great American game. His light weight,
however, is a great handicap in meeting Americans, both in batting and base running.” Each
July 4th in Zamboanga, the Americans used their national holiday to stage a game that pitted
the local Filipino team against the Moro one.
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Here, American patriotic fervor was a staging

ground for intra-imperial competition between two groups of subject people that despised one
another. Nearly twenty years later, Charles Ivins spoke of the same dynamic, opening his
memoirs with a scene from a baseball game between the Filipino and Moro Companies of the
Philippine Scouts. The game ends with a Moro sergeant killed by an errant pitch, and Ivins
reflecting on the man up in “the Mohammedan heavens” starring “as the home-run king in
71

some celestial ball park.”

Ivins’ comingling of the Islamic afterlife with an American

pastime is lighthearted in its intent, but also telling of how in colonial environments even
72

leisure was deployed as a tool of civilizational imperatives.

When stationed in Zamboanga, colonial personnel took great pains to establish
domestic spaces for themselves that replicated (as far as possible) the pleasures of home. To
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achieve this, they exploited the effects of colonial rule on local labour. The wives of officers
often managed households, and nearly all of them did so with Moro and Filipino cooks,
houseboys, and laundrywomen, “who in nearly all cases were well trained and needed little
73

supervision.” This reliance on servants, shared by both American men and women, freed up
time to have long boozy lunches at the clubs around Zamboanga, play bridge, pick over the
disappointing merchandise at the commissary, explore the surrounding area, go to the cinema,
74

and indulge in cocktail hour.

If an American woman’s home had dull floors or was not

immaculately tidy, assumptions were made that she did not know “how to run her servants.”
In the 1930s, it was generally agreed that Mrs. Worcester, widow of Dean, set the standard
75

for imperial hauteur in the provincial capital.

While Americans in the Philippines were delighted by tropical fruits and vegetables,
they also desired familiar staples from North America. As most goods were shipped from
Manila, where the best items were picked over first, American personnel in the South were
often left with the second-rate remainders. When a special meal occurred, particularly in the
early years of the occupation, it was a cause for celebration. So much so that Walter Cutter
recorded the entire menu of the Thanksgiving meal he had at Jolo in 1901, commenting that
“under the fierce rays of the tropical sun, with swarthy Mohammedans looking curiously on,
it seemed a strange setting for the old New England holiday.” The menu for the Christmas
meal Cutter ate the following month was transcribed in even greater detail.
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For the officers,

such meals were extensive. At the 23rd Infantry Mess’ thirteenth anniversary dinner in late
1909, those present feasted on caviar on toast, devilled Illana Bay crabs, fillet of beef with
77

mushroom sauce, crème de menthe, and duty-free cigars,
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all while singing songs that
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humorously skewered the trials and tribulations of life on Jolo.

Those stationed near Bud

Dajo in 1911, was less enthusiastic about what was being served, writing in a letter to his
wife that “the meat + potatoes + all were cooked to a sort of thick pulp” and he was
79

constantly ravenous as a result.

As Susie Protschky notes in her study of culinary habits in the Dutch East Indies,
“eating assumed a deep significance: it performed the social function of demonstrating
cultural affiliation” in colonial environments.
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For Americans, especially those living in

isolated areas, what food was consumed and how it was consumed was important to
maintaining hierarchies of difference. This applied not only to holidays and special events,
but also to everyday life. Charles Ivins noticed this when he visited the Goodyear rubber
plantation at Kabsalan. Despite arriving in the middle of the night, Ivins was met by two
plantation labourers, who pushed him on a flat car along a narrow-gauge railway for two
miles over a “pestilential swamp” until he arrived at the manager’s home in the early hours of
the morning. There he was greeted with “a couple rounds of drinks and a large dinner” that
was prepared for the Americans by the Filipino cooks and houseboys. Ivins explained that the
servants enjoyed serving them dinner and drinks at such an advanced hour because the
Filipino “likes to make people happy.”
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For men like Ivins and the writer Vic Hurley, who

was then working at Kabsalan, maintaining civilized behaviour in the midst of the untamed
wilderness of Mindanao reified their status as bearers of a superior culture, and meals like the
one described were totemic in their significance.
At Kabsalan, Ivins also participated in amateur exploration, another popular pastime
of American colonials. If the imagined terra incognita of Mindanao and Sulu was ‘mastered’
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in the towns where Americans resided, elsewhere it was utilized by those with a sense of
adventure and a wish to prove themselves against untamed nature. The American presence in
the archipelago coincided with the last great era of exploration, and the idea of the great
Victorian adventurer, while dwindling, still maintained a hold on the popular imagination. In
the 1920s, newspapers avidly covered expeditions like that of the doomed Percy Fawcett in
82

the Amazon, and many of the world’s highest peaks remained unscaled.

Add to this the

Rooseveltian ideal of the “vigorous life,” and the result was a class of American men and
women in the Southern Philippines who saw the occasional sojourn into the wilds as a mark
of strength.
Betty Hurley, wife of Vic, led treks into the jungle surrounding Kabsalan. “Betty was
the only white woman within a hundred miles and was of course quite an object of interest on
that account,” Ivins related. “That afternoon she took us on an extended hike over some of
her favourite trails. Doc and I were used to long hikes carrying plenty of equipment but Betty
set a fast pace that had us soon panting for breath.” Leeches besieged the party, but Ivins
described the adventure as one of good fun.
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Betty Hurley was by no means the only woman

who trekked into Mindanao’s interior. Three decades earlier, Maud Jenks travelled across
Lake Lanao with her husband as they secured the human exhibits for the St. Louis World’s
Fair. Jenks, an active participant in her husband’s scholarly pursuits, noted the tribal histories
of the people she met in letters home to her mother. She boasted of “[probing] the wilds
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where no white woman has ever been before” in multiple letters, saying she felt “quite
honored.”

84

Treks into the unknown were encouraged from the outset of American rule. In 1901,
the anthropologist and Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes chief David Prescott Barrows issued a
pamphlet to volunteer field workers for the Museum of Ethnology, Natural History and
Commerce giving extensive directions for non-specialists to take anthropometric
measurements of the natives, question them about their cultural practices, and record their
vocabulary. The reports sent back to the Bureau would then be used for investigations
regarding: “1. Miscegenation in the Philippines, 2. Racial Pathology in the Philippines, 3.
85

Racial Psychology, 4. Criminal Anthropology, 5. Viability of the Chinese Population.”

This

spoke to a broader project of population mapping and control, but the governing idea of the
document – that the entire Philippine Archipelago was a blank slate and gaps in knowledge
could be filled by even non-specialist contributions – often intersected with the daily lives of
those colonials who ventured, or were assigned, outside of built-up stations. Such outings
were common in the South. Fred Passmore, then Acting Division Superintendent of
Education for Lanao, described in detail to J.R. Hayden a two-day hiking trip around the
Ramain region southeast of Dansalan. The climate was “unsurpassed” as was the “scenery,”
which included the Moro settlements the hiking group passed through. “The native
culture…is surely most interesting and in some respects replete with charm,” Passmore
86

reflected.

The army surgeon Charles Hack spent his free time along the southern shores of Lake
Lanao studying the local flora and fauna. During one visit to the Mataling River, he recorded
his descriptions of the various plants that grew there and, lost in thought, marvelled at how
close he was “to the heart of nature.” Despite the presence of Moro villages throughout the
area, Hack reflected that it was “strange to think of the United States having territory that is
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yet unexplored.”

The surgeon collected Moro manufactures and extensively listed them in

his journal. He gave a partial accounting, noting he had fifteen krises (the most valuable
being those with intricate patterns or those that had killed people), seven agongs, a lantaka,
three spears, a betel nut box, a coat of mail and brass helmet, and some sarongs, among other
items.

88

He eventually shipped his collection back to the United States, where his widow

donated it to the Museum of Natural History in New York City after his death.
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W. Cameron Forbes also accumulated a collection during trips to Mindanao and Sulu,
making repeated reference to his lantakas, krises, barongs and other curiosities in his
90

journal.

Many Westerners stationed in or visiting the Southern Philippines shared an

enthusiasm for collecting Moro weapons, clothing, and jewelry. Seymour Howell wrote to his
91

wife about searching for “desirable brass work” in the markets of Zamboanga,
Hayden wrote home describing the fine silks available in Jolo.
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and J.R.

Here, the enthusiasms of the

amateur anthropologist coalesced with the commodification of Moro culture, which could be
purchased and sent to the United States to be admired for its Oriental exoticism. Businessminded residents, Moro and Western alike, soon realized the market for such items and
produced them at greater rates. Jos. S. Johnston of Zamboanga manufactured picture
93

postcards that featured idealized scenes of Mindanao and Sulu,

and the American Bazaar

sold everything from “gentlemen’s furnishing goods” to “novelties” at prices “cheaper than
94

you can buy elsewhere in Philippines.”
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Alongside exploring and collecting, photography was also a popular hobby for
American colonials. Technological developments in the field meant that by the early
twentieth-century barriers to owning and operating a camera had largely vanished. Those
interested in capturing environmental knowledge through the medium were increasingly free
to do so. Dean Worcester became the most famous practitioner of this trend in the
Philippines, turning an amateur interest into a vast archive cataloguing the peoples of the
archipelago and contributing to anthropological studies of the day.
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Most colonials taking

photographs in the Muslim South did not have the resources, access, or inclinations of Dean
Worcester, yet what pictures they did take are still telling. As Krista Thompson notes in her
study of photography in the British Caribbean colonies, images were often a means for
colonials to depict idealized versions of the tropical environment while also conveying a
sense of “exemplary and disciplined” colonial societies.
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Photographs from the period

convey the innate foreignness of the people and environment of the Southern Philippines, and
promote visions of disciplined Anglo-Saxon men mastering wild peoples.
Constabulary officer Sterling Larrabee exemplified the practice of visually
documenting life in Mindanao and Sulu. Photographs regularly accompanied the letters he
mailed to his parents in the United States. In one missive from 1912, he included a variety of
photographs taken during his time on an expedition in the Mindanao interior. A casual shot of
“Lt. Johnson frying some carabao liver” is appended with the offhanded comment “We shot
the carabao along with two Moros that morning,” suggesting violence was routine to the
point of banality for Larrabee and his men. Another photograph shows Captain Guy O. Fort
of the Constabulary with two Moro capitazes (men in charge of baggage-carrying). The two
Moros stand with hands on their hips as Captain Fort observes them. “Fort speaks the
Malanao Moro dialect like a native,” Larrabee explained to his parents, also mentioning that
the “picture shows the Malanao (Lake Lanao) type of Moro to perfection.”
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In his personal scrapbook Larrabee paired newspaper articles about skirmishes he
participated in with photographs he took. A report from the New York Herald about a battle
between Constabulary soldiers and Moro outlaws was pasted alongside informal pictures of
98

Moros at rest and work, as well as a staged portrait of a Lanao headman and his retinue.

Larrabee also dabbled in photographs resembling the formal ethnographic ones taken by
academics like Worcester. A letter to his parents in August 1911 included two photographs,
99

one of 1st Sergeant Malaco and the other of one of Larrabee’s “muchachos,” a boy named
Bwasa whom he taught to read and write. In the shots, a sheet is hung behind each subject to
isolate them from their surroundings, and they are similarly captured: full body, hands to the
side, staring directly into the camera.
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These photographs, along with that of the “perfect”

Lanao Moros, display a preoccupation with rigorous documentation and categorization of
living environments common to colonial photography.
Robert Lee Bullard, famous for his service in the First World War, also spent his
leisure time photographing the landscapes and inhabitants of the Southern Philippines. Staged
group portraits in his collection include nearly every important Moro leader in the region
during the transition to civilian rule in 1913 and 1914. Bullard was a fastidious captionwriter, recording not only the names of the dignitaries, but also the roles of their retainers. He
took informal photographs of Moro krises, Moro road labourers, the pier at Jolo, American
soldiers on patrol and at rest amidst lush tropical surroundings, and even Moro women
101

bathing.

Photographs of nude or semi-nude Moros were in keeping with the social mores

of the time, which, taking their lead from the ethnographic portraiture found in magazines
like National Geographic, dictated that capturing images of nudity did not constitute moral
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transgression if the subjects were of semi-civilized racial stock.

102

Frank McCoy, who

returned to the Philippines with the Wood-Forbes mission in 1921, likewise photographed
103

exposed natives.

Anthropologists and eugenicists of the period promoted ‘scientifically

managed’ photography of naked non-white peoples as a tool which revealed racialcivilizational truths, yet neither Bullard nor McCoy were taking their photos as part of any
academic exercise.

104

Rather, they had internalized the dominant mode of visually

cataloguing foreign bodies and utilized this knowledge when taking photographs for pleasure.
Americans in the Southern Philippines went to great efforts to manage their
environment, maintain domestic standards, and replicate the popular social activities they
engaged in at home in the United States. The distinctions they maintained between
themselves and the natives were established to demonstrate not only the superiority of
Western culture, but also as a bulwark against racial pollution or transgression. The natural
environment (which, to colonials, included the natives) provided a space where one could
show their adventurous spirit, participate in the larger colonial project of ‘discovery,’ collect
unique indigenous items to demonstrate one’s familiarity with Oriental cultures, or study the
local flora and fauna through photography. Yet these pursuits rested upon unstable ground.

Dissipation and Breakdown
Alongside sporting events, parades, dances, and other leisurely pursuits were pervasive fears
about the deleterious effects of climate and immorality on the American body and psyche. In
the Southern Philippines, these concerns were expressed in diffuse ways, in some cases being
considered dire medical emergencies and in others topics of levity. What remained constant
were general anxieties about what has been alternately referred to as tropical neurasthenia,
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colonial breakdown, and, in lighter accounts, ‘Philippinitis.’

105

Military reports, civilians and

soldiers writing home, amateur poets, barracks newsletters, medical professionals, and
diarists all commented on the condition. Beneath the seemingly bucolic conditions in
Zamboanga and Dansalan were lingering anxieties about the ways the environment and its
inhabitants could spur degeneration in Westerners and destabilize the colonial project.
In his study of American tropical medicine in the Philippines, Warwick Anderson
explores the shifting understandings of colonial breakdown among U.S. military and civilian
personnel. The early years of the occupation, he argues, were characterized by a belief that
cases of collapse in the Philippines were “an unfortunate but understandable failure of
character – letting down the side of manly civilization, but perhaps the side was
physiologically a forlorn hope in such a climate.”

106

The latter half of the American period

saw a decrease in diagnoses of tropical breakdown, partially, according to Anderson, due to a
smaller white presence in the archipelago, but also because of increasing currency of
Freudian ideas among medical professionals. This created a shift from a “mechanistic” to a
“psychodynamic” model of understanding breakdown. Explanatory models now tended to
link nervousness and emotional collapse with psychosexual disorders. “The white man’s dirty
secret was replacing the white man’s burden,” and there was a growing reticence among
107

Americans in the Philippines to seek diagnosis or treatment.

As with many other aspects of American colonial empire in the early twentiethcentury, fears of tropical neurasthenia and related forms of breakdown were shared among
other white colonial regimes around the globe. In her article on the linkages between
metropolitan psychiatric practices and understandings of tropical neurasthenia in the British
Empire, Anna Crozier contends that colonial administrations used the diagnosis of tropical
neurasthenia to control their officials, discarding those deemed unfit to serve, and that this
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practice eventually extended into non-governmental organizations.

108

Recent developments

in the field suggest discussions of race, climatic conditions, and empire can be understood
within the context of imperial “helplessness” and epistemic uncertainties.

109

Thus, when we

discuss colonial breakdown in the Southern Philippines we are situated within transcolonial
conversations predating American colonial empire in the Pacific.
Early reports from Mindanao and Sulu highlight the comparative thinking of military
officials. George Langhorne, secretary of the Moro Province, recorded in 1904 that there was
nothing in the climate of this portion of the islands which prohibits long
residence here. The British residents of North Borneo and the Malay
Peninsula and the Dutch in Java manage to live apparently very contented
and healthy lives in those countries, which are hotter than any portion of the
Philippine Islands. While service is in a way severe, it does not seem to
deter the average Englishman or Dutchman from competing eagerly for
positions in the government of the colonies, and it is believed that
Americans can live and do good work where any other white race can. A
moral life, with plenty of hard work, will be found to counteract in most
110

cases the so-called demoralizing effects of the Philippine climate.

If the British and Dutch survived in the tropics, Langhorne thought, the Americans could
thrive in them, particularly if citizens of the “best class” were brought to the islands.
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Nevertheless, the colonial ideal of the citizen-soldier-settler prospering in the tropical
environment was destabilized repeatedly in the lives of colonials in Mindanao and Sulu.
Accounts of nervous exhaustion are evident in the writings of the earliest American
chroniclers of the Muslim South. A typical example is the journal of the army surgeon
Charles W. Hack. Arriving in Mindanao in 1902, Hack was optimistic. He preferred the
Moros to the Christian Filipinos, and wrote enthusiastically about how the Muslim children
spoke English, the quality of the rubber market, and the abundance of fruits and vegetables in
Lanao. Even when posted to remote Camp Vicars at the southern end of Lake Lanao, Hack
remained pragmatically upbeat. He wrote in June 1902 that “the life is rough and hard here;
we have no pleasures except those we make for ourselves. We sleep with our clothes on, eat
bacon and hard tack, etc., but I do not care so much.”

112

Eventually the difficult environment, poor quality army food, and his own racial and
religious suspicions began to erode Hack’s adventurous bonhomie. At the end of June he was
moved to an even more isolated post at Mataling Falls. Hack fulminated against the Maranao
communities surrounding him in his journal. “They (being Mohammedan) have no regard for
human life…It seems that no Malay can be trusted, whether Moro, Filipino or whatever,” he
113

wrote on June 30th.

While still enjoying collecting local manufactures, Hack became

increasingly disaffected by the military’s unwillingness or inability to move against the
Moros “on account of politics in the States.”

114

He began dreading roll call each morning and

by September his diary was punctuated by racist screeds about the intractability of the
American position in Lanao.
Charles Hack blamed his worsening condition not on the consistent fighting between
the Maranao Moros and the Americans, but rather on the climate and his remove from proper
civilization. This remove, which saw him “nearly six months without even being in a house,
and no music, theatres, clubs or anything of that kind or church,” left him “nothing short of
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lazy.”

115

Ironically, his ‘Philippinitis’ caused difficulty when pursuing cultivated studies, and

he concluded, near the end of his time in Lanao, “I trust when we return to the States any
energy we may have once had will return. I am not only speaking of my own case, but this is
116

the experience of nearly everyone I have been associated with.”

Amidst denunciations of

the Moros and Filipinos as racially and culturally inferior, Hack’s diaries display a creeping
unease about the destabilizing qualities of the isolated tropical environment on the civilized
character of the American male.
Hack’s journal entries speak to a larger concern about the ability of American men to
serve in the Southern Philippines during the first decade of the 1900s. In February 1903, an
article in the Manila Times about troop replacement in Lanao focused mainly on the
intolerable conditions there. The soldiers were plagued by ill health and on the verge of
malnourishment. The newspaper bitterly observed that the troops were forced to double as
road labourers as “the Moros did not have the heart” to perform the tasks the Americans
demanded of them.

117

The Times’ account of climactic and epidemiological conditions at

points verged on the biblical. Descriptions of the weather emphasized the oppressive heat and
excessive rainfall, which at times turned into floods “lasting often as long as from twenty-five
to thirty days.” When the floodwaters receded “the bodies of those who succumb in the
floods appear later suspended in the trees on account of the lack of dry earth in which to bury
them.” The prevalence of cholera, smallpox, and “fevers of the most malignant type” ensured
high death rates and infirmities among Americans. Dysentery in Lanao was so acute and
widespread that the Times reported soldiers were “merely dragging themselves along on their
rounds of duty on account of the wasting disease.”

118

Far from being private, forms of physical and emotional collapse were so common
amongst military personnel that regimental newspapers discussed them openly. In 1909, the
Twenty-Third Infantry Lantaka featured a long tongue-in-cheek description of ‘Philippinitis’
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in its pages. Ostensibly responding to a question posed by a female reader in Philadelphia,
the editors of the Lantaka gave a comically philosophical accounting of what ‘Philippinitis’
was, or was not: “There is no theory to account for it and no practice to fit it. It is like the
wicked flea: the moment a man discovers that he has it, he has it not. There is neither
subjective nor objective consciousness of a Philippinitic state. It is fortuitous, sporadic,
imminent, and may be figured on as closely as where the lightning will strike or what turn a
balky mule will take next.” Philippinitis, it claimed, had existed “since the days of
Methuselah, but it is only within the last decade that the preponderance of American
population in the tropics has resulted in finding a name for it.”

119

The Lantaka also reported on serious regimental news, and distinguished between
‘Philippinitis’ and actual cases of mental collapse. In relating the goings-on around Parang,
the paper lamented the departure of one Lieutenant Pepper and his wife. Pepper had been
shipped back to the United States on sick leave. “He has been afflicted with neurasthenia for
some time,” the newspaper read, “and it is sincerely hoped that the trip and home atmosphere
will return him to health.”

120

To the editors of the Lantaka, when a state of collapse became

serious enough, it ceased being the existentially absurd ‘Philippinitis’ and was medicalized as
‘neurasthenia.’ The dichotomy presented in the publication suggests shifting understandings
of the relationship between minds, bodies, and the tropical environment.
J. Franklin Bell, commander of the Philippines Division in the waning years of the
military period, held strong views about the health of the troops and the effects of isolation
and climate. In a 1914 report on shortening tours of duty, Bell assessed the benefits and
121

shortcomings of each military station in Mindanao and Sulu.
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convenience available in Manila will be obtainable there. Better markets could not be
expected,” Bell wrote of Zamboanga. Only Camp John Hay in Baguio exceeded Camp
Keithley in the “healthfulness and comfort” of its climate. Augur Barracks in Jolo received
122

the mildest criticism: “Opportunity for amusement and recreation is limited.”

With these

considerations in mind, Bell regarded those who succumbed to the “depressive effect” and
“monotony of life at remote and outlaying stations” as moral failures. The cause of
breakdown was not environmental but internal, with soldiers who “have not sufficient
determination and perseverance to maintain a proper regimen” more likely to “suffer from the
effects which have been noted in the letter of the Department Surgeon and the Sanitary
Inspector.” Bell’s refutation of the Sanitary Inspector’s recommendations extended to
officers, and he claimed that only those “who crave the fleshpots of society” were averse to
123

postings outside of Manila.

Bell’s conception of breakdown as entirely linked to social

dissipation, with implications of substance abuse and sexual immorality, may have been
influenced by pragmatic concerns. Shortened tours of duty increased military costs for
transportation and training.
The onset of civilian rule did little to decrease fears about the state of the occidental
body, and Americans continued to suffer similar ailments. The most prominent of these was
Governor Frank Carpenter, whose service in the Philippines led to repeated breakdowns, and
“a progressive invalidism with repeated relapses on account of disease of the heart and
circulatory system ‘contracted in the line of duty.’”

124

Carpenter was one of the longest-

serving American officials in the Philippines. Coming to the islands in 1899 as a stenographer
attached to the 4th U.S. Army Corps, he served in a variety of administrative positions in the
Central and Northern Philippines for the next decade and a half. By the time he was
125

transferred to the South, Carpenter was already in poor health.

Writing about Carpenter in
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1915, Governor General Francis Burton Harrison ascribed Carpenter’s poor state not only to
126

his ceaseless work ethic but also “continued residence for so long a time in the tropics,”

suggesting that an American could only survive for a finite period of time in such a place
before collapse.
Carpenter remained in the Philippines until the early 1920s, by which time the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu had been disestablished and reorganized into a series of
smaller provinces under the direction of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. After two years
of recovery in Japan, he returned to private life in the United States. The lingering effects of
Carpenter’s service led him, in the mid-1930s, to lobby the U.S. Senate and Congress for
dispensation to receive a military pension on account of the length of his service and his
ailments. In 1935, he wrote Rep. Richard B. Wigglesworth, giving an account of how he was,
at sixty-four, “without resources, completely incapacitated, not only for manual labour but
also for any gainful employment” as a result of his time in the Philippines.

127

In 1937, the

Senate granted Carpenter an annuity amounting to $1,800 per annum, in recognition that he
128

was “broken in health due to long service in the tropics.”

James Fugate, Governor of Sulu in the 1920s and 1930s, also attributed his failing
health to life in the tropics, and in correspondence with J.R. Hayden spoke of recurrent
129

stomach troubles and throat issues limiting him to a single meal per day.

The botanist H.H.

Bartlett met Fugate while accompanying Hayden on an inspection tour of the South in 1935
and described him as being “in bad health…and hanging on by grim determination.”
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Fugate’s correspondence from the period was marked by a stoic fatalism: the colonial
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administrator fighting for civilizational coherence against the politicking of the local Moro
elites and the onslaught of tropical fecundity.

131

As with most subjects, Charles Ivins had strong opinions about the effects of the
Muslim South on the American mind and body. The officers he encountered at Camp
Keithley troubled him. “It seemed that prolonged existence in the tropics working for and
with natives erodes a white man’s character,” Ivins observed. “He seems to have a chip on his
shoulder and usually gradually deteriorates, often resorting to alcohol.”

132

Conversely, Ivins

believed the natives had assimilated “the improvements in Western thought and science, they
know they are on the way up, whereas the whites know they are on the way down.” Ivins was
quick to clarify that he referred to Caucasians who went “over to the native side – not to those
who remain in the employ of homeside commercial entities or who are able to run their own
businesses.”

133

In his worldview, Moro or Filipino contact with American culture could only

improve their wellbeing, while those Americans assimilating into native cultures were
destined to waste away.
Elsewhere in his memoirs, Ivins addressed relations between the respectable segments
of the colonial class (including himself, naturally) and those Americans who transgressed.
The latter permanently settled in Mindanao and violated racial-sexual boundaries by marrying
and having children with local women. These men were “usually soldiers who had been
retired at lower grades” and were referred to as “Sunshiners.” Ivins noted their penchant for
cheap “square-face” gin, which they bought from Chinese merchants, and the way they
wandered around “stooped over, with dull vacant eyes” when in the midst of a binge. He
separated them further from the administrative and business classes by commenting on their
aversion to shaving and bathing, making light of their stench. Racial tropes linking tropical
inhabitants with unhygienic practices were thusly employed to recategorize these problematic
men as something other than white or American, allowing Ivins and his ilk to view them as
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ridiculous savages rather than countrymen who made the conscious decision to live outside
134

status quo demarcations of class and race.

The Sunshiners and their lives also provided an arena for sexual titillation. In
recounting his encounters with them, Ivins spoke of “a giant of a man” who came down the
coast to Zamboanga every few months to resupply. This American ex-soldier had married
several native women and each time he visited the commissary he invited Ivins to come to his
homestead “and to make the acquaintance of his wives and daughters, the latter of whom he
assured me with a broad wink, would do their best to make my journey socially
135

enjoyable.”

The suggestions of boundary violation here speak to the persistent belief

among officials in Mindanao that the tropics were a sensuous and debased space, where a
136

man could easily indulge himself in temporal delights – but at the cost of his racial fitness.

In Ivins’ estimation, combatting the deleterious climactic effects and lurid natives involved
constant diligence.

137

Connected to these fears of racial, sexual, and medical breakdown were gendered
notions that depicted the tropics as a crucible of manliness. If the white man could survive the
moral and physical hazards of the environment, he stood to reap great rewards from the
untapped riches of the land. Robert Aldrich’s observations about French colonial masculinity
apply here. He writes that “manly virtues provided the mettle of empire, with manly pleasures
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as its rewards…the French man had constantly to promote and defend his manliness as the
brave soldier, the wise administrator, the hard-working colonist, and to cast himself into the
138

role of the civilized man juxtaposed to the savage one.”

As with the French colonial man

so with the American one. When Vic Hurley arrived in Zamboanga in the mid-1920s he
optimistically observed that “all the romance of the tropics was there, just as it had been in
139

the story books.”

After a successful NCAA track career at the University of Oregon, he

came to Mindanao to grow coconuts and belladonna, acquiring a plot of land with his
business partner in a remote part of Southern Cotabato rarely visited by white colonials. In
braving the flora and fauna of Mindanao, Hurley hoped to get rich and prove his mettle.
Surveying the human landscape before departing from Zamboanga, the young writer
sneered at those who confined themselves to the “drinking parties and bridge parties” of
Zamboanga and then bragged of “tropic service” upon returning to the United States. He was,
however, fascinated by the sexual politics of the town, commenting that when an American
man married a “little mestiza girl” he found that “every white door swings shut to him. He is
forced to associate with the Filipinos. His job suffers and in time he fades from the picture.”
Like Ivins, Hurley was fascinated by the Sunshiners, who were “completely ostracized by the
whites.” These outcasts, tending to small plots of land and surviving off their modest U.S.
Army pensions, had “deliberately forsaken the ways of the white men.” Still, Hurley
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suspected that they were “probably better off than they would be at home” and afforded them
a grudging respect he did not show to the colonial bourgeoisie in Zamboanga. The Sunshiners
came to the tropics and mastered the environment without Occidental pleasures like golf
140

courses or scotch whiskey on a shaded veranda.

Arriving at his plantation-to-be, Hurley was beset by a fear of encirclement particular
to colonials in isolated areas. He had guns shipped from Manila and fretted about entering the
“unsettled and dangerous” interior. “The idea of going too far from civilization disturbs me,”
he wrote, “This portion of the islands is still marked unexplored. Everyone tells us that it is a
wild country and that the Moros are not dependable.”

141

Still, he had hope for his plantation

and even fantasized about discovering rare hardwood specimens and becoming wealthy.
Living in a small shack at the edge of the jungle, Hurley spent nearly a year trying to make
his venture succeed. It failed miserably, and Hurley’s health and equilibrium deteriorated in
the process. Some nights, he brought his kerosene lamp outside into the darkness and shot in
the direction of the animal eyes reflecting back at him. The writer had numerous run-ins with
wild boar, huge pythons, crocodiles, and a seven-inch centipede that one evening made a
home in his armpit while he was sleeping. Well-armed, he feared the curious Moros who
occasionally visited his property, and fretted they would kill him for his guns. Hurley became
increasingly unhinged.
Malaria was what finally undid him. Alone in his shack with a pistol by his side, he
slipped into a feverish state and fantasized about the “billions of little parasites…racing to
destroy the corpuscles of my blood…three thousand billion little parasites running through
142

my veins as I lie here on my cot.”

Hurley spent his final days feverish and paranoid,

waiting for his partner (long since departed) to return to collect him. “This is my reward for
going to impossible places where no white man should be,” he wrote, “Maybe I am not tough
enough for this country. I have stood up to the strain of highly competitive athletics in college
and I have stood up to France in wartime but I am afraid that I cannot stand up to the bush in

140
141
142

Ibid., 32-34.
Ibid., 27.
Ibid., 219.

295

Mindanao. It is sapping me and I am becoming more afraid everyday.”

143

Abandoning his

failed business venture, Hurley nevertheless remained in Mindanao until the 1930s, managing
several plantations for larger firms. When he published his memoir in 1935, the Saturday
144

Review of Literature called their article on it, fittingly, “No Place for a White Man.”

Causes and solutions to the threat of the tropical environment were linked by how
porous and shifting they were. While the colonial medical elite developed their own
understandings, Americans sojourning in the Southern Philippines employed a broad
spectrum of explanations to rationalize everything from ennui to the maintenance of racialsexual boundaries. Even in comic accounts of ‘Philippinitis’ lingered an anxious undercurrent
acknowledging the harsh realities of serving on the colonial frontier. What all accounts
shared was an anxiety that Americans lived in an environment actively hostile to them in
every sense: through a lack of modern amenities; through the relentless tropical climate;
through the strange and dangerous wildlife; through prolonged contact with inferior races.
Those failing to monitor their personal hygiene, alcohol consumption, or interactions with the
natives were prone to degeneration, with the most extreme cases abandoning their American
essence and becoming Sunshiners eking out a marginal existence along the Mindanao littoral.
Placed upon a broader canvas, fears of degeneration highlighted “the simultaneous
imperatives of individual conduct and political administration” in the colonial project.

145

The

threat to the American mind and body posed by the environment was not just an individual
concern, but had direct implications for the stability of American rule in Mindanao and Sulu.
This was certainly the belief of U.S. Army commanders like J. Franklin Bell, who spent
considerable time pondering questions of dissipation and breakdown during tropical service.
Even after direct military rule ended, and American personnel in the region were greatly
reduced, the stresses of tropical life, real and manufactured, continued to plague U.S.
colonials in the region. Questions of “how best to educate or to discipline [the] civilized mind
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– how to harden it against internal and external enemies” were a persistent trope throughout
the period.

146

Paradise and Purgatory
Americans in Mindanao and Sulu experienced their environment as a series of bifurcations. It
appealed to their idyllic notions of a tropical paradise, yet was also teeming with uncontrolled
filth and disease. It was refreshingly different from the United States, yet required mastering
to reflect American domestic standards. It was ripe for exploration, yet unspeakably
dangerous. This extended to the natives of the Southern Philippines as well. The Moros were
fascinating and colourful, but also savage practitioners of a degraded form of Islam at odds
with Christian values. Native bodies needed close study, yet distance was required lest
boundaries be violated. Native weapons and clothing were sought-after collectors items, yet
also symbolic of profound barbarism. For American colonials, the landscape in toto was an
object of allure and repulsion in almost equal measure.
To combat potential threats of breakdown and deracination in the inherently
“indigenous, sensual” tropics, American colonials fashioned spaces for themselves that
borrowed from pre-existing colonial models and addressed concerns about the deleterious
effects of the tropics on the mind and body of the Westerner.

147

As David Brody observes,

this “visual scape of the built environment played a significant role in the expression of
Orientalist discourse and the defense of imperialist action.”

148

In their leisure time, Americans

created small newspapers, golfed, played sports, and drank liberally within their colonial
enclaves. When they ventured outside of them for pleasure, they did so as amateur explorers,
collectors, or photographers, and were careful to maintain distance between themselves and
subject populations. Nevertheless, fears about the degenerative qualities of the climate and
prolonged contact with the natives persisted throughout the colonial period and infused the
American presence there with an anxious quality.
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We end as we began with Charles Ivins. At the end of his tour, Ivins and his wife
threw a party attended by all the other colonials in Zamboanga, and continued the festivities
at the bar on the ship taking them to Manila the following day. There were “toasts,
handshakes, kisses, laughter and tears” as Charles and Vivienne left, and the military band
came out for their departure to play “The Monkeys Have No Tails In Zamboanga,”

149

a

favourite of the Americans and the song that gave Ivins’ memoirs their name. “Soon the pier
became smaller and smaller,” Ivins wrote, “and in less than an hour Zamboanga dropped
below the horizon into the sea of pleasant, wistful memories.”
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Chapter Seven / Moros in America
Visiting the Metropole in Fact and Fiction

In the summer of 1904, a married couple from rural Maine made the long overland journey to
reach the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, commonly referred to as the St. Louis World’s Fair.
After several days taking in the sights, the couple, Bob and Becky, visited the Philippine
Reservation. Spread across forty-seven acres, it was the largest exhibit at the fair. Built with
ample funding from the Insular Government in Manila, the exhibit was a paean to the moral
and commercial victories of imperial aggrandizement, and its organizers envisioned the
display as a validation of colonial empire. Bob came to the fair as a “radical antiexpansionist” who thought “the government had all the territory it needed for its people” and
ought not to look for “new possessions till our own country was perfected.” He and Becky
toured the grounds of the reservation, visiting the villages of the Samal Moros and other nonChristian tribes “where men and boys of varying shades of brown and yellow sported among
the trees, almost entirely nude.” Bob was unconvinced by their potential, claiming that the
United States could not “civilize ‘em in three centuries or more.”

1

Bob’s mind changed when he saw members of the Philippine Scouts and
Constabulary in their “natty uniforms” marching to ‘The Battle Hymn of the Republic’ under
an American flag. He cheered at the sight and Becky “wiped her eyes, bedimmed with
patriotic tears.” The display of tutelary uplift moved the New Englanders to declare that it
should be America’s mission “to scatter the influence of Christianity, establish our
commercial supremacy and relieve the oppressed, build up and disseminate the fruits of
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civilization where cruelty, ignorance and superstition exist.” Of course, this Damascene
moment was imaginary and so were Bob and Becky, two characters in a vernacular dime
novel about the St. Louis World’s Fair. Yet this fiction, written in a simple style and aimed at
a mass audience, spoke broadly to how empire permeated metropolitan culture. How could
colonies be presented to a skeptical American public? How should producers of popular
culture portray America’s new foreign subjects? Should they be viewed as inveterate
primitives under the protection of Uncle Sam, as peoples on the make due to the guiding
principles of civilizational reform, or as some combination of both?
This chapter uses the Moro villages at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition as an entry
point into a wider examination of how Muslims from the Southern Philippines entered the
American public consciousness – as display objects, as independent travellers, and as fictions
in stage plays, children’s books, radio serials, and Hollywood films. The Moros in America,
beginning in St. Louis and continuing up until the 1940s, were portrayed in a manner meant
to emphasize the moral aspects of the colonial project, but this narrative was easily
destabilized. First, through the tendency of those supporting colonial empire to sensationalize
the innate otherness of the Moros, thereby contradicting their own storyline of racial and
cultural redemption. Second, through Moros like Tarhata Kiram, educated in America yet
critical of the colonial regime in the Philippines, and writers like George Ade, who skewered
the self-serious business of ‘civilizing’ other peoples.
The first encounters between the American people and the Moros that occurred
outside of the colony or printed page came in St. Louis. The Philippine Reservation borrowed
from well-established imperial traditions of introducing foreign subjects to the metropolitan
public through grand spectacle. These displays were manufactured to titillate the spectator
while reaffirming their beliefs in the fundamental correctness of colonial rule. Imperial
notions of time, progress, and the ordering of mankind were on offer as early as the first
World’s Fair, held in London in 1851 and constructed as a impressive visual scape where
“time became global, a progressive accumulation of panoramas and scenes arranged, ordered
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Ibid., 280.
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and catalogued according to the logic of imperial capital.” On these massive stages,
commercial and racial exhibits mesmerized visitors with their unitary chronicles of progress.
Nations also used the fairs to define their colonial identities. For instance, France created its
own miniature native villages with human displays and placed them alongside museum
exhibits attesting to the advances made by their subjects. All of this, according to Dana S.
Hale, created a vision of a “racially, materially, and morally superior France whose leaders
embarked on colonial conquest to benefit backward societies and develop underutilized
4

resources.”

If international exhibitions and their landscapes of cultural power were pervasive in
the latter half of the nineteenth-century, so were visits to the metropole by elite indigenous
5

members of colonial society and depictions of the colonized in cultural products. When
America acquired its overseas colonies, foreswearing empire was displaced in favour of
demonstrating the exceptionality of empire-building in places like the Philippines. In
displaying the human and material progress being achieved there, American supporters of
empire participated in the transcolonial phenomenon of exhibitory racism as a response to
domestic critics who portrayed empire as a moral failure. The leitmotif of benevolent
assimilation was complicated in the case of the Moros, who in the racial schemas of
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American empire were seen as less civilized than Christian Filipinos, yet potentially
redeemable in ways not available to ‘lesser’ groupings like the Negritos. This nebulous
ranking generated a multiplicity of cultural imaginings when Moros began visiting the
metropole in fact and fiction.

A Moral Display in St. Louis
In a pamphlet distributed at the 1904 St. Louis World’s Fair, Herbert Stone, Chief of
Publicity for the Philippine Exposition Board [PEB], spelled out the cultural message
intended for visitors to the sprawling Philippine Reservation: “The one thing that has stood in
the way of the proper development of any colonial possession by its governing country,” the
pamphlet declared, “has been the fact that a lack of knowledge of the real conditions and
affairs of their colonies has blocked the way of the legislation most necessary for such
development and exploitation. Every American resident of the Philippine Islands has had this
truth thrust upon him, and realizes just what is meant by the ‘White Man’s Burden” yet
within the United States the potential of the Philippines and its peoples [is] underappreciated
from both moralistic and commercial standpoints.” The PEB aimed to remedy that in
presenting “to the people of the United States a vivid outline picture of the Philippine Islands
and their eight million inhabitants.” The Philippine Reservation would be the largest single
exhibit at the exposition, costing over $1,000,000 (close to $30,000,000 by present
valuation), with nearly one hundred buildings, 75,000 catalogued exhibits, and 1,100 people
6

on display.

Plans for a Philippine exhibit got underway in late 1901, when Civil Governor
William Howard Taft sent an official communiqué to the Louisiana Purchase Exposition
Company [LPEC], headed by former mayor of St. Louis David R. Francis, expressing interest
in securing at the exposition “a suitable exhibition of the resources of the Philippines.” C.H.
Huttig, Chairman for the Committee on State and Territorial Exhibits at the LPEC, noted
approvingly that the insular treasuries would pay for the Philippine exhibit. Even at this early
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stage, what became the Philippine Reservation was forecasted to be an impressive thirty to
7

forty acres in size. A subsequent memorandum by LPEC secretary Charles M. Reeves
indicated “large sums of money will be expended on the exhibits from the Insular
Possessions” and that Governor Taft was authorized by the War Department to set aside
funds to “defray the expense of the Philippine exhibit.” Although fighting between
Americans and Filipinos was ongoing, the political elite in Manila and Washington looked
ahead to 1904 as an important chance to advertise the benefits of American colonial rule to
the world.
In the summer of 1902, Taft held a conference with W.P. Wilson, Director of the
Philadelphia Commercial Museum, to plan for the exhibit. Act No. 514 of the Philippine
Commission, passed in November 1902, created the PEB. Wilson and his deputy Gustavo
Niederlein, a German botanist who played a key role gathering materials for the exhibit,
8

headed the board. The government in Manila gave the PEB impressive powers, placing at its
disposal “different bureaus, such as forestry, agriculture, ethnology, education, and scientific
laboratories, the complete telegraph system throughout the islands, and the use of the
9

numerous government steamers…constantly plying between Manila and all the other ports.”
In the meantime, provincial governors and other colonial officials were urged to form
committees aimed at securing collections for the PEB that “would illustrate the habits,
10

customs, and life of the people.”

The mobilization of personnel and resources for the

purposes of the exhibit occurred throughout the Philippines, although in the South there were
two men, Albert Jenks and Gustavo Niederlein, who played pivotal roles in securing the
human and non-human exhibits for display in St. Louis.
As Chief of the Ethnological Survey in the Philippines, Albert Ernest Jenks was
assigned to the collection of living exhibits for the exposition. Jenks was a Michigan-born
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academic who initially studied to be an economist, publishing his dissertation on rice
gathering and utilization among Native Americans. Self-trained as an anthropologist and
archaeologist, Jenks’ multidisciplinary endeavours were common among academics during
the late nineteenth-century. Jenks came to the Philippines via his service with the Bureau of
American Ethnology in 1902, when he was appointed Assistant Chief of the Bureau of NonChristian Tribes, lately under the leadership of David Prescott Barrows. Shortly thereafter,
Jenks became Chief of the Ethnological Survey, putting him in charge of cataloguing the
various ethnic groupings of the archipelago. His most prominent work took place among the
Bontoc Igorot population of Northern Luzon, a people about whom he published a book in
1905.

11

Albert and Maud Jenks began their collection tour in Zamboanga in November
12

1902. There they met with the physician and Moro specialist Najeeb Saleeby, then heading
the public school system in the Moro Province, who agreed to help with arrangements for the
human exhibits. Saleeby sought out “dependable men” to “keep the natives safeguarded” in
St. Louis, and he and Jenks eventually settled on Frederick Lewis, an American expatriate
later involved in the government of the Moro Province. Lewis was entrusted with the
management of the Samal Moros, and Maud Jenks described him as “a man of good
character, who is said to know the natives as well as any American and understands how to
13

get along with them.”

In her letters home, Maud relayed the complications her husband

faced arranging “the whole undertaking.” Simply getting money from Manila to Mindanao
was difficult because in many areas there was nobody authorized to receive wire transfers,
and Albert Jenks was reticent about carrying around $1,000 in cash to secure contracts. Maud
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admitted that at some points it seemed as though “the venture would be a failure,” but tried to
stay positive, relating that “of the three groups contracted for down here, some ought to get to
14

the United States in satisfactory condition.”

The forty Maranao Moros who visited St. Louis were the product of the Jenks’ efforts
in the Lake Lanao region the following month. The entire area, in the midst of John
Pershing’s famous pacification campaigns, was restive, and even travelling down the newly
established road between Iligan and the northern tip of Lake Lanao could be a harrowing
experience. In the settlements surrounding the lake, scores of datus and self-proclaimed
sultans vied for power, alternately collaborating with or confronting American military forces
as it suited their purposes. The Jenks were given an armed escort of five soldiers as a safety
precaution. The group travelled by night and was picked up on the shores of Lanao by an
army rowboat, so as not to alert nearby Maranao settlements to their presence. They passed
silently through the narrow channel that separated the mainland from Woman’s Island, socalled because it was where Maranaos safe-kept their wives during times of war.

15

Journalist Guy T. Viskniskki told readers of the Toledo Times-Bee how the Moros
were impressed by Maud Jenks’ bravery and decided to negotiate with the Americans
because of it. Bungud, a minor sultan on the Lanao coast, was persuaded by the Jenks to
travel to St. Louis with forty of his people. The sultan wanted to bring 130 women, as he was
being paid ten dollars per person who joined him. Alas, Bungud was only allowed to bring
four wives, which still amounted to a decent sum. Likewise, Hadji Butu, prime minister to the
Sultan of Sulu, was said to have acquired two additional wives when he found out about
16

payments per head.

Butu’s attempts to augment his salary were likewise reined in.

Viskniskki’s descriptions, exotic hyperbole aside, are evidence that the collection of human
beings for the fair involved careful negotiation on the part of Albert and Maud Jenks.

14
15

Ibid., 189.

Guy T. Viskniskki, “The Filipino Conquest of America,” Toledo Times-Bee, 17 July 1904. Louisiana
Purchase Exposition Scrapbook 196, Missouri History Museum Library and Research Center, St. Louis,
Missouri. Henceforth, newspaper articles appended with ‘LPE scrapbook #’ are those I’ve gathered from the
Missouri History Museum. They are clipped and pasted into these scrapbooks, often without reference to the
page numbers and often from obscure regional newspapers.
16

Ibid.

305

Unaware of the racial-pedagogic function of the displays, Moro elites treated their co-option
into the fair as a form of employment and a chance to travel abroad.
Responsible for gathering non-human items for the exposition was another colonial
agent, Gustavo Niederlein. The deputy of W.P. Wilson at the PEB, Niederlein’s life was a
case study in fashioning a career across empires. Born in Saxony and trained as a botanist at
Berlin University, he first taught at the University of Cordoba in Argentina in 1879.
Ingratiating himself into the Argentine power structure, Niederlein participated in a variety of
scientific expeditions, including one connected with the conquest of the indigenous peoples
of Patagonia in the early 1880s. As a special commissioner with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, he was involved in mediating boundary disputes with Brazil. Returning to his
botanist roots, Niederlein collected and classified products for Argentina during the lead-up
to the Paris Exposition of 1889. Made National Inspector of Agriculture in 1891, Niederlein
represented Argentina at the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago, before taking a job as
Chief of the Scientific Department of the Philadelphia Museums the following year. A
perennial exposition participant, he attended fairs in Antwerp in 1894, Atlanta in 1896,
Guatemala City in 1897, and Paris in 1900. In addition to his busy fair schedule, Niederlein
also represented the United States Commercial Commission to China in 1898-1899, and was
responsible for the classification of colonial products for France’s Overseas Ministry in the
wake of the Paris Exposition. W.P. Wilson was effusive in his praise, saying that he had sent
Niederlein “to China, Japan, and the Philippines, where he has in relation to those
governments, made himself a power.” Noël Auricoste, an influential merchant connected to
the French Colonial Union, requested Niederlein stay on in France and become a
representative of French colonial products at the Colonial Exposition in Hanoi.

17

The insular government in Manila gave Niederlein a carte blanche to scour the
archipelago for exhibition items. Governor Taft wrote the botanist a letter which, addressed to
“all Bureaus, all the Chiefs of Bureaus of the Insular Government, to all the Provincial
Governors and other Provincial Officers, to all Municipal Officers of Municipalities in the
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Philippine Islands,” gave instructions that Niederlein should be extended “every assistance in
your power in the very important work which he has preparing exhibits for the Philippine part
18

of the St. Louis Exposition.”

The letter was printed in a pamphlet by the Exposition Board,

and distributed to officials throughout the Philippine Islands in anticipation of Niederlein’s
arrival. It included a general invitation to “join in the efforts of the Philippine Exposition
Board in Making the Philippine Exhibit a success” by “procuring superior exhibits which
shall well represent the past and future as well as the actual state of economic and social
19

development of the Philippines.”

The majority of the pamphlet was given to detailed

instructions on how eager colonials could go about selecting, preparing, and shipping their
items. Each department featured at the fair gave specifications. For the Department of
Anthropology and Ethnology, this included “tribal and racial exhibits in every detail, with full
description, photographs, casts, measurements, regarding the physical structure of races;
besides books, grammars, vocabularies in different languages and dialects, showing the state
20

of culture and growth of civilization.”

In this scheme, Niederlein was the chief collector,

but every Westerner and ‘civilized’ Filipino could play a role in presenting the colony at St.
Louis.
Gustavo Niederlein travelled throughout the Philippine Archipelago, making hundreds
of stops on his grand collection tour.

21

The Binghampton Leader-Chronicle reported on his

journeys in the Southern Philippines in October 1903. The paper took special interest in
Niederlein’s time on Jolo, then best known in the United States as the setting of George
Ade’s comic opera The Sultan of Sulu. With the help of S.A. Korczki, a Polish merchant,
Niederlein surveyed the Moro villages near the town of Jolo, noting the designs of Tausūg
homes, as well as the unique items contained within: “goat skins, copper plates and copper
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ware, earthen and china ware, large pots, baskets of all forms, fishing nets, gongs of peculiar
shapes, lances, knives, barongs, campilans, shields, hats, turbans, betelnut boxes, cocoanuts,
cloths and scores of other articles of wide range.” Niederlein and his party then visited a local
Moro blacksmith, and watched a group of armed Tausūg men giving “a representation of a
Moro war dance.” Commercial and ethnographic products (the demarcation between the two
was blurred continuously) were collected, and Niederlein arranged for further work on an
exhibit in St. Louis showing “useful products” and the natives of Jolo “engaged in their work,
songs, dances and strange rites and ceremonies.”

22

Moving on, Niederlein made a stop at Zamboanga, which the Leader-Chronicle
identified as “a great export place for copra, pearl shells, wax, resins, oil seeds, gutta-percha
and seeds,” where he procured an “exquisitely beautiful” collection of orchids previously
unseen outside of Mindanao. In Basilan, he visited Datu Pedro Cuevas, who promised to
attend the exposition and aid in the collection of items for it. Niederlein travelled around
Lake Lanao, and then ventured past Cotabato, up the Rio Grande, and into Maguindanao
territory, securing other “valuable collections” as he progressed. All told, the trip took nearly
a month.

23

The following year, the Chicago Record-Herald praised Niederlein’s efforts,

claiming that he “seized everything he could find that illustrates the life, customs, commerce,
arts and industries of the people, and installed them here in a scientific and attractive
manner.” The paper bubbled that Niederlein’s “complete and comprehensive collection”
24

illustrated the raw economic potential of the Philippines.

Colonial agents like Albert Jenks

and Gustavo Niederlein illustrate the complex and extended process of collection for the fair.
American power in the Southern Philippines was often coercive yet far from total, especially
in the Lake Lanao region, and Jenks and Niederlein were forced to negotiate with Moro
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leaders, often using colonial intermediaries like Najeeb Saleeby or S.A. Korczki to secure
peoples and items valuable to the exposition.
Although W.P. Wilson travelled to the Philippines briefly in May 1903, the majority
of his work as head of the PEB occurred in St. Louis. Wilson first visited the intended site of
the exhibit in late 1902 to “canvass the possibilities of showing the wild tribes in the
Philippines under natural conditions.” After examining the grounds, Wilson put in a “formal
request” that the trees there be “carefully preserved” so they could be used to house treedwelling tribes. The article in the World’s Fair Bulletin describing Wilson’s visit also made
mention of space allotted for “lake dwellers living in huts built on poles in the water,” the
25

first indication that the Samal Moros were being brought to America.

Work began on the

construction of buildings for the reservation in October 1903, when Filipino labourers
“commenced the work of building their native houses and camps.” By the opening of the fair
on April 30th 1904, boosters claimed that the Philippine exhibit stood as “a monument to
Secretary Taft and his able assistants, the Philippine Exhibit Board.”

26

Wilson’s work beautifying the forty-seven acre grounds resulted in an enclosed
reservation that functioned within the framework of the World’s Fair, yet was also an entity
apart. Located in the southwest corner of the exposition grounds, visitors accessed the exhibit
by three bridges that crossed over Lake Arrowhead, a small body of water bounding the
grounds on its north and east sides. The main bridge to the exhibit was a reproduction of the
Bridge of Spain over the Pasig River and deposited visitors at a miniature replication of
Manila’s walled city, complete with a functioning infrastructure and a military museum.
Further into the grounds, there was a central plaza surrounded by buildings dedicated to
government, education, and horticulture. There were also buildings “devoted to forestry, to
mines and metallurgy, to agriculture and horticulture, to fish and game and to ethnology, all
artistically placed.” There was a large relief map of the archipelago, and fairgoers could visit
an observatory, or view lantern slides showing life in the islands. Along with a restaurant,
there were cafés and concession stands where visitors enjoyed refreshments and purchased
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items crafted by the natives.

Such elements of the Philippine Reservation were purpose-

built to demonstrate the great progress the islands had made in the brief time since the
American conquest.
More sensational, and thus more popular, were the humans on display. Located along
the shore of Lake Arrowhead and in the forest surrounding the central plaza, the various
ethnic groups of the archipelago were categorized and exhibited based on their perceived
level of civilization, with the ‘savage’ Negritos depicted as debased evolutionary survivals
next to the comparatively refined Visayans. Apart from anthropological concerns, which we
shall arrive at in a moment, members of LPEC and the PEB wanted to convey a sense of
authenticity to visitors. The spectator, viewing the settlements of the savage and semi-savage
peoples of the Philippines, was meant to imagine they were viewing the real thing: primitive
native villages transported, as if by magic, to the American Midwest. Visitors were assured
by advertisements and press reports that by visiting the Philippine Reservation they would
“find the material to fill in the detail of the complete picture” of life in the islands.

28

Writing

in the Boise Bulletin, Edmund Mitchell proclaimed that the exhibit brought the advantages of
foreign travel within “the reach of the multitude” and “in certain circumstances…may prove
29

even more profitable than an actual voyage to distant lands.”

In the same way that modern

zoos attempted to recreate the habitat of wild animals, Wilson and his team fashioned what
Robert Rydell calls an “anthropologically validated racial landscape” demonstrating to the
American people in stark visual terms why colonial control and reconfiguration of these far30

away islands was necessary.
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The Samal and Lanao Moros lived in two settlements along the northern section of
Lake Arrowhead. The Moros began their long journey to St. Louis in late 1903. The Samal
group, led by Datu Facundo and managed by Frederick Lewis, consisted of nineteen men,
eleven women, five boys, and five girls. Departing from Zamboanga, they stopped in Manila,
where “a number of exhibitions were given for the benefit of the various officials, and the
natives themselves were given an opportunity of seeing their first city of any size, and of
31

becoming accustomed to the ways of modern civilization.”

This extended stopover in

Manila was to prepare them for the even greater attention they would receive in St. Louis. It
was here they met with the thirty-eight Maranao Moros and their manager C.H. Wax. The
Samals and the Maranao travelled together to St. Louis, but did not mix socially.

32

The Samal village was modeled on buildings in Magay, the Moro section of
Zamboanga, and, according to LPEC President David R. Francis, “every detail characteristic
of Moro architecture was carefully adhered to.” No nails were used while assembling the
Samal dwellings, and each was made of nipa, rattan, and bamboo in an attempt to maintain
realism.

33

The Moros “in accordance with their own peculiar ideas and style of architecture”

built the village. It included seven small residences for the inhabitants, as well as an
administrative building displaying items of ethnographic relevance, and a theatre for public
performances. Gravel was strewn about the shores of Lake Arrowhead to mimic the sandy
beaches of the Southern Philippines. The Lanao village, comparable in size although
architecturally distinct, was initially separate but soon merged with the Samal settlement. The
native villages officially opened to the public on June 18th 1904 and remained so until the
exposition ended.
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Official programs, schedules, and a free map give us an idea of how the displayed
Muslims spent their days. As both employees and living exhibits they were subject to robust
routines. Visitors watched Moro women weaving “all day,” and women and children gave
hourly dances at the village theatre. In the late morning, Samal Moro boys engaged in canoe
races, ‘shooting the chutes’ (forerunners of modern waterslides), and diving into Lake
Arrowhead for coins thrown by spectators. Inhabitants played gongs and other “curious
musical instruments,” and fairgoers were treated to a spear and shield dance, referred to in
35

exposition literature as the “Moro-Moro dance.” When not engaged in these displays, Moro
youth attended the classroom of Pilar Zamora, “the only native Filipino who has ever taught
at the Government Normal School.” Located next to the cathedral, the model schoolhouse
was intended as a practical illustration of how American teaching methods were instilling
modern ideals in the children of the islands. Although an occasional class brought all the
students together, the Moros were generally taught apart from the Negritos, Visayans,
Igorots, and Bagobos.

36

Otherwise, the Moros could be seen “engaging in their native

industries and occupations,” which for the men meant fishing in Lake Arrowhead. “Every
possible attraction introduced that might prove interesting and instructive to visitors was
37

presented,” observed David R. Francis.

In August, shipments of “sufficient raw materials”

were released by U.S. customs, which led to pearl diving in the lake and “the cleaning and
polishing of pearl shells.” The final report from the PEB also proudly mentioned that the
Moros were provided food similar to what they ate in Mindanao and had “no complaints.”

38

The materials collected from the Moros by American colonials and assembled by
Gustavo Niederlein were housed in the Ethnology Building, located just behind the
grandstand off of the central plaza. While material evidence of the advances made by
Christian Filipinos featured in a variety of buildings (horticulture, agriculture, industry,
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forestry), manufactures of the ‘savage’ and ‘semi-savage’ peoples were displayed as
curiosities indicative of stunted historical and racial development. The building included
items from thirty separate groups. In the prevalent tone of anthropological condescension,
Albert Jenks wrote that the exhibits in the Ethnology Building were unreflective of the
Filipino’s potential for cultural progress, as “these wild people” represented only one-seventh
of the population of the Philippines and had cultures “almost entirely of their own
development.” Despite their primitive state, Jenks observed, “it should also be noticed here
and there an individual group has developed a single art or process to a relatively high
39

degree.” Promotional literature for the exhibit gave similarly backhanded compliments,
noting “in spite of the uniform shallowness of the Philippine culture, here and there
something has impelled a group of savages to a high degree an industrial activity which
elsewhere in the archipelago may yet be in its crudest development.”

40

Collected and

exhibited in the Ethnology building were household utensils, clothing, ornaments, musical
instruments, and hunting and fishing implements from the Samal Moros. From the Sulu came
clothing, personal ornaments, household utensils, looms, agricultural, fishing and hunting
implements, brass armor, bass betelnut boxes, jars and trays, bedding, saddles, bridles,
41

musical instruments, and cannons.

The weaponry of Moros and other non-Christians was collected by members of the
Philippine Constabulary and displayed in the Walled City. Moro lantakas, bolos, kris, and
other objects of war were shipped to St. Louis to tell “a varied and interesting story of the
peculiarly misdirected and undirected struggle against America.”

42

The Constabulary took

the exhibit seriously and sent a battalion of men to demonstrate to audiences what a Filipino
paramilitary force, trained under U.S. supervision, was capable of. Alongside the Philippine
Scouts, the men of the Constabulary, dressed in sharp military attire, stood in stark contrast to
the scantily clad natives of the villages, and visually mapped colonial uplift for visitors. The
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Constabulary battalion was barracked in the Cuartel Filipino in the southwest corner of the
reservation, and among the eleven officers and 280 enlisted men were nine Moros. They
came from the Fifth Constabulary District in the Moro Province, and instead of the customary
campaign hat wore a red fez. Colonel Harry Bandholtz, chief of the Constabulary District,
43

gave these men special dispensation for their dietary needs.

The racialized spectacle of the native villages was popular with fairgoers, and
newspapers avidly reported to their readership. Martha Root, writing for the Pittsburg
Dispatch, wrote that the Moros “were not bred so dull they cannot learn” but that “so far they
have been immune from the epidemic called civilization” before launching into a lengthy
taxonomy of the non-Christian tribes of the archipelago. Drawing from the stock phraseology
developed for the Moros since 1899, Root described them as the “fiercest of all tribes” to
whom war was “only recreation.” The Samal village was a “primitive Atlantic City, where
the inhabitants practically live in the water” and the Moro women, of whose honour the men
44

were “intensely jealous,” were “modest and comely.”

William E. Curtis,

45

the globetrotting

reporter and one-time head of the Latin American Department at the 1893 Chicago World’s
Fair, saw the Moros as remarkable athletic specimens – “muscular, agile, and enduring” –and
thought them superior to Christian Filipinos. Describing the traits of the Moros at length,
Curtis claimed they were an “interesting problem for [the] ethnologists and sociologists” who
would “watch their development under a liberal government and the educational privileges
the Yankees have introduced in the southern islands of the Philippine archipelago.” The
Moros at the fair were “an object lesson for the information and edification of the American
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people,” and Curtis assured readers that the exhibit was “not only interesting but accurate and
46

quite true to life.”

Apart from assessments of racial fitness, reporters who visited St. Louis related the
‘unusual’ customs and daily activities of the Moros back to the American public. In a short
article that also featured news on the Apache Indians and Hawaiian Islanders, the
Indianapolis Journal related how the Lanao Moros participated in a cycle of praying and
feasting in anticipation of the marriage of one of their chiefs, Datu Asume, who was said to
47

have “ninety slave-wives.” Moro leaders at the fair had their lives and customs conveyed in
tabloid fashion. The St. Louis Republic regaled its audience with a story from the love life of
Datu Facundo, leader of the Samal Moros, telling of how he killed fourteen men who tried to
thwart one of his love affairs. The likely exaggerated tale read like a revenge thriller. The
suitors and male relations of Facundo’s love interest banded together against him. One of her
brothers attempted to murder him, but Facundo killed him and then embarked on a campaign
of vengeance against those who opposed the marriage. “The battle between Fecundo and
those opposed to him extended over several Moro provinces and lasted for nearly two years,”
the Republic wrote. “During the time the girl was spirited away by her family and pursued by
Fecundo.” It did not conclude until he married the girl, who joined him in St. Louis. Giving a
titillating wink to readers, the newspaper opined that “the strenuous life of a Moro lover
would be too much for even the most enthusiastic American.”

48

Less fantastical and more telling was an article in the Washington Post from
September 1904, which described an encounter on the fair playgrounds. Visayan children
using the swings quickly vacated them when Moro and Negrito boys approached, refusing to
play with non-Christians from unfamiliar tribes. The Post saw this as “old caste prejudice in
the islands transplanted to America. At home a Visayan never mingles on equal terms with an
Igorrote or Moro, much less a Negrito, who is the most despised of all.” The paper wrote
approvingly of how two American boys “brought out the contrast between democratic
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America and the Filipino caste system” by playing with the children the Visayans had
snubbed. The paper made no mention of why the Moros and others were present in
49

“democratic America” to begin with, or the state of race relations in Missouri at the time.
Elsewhere on the fairgrounds, a follower of the charismatic Scottish faith healer John
Alexander Dowie spoke with C.H. Wax, manager of the Lanao Moros, to request an
opportunity to convert them to the Christian Faith. The Moros came to Dowie’s attention
because they abstained from pork and tobacco, but Wax dissuaded his acolyte from
attempting missionary work by warning that the Moros would likely kill him.

50

This

supposedly fierce temperament led to rumours that photographing Muslims could result in
smashed cameras and grievous bodily harm to the photographer.

51

Colonial officials and fair organizers intended the Philippine Reservation as a curated
expression of how empire benefitted the world’s benighted races. As early as 1902, Governor
Taft spoke of the “moral effect” the exhibit would have on the wards of the state, and how
their participation in the fair would be “a very great influence in completing pacification and
in bringing Filipinos to improve their condition.” Taft expressed his displeasure that
questions of governance in the Philippines became caught up in American domestic politics,
instead preferring to view ‘progress’ amongst the inhabitants of the archipelago as the
52

apolitical cultural benefit of American rule.

LPEC President David Francis also believed

that the American mission in the Philippines was a matter of duty, proclaiming that educating
53

and protecting the islanders’ interests would “advance [Filipinos] to civilization.”

Head of

the Department of Anthropology W.J. McGee was similarly self-righteous. “The primary
motives of expositions are commercial and intellectual,” he wrote, “yet the time would seem
to be ripe for introducing a moral motive among the rest – and save incidentally, in the
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department connected with education, there is little place for the revelation of the moral
54

motive except in the Department of Anthropology.”

Like Albert Jenks and Gustavo Niederlein, W.J. McGee was something of a
professional and intellectual chameleon, self-training as a geologist before moving into
anthropology professionally in the 1890s. Primarily interested in cultures “uncontaminated by
outside influences,” McGee produced an ethnographic account of the Seri Indians of Sonora,
Mexico, using his “imaginative powers of generalization and preconceived expectations to
55

portray the Seri as the quintessential ‘savages’ of North America.”

After losing a fight to

control the Bureau of American Ethnology and becoming mired in a minor financial scandal,
McGee was hired by the LPEC to arrange the anthropological displays for the World’s Fair.
His ideas, which Nancy Parezo and Don Fowler detail in their examination of anthropology at
the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, were beholden to nineteenth-century notions wherein
races were ranked against one another through panoptic measurements of civilizational
progress. McGee’s racial schematics validated late Victorian American bourgeois culture as
the apogee of human development, which meshed well with the beliefs (and origins) of the
fair organizers and bestowed upon LPEC endeavours the veil of scientific legitimacy.

56

Departing from station six of the intramural railway running through the fairgrounds,
visitors could head north, stopping to view ‘primitive’ tools and art in the Ethnological
Building before continuing through the human portion of the anthropology exhibit. Here were
Ainu from Japan, Patagonian indigenes, Cocopa Indians from Mexico, and Native Americans
from a variety of tribes. McGee’s charting of progress-through-exhibition melded soberminded academic language, the moralism of the colonial project, and the titillation of the
circus sideshow. “The Anthropology exhibit has the interest of strangeness,” McGee wrote in
The World’s Work, “for it is an exhibit of races of men whose lives and crafts have no
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counterpart in our lives and crafts.”

According to McGee’s logic, the Ainu, Patagonian, and

Cocopa were unreconstructed primitives, but the Native Americans were beneficiaries of U.S.
colonialism, and their exhibit told “two living stories.” One of a “race narrative of odd
peoples who mark time while the world advances,” and the other “of savages made, by
American methods, into civilized workers.”

58

McGee diagramed the global racial landscape upon the fairgrounds, and believed that
visitors could follow “the course of human progress…in a general way from the ethnic and
cultural types assembled on the grounds under the Department of Anthropology, in the
Philippine display, and in some of the attractions on The Pike.” The idea of racial progress
was apparent in the use of didactic before-and-after displays. The “trained pupils” of the
American Indian exhibit were placed on the opposite side of a long hallway in the Indian
Building from their parents, with the former group illustrating “the educational methods of
the United States Indian Office” while the latter engaged in traditional, and by implication
inferior, crafting.

59

Commissioner for Indian Affairs Francis E. Leupp visited the fair and was

explicit in his belief that “the contrast between the old Indian and the new is thus most vividly
brought out – the savage, dirty, ignorant, and forlorn, leading a useless and purposeless
existence…the Government pupil trained to fit a place in the world of to-day, his naturally
sharp senses brought to a keener edge, his resources multiplied, which he can coin into
60

dollars.” Viewing the humans on display, Leupp followed the short path that connected the
Indian Building and the Philippine Reservation. He thought there was “not the first
suggestion of indecency about the exhibition,” and, like other visitors, was treated to
61

dichotomies-by-design similar to those shown at the anthropology exhibit.

The barely

clothed Moro villagers were juxtaposed with the sharply dressed members of the Philippine
Constabulary. Moro children in their natural state engaged in rambunctious, unstructured
tomfoolery, but were redeemed by American influence when they attended Pilar Zamora’s
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class at the model schoolhouse. Fair organizers reaped monetary benefits from having human
spectacles for fairgoers to ogle, while also downplaying the carnival atmosphere in favour of
the moral message of racial uplift.
On November 26th, a week before the St. Louis World’s Fair closed, President
Theodore Roosevelt visited the Philippine Reservation. After witnessing a drill by the
Constabulary and Scouts, he toured the various buildings of the exhibit, stopping at the model
school to congratulate Pilar Zamora. While visiting the Samal and Lanao leaders, Datu
Facundo presented a bolo to Roosevelt, with which the Samal chief claimed to have killed
three men: “In presenting the weapon [Facundo] remarked that he had no further use for it,
62

and surrendered it to the President of the United States.”

At closing, the Moro village had

made $40,624.37 from sales and admissions, a higher take than the Visayan or Negrito
villages but well below the $137,147.92 made by the Igorot village. For all the high-minded
talk of displaying civilizational progress, the exhibits at the fair were primarily moneymaking
ventures.

63

Numerous Moro display items received awards, and organizers bestowed a gold

medal on Datu Facundo for the quality of his participation. Six Lanao Moro leaders were
given silver medals, “with the exception of one or two who behaved badly and received lesser
64

recognition.”

As Nancy Parezo and Don Fowler observe, “assimilation was rewarded.”

Christian Filipino “honourable residents” received medals without exception.

65

During the

fair, two Moro participants died from beriberi, while another, a twenty-year-old named
66

Pgpina, died suddenly after a dancing session.

The Moros were buried in St. Louis

“together with the half dozen other Filipinos who died since coming to the World’s Fair.”
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For fair boosters and supporters of American empire (often one and the same), the
Philippine Reservation was an unmitigated success. “It is the first attempt of the United States
to exploit a colony, and without doubt it is the best colonial exhibit ever brought together,”
gushed William E. Curtis in the Chicago Record-Herald.

68

Promotional literature distributed

by the PEC viewed the colonization of the Philippines through rose-tinted glasses,
proclaiming that benevolent assimilation had ensured “race antipathy” was “nearly a thing of
the past” in the archipelago. The exhibit was necessary to give Americans a “clearer
understanding” of the “duties thrust upon them with their assumption of the sovereignty of
the Philippine Islands.”

69

Still, the fair presented problems for organizers and supporters of

colonial empire in the government. The display of ‘savages’ like the Moros gave fuel to those
who opposed empire from a racial standpoint and argued that annexing the Philippine Islands
meant taking on groupings of irredeemable primitives.

70

More practical problems faced by

the PEB included controlling the complex array of racial and civilizational tropes presented at
the Philippine Reservation, turning a profit, and disposing of collected materials and
promotional literature once the World’s Fair ended. A museum based on the exhibit in
Manila, originally intended to be permanent, closed quickly, and returns on the insular
government’s investments in the fair were meager.

71

Despite these ideological and monetary problems at St. Louis, Moros were displayed
again at the Jamestown Exposition, held outside of Norfolk, Virginia in 1907. The much
smaller five-acre exhibit featured Moros, Bagobos, Ilocanos, and Tagalogs, but was staged in
opposition to the desires of many American officials, who believed that exhibitions of
uncivilized and semi-civilized residents of the Philippines contravened the progressive
imperatives of the American mission there, and, in the case of Filipino nationalists, the quest
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for a cohesive national identity and independent statehood.

Datu Sansaluna and four of his

Maguindanao followers from Cotabato came to Jamestown to be presented alongside other
race-based exhibits. Sansaluna was the teenage son of Datu Ali, famous for resisting
American rule in Cotabato until his death in 1905. The Washington Post observed
Sansaluna’s “great respect for the uniform and shoulder straps,” and his imperious nature,
evidenced in his refusal to meet with anybody besides high-ranking officials. The newspaper
added that Tasker Bliss, Governor of the Moro Province, was eager to see Sansaluna leave
73

the country lest warfare breakout.

This was not true. In fact, Bliss was skeptical of Moro

participation in fairs and remarked acidly in his 1907 annual report that “the exhibition of
Moros seems to have become a stock feature of these expositions. No good has come to the
74

Moros from it and I recommend that the practice be stopped.”

Visiting the Metropole
Frederick Lewis, the manager of the Moro Village, received a telegram on August 7th 1904
from the White House extending an invitation to Datu Facundo and some of his followers to
visit Washington and meet with President Theodore Roosevelt.

75

Also invited was Datu

Antonio of the Igorots. The American managers of both native villages accompanied the
group of three Moros and four Igorots, whose purpose, according to press reports, was to
assure the President of their loyalty and “express the appreciation which their people feel for
the changes from their old system to the present form of government, inaugurated by the
United States.”
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Facundo’s meeting with Roosevelt was the first in a series of journeys to the

United States by Moro elites during the colonial period. Press outlets eager to provide
Americans with details about their nation’s Muslim wards covered these visits.
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Although the trip to Washington was organized quickly, it still received publicity.
Clarence R. Edwards, Chief of the Insular Bureau of the War Department, told reporters that
the visitors were “about on a par in many respect with some of the Indians of this country,
and that they are as much objects of interest in Manila as they are in America.” The Moros
and Igorots were eager to meet Roosevelt, and Edwards dubiously claimed the tribesmen
were like the American Indians in how they imagined the President as their “Great White
77

Father.” Frederick Lewis and T.K. Hunt, managers of the Moro and Igorot villages,
accompanied the group on their visit as “social mentors” to “prevent them from committing
any social faux pas” during the brief trip. The unspoken implication was that these
unreconstructed savages were prone at any moment to break into violent or lascivious
78

behaviour if not under proper control.

The Moros and Igorots travelled to D.C. by overnight

train, and were objects of fascination for the other passengers, who clamored to visit with
them. Lewis and Hunt claimed that were it not for their interference “their charges would
have been torn limb from limb” on the way to Washington by the attentions of the crowd.
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They arrived in the capital on the morning of August 9th.
The Washington Post covered the visit of Facundo and his companions closely,
paying attention to the garment choices of the Moros and Igorots during their time in D.C. As
happened at the fair, Washingtonians gaped at the exotic dress and behaviours of the two
groups, and crowds gathered at the train station and outside their hotel on Third Street. The
Post dedicated nearly a third of its page-long article on the visit to the attire of the Moros and
Igorots. The newspaper was disappointed that the visitors were mostly clothed, which “took
away from the day and its heroes one-half of the interest and all of its picturesque character.”
The unclothed Moro was “as alluring as a new toy and as entertaining as a pet monkey,” yet
garbed he had “a hobo appearance that no amount of stage setting can redeem.” The Post
assured readers that the Moros had eschewed clothing until right before disembarking in
Washington, and disrobed immediately upon leaving. During the visit, they were monitored
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lest they remove their suits at an inopportune moment. Much to the paper’s chagrin, Datu
Facundo insisted on wearing shoes during the visit. Digressing into sartorial colonialism, the
Post declared, “neither the Moro nor the Igorrote foot is made for the ordinary shoe of
civilization” before giving a precise description of the ideal footwear for them: “A shoe of
moderate length, almost six inches wide at the toe and tapering to almost a point at the back
of the heel, would be the style for these most recent wards of the nation.”
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The group visited the War Department, the Naval Yards, the Treasury Department,
and met the President at the White House during their day in Washington. At the Treasury
Department, Chief Antonio sang ‘My Country, ‘Tis of Thee’ for an assembled crowd of
seven hundred, while at the Naval Yards Datu Facundo declared any resistance against the
colonial state in the Philippines hopeless, as the Americans had “more guns in the navy than
there were Moros warriors in the Island of Mindanao.”
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At the White House, Roosevelt

assured the Moros and Igorots via translator of the American people’s desire to help them in
their development. When the President referenced continuing rebellions on Mindanao, Datu
Facundo offered to kill Datu Ali, then leading resistance against the Americans in the
Cotabato Valley. The Post related the declarations of Facundo in the literary style of pidgin
English prototypical of what was later referred to as ‘Tonto Speak’ or ‘Tonto Talk’ and used
to depict American Indians:

82

“Tell great white Chief that me know big chief who fight

Americanos. Me go back home and get head of chief. This stop little chiefs. Me go right
now.” Roosevelt replied that he appreciated the offer, but that the Americans in the Southern
Philippines were “entirely able to master the rebellious chief and [he] did not desire Facundo
to go to all that trouble.” The President received a variety of gifts from his guests, including
carved metallic pipes, a spear, and two shields.
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Sufficiently awed by the grandiose expressions of American power they saw in
Washington, the Moros and Igorots returned to St. Louis, where they remained until the fair’s
end. The next visit occurred in November 1907, when Datu Sansaluna made the short trip
from Norfolk to Washington to meet with President Roosevelt. The Evening Star described
Sansaluna’s colourful apparel and took interest in his gift to Roosevelt, a doubled-edged kris
purported to have been property of Datu Ali and passed down in the family for 280 years.”
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Unlike Facundo, Sansaluna had a private secretary and contacted the New Willard Hotel in
advance asking them to reserve rooms for him and his party. The Post reported that the young
noble was visiting the United States not only to participate in the Jamestown Exposition, but
85

also in hopes of entering an American college.

Descriptions of the “Moro Prince” were not

all genteel. Reports surfaced that he attempted to cut down a Filipino guide at the exposition
with his kris because the man erroneously told visitors that Sansaluna had five wives. The
Moro commented that it was “bad enough to be stared at by the crowds without being pointed
out as the husband of five women.”
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The visit of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II to the United States in 1910 garnered even more
attention. Kiram, the titular head of the Moros in the Sulu Archipelago, received extensive
coverage in the domestic press during the preceding decade. Newspapers portrayed him as an
encapsulation of the unusual Muslim customs. Ruling from his modest ‘palace’ at Maibun on
Jolo, Kiram’s actual power was always in debate, as an interchanging series of Tausūg datus
in Sulu chipped away at his claims to leadership. Letters to American officials from the
Sultan during the period show a leader constantly concerned about the erosion of his power,
particularly at the hands of his principal rival Datu Jokanain.
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Throughout the colonial

period, American military and civilian officials were dismissive of Kiram’s abilities, with J.
Franklin Bell, commander of U.S. military forces in the Philippines during the lead-up to
Filipinization, describing the Moro ruler as a “weakling – mentally, morally and
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physically…Unlike most of the leaders of the Moros he is timid, weak, vacillating and very
much afraid of responsibility.”

89

Despite such misgivings, Kiram was the public face of

Muslims in the Philippines, and managed to retain his status (albeit in a politically limited
way) until his death in the 1930s. As such, his visit to the United States was met with interest.
Kiram arrived in New York City aboard the ocean liner St. Louis on 24 September
1910, and was greeted at the docks by Hugh Scott, the one-time District Governor of Sulu
and a figure with more extensive links to the Tausūg elite than any other American. With the
Sultan was Hadji Muhammad Panglima Mulian, Hadji Tahib, Salip Maydano, and Hadji
90

Gulamu Rasul, the son of the Joloano diplomat and politician Hadji Butu.

Kiram’s long

voyage to the United States by way of China and Europe had been news since his departure,
with the Los Angeles Times speculating (incorrectly) that the Sultan was bringing hundreds of
thousands of dollars in pearls and was willing to pay $25,000 “for a choice Southern
California girl.” The newspaper reported (also incorrectly) that the Sultan propositioned Alice
Roosevelt, daughter of Theodore, with marriage during her visit to the Philippines and
91

offered the President “a large price for his daughter.”

Multiple newspapers picked up on

rumours about the Sultan’s “famous pearls,” with the Boston Daily Globe claiming their
worth at $500,000 and speculating about how the U.S. Treasury Department would deal with
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that matter were they declared at customs.

92

When asked about the supposed treasures by

Hugh Scott during his disembarkation from the St. Louis, Kiram mentioned that he had sold
93

$100,000 of pearls during his stay in London and had none remaining with him.

The New York Times was especially fond of relating how awed the Moros were by the
sites and sounds of the metropolis. Travelling to their hotel, the Astor, the Tausūg dignitaries
“hardly said a word all the way. They simply looked and marveled at the wonderful sight.”
Viewing the city from the top of the Times Building (now One Times Square), the Sultan and
his retinue “could not find words to express their delight. When they passed Wallack’s
Theatre, where George Ade’s play about the Sultan had ran, Kiram regretted not seeing “what
he looked like on stage.”

94

The party taxied around Manhattan and Brooklyn, visiting Central

Park, the Bowery, and Grant’s Tomb, among other sites. Kiram expressed his desire to
remain in New York to the press, but said President Taft would be “grieved” if he stayed in
95

the city and enjoyed himself “instead of performing the duties of [his] rank.”

This was an

overstatement, as when he arrived in Washington Kiram waited several days before receiving
an audience with Taft. In the meantime, the Moros visited Leonard Wood at the War
Department and took in the sites of the capital. The Washington Post fixated on the habits of
Kiram as it had done with Datu Facundo, observing that he was “doubtful about civilization’s
sartorial mandates” and did not like the feel of trousers. Besides taking note of his eating
habits, the Post reported on the Sultan’s visit to an acrobatic show and congratulated “the
government of a great people” doing “all possible to make him happy” despite the visit being
unofficial.
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Kiram’s visit with President Taft at the White House was brief but cordial.
Accompanied by Hugh Scott, the Sultan joined Taft in the Green Room where they discussed
“old times” with the aide of an interpreter. While there, Kiram viewed the portraits of the exPresidents, and “evinced great interest in the painting of Abraham Lincoln, who, it was
explained to him, set the slaves free.” A journalist present observed that the Sultan was forced
to give up his slaves by the United States only a decade previous.
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Three days later, Kiram’s

party stopped in Chicago, where the issue of trousers was once more on the agenda. The
Daily Tribune took relish in describing how the Sultan “fell prey to a New York clothes
shop” that sold him a pair of ill-fitting pants requiring constant adjustments. Kiram corrected
this in Chicago, where he purchased a seven-dollar pair of trousers that were “cut off right
and hung straight.” During his tour of the city, he visited a variety of parks and at the
stockyards inquired as to whether he was allowed to slaughter an animal. The meatpacking
district, made infamous by Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle four years prior, impressed the Sultan
so much that he claimed he planned on using the methods he witnessed upon returning to
98

Jolo. On October 5th, Kiram and his companions arrived in San Francisco and departed for
Honolulu, en route to Manila and, finally, Jolo.
The Sultan of Sulu and his American hosts saw the tour as instructive, although in
different ways. While staying in Washington, Kiram told reporters grandiloquently that his
mission in the United States was to “learn of the world for my people” and, playing to the
national pride of the gathered press, that he wanted to tell them “fully of the nation of which
they have become a part of.” The Sultan continued in the same vein, talking about the
importance of global travel for somebody from a part of the world where such things were
not common.
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American writers commented on the visit with a greater degree of racial

condescension, observing that it was the first time the “fiercest fighting strain” of Malays had
seen “civilization.” The Washington Post was impressed that “there was not a sign of the
uncouth, of the bizarre, of the savage” about the Moros, declaring this evidence that good
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manners were “a matter of intention, not convention” – the implication being that ‘civilized’
100

manners were by no means conventional in the Southern Philippines.

The Christian

Science Monitor was more explicit about the moral effects of American empire on the Moros,
noting that “his little dark brown majesty” could spread the word about the benefits of
Western technology and encourage his people to engage in industrial education so that
automobiles, “talking machines,” and agricultural equipment could be extensively introduced
101

to the region.

Another article used the Sultan’s visit to reflect on the presence of “Asiatic

visitors” in the United States, linking Kiram with transcolonial developments in the Pacific
world that connected Asian countries and the United States through trade, religion, and
education. Although the article deemed the Sultan a “dependent,” scant mention was made of
America’s largest role in Asia being the maintenance of colonial states.
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The Moro visitor who most captured the American public imagination was not the
Sultan of Sulu, but rather his remarkable young niece, Tarhata Kiram. Born on Jolo in 1904,
authorities identified Tarhata at a young age as the type of Moro woman the colonial state
wanted to groom. Although the sultanate was highly patriarchal, women from noble families
still had influence over the affairs of the region, as was evident in the deference paid to the
Sultan’s mother Inchy Jamela. Educating Moro women was seen as a corrective to the ill of
plural marriage, a common practice for wealthier men in Sulu and anathematic to the
Victorian sensibilities of the Americans. To this end, the Cotabato Girls’ School was opened
in 1913 and a girls’ dormitory and school on Jolo in 1916. By teaching Moro girls “personal
cleanliness, housekeeping, cooking, embroidery, and English,” officials believed they could
transform gender relations in the region to match North American norms, which is to say that
women would still be in a primarily subordinate domestic role, but arranged and multiple
marriages would cease and Moro men would inch closer to civilization.
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In this way, Moro
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women would serve as Trojan horses for America’s cultural prerogatives. In 1914, Tarhata
was sent to the elite Normal School in Manila to receive “training in domestic science and
other appropriate branches.”

104

Governor Frank W. Carpenter hoped that bringing Moro girls

into contact with the dominant Christian culture of the islands would help assimilate the
Muslims into American “beliefs, standards and ideals” (although religious conversion was
105

never actively pursued) and advance a unified Filipino national identity.

After her time in Manila, Tarhata Kiram, at the urging of the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, enrolled at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, becoming the first Moro
woman on record to attend an American post-secondary institution. Still a teenager, she
arrived in Illinois at the end of August 1919 with friend and roommate Carmen Aguinaldo,
106

daughter of revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo.

Tarhata’s presence was noticed by

several newspapers, one of which wrote that she “has come to this country to acquire much as
possible of American training and ideas. She has chosen a college in the Middle West, she
107

says, because of the greater opportunity to mingle with and meet everyday Americans.”

By

all accounts, Tarhata’s time at the University of Illinois was busy. She began her studies in
the School of Music, but soon switched to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, where
she took courses in history, economics, political science, and trigonometry. Outside of the
classroom, she adopted American fashion, owning “numerous streets dresses,” fur coats, and
skirts. She kept her hair in a bob, a style popular among female university students of the
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period, and “never appeared to skimp on her spending money.”

108

Light-heartedly referred to

as “The One and Only Sulu Flapper” by other students, Tarhata was remarkably popular on
campus, attending parties, dances, and generally living a life typical of the well-heeled
American college student. Only nominally Muslim, she would joke with her friends about
‘going juramentado’ and was reputed to blow better smoke rings “than the slickest ‘campus
109

cowboy’ on the dean’s list.”

Tarhata remained in Illinois until 1924, when she returned to

the Sulu Archipelago.
Tarhata Kiram reappeared in the American press in 1927, this time as a cautionary
tale about the dangers of colonial betrayal. A year prior, she became the fourth wife of Datu
Tahil, son of the famed Datu Jokanain and one of the leaders who faced John Pershing at the
Battle of Bagsak in 1913 (where a wife and child of his were killed). Tahil made peace with
the government after Bagsak and for a time served as third member of the Provincial Board.
When he was politically outmaneuvered and replaced by Arolas Tulawie, a fluent Englishspeaker and staunch supporter of American colonial power, Tahil turned against state taxation
policies and built a fortification at Patikul, some miles east of Jolo town.
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At the orders of

Sulu Governor Carl Moore, the Philippine Constabulary was sent to Patikul and there was a
tense standoff lasting several days. The Constabulary did not approach the cotta while
Tarhata was inside. They feared her death could cause a general revolt on Jolo and waited
until she left the fort. On January 27th, thirty-five of Tahil’s followers died in a brief but
intense battle with the Constabulary. Tahil was taken into custody soon thereafter, while
Tarhata Kiram was arrested and charged with sedition on February 4th.

111

Reaction to Tarhata’s ‘betrayal’ in the United States was swift and condemnatory.
Elizabeth Walker, reporting for the Los Angeles Times, described the Tausūg princess’
“reversion to type” in physical terms. She had replaced her “fashionable foreign clothes” with
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a traditional sarong, filed her teeth, and allowed her hair to grow out, although Walker
noticed that Tarhata continued “practicing the only lesson she really ever learned in an
American classroom – that woman’s place is wherever she wants it to be.” When the
journalist met Tarhata she described her as a “slatternly creature in native garb” who had
112

“scandalized” her “sophisticated American neighbors” by marrying the rebellious Tahil.

The Atlanta Constitution was even more unsparing, claiming that the “thin veneer of culture”
bestowed upon Tarhata during her time in America had “wore off when she got back among
her own primitive people.” Dedicating a full-page feature to her, the Constitution declared
that Tarhata had transformed back into a savage “despite the best efforts of the University of
Illinois and other agencies of American culture to send her back to the Philippines thoroughly
113

and incurably Americanized.”

The article suggested that whatever transformation Tarhata

underwent in the United States was replaced by defeminized barbarism once she returned to
her homeland. Every report on her role in the rebellion implied a betrayal of “all the
advantages given her” and with it a reversion that stripped her physically and intellectually of
114

any accumulated cultural cachet.

The lone voice of protest against Tarhata’s treatment in

the U.S. media was a letter to the Chicago Daily Tribune from Margaret C. Stoll, a fellow
student from the University of Illinois. Her defence was an argument for Tarhata’s
acculturation, rather than a simple statement of support: “She is a cultured, refined, and keen
witted woman who, against the odds of century-old oriental customs, is struggling to maintain
115

her thoroughly occidental ideas,” Stoll wrote.

The editorial Tarhata Kiram wrote in response to the attacks on her was measured and
thoughtful. Published in the Los Angeles Times on February 18th, the piece blamed the unrest
on the unjust power dynamics in Sulu. Governor Carl Moore, she wrote, was not only the
chief executive in the region, but also acted as Superintendent of Schools and Justice of the
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Peace, thereby usurping “the prerogatives of the other officials, who are being converted into
mere pawns on the chessboard.” She claimed her stay in America had taught her “that the true
essence of free government is that all powers should not be vested in one man.” Alluding
indirectly to her own life, she reflected that it was “the experience of all colonial governments
that the most troublesome elements in a subjugated country belong to the educated class,
particularly those educated abroad. It is axiomatic that you cannot make slave of a man after
116

educating him.”

Based on this sanguine response, it is apparent Tarhata had a deeper

comprehension of the paradoxes inherent in the relationships between colonial officials,
Western education, and the indigenous elite than her detractors in the American press – so
quick to resort to racial caricature – did. In an interview she gave shortly after her capture,
Tarhata inquired about the famous Leopold and Loeb murder case, asked after a male friend
she had dated (football legend Red Grange), and explained that her return to traditional
Tausūg garb was a pragmatic way of becoming “a power among my own people” and helping
rescue them from impending Filipino hegemony. The short-lived rebellion of 1927 sidelined
Princess Tarhata for only a few years, and by the early 1930s, she had reappeared in the
American and Filipino Press to advocate for the return of certain islands and territories of
British North Borneo to the Sultanate of Sulu. Later in the decade she became a Special
117

Agent for the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes and led raids against outlaws.

Other Moro visitors who came to the United States during the colonial period also
received press coverage, albeit not as extensively as Jamalul or Tarhata Kiram. Abdullah, son
of Datu Piang, leader of Cotabato, visited San Francisco in 1912 and newspapers claimed he
was on the hunt for an American wife, giving scant evidence but likely titillating the racial
sensitivities of their readership.
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Gulamu Rasul, the youngest member of the Sultan’s
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entourage in 1910, returned to America in 1919 and enrolled at George Washington
119

University, where he met a woman named Alma Stewart whom he courted and married.

The younger generation of Moro elite blurred racial and cultural lines in ways that the press
found to difficult to convey. Tarhata Kiram’s selective role in anti-colonial agitation when
she returned home was depicted in terms of a betrayal of the culture bequeathed her by
benevolent colonial authorities. The romantic lives of Abdullah Piang and Gulamu Rasul
while in the United States carried with them serious notes of interracial sexual transgression,
complicating demarcations between colonizer and colonized, and were thus brushed off as
comic asides. Newspaper writers were at ease reporting on the stage-managed visits to
Washington by Datus Facundo and Sansaluna, or the awe expressed by the Sultan of Sulu as
he admired New York City’s vertices and Chicago’s sprawling abattoirs. In these earlier
visits, racial-cultural hierarchies appeared fixed, with a small people paying homage to the
cultural gifts bestowed by a great nation. In the 1920s, as colonial empire entered its terminal
phase across the globe, visits to the metropole by Moros became more complex and, by
extension, troubling.

Cotabato to cover the death of Datu Ali in 1905, used Abdullah Piang’s presence in America to revive the
Piang-Ali family romance he reported on seven years earlier: “Abdullah, the son of Piang, has plenty of money
and the robes of office, with which he may travel to the splendid America which assisted his father to overcome
his enemy. Ali, the son of Ali, is over there in a small village on the banks of the Cottabatto, poor, friendless,
unable to buy even one wife, but in his veins flow the blood of Mahomet, which is white. Time will tell.” In the
years after his visit to America, the younger Piang became notorious in Cotabato for his brazen behaviour. J.R.
Hayden, travelling through the region in 1926 related to his wife that Abdullah was known as “a loud mouthed
drunkard whose chief purpose in life seems to be the squandering of his sire’s hoarded gold. When I asked Piang
how many carabao he had, he replied not many, that Abdullah had sold them all and wasted the money. When I
remarked that he must get a lot of money from all of the stores in his town that he rents to Chinese merchants he
admitted that he got 600 pesos per month, but lamented that Abdullah spent that much in a week. He also
informed me that Abdullah had tricked him into signing a power of attorney and then had sold his big house in
Cotabato – and so forth. The funny part is though, that Abdullah is the favorite of his 32 living children and that
the old Chino gets a great kick out of his very excesses. Of course his drinking is a scandal to all
Mohammedans…while his affairs with women are both vicious and expensive. There has never been a Moro
like him and so far as I can make out, his goings on are a great source of interest among his compatriots…At any
rate, last year he got the GG to appoint the rascal representative at large from Mindanao and Sulu and he is now
a Moro statesman.” – Letter from J.R. Hayden to Betty Hayden, 17 September 1926, Box 28, Folder 26. J.R.
Hayden Papers, BHL.
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Subjects, Sidekicks, and Savages
Regrettably missed by its titular character, George Ade’s comic opera The Sultan of Sulu
opened in Chicago on 11 March 1902 to an audience comprised mainly of the writer’s
friends. Regional newspapers took note, with the Kansas City Star reporting “nearly every
newspaper paragrapher in the country noted at the time of the addition of Sulu to America’s
territorial possessions that the incident afforded an excellent subject for comic opera
120

treatment.”

Ade was an Indiana-born writer who established his reputation penning

vernacular fables for Chicago newspapers at the turn of the century. His work was famed for
its keen understanding of the American character, especially that of the Midwesterner, and,
121

like his contemporary Mark Twain, he made extensive use regional slang.

A staunch anti-

imperialist, Ade critiqued the American conquest and the project of benevolent assimilation
in print, imbuing in his Filipino characters a plainspoken common sense (similar to that found
in his sketches of Midwesterners) that cut through the grandiose yet hollow rhetoric of those
in favour of empire.
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Ade’s visit to the Philippines in 1900 coincided with his decision to

focus on writing for the stage. Meeting in Manila with press correspondents who had reported
from Sulu, Ade was intrigued by their stories of Kiram’s “pretentious court, extensive harem,
and his disagreement with certain provisos of the American constitution.” Ade kept current
with developments in the Sulu Archipelago as he wrote the play over the next two years.
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After making its New York City premiere in December 1902, The Sultan of Sulu was
performed there a further 192 times during its inaugural run, making it Ade’s first major
success on the stage.
Ade’s satire did not include much in the way of detail about the Tausūg Moros,
despite being set in the Sulu Archipelago. In the play, Kiram - stylized as ‘Ki-Ram’ - is
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portrayed as a ridiculous yet harmless figure, a holder of slaves, and a dedicated polygamist.
Dramatic tension arises from the arrival of the Americans, led by Colonel Jefferson Budd,
who introduce the Sultan to the glories of democratic rule and then use the same system to
strip him of his wives and imprison him for failure to pay alimony. The Kiram figure, dressed
in a clown costume, plays an Asian version of the rural naïf in one of Ade’s American stories,
constantly duped yet possessed with a charming ability to see through the blithe hypocrisies
of his persecutors (if not his own). Ade’s songs take aim at the dissonance found in the
colonial regime’s pairing of military conquest and benevolent assimilation, and at one point a
group of American soldiers sing “We want to assimilate, if we can, / Our brother who is
brown; / We love our dusky fellow-man / And we hate to hunt him down / So, when we
perforate his frame, / We want him to be good / We shoot at him to make him tame, / If he’d
124

but understand.”

Shortly thereafter, Colonel Budd asks Ki-Ram if he “consents” to the

“benevolent plan” of educating the “neglected race” of Moros, to which the Sultan does –
125

albeit surrounded by soldiers’ bayonets.

Several of these strange scenes punctuate the play

(there is even, at one point, a minstrel act), with the sum being a humorous skewering of the
conventions and contradictions of empire-building.
Despite its lack of concrete information about the inhabitants of the Sulu Archipelago,
Ade’s play was for many Americans the only cultural product associated with the region in
the first years of colonial rule. Even intimates of American officials in the Philippines
developed their understandings of the Moros through it. A friend of Hugh Scott, Governor of
Sulu, wrote to him that he had seen the play three times and “liked it very much, but I little
thought that I would soon have the pleasure of an acquaintance with the Sultan himself of that
strange and very interesting part of our common country.” The friend, George Barbour,
encouraged Scott in his new role as governor, confident he would help the Moros and “very
readily grasp the conditions necessary for their good,” perhaps marveling that he was
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corresponding with a real life Colonel Jefferson Budd.

126

Vivienne Angeles writes that The

Sultan of Sulu emphasized “otherness” and “justified the need to change” the Tausūg Moros,
yet this unsmiling read of the play does not consider that the Americans were also portrayed
127

as fundamentally ludicrous.

If the Sultan and his subjects were Orientalist tropes, then the

self-righteous Americans, certain in the knowledge that Western modernity could be spread at
gunpoint, were Occidental ones. The play, after all, was satire. The Sultan of Sulu was milder
than other depictions of the Moros in American culture, which tended to be less self-aware
and more indebted to prevalent ideas on race.
Offstage, America’s fictional colonial endeavours among the Moros were promoted
through children’s literature. Imperial adventure stories were a staple in Britain, and were
typified in the early twentieth-century by the works of Rudyard Kipling (himself a famous
supporter of America’s mission in the Philippines) and, later on, Hugh Lofting. Colonized
lands were simultaneously places of fantasy, where a child’s imagination could run wild, and
zones of moral inscription, where the values of the civilized world proved their mettle against
the chaotic degradation of precolonial culture. “The omnipresence of empire and its images in
popular juvenile fiction is no surprise,” writes M. Daphne Kutzer. “Empire and exploitation
lend themselves to sensationalism, to exoticism, to ceremony, to jargon and lingo and secret
societies, all of which have an appeal for children, and especially for boys of the period.”
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This exoticism was harnessed and made knowable in more instructive works like Burtis M.
Little’s Francisco the Filipino, wherein the titular character is used as vessel to expand the
American child’s understanding of the moral and commercial possibilities of colonial
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possessions.

129

Alternately, the Southern Philippines was for Americans akin to the unknown

spaces of British India or colonial Africa, and used as the backdrop for stories articulating
130

notions of civilization and savagery.

This was so in Florence Partello Stuart’s The Adventures of Piang the Moro Jungle
Boy, a collection of adventure stories all featuring the title character engaging in feats of
daring and learning about the benefits of American rule in the process. Stuart, who spent time
in Mindanao when her father was stationed there, credited Dean Worcester in the preamble
for providing statistics and information pertaining to the “origin and development of the
Moro.” Stuart even claimed “some of Piang’s adventures” were “actual incidents of Dean
Worcester’s travels,” evidencing direct contact between American officialdom and the
production of colonial fantasy.

131

The Adventures of Piang the Moro Jungle Boy, published in

1917, attempted to remedy the ignorance and indifference of the American public towards the
Philippines and was subtitled “A Book for Young and Old,” although the earlier publication
of some of the stories in Boys’ World magazine indicate they were written mainly for
132

youth.

Piang’s adventures can be roughly split into two categories, the first serving as a
simplistic ethnographic portrait of the life of Moros in the Cotabato region, and the second
illustrating the ameliorating effects of American rule in Mindanao and Sulu. In the first group
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of stories, the reader is introduced to Piang and the Moros. Piang is the young hero of his
tribe, and the main helper of the tribe’s datu, Kali Pandapatan. His main enemy is another
adolescent named Sicto, a mestizo bully whose “dirty cream color” skin and “murky eyes” are
evidence of his treacherous nature. Piang’s early adventures concentrate mainly on his
struggles against the natural world, with snakes, wild boar, crocodiles, typhoons, and
waterfalls all attempting to thwart the Moro boy. He competes with Sicto to reach Mount
Ganassi and become the “charm boy” of his tribe, which he accomplishes to the delight of
Kali Pandapatan and his fellow villagers. The boy hero also faces threats from rival tribes,
who are receiving help from his chief adversary: “Sicto has betrayed us, but have no fear.
Piang, the charm boy leads you; take courage, and Allah, the Merciful, will give you
133

victory.”

In the first half of the book, the young American reader is given fairly

straightforward boy vs. nature tales, albeit with racialized elements.
Piang’s first extended contact with American colonials happens during a period of
famine, when the U.S. military brings the village much-needed supplies to ease their
suffering. As a result, any suspicions of the foreigners are “banished from the minds of the
natives.” Piang then helps the Americans recover rice from the bottom of Lake Lanao despite
the presence of the dangerous natives of the region, in the process learning of the heroic
exploits of “General Bushing,” a fictional stand-in for John Pershing, in the pacification of
the Lanao country. Since Piang’s tribe welcomed the colonizers, it is implied they will be safe
and reap the benefits of colonial rule. The Americans respond to their greeting by naming a
recovered Spanish boat (sunk in Lake Lanao) after the boy.

134

Piang subsequently becomes the sidekick of Lieutenant Lewis, a young army officer
who epitomizes American valor. The two participate in a pirate-hunting mission on the island
of Basilan, off the coast of Zamboanga, where Piang helps U.S. troops face down the threat
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of juramentados. “Ashamed of his fierce people,” Piang describes to Lewis and his men the
tradition of ritual suicide in battle against the infidel, and how the slain juramentado then
rode into the afterlife on a “shadowy white horse taller than a carabao.” Lewis chides Piang
for believing “those fairy tales” now that the Moro boy is “a good American.” Piang replies,
“Sure, me good American now.” When the army detachment is attacked by juramentados,
they confront the local Sultan, who responds indifferently by telling them that his people
become excited on Islamic feast days and he cannot control their actions. Lewis is frustrated
at how it seems “impossible to deal with the crafty sultan according to Christian standards”
but soon devises a plan with the help of Piang. He sends the gunboat Sabah up to the nearby
Moro village where the Sultan lives and has it open fire. When the Sultan visits the
Americans to protest, he comes in state. “No insignificant nigger greeted Lewis this time,”
writes Stuart, employing racial epithets culled from the United States to emphasize the
grandeur of the Sultan and his retainers. When asked to explain why the Sabah attacked the
village, Lewis explains that the ship went juramentado because it was the Christian feast day
of Christmas and could not be controlled. The Sultan understands that his logic is being used
against him and brings the Americans gifts of turkeys (for their Christmas dinner) and keshi
pearls.

135

The ‘true’ story of the boat ‘going juramentado’ was a favourite of colonials in
Mindanao and Sulu, and, as related earlier, was alternately attributed to the Spanish General
Juan Arolas, John Pershing, and Leonard Wood. It is likely Stuart sourced it from her talks
136

with Dean Worcester or John Finley, both of whom were familiar with the comic anecdote.

Likewise, Stuart’s descriptions in the following chapter of a bichara (a ceremonial meeting of
elders, or rough equivalent of a durbar in the British Raj) organized by “Governor Findy”
correspond directly to those held by John Findley during his time governing the District of
Zamboanga.
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Stuart observes that the Findy (Findley) character has “been severely

Ibid.
See Chapter Five, footnotes eighteen and nineteen.

“These people arrived by trail and by a vast number of native boats, the latter being highly decorated with
native bunting. Their approach was heralded by the beating of agongs and kulintangans and the firing of
lantakas…As this vast assemblage drew near to the Zamboanga dock, the hum of voices, the shouts of
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criticized for his experiment” in transforming the Moros, but that “he was willing to run the
risks” to “bring the light of freedom and peace to the misguided savages.”

138

Piang delights

in the festivities, of course, marveling at American-made confections such as pink lemonade,
toy balloons, and popcorn. He also foils a plot to assassinate Governor Findy, earning further
plaudits from the Americans.
Apart from Findley and Pershing, fictionalized versions of a variety of real personages
appear or are referenced by Stuart. This includes Datu Mandi, Datu Enoch, the pirate Jikiri,
Datu Ali, the insurrecto Vincente Alvarez, and Leonard Wood. Although Stuart claimed
Piang was a real boy in the preface to the collection, he was likely named after Datu Piang,
the mixed Moro-Chinese ruler of the Cotabato region. Findley even provided a blurb for the
book, saying that Stuart “faithfully portrayed the daily life of the average Moro” and
accurately “depicted the characteristics of Malayan Moro youth.”

139

Drawing on materials

from the War Department, her access to Dean Worcester and John Findley, and her own
experiences in Mindanao, Stuart presented the stories as lightly fictionalized accounts of the
lives of ‘loyal’ Muslims. The book was praised in the New York Times for the excitement of
Piang’s adventures, but also for being “full of information about the customs, beliefs, and
140

way of living of the Moros.”

The Times did not mention that the tales were also allegories

about the righteousness of the American project to reconfigure society in the Southern
Philippines.
Children with military aspirations read about the Muslim South in H. Irving
Hancock’s Uncle Sam’s Boys in the Philippines: or, Following the Flag Against the Moros.
The book was one of a series that followed the young men of B Company in the 34th Infantry

command, the swish of paddles, all coupled with the noise of agongs and lantakas made indescribable din and a
scene of matchless barbaric splendor. The Sultan and his tribal chiefs were received by Governor Finley with
high military honors and escorted by troops to the audience chamber.” See Findley, “Race Development by
Industrial Means,” 343-344.
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as they battled foes, foreign and domestic alike. In Following the Flag, the company is
stationed in the fictional town of Bantoc, likely named by Hancock after Bontoc in Mountain
Province but modeled on Zamboanga in its ethnic composition. The “lazy and good-natured”
Christian Filipino residents in the story are contrasted with the fierce Moros, who quickly
burn down an American schoolhouse and pay special attention to destroying its American
flag. An American plantation owner in the area begs the soldiers to “not conclude that all of
the Moros are bad, or even troublesome. The truth is that most of the Moros on the island of
Mindanao are good fellows. They’re lazy, but not notably vicious.” The planter, Seaforth,
explains to the soldiers that the cause of problems stems from local datus worried about
141

losing power.

The second half of the novel focuses on the outnumbered Americans of B Company
using their superior weaponry to protect American plantation owners from the extortions of
local datus. In scenes of slaughter, the infantrymen mow down “dense brown ranks” of
Moros with their Gatling gun.

142

The natives are referred to as “goo-goos” and accused of the

desecration of American graves. In one chapter, entitled “Playing Goo-Goo in a Grim Game,”
two B Company soldiers cover themselves with dirt and infiltrate a Moro encampment by
speaking gibberish to the guards (who assume it’s a local dialect). When the hostile Datu
Hakkut is eventually surrounded, he commits seppuku and the Americans fling his body over
the ramparts of the cotta to quell his men: “’I fancy the cruel war is over, gentlemen,’
remarked Captain Freeman that evening to his two younger officers. ‘These Moros, like other
semi-savages, fight with heart only when they have a great leader.’”

143

The novel closes with

a vulgar scene of patriotic fervor and racial denigration. The American flag is raised above
the captured cotta and the Moro prisoners are “forced to pay it humble reverence, after which
they were allowed, on their hands and knees, to crawl out of the fort and find their liberty
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outside.”

For the young reader, American moral and material superiority over savagery is

made explicit in these and many other scenes in Hancock’s novel.
If Piang represented the ideal faithful Moro – resourceful yet hampered by racial and
cultural determinants – then his spiritual counterpart was Jack Armstrong, the All-American
Boy. In his nightly radio program, airing from 1933-1951, the fictional Jack travelled the
globe with his two friends, Betty and Billy, and their industrialist uncle, Jim Fairfield. In his
compendium of old-time radio, John Dunning claims that the program was “a pinnacle of
145

juvenile American radio serials,” in a period when the form was pervasive.

The show was

underwritten during its two decade run by General Mills and their cereal Wheaties, and each
episode began with an advertisement (itself a short dramatic skit) connecting the product to
the athleticism, personal hygiene, and regular breakfast habits of Jack Armstrong. Popular
with the young listenership were the mail-in products linked to the cereal, some of which
appeared in Jack’s adventures. During Jack’s trip to the Philippines, for example, young fans
could send away for a pedometer.
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Jack Armstrong, the All-American Boy was vetted by the

child psychologist Martin L. Reymert, director of the Mooseheart Lab for Child Research,
who implemented a “five point program” to ensure that the serial’s plots were “objective,”
fostered a “constructive social attitude” in young listeners, promoted “a respect for fine
personal qualities,” developed “an attitude of self-reliance,” and was “wholesome” in its
147

excitements.

Not only a simple children’s program, Jack Armstrong married American

consumer culture with military-technological fetishism, and was grounded in the idea that the
incipient moral awareness of youth could be scientifically managed.
Jack and his gang met the Moros during their 1940-1941 adventures in the
Philippines. Searching for the missing Professor Loring and his dangerous cache of uranium-
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235, the group clashes with villains in Luzon and the Sulu Sea before landing on Mindanao.
At Zamboanga, Betty and Uncle Jim have this telling exchange:
Betty: Oh Uncle Jim, everything around here looks so civilized – it’s not at
all like the part of Mindanao we were in before!
Uncle Jim: That’s the U.S. Army for you, Betty…everything looks ready
for inspection, and that’s a sure sign that the troops are ready for
anything.

148

In the world of Jack Armstrong, the Americans are still the undisputed masters of the
Southern Philippines on the eve of the Second World War, and Zamboanga is still firmly in
the hands of the U.S. military (who officially ceded control to civilians nearly three decades
earlier). Uncle Jim warns Jack and his companions that the ‘civilization’ on offer in
Zamboanga is tenuous, telling them of his participation years earlier in suppressing an
uprising in the region and giving the youth a primer on the dangers of the peninsula. “You
wouldn’t think so to look at this orderly town…on the surface everything is peaceful, but
look at that range of hills beyond the parade grounds. They are only a few miles away, and
yet once you get on the other side of them you’re in a wild and savage country.”

149

For the

listeners of Jack Armstrong, Zamboanga remained a civilized outpost in an untamed land,
much as it appeared to Americans arriving there four decades earlier.
The narrative conventions of the adventure story ensured that Jack and company are
travelling in the “wild and savage country” beyond Zamboanga by the next episode. The
Moros in the fictional village of Mulita, headed by the nefarious Datu Karang, are hostile and
threaten the party. They are tricked through Jack’s predictable use of the latest technology.
He convinces Karang that a horse he has rigged with a walkie-talkie can speak, scaring the
Moro datu and safeguarding the group. Manua, a loyal Moro from “Cotabango” (Cotabato),
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aids Jack. He informs the group that the real villain is the “White Sultan of Mindanao,” who
150

wants to unite all the Moro tribes into “one piratical government.”

As in the Piang stories,

Moros are dichotomized as either savage and untrustworthy, or dull-witted and “faithful.”
The Moro and Lumad tribes of Mindanao are a source of constant danger to Jack and his
friends, who repeatedly escape trouble through their innate resourcefulness and technological
marvels like Uncle Jim’s autogyro (a proto-helicopter). The group thwarts gun smugglers,
rescues captured American soldiers, and, eventually, finds Professor Loring and the missing
uranium-235. The show’s incredible popularity made it one of the few conduits for
(admittedly dubious) information about the Moros available to American adolescents.
Depictions of Moros in youth literature and radio serials were largely unflattering, much like
the cultural products aimed at older audiences.
In the spring of 1939, work finished on a replica Philippine village spread over six
acres on the United Artists film lot in Los Angeles. Featuring a 700-foot tropical lagoon, it
151

was at the time “the largest set ever used in Hollywood.”

This was where The Real Glory,

the only movie about the so-called Moro Rebellion, was filmed.

152

Produced by Samuel

Goldwyn and directed by Henry Hathaway, the film starred Gary Cooper, David Niven, and
Reginald Owen as officers of the Philippine Constabulary posted to a remote station in
Northern Mindanao and tasked with training helpless Christian Filipino villagers to fight the
Moro scourge. The film was released in September 1939 to limited fanfare. It was re-released
in 1942 to capitalize on renewed interest in Asia driven by the war with Japan, but pulled
quickly at the behest of the Motion Picture Division of the Office of War Information, who
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had received protests and thought it “held our Allies in a bad light.”

153

At the time, groups of

Moros were aiding the Americans in guerilla warfare against the Japanese on Mindanao.
The Real Glory begins with a dedication to the “members of the Philippine
Constabulary – who, ‘always outnumbered, never outfought’ – struggled valiantly to wrest
independence from forces that sought to enslave them. Their unfailing courage in the face of
untold hardships – has made possible the great Philippine Commonwealth as we know it
today.”

154

To portray the “forces that sought to enslave” the Philippine Constabulary, the

movie took significant liberties with the historical record. Opening in 1906 with the departure
of the United States Army from Fort Mysang in Northern Mindanao, The Real Glory portrays
a Tagalog-speaking community in mortal danger from the predations of Alipang, a Moro
chieftain whose monomaniacal desire to kill and enslave Christians enters into the realm of
the absurd. The villagers and native members of the Constabulary are helpless against the
bolos of the Moros, and run in fear whenever attacked. The ruminative Catholic priest, who is
the only ‘Filipino’ voice in the film, comments to the American officers that the Moros “will
kill all the men, and carry away all the women and children into slavery…for you it will be a
report written in ink, but for my people it will be a report written in blood.”
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When successive American commanders of Fort Mysang are killed by juramentado
attacks, Dr. Canavan, played by Cooper, decides to attack what he sees as the root of the
problem: the Filipino fear of the Moro. After being told by the padre that Moros are unafraid
to die but terrified of being buried in a pigskin (“Father Filipe, you’ve done it! You’ve
isolated the germ for me! A pigskin might be the salvation of Mysang!”), Canavan captures a
would-be juramentado and parades him before the Filipinos. The doctor places the Moro into
the pigskin where he begins screaming out in horror. “Now look at him, your brave Moro,
your terrible Moro,” says Canavan, “who won’t let you work your rice fields or fish the seas
in peace. How can you be afraid of that worm crawling on the ground howling for mercy,
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begging for help, scared out of his skin because of the skin of a dead pig?” The invigorated
Filipinos are then shown hitting and bayonetting the dummies of Moro warriors that they
were once afraid of, suggesting Canavan’s pigskin act has imbued them with a martial spirit.
The Constabulary outpost and surrounding village are still in peril, however. Alipang dams
the water supply, leading to an outbreak of cholera when the misguided Commander Hartley,
played by Owen, insists on using a well instead of attacking the Moros and undamming the
river. “Why doesn’t he come down here and fight like a man?” Canavan says of Alipang,
“He’s making war with germs instead of bolos.” Canavan employs the latest sanitary
measures to halt the outbreak – cottonseed oil, a prohibition against eating raw foods,
scrubbing rooms with carbolic acid – but is unsuccessful.

156

Commander Hartley, the main impediment to confronting Alipang, finally admits his
errors, and proclaims that “Mysang isn’t just an isolated village, it’s a test” of the colonial
project to train self-sufficient Filipinos. With this admission, the film’s violent final act
begins. Canavan discovers a fellow officer murdered by being buried up to his neck, covered
in honey, and feasted upon by the jungle ants. Enraged, he dynamites the dam and returns to
the village to confront the Moros. Spears, bolos, a Gatling gun, and dynamite all feature as
the body count rises, but eventually Alipang’s goal of looting the three hundred KragJorgenson rifles in Mysang’s armory and becoming “the Sultan of Mindanao” is foiled. In a
highly symbolic final battle, Yamo, the detachment’s Filipino lieutenant, confronts the Moro
leader, beating him to death with the butt of his Krag and knocking his body into the river,
where it is carried downstream. As Canavan and Hartley leave for Manila shortly thereafter,
having brought the Filipinos up to American standards, the well-trained and attired members
of the Philippine Constabulary, led by Yamo, stand at attention for them. “We who are about
to live salute you,” says the Catholic padre, as the villagers throw garlands of flowers at the
Americans’ departing boat and the screen fades to black
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In The Real Glory, the Moro is an evil figure – a primitive, despotic villain who seeks
domination of the more docile Christian Filipinos for no other reason than because his
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warlike disposition dictates he do so. Besides Alipang, the only other Moro adult to play a
prominent role in the film is the unnamed Datu, who acts as a friend to the Americans while
secretly working for Alipang. A boy with a Hispanic name, Miguel, plays the one ‘good’
Moro in the film (why he has a typically Filipino name is not cleared up). Referred to as
‘Mike’ by the Americans, he quickly becomes a sidekick/manservant to Canavan, in a
relationship that mimics that of Lewis and Piang in Florence Partello Stuart’s collection of
stories. ‘Mike’ shines Canavan’s boots, laughs when his fellow Muslim is being threatened
with the pigskin, and dispenses his thoughts in predictable pidgin sentences like “Moro no
afraid of things he can see, only afraid of things he can’t see.”

158

‘Mike’ is rewarded for his

collaboration with a spot on Canavan’s boat to Manila, and he is last seen dressed in a
Western-style suit.
The film garnered favourable reviews, although the critic Nelson B. Bell wrote that
the leaders of the Philippine Commonwealth took issue with some depictions of the Filipinos
as “craven cowards.” Gary Cooper, wrote Bell, was to be “patted on the back for the fine
159

display of American sagacity and scientific heroism.”

Mae Tinee, the byline for multiple

female reviewers at the Chicago Daily Tribune, praised the depiction of American heroism
against “the savage Moros who lived in the jungles” but was most interested in the “vivid and
heartbreaking” scenes that showed Mysang in the grip of the cholera outbreak. “Science
marches on, praise God!” it concluded.
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Upon its re-release, the Hartford Courant claimed

that The Real Glory was “rip-snorting film fare, without a shadow of a doubt, which could
easily be enjoyable at second viewing, particularly in the light of today’s Philippine
history.”
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For reviewers, the Filipinos and Moros served as adequate victims and villains,

respectively, but the real focus was on the intellectual and physical dynamism of Cooper, the
one-man encapsulation of the American civilizing mission in Asia.
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The Limits of Colonial Spectacle
In “Benefits of the Exposition,” featured in the opening pages of the Official Guide to the
Louisiana Purchase Exposition, LPEC President David R. Francis claimed the “educational
and moral benefits” of the fair could not be “measured in terms of dollars and cents,” and that
“the far-reaching effect of such a vast display of man’s best works on the intelligent and
emulous minds of fifty or sixty millions of students, is beyond computation.” For Francis and
the LPEC, the fairgrounds were a vast classroom, where the progress of the world’s peoples
was assessed. In terms dictated by the Victorian moral and racial concepts of the organizers,
162

visitors could be taught “the noble lessons of human worth and human brotherhood.”

Yet

for all these high-sounding pedagogical claims, the St. Louis World’s Fair retained the
atmosphere of the carnival. Within the same guidebook, the “Moros of Mindanao” were
described as “piratical” and representative of “some of the most savage tribes” in the
Philippines. Spectators were warned about taking their pictures, and the rivalry between the
Samal and Lanao villages was reportedly so intense that a special guard was posted to ensure
peace. The “noble lessons” touted by Francis are nowhere in the write-up, with visitors
163

interest instead being drawn by the more sensational aspects of human exhibits.

“The shifting ways in which displayed peoples were recruited and marketed,” writes
164

Sadiah Qureshi, “both reflected and contributed to an expanding imperial presence.”

Qureshi’s work focuses on expositions in the British Empire, but his observation can be
applied to the United States in the early twentieth-century as well. As the American public
came to terms with their role as colonial masters in the Philippines they were presented with
competing visions that emphasized, on one hand, the innate morality of civilizational
transformation through colonial tutelage, and, on the other, the spectacular and irresolvable
barbarity of their subjects. These contradictory strains of thought often coexisted, as in the
pages of the guidebook, and made America’s cultural interactions with the Moros curiously
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diffuse. Essentialized Moro characters, real and imagined, were repurposed by writers for
their own ends. Datu Facundo was a clueless savage coming to pay tribute to the “great white
chief” Theodore Roosevelt, but Sultan Jamalul Kiram II was the possessor of Oriental riches
(pearls) and came to the United States to learn about its technological marvels. Piang the
Moro Jungle Boy was a resourceful ally of the American troops in the Southern Philippines,
but the Moros in The Real Glory were deceitful murderers and obstacles to progress in the
colonial state. This inchoate presentation of the Moros to the American public through
official and unofficial channels meant that the story of benevolent assimilation was never as
effectively applied as it was to Christian Filipinos.
To understand how the Moros materialized the American public consciousness, this
chapter has examined a variety of cultural products. The average American citizen did not
encounter a Tausūg or Samal Moro through travel to the Southern Philippines, or by reading
colonial reports, or in the pages of scholarly articles. Rather, their contact with the Muslim
South came through manufactured displays, as at St. Louis and Jamestown, or in newspaper
reports about visiting Moro elites, or in popular entertainments. As Meg Wesling observes,
supporters of empire were “united by a particular, and particularly timely, logic of cultural
transmission, a pragmatic notion of culture as an ameliorative and powerful force in the
165

formation of citizens and the submission of colonial subjects.”

While the overwhelming

majority of cultural material produced about the Moros in America explicitly or implicitly
supported their status as wards of the state, there were instances of subversion. George Ade’s
play, The Sultan of Sulu, poked fun at self-serious American assumptions about the need to
reconfigure Tausūg society, and Tarhata Kiram, the Tausūg princess educated in Illinois,
resisted racially condescending depictions of her in the American press after she broke with
the colonial government on Jolo. Although these examples are buried under the weight of
material validating empire, they do indicate that the racial and cultural logic that drove the
subjugation of the Moros did not pass through the vigorous public culture of the United States
unchallenged.
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Chapter Eight / Imperial Exchanges
The Southern Philippines in a Connected World

“Example is contagious,” José Rizal wrote about the drive for empire, “perhaps the great
American Republic, which has interests in the Pacific and does not share in the spoils of
1

Africa, may some day think of ultramarine possessions.” The Filipino intellectual’s
predictions manifested less than a decade later in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War.
In the Philippines, the United States acquired a colony with its own pre-existing connections,
which stretched between and through regions, nations, and empires. These dense relational
networks and their numerous contingencies shaped how Americans, Filipinos, Moros, and a
variety of other groups positioned themselves relative to one another. Americans also created
their own networks as they solidified rule, participating in exchanges across a world that was,
2

at the close of the nineteenth-century, permeated by colonial empire. Far from existing in
hermetic separation from the societies surrounding it (and those further afield), the Muslim
South was in constant conversation with them.
This chapter investigates these transmissions, entanglements, and connected histories.
Although sometimes considered outposts or frontiers by colonial officials and in the
subsequent scholarly literature, Mindanao and Sulu were spaces shaped by a cacophony of
competing and collaborating forces before, during, and after the American colonial period.

1

José Rizal, The Philippines A Century Hence (Manila: Philippine Education Company, 1912), 107. The book
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The colony the Americans took from the Spanish was already a connected space. For examples of ties between
the Philippines and other Spanish possessions, see Katharine Bjork, “The Link That Kept the Philippines
Spanish: Mexican Merchant Interests and the Manila Trade, 1571-1815,” Journal of World History 9.1 (1998):
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maritime trade, see James Francis Warren, “The Structure of Slavery in the Sulu Zone,” 111-128.
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Prior chapters in this dissertation have suggested connections between the United States and
other colonial entities: in the exhibition of racially othered subjects at exhibitions; through the
use of colonial massacre as a civilizational corrective; in the way foreign peoples were
imagined; through the work of globally networked social reformers. Here the entire focus is
on how the global, the regional, and the local interacted with each other to influence the
shaping of colonial cultures in the Southern Philippines. Accomplishing this means
eschewing the type of methodological nationalism that envisions history as occurring within a
series of containers circumscribed by the contours of the national body. A growing subfield
that comparatively situates the American empire within constellations of imperial formations
and transcolonial flows helps place this analysis outside traditional exceptionalist narratives,
3

or, in the words of Yves-Pierre Saunier, “self-narratives of autonomous production.” This is
not to deny that American power had its own specificities. As demonstrated elsewhere in this
project, the culture of the U.S. military and the republican character of American democracy
both influenced the style of rule in Mindanao and Sulu. But to stipulate a purely dyadic
relationship between the United States and Southern Philippines is to overlook multiple areas
of reciprocal connection involving other actors.
By tapping into networks of cultural exchange, imperial or otherwise, the student of
American empire sees that even in spaces perceived as remote or isolated there are high

3
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degrees of connectivity. This does not mean that the local or national are rejected as tools of
analysis. Rather, they are given further depth and texture by exploring their interactivities
with ‘outside’ entities, from individuals to empires. Studying the resultant cross-pollinations
– with their mimicries, adaptations, critiques, hybridities, or rejections – allows richer
conceptualizations of the character of colonial societies. In this manner, we move past the
comparative and into the transcolonial, or inter-imperial, and escape the constraints of
methodological approaches that promote nationalist-exceptionalist or colonialistexceptionalist models. Prasenjit Duara stresses territorial boundaries as “illusory means of
keeping histories apart,” and here I add that nationalist historiographies and their intellectual
4

boundaries operate in the same manner. By mapping “the uneven pulses that linked regions
and nations across the modern world” my approach treats histories and historiographies not as
5

hermetic entities but as overlapping explanatory frameworks. In the case of the Southern
Philippines, it demonstrates that even the supposed frontiers of colonial empire were often
heterogeneous spaces connected to and continuously reshaped by global flows of people,
commodities, ideas, governance models, and so forth.
Understanding the colonial experience in the Southern Philippines is not simply a
matter of comparing the policies of the United States to other European colonial empires,
although that constitutes an important component. Part of this process involves assessing the
relations between non-Western actors, and by moving outside notions of late nineteenthcentury empire as the sole domain of Europeans and Americans to examine the role that nonEuropean empires like the Ottomans played in the relationship between the United States and
the Moros. As Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton observe, “the metropole-colony binary
that has organized so much writing on empires fails to illuminate the complex commercial
arrangements, knowledge networks, and political affiliations that developed within and
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frequently split out of imperial systems.” In moving beyond these binaries, we can better
view how colonial power was shaped and mediated by traffic between and within empires, by
imperial mimesis, and through the often surprising ability of the local to assert itself against
broader prerogatives of control and reconfiguration. This complicates our view of the
Southern Philippines between 1899 and the Second World War, but also provides a textured
view of the colonial experience that is missed otherwise.
This chapter uses group and individual biography as a means of showing mobility and
connection. If notions of the ‘transnational’ or the ‘transcolonial’ are sometimes theoretically
oblique, it is in lived experiences that we can most readily grasp the permeability of borders
and complexities of cultural transfer. I have peopled the following with wanderers, who
passed through the Southern Philippines on lifelong global journeys, or who utilized their
own hybrid identities to influence the societies they operated within. The manifestations of
these encounters were alternately violent, intimate, exploitative, and productive. The men and
women who travelled through empire did so for money, for adventure, for romance, for
religion, for education, and for ideology. As we shall see, there was not an atypical
transcolonial ‘type’ in Mindanao and Sulu. To borrow the words of Angela Woolacott,
Desley Deacon, and Penny Russell, “transnationalism is not a mere analytic category. It is
unalterably an element of human experience.”

7

The following is broken into five sections, which together argue for an analytical
approach to American colonialism in the Southern Philippines that acknowledges the
formative role played by trans-regional and inter-imperial connectivities. The first section is
an overview of how Americans in the Southern Philippines drew upon Spanish colonial
knowledge and experience for their own projects. The second examines Mindanao and Sulu
as hybrid spaces, where individuals from a diffuse array of backgrounds interacted against
backdrop of empire, and where colonial empires themselves collaborated with and critiqued
one another. The third section is a study of how colonial personnel and ideas circulated
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throughout Southeast Asia between 1899 and 1942. Numerous American officials involved in
the administration of the Southern Philippines visited European colonial possessions and
chronicled their experiences in letters to one another, in their diaries, and in official reports.
Belying exceptionalist rhetoric, inter-imperial exchange between American and European
colonials was an important means to chart developments in agriculture, engineering,
sanitation, penology, education, and many other fields, as well as take stock of the
competition. It was also an opportunity for professionals with transferrable skills – in our case
soldiers and engineers – to market their abilities in multiple imperial contexts. The fourth
section assesses the relationship between the Moros, the Americans, and the Muslim world.
Forging their own global networks, Moro elites looked to the Islamic ummah, in particular
the Ottoman Empire, to bolster claims of spiritual and temporal authority in the face of
colonial incursion. American officials also attempted to profit from the relationship between
the Moros and the Ottomans, creating tensions within the colonial government in the
Philippines. The final section briefly considers ethnic diaspora and transnational connections
between Japanese migrants, Filipinos, and Moros.

Antecedents
Arriving in the Southern Philippines, American officials looked to Spanish colonial
knowledge, which they consciously built on in their quest to remold their new subjects.
Initially, press coverage of the Spanish-American War emphasized a feminized and morally
debased Spanish colonial culture at odds with the martial masculinity and progressive outlook
of the American republic. Whereas the Spanish authorities were irredeemably corrupted by
their incestuous relationship with missionary Catholicism, Americans saw themselves as
beyond such conflicts due to their elevated Protestant sensibilities and secular government.

8

Likewise, American colonials were confident that their transformational visions for the
people of the Philippine Archipelago would not be compromised and fragmented like the ad
hoc Spanish versions, which they viewed in racial terms as products of a sensuous and
corrupt Latinate culture. New standards of rationalization and management would replace the

8
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tyranny and inefficiency of the religious orders in managing the underdeveloped lands, and
the peoples of the archipelago would be uplifted from neglected squalor via modern
9

sanitation and hygiene technologies, secular education, and honest wage labour.

As tends to happen, these strategies of differentiation were more pristine ideals than
functional realities when Americans confronted the practicalities of managing a colonial
possession. Famously, the Americans looked to Jesuit scientific research and production in
reorganizing the Philippine Meteorological Service, recognizing the significant
10

accomplishments of the religious order at their Manila Observatory.

Elsewhere, economic

experts studied Spanish monetary policies to reduce the frictions of colonial transition.

11

The

Spanish elites in Manila and other cities were called upon to provide intelligence on the
Filipino ilustrado class and those among them most likely to intrigue against U.S.
authorities.

12

While public pronouncements about the Spanish, such as those of John

Foreman in the Contemporary Review, continued to emphasize the “religious despotism and
greed” of their colonial enterprise, the Americans in the Philippines were also learning from
13

their predecessors.

9
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Foreman’s condemnation of Spain’s colonial endeavours was expansive: “Spain as a conquering nation has
been a great success; but the days of conquest have long gone by. As a colonising nation she has proved a great
failure from the beginning, for wherever she has ceased to hold her own by sheer force of arms no merited
gratitude of a prosperous people has been able to hold together those bonds originally created by the sword.
Where military despotism has opened the way, generous intelligent administration has not followed in the wake
to promote the happiness and wellbeing of the subjected races. The two great factors in the decline of Spanish
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In Sulu, negotiations between Brigadier General John Bates and Sultan Jamalul Kiram
II occurred throughout the summer of 1899. Each man relied on treaties the Tausūg royals
made with the Spanish in the previous half-century. In his notes from the negotiations, Bates
and his staff paid close attention to material in previous treaties on the suppression of piracy,
the purchase and sale of firearms, the exclusive use of the Spanish flag, the treatment of
missionaries, matters of trade and taxation, and salaries for the Sultan and other important
Tausūg leaders. Bates also took notes on the 1851 agreement that stipulated the Spanish not
14

interfere in Tausūg religion and customs.

In interviews with Kiram and leading datus, he

promised that the United States would replace Spain in honouring treaties. Bates sought a
revised version of the 1878 treaty between Spain and the Sulu Sultanate, wherein the Spanish
assumed sovereignty over the islands of the archipelago.
Elwell S. Otis, Military Governor of the Philippines, did not mince words, explaining
that “the Kingly prerogatives of Spain, thus abridged by solemn concession, have descended
to the United States, and conditions existing at the time of transfer should remain.” Otis
continued, saying the Moros were “entitled to enjoy identical privileges” to those they
15

maintained under the Spanish “until abridged or modified by future mutual agreement.”

The meetings that concluded with the Bates Treaty were forged upon the understandings the
Sultan had had with the Spanish, although Otis believed that the United States would better
handle revenue reform, trade, and “the educational and social conditions of the inhabitants”
of the Sulu Archipelago.

16

At one point during the negotiations, Bates told Kiram sharply

(through a translator) that:
The matter has been discussed a long time between his representatives and
myself and I see no reason why we should bring it up again. We have

rule have been religious despotism and greed.” – John Foreman, “Spain and the Philippine Islands,” The
Contemporary Review 74 (1898), 32-33.
14
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copies of treaties here with Spain, and I take them as evidence…It is
published to the world in this shape, and this treaty says it will be published
at Manila and at Madrid and it was so published to the world in this way
and this is the way we got it, and we whipped the Spanish, drove them out
and took their place, and we got all the rights that Spain had. We do not
want to do an injustice.

17

Bates’ frustration with the Sultan arose from Kiram’s unwillingness to accept that American
legitimacy in Sulu was enshrined by their victory over the Spanish. In the same interview,
Bates enticed Kiram by talking about the “great many Mohammedans” in the British
possessions who were “living very contentedly,” and the “proper dignity” shown to their
chiefs and high officers. Kiram responded that he had “heard that Americans were just as
good and better than the English as they gave more liberty than the English did.”

18

American military officers relied upon translated Spanish texts to interpret the
Southern Philippines. With scant information from American sources available, Spanish
histories of Mindanao and Sulu were invaluable. The Jesuit Priest Francisco X. Baranera’s
Compendio de la Historia de Filipinas was translated into English within a year of the
American occupation. In it were long descriptions of the physical characteristics of the
islands, including the flora and fauna, mineral resources, and a compendium of which crops
could be grown successfully. More importantly for incoming colonial officials, it was a
blueprint for Spanish colonial rule, giving numbers of troops stationed in each region, details
on how the school system operated, and information on commercial operations. The massive
collection of translated Spanish documents compiled by Emma Blair and James Alexander
Robinson, under supervision of the colonial agent James A. LeRoy, stands as a testament to
American fascination with Spain’s experiences in the Pacific. The Philippine Islands 1493-
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Ibid. Hugh Scott, Governor of Sulu, did not think highly of the Bates Treaty, observing that it created a
situation where “the American, like the Spanish governor, must look on and permit the Moros to murder, rob,
and enslave each other as they saw fit.” – Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier, 288.
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1898 spanned fifty-five volumes and served as a standard (albeit partial) resource for
Americans seeking historical information about their new island possessions.

19

In Baranera’s work, Americans travelling to Mindanao and Sulu could consult
sections on specific regions and find out, for example, that Jolo was “a pretty town with clean
and shady streets” and the vegetation on the island was “similar to that of Mindanao. In the
forests are found narra, molave, nipa-palm, cocoanut trees and others.”

20

Spanish

observations on the character of the Moros instructed Americans how to approach their new
wards. An untitled translation of a Jesuit account of Mindanao and Sulu described the Moros
as “very cunning characters, hypocritic, treacherous, suspicious, cowardly, not serviceable
and beggarly beyond expression” who had “souls habituated towards crime.” The text
continued in this vein, mixing proto-anthropological observations about the traits of the
21

natives with objective information on physical geography and trade.

As we have seen in
22

Chapter Two, many Americans adopted these understandings with little alteration.

Spanish experience fighting and governing the Moros became a reference point for
American colonials as well. The enlisted soldier Walter Cutter noticed during his wanderings
through Jolo “a number of tablets and monuments where the Moros had butchered Spanish
soldiers in times past. One hundred fell at one place, and many were sleeping in the cemetery
who had ‘died with their boots on.’” He reasoned that Tausūg massacres of the Spanish
proved “that our precautions were well taken. Blest by nature as lands are, these islands are
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The history of the Jesuits in Mindanao during the nineteenth-century is fascinating and fraught. The
missionaries existed in a tentative position between government and rebel forces during the Philippine
Revolution and were among the last Spanish residents to leave Mindanao. The final group of Jesuits departed
the island on 17 April 1900. The historian José S. Arcilla claims that the influence of the Jesuits made it “easier
for the Americans to teach the Filipino nation the ways of modern western democracy.” – José S. Arcilla, “The
Philippine Revolution and the Jesuit Missions in Mindanao,” 376; José S. Arcilla, “The Jesuits During the
Philippine Revolution,” Philippine Studies 35.3 (1987): 296-315; José S. Arcilla (ed.), Jesuit Missionary Letters
from Mindanao, Vol.1: The Rio Grande Mission (Quezon City: Philippine Province Archives, 1990); José S.
Arcilla, Jesuit Missionary Letters from Mindanao Vol.2: The Zamboanga-Basilan-Jolo Mission (Quezon City:
Philippine Province Archives, 1993).
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cursed by ignorance and savagery of the worst description.”

John Finley enjoyed peppering

Spanish colonial history into his writings and speeches to demonstrate how he improved upon
their work. He did, however, credit the Spanish general Valeriano Weyler as being the first to
properly understand the “pastoral and peaceful” nature of certain non-Christian tribes on
24

Mindanao.

As late as 1934, the Spanish were still a reference point for managing the South.

A memorandum crossing the desk of Vice Governor J.R. Hayden referenced Spanish rule in
Sulu, stating that the Americans mistakenly followed the Spaniards “by obtaining the free or
forced consent of the Sultan and then using military force to establish and maintain law and
order,” a policy that “invariably met with failure.”

25

After animosities from the Spanish-American War ebbed, many U.S. officials praised
their erstwhile adversaries. Frank McCoy harboured a romantic view of Spain, observing that
relinquishing colonial possessions meant the nation could “retake the brilliant place in the
world which it occupied in the most famous days of its national history.” He further praised
the Spanish special cavalry and the “distinguished services” rendered by the Spanish
Engineer Corps.

26

During his time as Governor of the Moro Province, Tasker Bliss gave a

ringing endorsement of the Spanish colonial legacy. He claimed that when the Americans
came to the Southern Philippines, they encountered “in operation a form of government and
code of laws not ill adapted to the requirements of the people, which had been evolved by the
intelligence and the experience of a long line of Spanish rulers during 300 years.” The
buildings, roads, and other infrastructural projects left behind by Spain demonstrated the
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“skill” of their colonizers, while the “heroic labors of Spanish priests who carried the Cross
and its influence into the most remote regions of the province” was honourable.

27

Far from being dismissed outright, the remnants of Spanish colonialism in the
Southern Philippines were frequently adopted and transformed by the Americans. While all
American officials believed the progressive modernity of the United States would pacify and
transform the region in ways a decayed European monarchy could not, they were also eager
to utilize the intellectual and physical byproducts of Spain’s three centuries of engagement
with Mindanao and Sulu. Rhetoric about Spain’s poisonous Catholic proselytizing and failure
to bring their colonized subjects up to an acceptable civilizational standard was quickly
dropped in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. In the Southern Philippines,
Americans consulted Spanish treaties to frame their own agreements with the Sultan of Sulu,
read Spanish books to learn about the characteristics of the people and land they now
controlled, used Spanish experiences to anchor their own understandings of conflicts with
Muslim populations, and praised Spain’s accomplishments in public speeches. After its
retreat from Asia at the close of the nineteenth-century, the Spanish Empire lived on through
what it transmitted to the United States.

28

Hybrid Peoples, Hybrid Spaces
An examination of population figures for Mindanao and Sulu in 1913, just prior to the
transition to civilian control, shows a region peopled by Moros, Lumads, and Filipinos. The
estimated population of 518,695 included 324,816 Moros, 103,358 Lumads, and 85,148
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Speech at Zamboanga Fair, February 1907, Box 43, Folder 5. Tasker Bliss Collection, USAHEC.

The effects of Spain’s relationship with the Moros lingered as well. The Samal leader Datu Mandi, a
favourite of the Spanish, served them as an interpreter on Bongao. He quickly became close with the Americans,
transferring his loyalties from one colonial power to another. Arolas Tulawie, an important figure in the cultural
battles waged between traditionalists and modernizers on Sulu in the 1920s and 1930s, was named after the
Spanish military leader Juan Arolas. In a letter to Teopisto Guingona, the first director of the Bureau of NonChristian Tribes, he claimed that his namesake was “respected and loved…because he was great and respected
our religious rights.” However, Tulawie thought that in general the Spanish were never able to rule the Moros
because they were morally weak. “A Moro despises weakness,” he wrote, going on to say that from what he had
witnessed of “Filipinos, their morals, education, religion, and civilization” that Moros would prefer to look after
themselves. Here he created linkages between the “weakness” of the Spanish and that of the Christian Filipinos.
– Letter from Arolas Tulawie to Teopisto Guingona, 12 August 1920, Box 29, Folder 24. J.R. Hayden Papers,
BHL.
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Filipinos. These numbers further broke down to account for the various cultural and tribal
subdivisions on the islands. The Maguindanaos, for example, were the most populous of the
Moro groups with 90,000 people. This left a small number of “Americans and foreigners” to
round out the figures. In Zamboanga, the colonial hub of the Southern Philippines, there were
1,062 Chinese, 387 Americans and Europeans, and 343 Japanese. A further 3,584 Americans,
Europeans, Japanese, and Chinese lived in other parts of the region, bringing the total number
to 5,376. In the following years, the numbers of Americans dropped as Filipinization
accelerated (although, as we have seen, Americans often occupied key posts into the late
29

1930s), while Japanese migration to the islands accelerated.

While remnants of the Spanish planter class remained along the Zamboanga
Peninsula, the Europeans in Zamboanga proper often represented foreign firms. Banks,
steamship lines, trading concerns, and manufacturers all had interests in the region and many
sent employees already well-practiced in colonial milieus. These men and their families
participated in white colonial life alongside the Americans. They socialized at the same
whites-only clubs, golfed together, and engaged in business ventures. Like the Americans, the
Europeans remained socially aloof from Filipinos, Moros, and Lumads. In his memoirs,
Charles Ivins commented at length on the “British and European business and plantation
people” who circulated through the region in the 1930s. Ivins’ recollections of one Scottish
couple, Ian and Heather McDougal, illustrated the competitive and collaborative relationship
between the Americans and Europeans in Zamboanga. The McDougals, he wrote, were
“mightily engaged in maintaining British superiority over the natives, the Americans,
including the military, and all other persons of whatever origin. The fact that the British had
no authority whatsoever in Zamboanga bothered neither of them a whit.” The verbal sparring
between Ivins and Ian McDougal covered a variety of topics, including the state of the
American banking system, the relative strengths of the U.S. and British militaries, and the
marital status of the Prince of Wales. Ian McDougal represented the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China (now Standard Chartered) and was also British Consul in Zamboanga.
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Pershing, Annual Report 1913, 50-53. The census of 1913 was the first made in Mindanao and Sulu since the
nationwide one in 1903. Pershing’s report admitted that the population study was “made under quite adverse
conditions.”
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Friendly competition aside, Ivins and the other Americans used McDougal as their banker,
golfed with him, and regularly attended parties thrown by his wife that featured “white coated
30

bare-footed Filipino boys.” Ivins’ interactions with the McDougals were emblematic of the
relations between Americans and Europeans in the region more broadly, where matters of
national pride and competition were often trumped by a shared sense of racial-civilizational
kinship.
Chinese migration to the Muslim South had been occurring for centuries prior to
America’s arrival, although settlement numbers increased from the mid nineteenth-century
onwards.

31

As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese in Mindanao and Sulu were firmly

linked to regional and international trade networks, often acting as the primary merchants and
moneylenders in settled areas. They also grew and sold produce from their small farms. This
placed them in an unusual intermediary role between the Americans, Filipinos, Moros, and
Lumads, as their livelihoods gave them cause to interact with each of the groups. The
American view of the Chinese was predictably coloured by familiar racial tropes that
emphasized their cunning nature and unclean habits, although more dispassionate accounts of
the Chinese presence admitted they were “hard at work improving and developing the
32

country.” Although financially strong, Chinese merchants were outnumbered and rarely
armed, making them easy prey for criminal elements or those jealous of their resources. Thus
when the Americans occupied the island of Siasi, they were greeted by a “manifestation of
joy” from its Chinese residents, victims of the pecuniary predations of Sultan Kiram’s
representatives, who set off “a great number of firecrackers and other fireworks.”

33

Chinese

merchants catered to the western penchant for kitsch throughout the American period. Ah
Wah On of Jolo, who adopted the colloquial name “Chino Charlie,” claimed to have the
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Anthropologist Charles Eugen Guthe encountered evidence of ancient Chinese trading goods and graves
during his expeditions in the Southern Philippines in the 1920s, surmising that intermarriage between Chinese
traders and local families must have been common long before European contact. – “University of Michigan
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largest line of “Moro Curios” in Jolo and to carry a “complete line of Chinese lanterns, both
large and small.” Additionally, a visitor to Ah Wah On’s shop could have a suit tailored, buy
a new pair of shoes, or eat a meal from the short order restaurant.

34

Connections between the Maguindanaos of Cotabato and the Chinese manifested
themselves most readily in the person of Datu Piang. Piang was born in 1846 to a Chinese
father and a Maguindanao Moro mother. His father, Tan Toy, was a trader from Amoy
(present day Xiamen) who visited Dulawan, where he befriended the ruler, Datu Uto. Uto
married Tan to the daughter of an ally and employed him as an advisor. Piang was born
shortly thereafter, and although his father died when he was only eleven he was raised within
35

the orbit of Datu Uto’s court.

During Piang’s early career he was a subordinate of Uto,

serving as his Minister of Lands, but later turned on his mentor, who was viewed by the
people of the Cotabato Valley as a tyrant. Piang sided with Moro oppositionists, led by Uto’s
nephew Ali, and with the approval of the Spanish overthrew the old datu in 1890. After the
ouster of the Spanish in 1899, Piang formed a government to oppose the rule of an insurrecto
junta. He executed twelve Filipino leaders and took steps to protect the Chinese in town, who
as traders and merchants were threatened by the instability. Piang raised the American flag
before U.S. Army troops arrived in Cotabato.

36

The only serious threat to Piang’s rule in the Maguindanaon areas of Western
Mindanao was Datu Ali, who was tracked down and killed by American forces in late 1905.
Until his death in 1933, Piang proved remarkable at both interpreting the prerogatives of the
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Programme of the Jolo Agricultural and Industrial Fair (Jolo: R.B. Hayes Printer, 1906), 10.

Patricio Abinales, “From Orang Besar to Colonial Big Man,” 200; McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, 9192. For Americans arriving in Cotabato, Piang’s Chinese heritage explained his acumen. A 1902 report to the
Philippine Commission read: “He is the only prominent Moro who seems to appreciate what the American
invasion means and the business opportunities it brings with it. The Chinese blood in him makes him a shrewd
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of the Rio Grande,” 57. For a good survey of Datu Uto’s rule, see Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, Magindanao, 18601888: The Career of Datu Uto of Buayan (Manila: Anvil Vintage, 2007) – note: the book was originally
published by the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University in 1971.
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colonial authorities and prospering greatly in his moneymaking ventures. Unlike many Moro
figures from traditional noble lineages, Piang had keen business acumen that allowed him to
prosper as a landlord, rice farmer, and owner of a photography studio. He also cultivated
important connections with colonial grandees like Leonard Wood, W. Cameron Forbes, and
Frank Carpenter. Visiting Piang in 1926, J.R. Hayden described him as a “a real personage”
and, more disparagingly, as “an old, fat, dirty Chinese idol,” albeit one with a “jolly laugh
and a keen sense of humor.” After talking with Piang, Hayden understood his “force and
37

shrewdness” and why he had managed to retain power for so long.

Towards the end of his

life, Piang became an advocate for separating Mindanao and Sulu from the rest of the
Philippines and petitioned President Calvin Coolidge not to allow the Moros to fall under the
38

control of the Filipinos.

Piang’s unlikely rise to power in Cotabato reveals a level of fluidity

in the class structures and social relations of Maguindanaon society. His nebulous status – the
biracial son of a concubine, albeit in the court of a powerful datu – and considerable natural
abilities allowed him to negotiate not only the power dynamics of the Maguindanao elite, but
also those of two colonial regimes.
Unlike more traditionally minded local strongmen in the Southern Philippines, Piang
understood that the integration of Southeast Asia into larger colonial trade regimes signaled
the end of Maguindanao as a politically independent space. Attempts to regulate commerce,
originating first from the European colonial powers and later from the Americans, curtailed
the trade in slaves, imposed taxation on goods, and regulated the movement of peoples. Piang
and the Chinese traders he worked with adapted to these new realities better than most.
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Letter from Datu Piang to Calvin Coolidge, 26 August 1927, Box 28, Folder 33. J.R. Hayden Papers, BHL.
The letter is extraordinary in its indictment of the Filipinos, who are caricatured as villains in the extreme.
According to Piang, the politics of the Filipino are as follows: “Never hesitate at an oath when it is desired to
seduce, never want a pretext when inclined to betray. Insolent to the humble, sycophantic to the great; flatterers
at the seat of power, extortioners at the hovel. Means the most atrociously cruel are resorted to as the more
appealing, being the more swift and sure. Strength of character not one of his characteristics, courage with him
not a point of honor. With a ponderous ego, his vanity is such it persuades him to believe that if he is present
when any deed is done he did it. It is this strong hallucination that causes him to prate about and boast of the
‘liberty he has won’, when all the world knows – except the Filipino – that America won it for him and handed it
to him.” The letter continues in this fashion, and gives an indication of how poor Moro-Filipino relations were in
the 1920s.
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Submitting to American rule readily, he was able to leverage the goodwill of U.S. military
authorities (who viewed him as the ‘ideal’ Moro) to expand his commercial holdings, all
while still exercising the firm control of a regional despot. Patricio Abinales argues that Piang
was a transitional figure, linking the more independent nineteenth-century Maguindanao
society to one increasingly subordinate to outside political power. “Piang became aware that
to keep his power and influence he had to accept the conditions imposed by the new colonial
reality,” writes Abinales.

39

Migration to the Southern Philippines also created culturally hybridic families useful
to the American colonial regime. Foremost among these were the Schucks of the Sulu
Archipelago. In 1864, Captain Herman Schuck, returning to Singapore from a trading mission
to Sulawesi, stopped on Jolo for freshwater and met the Sultan of Sulu Jamalul Alam. The
German trader-explorer and the Tausūg leader liked one another and the meeting marked the
beginning of a long relationship. Eventually, the Sultan granted land to Schuck near the town
of Jolo and in Sandakan Bay in North Borneo. The German used his new allotments to create
his own trading network, originating in Singapore, where he acquired products from a
German-British consortium called the Labuan Trading Company, and spreading across North
Borneo and the Sulu Archipelago. Schuck moved opium, firearms, tobacco and other goods
from Singapore to Tawi-Tawi, exchanging them there for slaves, which he in turn bartered on
Jolo for mother-of-pearl shell. Operating against the backdrop of Spanish incursions into Sulu
Archipelago and inter-imperial intrigue, Schuck managed to maintain his good relations with
the Sultan, and served as an advisor to him in his 1878 treaty with Spain. Settling on Jolo to
take advantage of his ties to Tausūg Royalty, Schuck ran a large plantation, continued his
regional trading, and maintained links with German colonial enterprises in the region like the
German Borneo Company. When he died in 1887 from cholera, Schuck left behind four sons
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from his first marriage, who came from Singapore to settle on Jolo, and another son from a
40

Tausūg wife.

The Schuck brothers – Edward, Charles, Herman, William, and Julius – were
important intermediaries between the Tausūgs and the Americans, serving as interpreters,
advisors, translators, guides, amateur police detectives, militia leaders, and local government
41

agents.

Edward, the oldest, was the official translator during the negotiations between

Sultan Jamalul Kiram II and John Bates in 1899. Bates thought Edward was “genuinely
interested in the development of the country” and believed he had “great influence with the
42

natives” in Sulu, recommending that the colonial authorities utilize the family in future.

During his time as the military commander of Bongao, an island in the Sulu Archipelago not
far from British North Borneo, Sydney Cloman used Herman Schuck as his interpreter and an
unofficial policeman of sorts. Cloman was fond of Herman, who “found a thousand ways to
43

make himself useful” and who was “patient and keen.”

The Schuck brothers had all married

local women, who themselves became notables and mediators on the islands they lived.
William Kobbé, touring Jolo during his time as military governor of the South, witnessed the
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wife of Eddy “settling a dispute over a cock-fight from the second-story window of her
house” with “large crowds standing below to await her decision.”

44

The brothers also

interceded in local affairs occasionally. In 1903, Edward Schuck was accused of keeping the
runaway wife of Hadji Tahir, a girl named Asda who claimed she sought refuge at his
homestead because of abuses she suffered at the hands of her husband.

45

It is difficult to overstate the reliance of American officials on the Schuck brothers,
especially during the first years of military rule. Few American personnel had any knowledge
of the region or its people when they arrived and the Schucks, straddling the liminal space
between Westerners and natives, were ideal middlemen. In military encounters, one or more
Schuck brother inevitably served as translators and guides. Charlie Schuck was chief
interpreter for Colonel Joseph W. Duncan during the expedition that culminated in the Bud
Dajo massacre, and the 4th Cavalry and 6th Infantry used the Schuck family plantation
46

southeast of the town of Jolo as a staging point beforehand.

Charlie was also involved in the

hunt for pirate Jikiri in 1908-1909, briefly capturing him in 1908 and guiding Captain Charles
Rhodes on an expedition to Siet Lake in May 1909. The following month, he was shot in the
leg and abdomen during an encounter on Pata Island, but recovered in time to participate in
47

the violent final confrontation with Jikiri on Patian Island.

In 1911, Charlie and Julius

Schuck once again advised military officers during the crisis over disarmament on Jolo that
caused Pershing’s cordon of a band of Tausūg holdouts on Bud Dajo.

48

By 1914, three of the Schuck brothers were dead. Herman moved to Bongao and was
beheaded in a dispute there, Edward died in 1912, and Charlie was murdered on Jolo in
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1914. Nevertheless, the two remaining brothers, Willie and Julius, and the surviving
children and wives of the deceased ensured the family continued playing an important, if
occasionally controversial, role in the politics of Sulu. Willie and Alexander Schuck served as
special agents for the Province of Sulu into the 1920s, and the former became Deputy
Governor of Tawi-Tawi in 1928.

50

The family incessantly politicked on Jolo, making and

breaking alliances with political officials, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, and members
of the Philippine Constabulary. As Governor of Sulu in the 1930s, James Fugate was often
frustrated by the attempts of Julius Schuck and his Tausūg wife Ruckaya to intervene in the
appointment of officials, stating at one point that they tried to “destroy” Arolas Tulawie, a
Moro notable who at the time served as Third Member in the provincial government.

51

During the later colonial years, various family members continued their plantation work and
also produced railway ties.

52

In Zamboanga, the Jurika family were also fascinating intermediary figures. Stefan
Jurika was a Czech born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire who became an American citizen.
He volunteered to fight in the Spanish-American War, and was sent to the Southern
Philippines, where he settled after leaving the army. Stefan started a trading company that
later opened branches in Zamboanga, Davao, and Cotabato. In Jolo, the headquarters of the
trading company doubled as a bar and pawnshop for servicemen and Filipinos. “Jurika’s
Place” advertised itself as “the finest drinking place in Jolo” and offered alcohol of all types
as well as “a line of the finest cigars.” An advertisement for the business from 1906 informed
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guests that they were “always sure of receiving the finest of goods, a hearty welcome and
53

drinks made up by skilled drink dispensers.”

Blanche and Stefan had children and moved to

Zamboanga, where they entered into business with a local Filipino and started Torrejon,
Jurika & Co. Inc., becoming the official distributor for Colgate products, including “hair
tonics, cosmetics, shampoos, and dental preparations.”

54

As president of the company, Stefan Jurika created closer links between the Muslim
South and trade networks in the Americas and Europe. Visiting Washington in 1907 en route
to sell pearls in Austria, he told the Washington Post that savvy American investors would be
wise to educate themselves on “the abundance of coal, iron, gold, and other minerals” found
in the Philippines, and claimed there had been “much misrepresentation of the mutinous
disposition of the natives” in the American press.

55

After moving to Zamboanga, Jurika

became the representative for a variety of concerns, including steamship lines, the Milton G.
Cooper Dry Goods Company, and the Goodyear Tire Company. He used a trip to Los
Angeles in 1923 to encourage American businesses to buy unprocessed native products from
56

the Philippines and, in return, sell their manufactures there.

When he died in 1928, Stefan

had spent three decades in the islands and established himself as one of the most active
merchants in Mindanao and Sulu.
His wife Blanche continued the business, using their savings to start a cocoanut
plantation at Panabutan Bay, seventy miles northeast of Zamboanga. She also opened a
hardware and dry goods store which, visiting in the mid-1930s, Charles Ivins called “the
equivalent of any oriental bazaar I have ever seen.” The shop carried items from all over the
world and, unlike some of the other American and European businesses in the region, catered
primarily to Moro customers. “Most of the Moros traded there,” wrote Ivins, “and it was one
of the Zamboanga sights to watch her and a group of native women haggle over the price of a
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box of matches or a cooking pot.”

57

Unlike like many Americans and Europeans in the

Southern Philippines, the Jurikas were long-time residents who became close with their Moro
neighbours. Ivins, whose personal life in Zamboanga was typically segregated from the
Moros and Filipinos, was surprised by Blanche Jurika’s ability to “go anywhere” among the
58

Moros “completely unarmed, day or night, and not be afraid of personal violence.”

Blanche relocated to Manila in the late 1930s, where she spent her time writing
fantastical children’s stories about the animals of the Philippines for the Sunday edition of the
Manila Tribune. She also presented a radio program for children on KZRH that aired three
times a week where she told “old legends and stories out of the living literature of all nations
59

east and west.” She stayed in Manila during the Japanese occupation, volunteering in a
hospital while covertly raising money for the resistance movement. In early 1944, a Filipino
double agent betrayed her cell and she was arrested by the Kempeitai (Japanese military
police) and imprisoned at Fort Santiago. She was beheaded in August 1944 in Manila’s North
Cemetery and buried in an unmarked grave along with other executed American and Filipino
civilians.
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Regional relationships likewise linked Mindanao and Sulu to the wider world. This is
best illustrated in linkages with British North Borneo (present-day Sabah). The region, on the
northeastern tip of the island, was acquired through 1878 negotiations between the Austrian
businessman Baron von Overbeck, Sultan Abdul Mumin of Brunei, and Sultan Jamalul Alam
of Sulu. Alfred and Edward Dent, powerful British traders operating out of Shanghai and
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London, backed the deal and William H. Treacher, a career colonial administrator who was
then acting Governor of Labuan, supervised the negotiations. Overbeck sold his shares in the
land to the Dents in 1880, and they returned to London to petition the Foreign and Colonial
Offices for a Royal Charter, which was granted in November 1881. The resulting British
North Borneo Chartered Company, modeled upon the East India Company, controlled around
28,000 square kilometers of land, which it attempted to develop industrially, agriculturally,
and commercially for the profit of its shareholders and the glory of the British Empire.
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The natives of the Sulu Archipelago saw little distinction between their islands and
North Borneo. The lease or sale (depending on who one asked) of Sabah by the Sultan of
Sulu was a revenue generation scheme for both parties, but for the average Tausūg merchant
who plied his trade between Tawi-Tawi and Sandakan there was little impact. In the years
prior to the Spanish-American War and for some time afterwards, Zamboanga and Jolo
maintained closer communication links with Sandakan than they did with Manila. In practical
terms, this meant people, manufactures, and information passing in and out of the Southern
Philippines had closer ties with British colonial networks originating in Singapore, Hong
Kong, and London.
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Spanish and Moro residents of Mindanao, fleeing instability and

insurrecto violence after the collapse of Spanish colonial power, went to Sandakan. One such
person was Don Jose Alvarez y Sebastian, a mestizo plantation owner who travelled to the
British colony by way of Jolo. While temporarily exiled in Sandakan, he received news
updates from the Moros and Chinese travelling between the port settlements. Visiting Jolo in
September 1899, Don Jose was interviewed by the Americans and pleaded his case as a
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“Zamboangan…a mixed race, formed by the union of Spaniards, Chinos, Moros, Tagalos and
Visayan” and not a Spaniard. He expressed his desire to return to Zamboanga and embraced
63

American sovereignty.

People and goods moved freely between North Borneo and the new American
possessions. The Schuck brothers left Sulu for a number of years after the death of their
father and started a coffee plantation in Borneo, where they grew Liberian beans through a
combination of wage and slave labour.

64

Population transfers between the two territories

were common, and famines or serious epidemics occurring in the Sulu Archipelago often led
residents there to relocate to North Borneo, where many had familial and commercial
connections. Since Spanish control over the Sulu Archipelago had always been tentative, and
the British were wont to encourage the channeling of trade through Sandakan, the traffic
between these contiguous spaces was largely unregulated. The sultans of Sulu always
insisted that they were merely ‘renting’ Sabah to the British North Borneo Chartered
Company for $5,000 per annum, although their ability to renege on the deal was non65

existent.

American officials also saw themselves as connected to the British possessions in

Borneo. Hugh Scott compared the efforts of the Americans to those of James Brooke, more
commonly known as Rajah Brooke, in Sarawak. Brooke’s work reducing banditry and
creating a “strong and substantial government,” thought Scott, made the people of Sarawak
disposed towards colonial rule. “In like manner the better class of people in Jolo feel thus
66

towards the United States,” he claimed.

During his negotiations with Sultan Jamalul Kiram II, John Bates contacted officials
in British North Borneo for assistance, attempting to secure the academic Nicholas Belfield
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Dennys, who was then working for the North Borneo Company at Sandakan, as an
interpreter. Dennys was the author of a work that made cultural comparisons between
Chinese folklore and “its affinities with that of the Aryan and Semitic Races,” as well as A
67

Descriptive Dictionary of British Malaya.

Kiram likewise used connections in the British

colony, calling upon Hadji Usman, a Tausūg appointed as the Sultan’s representative on the
island of Siasi two years prior. Between 1881 and 1897, Usman was in the employ of the
North Borneo Company as a maritime pilot. Knowing some English, he helped translate the
meetings between Bates and the Sultan, and told Bates: “I am very glad the Americans came
here as I have been accustomed to English rule for many years and as English and American
rule are practically identical I am very glad they are here.” Usman then inquired about
68

employment opportunities with the new colonial government.

Illegal traffic between the Southern Philippines and Borneo was a recurring issue for
American officials. As early as June 1899, Commander Very of the USS Castine was
reporting “illicit traffic” between Sandakan and Mindanao, noting that “if the reports are true
69

there are several chartered steamers trading on that group.”

Americans wanted to regulate

trade, migration, and eliminate the vices of gambling, opium, and prostitution from Mindanao
and Sulu. They were shocked to find dubious characters from North Borneo openly seeking
business opportunities in Zamboanga and Jolo. A Japanese brothel-owner in Sandakan named
Otama, for instance, petitioned William Kobbé to open up an “accommodation house” in
Zamboanga and bring fifteen to twenty young women to work there. Although he ensured
Kobbé that the brothel would meet the highest standards of safety and conduct, it is doubtful
70

authorities gave Otama permission for his operation.

The smuggling of people and goods

between Borneo and the Sulu Archipelago was so vexatious to E.L. Cook, a regional customs
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official in Jolo, that he submitted a plan to Manila aimed at reorganizing the district. Cook
suggested that a large customs boat be put on constant patrol of the water, ensuring “a large
amount of these smaller craft would be forced to relinquish this illicit trade, and so in time the
greater part of the same would be brought under the surveillance of the Customs.” In the
same letter, Cook advised Morgan Shuster that appointing a permanent customs official with
71

Constabulary-backing would also curb illegal activities.

Slaving and smuggling, often inextricably intertwined, continued apace. At the end of
his time in the Insular Government, Dean Worcester complained that “unless the long arm of
Uncle Sam is vigorously exercised slavery and peonage will continue to flourish in the
Philippines,” and referenced his experiences at an open-air slave market where Dutch planters
72

from Borneo purchased the human wares from the Moros.

John C. Early complained of a

“constant ingress of Chinese from Borneo through the southern islands.” The coastguard ship
that patrolled the waters off of Mindanao was not fast enough to catch the quick vintas the
migrants arrived in and the government in the South lacked the funds to hold or deport
73

them.

By the Commonwealth period, the transitional government was experimenting with

travel passes aimed at “minimizing the smuggling of aliens between the southern islands and
the colonies near Mindanao, like Borneo and the East Indies.”

74

Connected to this human traffic were questions of inter-colonial policing and
surveillance. Contact and coordination between the Americans and the British authorities in
Borneo benefited both. Philippine commissioner Jacob Gould Schurman made an inspection
tour to British North Borneo in the summer of 1899, where he met the British resident at
Labuan, R.M. Little. On returning to the small British colony, just off the coast of Brunei,
Little contacted the U.S. Navy, inviting any ships travelling past Labuan to visit there,
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discussing the possible coordination of trade routes between Sulu and the island, and
providing information on a seditious character who had been aiding the insurrecto General
Emilio Aguinaldo. “I shall not allow Labuan to be made a centre for any intrigues with the
Filipinos,” he declared in his letter.
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Once a system of colonial policing was established in

Sulu and Mindanao, dialogue between Americans and the British in Borneo became standard
practice. Crossing the invisible border that separated the colonies was often a means of
escaping capture, hence the efforts to coordinate. The British regularly contacted authorities
in Sulu. In October 1902, Lieutenant George Duncan, then stationed in Tawi-Tawi, received
word from the Superintendent of Police in Sandakan of a break-in at the museum there. Two
elephant tusks had been stolen and the Sandakan police believed Datu Tan Tong of Simunul
was responsible. As Siminul was under American control, Duncan made a search of Datu Tan
Tong’s property on behalf of the British. Nothing was found, however, and Tan Tong
requested he be allowed to travel to Sandakan to clear his name.
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A more serious incident occurred in January 1905, when a mercenary and pirate
named Pala, previously hired by Sultan Kiram to hunt down Panglima Hassan, raided a
settlement in British North Borneo. He and his men killed thirty-five people, returning to Jolo
afterwards. With him, Pala brought “a number of recruits from other islands, deserters from
the Constabulary, and disorderly characters of all kinds” and fomented unrest, exploiting the
widespread dislike of the cedula tax. Scott received an official arrest and extradition request
from Whitehall in March and asked Leonard Wood to send him more troops for a campaign
against Pala and his band. Some twelve hundred men representing a variety of companies and
detachments of the U.S. Army, the Philippine Scouts, and the Moro Constabulary moved
against Pala in early May. It was the native Constabulary troops who finally tracked down
and killed the outlaw, confronting his band in close quarters fighting. In the days immediately
following, Wood’s men attacked other hostile groups on the island, including that of
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Tungalang, a prophet claiming his divine powers bestowed invulnerability and invisibility
upon his followers. Afterwards, Wood concluded that Pala was “the head and front of the
trouble, and realizing what must happen to him eventually on account of his crimes in
Borneo, made every effort to gather about him others like himself.”

77

Despite these impressive displays of force, crimes committed between empires
continued, as did coordinated responses to them. In April 1909, a group of seven Moros from
Manuk Manka, near Bongao in the Sulu Archipelago, travelled to Sulawesi where they
robbed and killed two Dutch planters. The Moros made the long voyage back to Manuk
Manka chased by a Dutch gunboat, which was unable to catch them before they disembarked.
The Dutch contacted the Constabulary detachment on Bongao, and the Americans took the
attack seriously enough that they reinforced the Constabulary with four companies of infantry
from Jolo. While the Americans searched the island for the fugitives, the Dutch gunboat
patrolled the waters. The partnership bore fruit when all of the suspects were apprehended
apart from the leader, who was captured shortly thereafter by “friendly Moros.”

78

Americans visiting North Borneo inevitably wrote about what they saw with a critical
eye, comparing it with their own efforts in the Philippines. Taking a vacation in 1922, John
Early travelled aboard a steamship en route to Sandakan. His first-class companions were an
assortment of colonial characters, including a Scotsman who regaled the others with his tales
of the Boer War, a drunken British naval officer, a British couple representing a firm that
hoped to export guano from the Micronesian island of Nauru (then a German colony), and a
New Zealander who bought curios in China for sale back home. Onboard, Early witnessed
the beating of Chinese prisoners, en route from Macao to a penal colony in Timor, by a
Portuguese lieutenant who had spent years living in England. This demonstrated, according to
Early, “how thin was the veneer of Anglo-Saxon fair play” in the “Latin” army officer. In this
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case, and many others, long sea voyages were often sites of inter-imperial contact and
dialogue.

79

Early’s first impressions of Sandakan were unfavourable. He sneered at the
government living off the “wages of shame” by legalizing and regulating vice, and observed
that the “town was quite unimproved and there were few roads leading out from it to nearby
plantations.” Early’s sense of colonial morality drove his criticisms. The British at Sandakan
had failed in their paternal mission, and since the colony was run like a business (which, in
effect, it actually was) “anything which did not pay was abandoned…there was in fact little
done to ameliorate the harsh conditions of life in the jungle settlement.” Early argued that the
British kept their labourers in a state of ignorance as a “matter of policy” and this caused a
disavowal of the “uplift movement” to the detriment of the colony. Such indifference to
civilizational imperatives, combined with the toleration of vice, encouraged a state of
dissipation in Sandakan. Chinese coolie labourers smoked opium “with the consent and to the
profit of the state” and those who were unhappy with their work contracts fled to the
Philippines, usually by way of Sulu and Mindanao. “They were content to risk capture and
deportation to China,” Early wrote, “rather than remain in Borneo under conditions as they
were.”
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Other Americans travelling through North Borneo were not as critical. Charles Ivins
enjoyed his time in Sandakan, and compared the British North Borneo Chartered Company to
“the old Hudson’s Bay Company” in Canada. He was impressed with the organization of the
town, but the Chinese opera he attended was “without doubt the dizziest affair ever dreamed
up by man since the Flood.”
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Harry Bandholtz, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary from

1907 until 1913, purchased an orangutan from a British Constabulary officer there and named
him Mike. Governor General Forbes was “absolutely fascinated” by the creature and “played
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with him a good deal.”

82

All of which is to say, Americans were linked to their fellow

imperialists in North Borneo in any number of ways – travel, sociality, trade, and policing
among them. As extensive as they were, however, relations with North Borneo were only one
facet of a larger series of inter-imperial connections between the Southern Philippines and the
rest of the world.

Colonial Transfers
“One of the first things Wood did was to send me around to Borneo, Java, and the British
Lake Peninsula to see how other people were doing,” George Langhorne told Leonard
Wood’s biographer Hermann Hagedorn. “On that trip we went into all sorts of details with
local governments and brought back a number of things in the way of plans for houses, ways
of running things, and whenever we learned anything from that trip that was good, we put it
into effect.” Langhorne observed that the Moro Exchanges were modeled on markets he and
83

his travel companions saw in other Southeast Asian colonies.

Langhorne’s travels were not

exceptional or isolated. Many of the soldiers and civilians shaping policy in Mindanao and
Sulu did so by drawing inspiration or directly borrowing from other colonial contexts. The
region itself hosted a variety of transcolonial characters – attracted through their work as
professional soldiers or engineers, or because of business opportunities, or just stopping in the
Southern Philippines before migrating to other outposts of empire.
Americans turned to the British Empire for guidance on how to run a colonial state,
and, according to Frank Schumacher, these interactions “provided an intellectual framework
84

within which Americans could discuss their own ideas about colonial rule.”

Sharing a

common language, boosters of empire on both sides of the Atlantic swapped ideas in
newspapers and periodicals, traveled on the same ocean liners and in the same train carriages,
intermarried, went into business with one other, and attended international conferences
together. “The success of Anglo-Saxonism as a racial-exceptionalist bridge between the
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United States and the British Empire,” Paul Kramer argues, “was due in part to the social,
familial, intellectual, and literary networks that tied elite Americans and Britons together.”

85

In a rapidly connecting world, the perception of a shared racial and cultural heritage led many
Americans to look to the British Empire as a blueprint upon which to model their own
colonial future. While the Americans and British were often critical of one another, a
conjoined sense of Anglo-Saxon moral mission ultimately overrode issues that arose.
Evidence of this is found in the sustained collaboration between American and British
colonial possessions during the first half of the twentieth-century. American businessmen
arriving in the Philippines found well-established trade networks led by British merchants
linking the islands with the economies of the Pacific world. These men modeled their racially
exclusive clubs and associations on those the British had already established. Protestant moral
reformers from Britain and the United States used the Philippines as a staging ground for
86

their battles against prostitution and opium.

Colonial elites circumnavigating the globe on their way to or from the Philippines
stopped frequently in Britain and its colonies on their journeys. Such was the case with W.
Cameron Forbes, who “consciously modeled himself on British officials” during his time as
head of the colonial Philippines.

87

Forbes met multiple times with Lord Cromer, famous for

his colonial administration of Egypt. During one meeting in 1909, the two discussed
irrigation, land titles, the potentialities of the unused land in the Philippines, and systems of
taxation. Cromer provided Forbes with reports from the Foreign Office and contacts with old
colonial hands. After this meeting, Forbes continued onwards to Egypt. Now proconsul of
Islamic peoples himself, he wanted to view the imperial management of a Muslim state. With

85
86

Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons,” 1326.

On prohibition and moral reform in the colonial Philippines, see Ian Tyrrell, “The Regulation of Alcohol and
Other Drugs in a Colonial Context: United States Policy Towards the Philippines, c. 1898-1910,” Contemporary
Drug Problems 35 (2008): 539-569; Daniel J.P. Wertz, “Idealism, Imperialism, and Internationalism: Opium
Politics in the Colonial Philippines, 1898-1925,” Modern Asian Studies 47.2 (2013): 467-499. For the British
context, see John Stuart, “Beyond Sovereignty? Protestant Missions, Empire and Transnationalism, 1890-1950,”
in Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c. 1880-1950, ed. Kevin Grant el al. (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 103-125.
87

Carnes Lord, Proconsuls: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from Rome to America Today
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 79.

379

the aid of a Foreign Office contact, Forbes examined irrigation plans, weighed the merits of
British schemes for Egyptian wage labour, and visited the chief engineer at Port Said, who
gave him a tour of the waterworks there. The trip was also something of a vacation, and
Forbes climbed the Great Pyramid, tried to acquire an Arab stallion for polo (to no avail), and
reflected on the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam in his idle moments. He returned to the
Philippines by way of the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean, and five months later was putting
the ideas he gathered abroad to work on an inspection trip to Mindanao and Sulu.

88

Charles Brent also visited Cromer, albeit in Cairo and not London. Writing to Frank
McCoy, then serving as Leonard Wood’s aide in Zamboanga, the Episcopal clergyman
related that “General Wood was in the mouth of everyone” he met in Cairo, and that he had
“lots to talk about” regarding Egypt when he returned to Mindanao. Cromer, Brent thought,
89

was “a statesman of no ordinary caliber” to whom he was “greatly attracted.”

His

enthusiasm for Cromer did not dim, and years later in Zamboanga he used the British
statesman as an example of morally upstanding imperial stewardship, alongside General
Charles Gordon and the British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston. In devising “unselfish”
colonial policies, the Americans could take inspiration from such men.
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At the Lake

Mohonk Conference in 1910, he quoted Sir Henry Maine’s statements on India (which he
took from Cromer’s writings) to further his moral case for colonial empire, and concluded his
lecture by paraphrasing Cromer on “handing over the torch of progress and civilization” to
the colonized peoples.
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British colonial empire inspired other Americans involved in the reconfiguration of
the Philippines. Leonard Wood was kept abreast of developments in India through
correspondence with the journalist Richard Barry, who relayed his conversations with Lord
Kitchener back to Mindanao. Aside from sharing colonial gossip about Lord Curzon’s
departure from India, Barry informed Wood that Kitchener had “asked many questions”
about Wood and that his eyes “brightened” when he was told that Wood was acting as both
civil and military Governor of the Moro Province.

92

Tasker Bliss, Wood’s successor, had a

fondness for British military history and in his spare time wrote letters to his wife about the
topic. In one, he retold a comic experience the Duke of Wellington had during the Peninsular
War against Napoleon that involved a drunken orderly attempting to get onto his horse and
93

invoking the names of saints for help.

When discussing his work on the Moro Exchange

system at Mohonk, John Finley claimed that his recognition of the Moros and Lumads as the
“the real producers” of the country was inspired by Lord Cromer’s “proper recognition and
protection of the rights of the fellahin producing class” in Egypt.
John C. Early had colonial empire on his mind when he commemorated Leonard
Wood and Charles Brent in 1932. At the Cathedral of St. Mary and St. John in Baguio, Early
dedicated memorial windows to the two men, whom he viewed, quoted Cecil Rhodes, as
“gentleman adventurers” of American empire. He set the army general and the moral
reformer alongside a cast of colonial legends from both sides of the Atlantic that included
Rhodes, T.E. Lawrence, John Nicholson, Merriweather Lewis, Sam Houston, and Marcus
Whitman. The speech catalogued Wood’s medical and military achievements in the
Caribbean and the Philippines, as well as Brent’s transnational fight against the opium trade
and paternal kindness towards the Igorots and the Moros. Early returned to comparatives in
his closing, recalling how the Pashtuns of the Indian colonial frontier mourned for John
Nicholson upon his death, and that in the generations since Nicholson remained “a vivid
personality to the Indian peasant.” Likewise would Wood and Brent be “living personalities
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planted deep in the hearts of the masses.” Early’s imperial sentimentalism bonded the grand
94

figures of the two empires within a unified moral history.

Colonial models in other Southeast Asian states factored into the administrative
considerations of officials. British North Borneo, the Malay States, the Straits Settlements,
and the Dutch East Indies were all examined. In 1902, General George Davis, military
commander of the Southern Philippines, looked at the composition of armies in Java,
Sumatra, and the Straits Settlements, and found that the Dutch and British relied mainly on
native soldiers, while maintaining a European officer class. Based on these calculations, he
made recommendations for how many battalions were needed for the ongoing rule of the
Philippine Archipelago (after the cessation of hostilities) and how Christian Filipinos and
95

Moros could be used as soldiers to defray American costs.

Davis returned to colonial

antecedents in his annual report the following year, arguing that the most effective colonial
armies were those composed of long-term European residents. The Dutch who served in the
army of the East Indies were usually from settler families, and a “very large proportion of the
British Officers in India were born in India.” In French Indochina, soldiers enlisted for ten
years and many stayed longer. Based on these facts, Davis recommended the average tour of
duty for American soldiers be lengthened, creating a soldiery with a deeper understanding of
the realities of military life in a colonial setting.
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After outbreaks of beriberi and cholera in

Mindanao in 1902, Davis dispatched army medical officers to India and the Dutch East
Indies, where they visited hospitals, examined the diets of European colonials and the natives,
and studied rates of infection with the goal of using the information to curb epidemics in the
Philippines.
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A decade later, Governor General Francis Burton Harrison was similarly preoccupied
with colonial precedents in Southeast Asia. Writing to Secretary of War Lindley Garrison,
Harrison used the British as an example of maintaining tact when dealing with the
98

“Mohammedan religion,” albeit not to the detriment of American values.

He also cited the

problems the Dutch faced in their four-decade war against the Sultanate of Aceh when
considering the specter of continued rebellion among the Moros. Harrison felt such an
uprising was unlikely because the Moros lacked the cohesion of the Acehnese and had been
mostly stripped of their weapons in Pershing’s disarmament campaign of the previous years.
Nevertheless, he saw the Moros as fierce warriors and compared them to the Beja warriors
who fought alongside the Mahdi against the British in Sudan, using the term “Fuzzy-Wuzzy”
for them that Rudyard Kipling had popularized.
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In building up the area around Dansalan in 1908, American military officials looked
to Dutch models of colonial labour in the East Indies. John McAuley Palmer, Governor of
Lanao, thought that “enforced or directed labour” should be utilized in Moro agricultural
colonies as it was on Java, with modifications. Where the Javanese were required “to
cultivate crops for the profit of the Dutch Government” the Maranao Moro “would only
labour for his own interest.” This progressive twist allowed Americans to avoid the label of
slavery while producing sedentary agriculturalists out of the once-fierce Moros. The idea of
forced labour would be “rather startling to Americans,” McAuley wrote to Tasker Bliss, but
“its necessity in dealing with people like the Moros must be apparent to anyone who has had
occasion to study them or similar peoples in Malaysia.” Although Javanese farmers were
required to labour as much as fifty-two days per year, McAuley thought this number could be
raised even higher in Lanao, as the Moros would be working towards “purely communal
interests” in the proposed agricultural colony. “It would be better to require too much than
too little,” he explained. A punishment and reward system for the behaviour of the colonists
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would be “similar to the method employed by the Dutch to secure the loyalty of the native
chiefs on Java.”

100

Knowledge also circulated through the Southern Philippines by way of low and midranking personnel with transcolonial careers. As we have seen elsewhere in this project,
“circuits of expert knowledge” where local observations and data could be “compared, tested,
confirmed, and connected together” became prominent in a variety of scientific and
101

humanistic disciplines.

On a more practical level, colonial knowledge often travelled

through men and women plying their trades across empire: soldiers, nurses, engineers,
teachers, and the like. The career of Oscar Preuss illustrates this phenomenon. Born in
Germany, he enlisted at a young age with the Hussars, before transferring to the German
colonies in East Africa, where he led a company of Askaris. After a short stint with the
Austrian Army, Preuss joined the German expeditionary force in its campaigns during the
Boxer Rebellion, and subsequently returned to Africa where he fought with the Boers against
the British. Vic Hurley claimed Preuss had also seen action in “various South and Central
American revolutions,” and in 1903 the German travelled to the United States and enlisted
with the 3rd Cavalry. He served with his regiment for three years, and after being discharged
immediately signed up with the Philippine Constabulary. He was still only twenty-five years
102

old.

As a lieutenant in the Philippine Constabulary, Preuss brought a wealth of martial
knowledge to his work. He became a travelling expert on the elimination of banditry, and was
103

stationed in various parts of Lanao, on Jolo, and (briefly) as Deputy Governor of Dapitan.

Preuss was renowned for his love of strong spirits (he reportedly drank a quart of Gordon’s
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Gin each day) and his violent methods. Hurley called him “the most ruthless Moro killer of
them all” and took delight in telling a comic anecdote about Preuss. The German bristled at
accusations by a tribunal in Manila, which accused him of personally killing 250 Moros.
104

“The report is in error, Colonel; my count places the total at 265,” Preuss told the panel.

Although the exchange could well have been the product of Hurley’s imagination, Preuss’
105

predilection for brutality was widely acknowledged by his fellow Constabulary officers.

His own reports were unblinking in their descriptions of the violence he and his men meted
106

out.

Perennially restless, the German took leave of the Constabulary in late 1911 to serve

for three months in the American gendarmerie in Persia under the direction of W. Morgan
Shuster, an old Philippines hand himself.
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Preuss returned to Germany and fought on the

Galician front, where he was reported as killed in July 1915. Despite this “later reports by the
AEF’s G-2 in France listed him as an agent in Spain in 1917-1918. He was also reported to be
in the United States in the 1920s.”
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The young Sterling Larrabee, serving under Preuss in the Constabulary, took
inspiration from his commanding officer in transferring his military skills elsewhere once his
stint in the Philippines concluded. The son of Charles Larrabee, one-time Assistant
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the Roosevelt administration, Sterling was honourably
discharged from West Point after being deemed deficient in mathematics. Nursing this blow
to his pride, Larrabee quickly joined with the Constabulary and served under Preuss in Lanao
before heading a company of Moro troops on Cagayan de Sulu, the most far-flung island in
the Sulu Archipelago. Larrabee and his men “cleaned up” the island and were “mentioned in
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orders for it.”

109

After leaving the Constabulary in 1913, Larrabee looked to Europe for

military adventure. His attempts to join the Seaforth Highlanders and the French Foreign
Legion failed, but he managed to meet with Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the
Admiralty, who placed him with the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. With the MEF,
Larrabee fought against Ottoman forces for nearly two years, before transferring to the Royal
Field Artillery and serving at the Somme and Vimy Ridge. He finished the war with the
American Expeditionary Force as a captain in the field artillery. During the interwar period,
Larrabee became “one of the great figures of foxhunting” in the United States, founding the
Old Dominion Hounds in Virginia and promoting the aristocratic British tradition amongst
110

the patrician elite of the Eastern Seaboard.

Transcolonial wanderers who came to the Southern Philippines were not limited to
111

military types like Oscar Preuss and Sterling Larrabee.

Engineers also moved freely
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between empires, finding work on the myriad transformative projects underway in the
European and American colonies. As “engineering feats” were seen “as both definitive
gauges of the level of development achieved by other societies and essential components of
the civilizing mission” it was unsurprising that the government in Mindanao and Sulu tried to
112

attract engineers.

In the early years of the Moro Province, a junior engineer in Zamboanga

named Manly typified the acquisition and use of knowledge between empires. Prior to
serving under Frank McCoy, the graduate of the Indiana College of Agricultural and
Mechanical Arts had worked in Mexico, Central America, South America, New Zealand, and
Australia. Using his engineering skills to finance further travels, Manly lived a “spartan life”
and helped McCoy construct roads, bridges, docks, and the Provincial Building at
Zamboanga. After a year in Zamboanga he left for Canton, where he prepared “plans for a
sewerage system for the Vice-Roy,” before moving on to Burma and working for Standard
Oil at the headwaters of the Irawaddy River. When McCoy last heard from Manly, the young
engineer was proposing to travel to Mombasa in colonial Kenya to work on the construction
113

of a railway line over the Nile.

Americans operating in more coordinated official capacities in Southeast Asia also
illustrated how the Southern Philippines tapped into networks of imperial knowledge. Under
the tutelage of Leonard Wood, Frank McCoy saw much of the colonial world. The two
travelled in Europe together in the late summer and autumn of 1902, “undertaking
pilgrimages to European cultural shrines” and meeting with the British elite in London,
including Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, King Edward VII, and Lord Kitchener, then
Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. The two parties had much to discuss, Wood having
recently concluded his stint as Governor of Santiago and the British still smarting from the
hard-fought Boer War. In September, Wood and McCoy visited Germany, where they met
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with Kaiser Wilhelm II and observed German military maneuvers.

114

The trip to Europe was

an antecedent of the larger tour Wood, McCoy, and Hugh Scott took of European colonial
possessions the following year en route to the Moro Province, where they all served as key
members of the military government. Before arriving in Southeast Asia, the group visited
Egypt and India. Observing the latter, McCoy thought that “the only decent, clean people east
of Suez are the native Christians and the British native soldiers. The British flag stands for a
lot more than one knows.” Reflecting that the work of civilizing India would be “a question
of centuries” for the British, McCoy anticipated later Republican opposition to independence
for the Philippines.

115

McCoy was impressed by what he saw during his party’s ten-day visit to the Dutch
East Indies in the summer of 1903. The civil service there was “such as we should build up
for our colonies” and the colonial army was likewise impressive. The racial-paternalist
assumptions of the Dutch rulers, and the way in which this coloured their treatment of the
116

natives, appeared a successful template to Wood and McCoy.

The visit was marred by one

small incident that occurred on a train in Java. A Dutch official, travelling in the same
compartment as the Americans, became insolent and attempted to kick McCoy out of his seat.
“Wood stood his insolence for about three minutes,” recalled McCoy, “then got up and threw
117

him bodily out of the compartment.”

Despite this momentary lapse of inter-imperial

harmony, the men looked favourably on their Dutch colleagues, and enjoyed similarly
positive experiences in Singapore and Hong Kong. McCoy’s work in Mindanao and Sulu
over the following years was informed by what he witnessed in other colonies, and, writing
letters to his mother in the United States, he frequently mentioned other colonial examples to
118

illustrate his points.
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For example, McCoy’s description of dealing with a man running amuck: “Down in Java each police station
and intermediate signal drums have a well known signal which is sounded right lustily when the loco runs
amuck. Prominent citizens are supposed to get under their beds or atop the roof while the police spread their net,
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The interpenetration of colonial empires through personnel and ideas continued to
play a role in the Southern Philippines into the 1930s, the twilight years of American rule.
Governor General Dwight F. Davis, formerly Secretary of War under Calvin Coolidge, made
an extensive inspection tour of the Southeast Asian colonies of the European powers in 1931.
Travelling aboard the USS Pittsburgh, Davis and his party – which included Filipino
politicians, the President of the National Bank of the Philippines, his aides, and two of his
children – covered six thousand miles over the course of forty-five days, stopping in various
parts of French Indochina, Siam, British Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. Billed as a
“good-will and fact finding” mission, Davis declared that the party had “continually been
comparing things and places throughout our travels with the conditions as they exist in the
Philippine Islands.” Through an “interchange of ideas,” Davis believed, the “countries of the
Far East” could learn from one another. The scope of the inspection tour included visits to
“banks, post offices, scientific plants, hospitals, air services, roads, experimental stations,
estates and farms given over to the production of sugar, rubber, fruit, tea, rice, and other
products...schools, museums…palm oil factories, tin mines, automobile factories, opium
plants, and other places of interest laid down by the protocol.” This ambitious itinerary
allowed Davis and accompanying officials to map out broad comparisons between the
Philippines and other colonial regimes, as well as exchange political, technical,
119

governmental, and cultural information with them.

More pointed observations and critiques from the trip were included in a confidential
memorandum sent to Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley in July 1931. European colonies
were assessed in terms of their physical conditions; the role of the native elite; the lives of the

each guard being armed with the amuck spear, rather a trident, the middle prong foreshortened and all three
prongs having barbs like fish-hooks, so arranged that there will be a nice clean fit around the neck; and once
pinned with it the juramentado is completely at the mercy of the captor and the rule is not to run the risk of
showing mercy.” – Letter from Frank McCoy to Margaret McCoy, 3 September 1903, Box 15, Folder 2.
Hermann Hagedorn Papers, LOC-MD. At the end of his time in the Moro Province, McCoy again travelled to
the Dutch East Indies and also did intelligence work for the military in Canton, China. See: Notes on Canton, 7
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native peasantry and their organization; governmental systems, policies, and personnel; the
role and organization of the military in the colony; and revenues, expenditures, and
commercial disposition. Davis dedicated the majority of the memorandum to the two colonial
possessions where Muslims made up large segments of the population, British Malaya and
the Dutch East Indies. In Malaya, he paid particular attention to the relationship between the
British colonial state and native royalty, through whom they governed in the Malay Federated
States. In the case of the Dutch, Davis was impressed by the organization and efficiency of
the colony, but noted that chances for advancement among the natives were less than in the
Philippines. He also commented that the Dutch, like the Americans in the Philippines, relied
heavily on their native constabulary for law and order. The memo concluded with direct
comparisons between the Philippines and the other colonies, with Davis noting that the
American colony outpaced the others in terms of education and progressive taxation, but
lagged behind on public works infrastructure.
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Moros, Americans, and the Muslim World
For the Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu, shared faith often generated cultural transfers with
the wider world. Although pilgrimage had long been an impetus for travel and exchange,
rapidly expanding transportation technologies in the late nineteenth-century meant that
journeys to holy sites became accessible to a far greater number of people. For pious Muslims
in the Southern Philippines, Islamic religious tradition dictated that all those able make the
hajj to Mecca do so at least once in their lives. Men who made the long trip were venerated in
Moro communities, given the honorific ‘hadji,’ and wore tight white caps on their heads to
121

denote their status.

Travelling the nearly nine thousand kilometers between Zamboanga

and Mecca, through the South China Sea and across the entire Indian Ocean, was arduous.
The third-class compartments many hopeful pilgrims bunked in were claustrophobic and
poorly maintained. Steamship companies hired Arabic and Malay agents to advertise amongst
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the Moros, who spent large amounts to secure passage to the Holy Land. John Pershing
disliked the endeavour, claiming that Muslims often mortgaged themselves into penury to
make the journey. En route they were often “robbed and cheated” and some would “fall ill
and die.” Those who did return had often contracted “loathsome diseases which they spread
about the community.” Pershing recommended that the government do everything in its
power to curtail the pilgrimages, except for those of proven financial capability (who would
be given American consular support en route).

122

Although Pershing’s condemnations of the

pilgrimage may have been too severe, there is abundant evidence that the journey was not an
easy one. Charles Ivins recorded in his memoirs that groups of prospective hadjis
occasionally appeared in Zamboanga and were lodged in the schoolhouse due to a lack of
hostels. The travellers sometimes fell victim to the predations of “cheats and swindlers” and
most did not make it out of Southeast Asia. Other Moros called these thwarted pilgrims
123

“Singapore Hadjis…an honorific hardly comparable to that of a bona fide Mecca hadji.”

In letters to his hometown newspaper in Pennsylvania, Frank Laubach described the
journey that Maranaos made from Lanao to Mecca. In 1930, eleven went at a cost of between
₱700 and ₱1,000 each. The pilgrims travelled first to Ganassi, then onwards to Malabang.
They took a small launch up to Zamboanga, and from there a steamer to Singapore. A larger
ship took the Maranao faithful across the Indian Ocean and up the Red Sea to Jeddah, after
which they travelled overland to Mecca. Once in the holy city, the pilgrims spent twentyseven days praying at the Masjid al-Haram. Laubach was told the stories of the pilgrims by
his Maranao confidante Datu Pambaya, and marvelled that there was little theft in the holy
city. “It would be very fine if all the people in the world could trust each other as they do in
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Mecca,” he wrote home.

Matias Cuadra, working for the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes

in the 1930s, believed that Moros travelling to “Mecca, Colombo, Aden and other places” had
learned modern methods of commerce, agriculture and “other essential factors for a decent
living” from their journeys. He thought the pilgrimages, although religiously-inspired, were
fundamentally positive in that they put the Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu in contact with
more modern Islamic societies.
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The relationship between the Moros and other Muslims factored into the dynamics of
American colonial rule as early as 1899. The U.S. Ambassador in Turkey, Oscar S. Straus,
was sent to meet with Sultan Abdul Hamid II in Constantinople. Straus, who later became the
first Jewish Cabinet Secretary under Theodore Roosevelt, feared that improperly handling the
Moros might lead to a holy war. The ambassador requested that Abdul Hamid “as Caliph of
the Muslim religion…act in behalf of his followers of Islam in the Philippines.” The Ottoman
Sultan was unaware such a body of people even existed, but nevertheless contacted
authorities in Mecca to see if the holy city was receiving Moro visitors. He was informed that
the Moros “not only visited Mecca in considerable numbers but that at that very time there
were Moros from Sulu in the Sacred City.” Straus presented the Sultan with the 1796 Treaty
of Tripoli and stated that the United States intended to uphold its promise not to interfere with
the religious rights of “any Mahometan nation,” citing the numerous treaties America had
126

made with the Ottomans and their record of friendship towards Muslim peoples.

Straus’

diplomacy led Abdul Hamid to draft “a message to be sent to the Mohammedans of the
Philippine Islands forbidding them to enter into any hostilities against the Americans,
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inasmuch as no interference with their religion would be allowed under American rule.”
Writing in 1915, John Finley argued that Straus’ work was the reason why the Moros never
127

joined Emilio Aguinaldo’s forces during the Philippine Insurrection.

Immigrants from the Ottoman Empire settled in Manila and other areas of the
Philippines during Spanish rule. Mainly Druze and Maronite Syrians, these refugees “became
well known both for their peddling businesses and trade in especially jewelry and
watches.”

128

Spanish authorities attempted to funnel Ottoman settlers into Mindanao with

moderate success, although they were vexed by “unofficial” migration from the Middle East,
wherein missionary-traders settled among Moro populations and integrated into them. In
doing so, they bypassed Spanish influence and represented what Isa Blumi calls a “steady
129

stream of counter-colonialism” in Mindanao.

As we have seen, John Pershing and other

Americans viewed these ‘Arabs’ with suspicion, fearing they would lead Muslim populations
in Mindanao and Sulu away from the corrective modernity being promoted by the colonial
state. Nevertheless, American authorities did hire Middle Eastern ‘experts’ like Najeeb
Saleeby and Sheikh Mustafa Ahmad to act as conduits between the government and the
130

Moros.

For their part, Moros were highly aware of the existence of the Ottoman Sultan and
his empire. In the waning years of the Spanish period and the early years of the American
one, prominent Tausūg men from Jolo made the long journey to Mecca, including Sultan
Jamalul Kiram II. During negotiations with John Bates in 1899, Kiram even boasted that the
131

Spanish had allowed him to fly the flag of the Sultanate while he visited Mecca.

Datu

Jokanain spent most of early 1903 in the city, and returned, according to American reports,
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with friendlier views towards the occupying forces.

132

In Lanao, some datus viewed the

Ottoman Sultan as leader of the ummat al-Islamiyah, the global Muslim community, and
believed they should direct their fealty towards him and not the Americans. John Pershing
grappled with this disposition in 1902 during his military campaigns around the lake. Datu
Gundar of Maciu informed John Pershing that those opposing the Americans “look to the
Sultan of Stanboul as the head of their government and insist that as he is not a friend of the
Americans they cannot be.” Pershing told Gundar and his companions that the “Sultan of
Stanboul” was, in fact, a friend of the Americans who sent his representatives to the United
States, and that American citizens travelled regularly to regions of the Ottoman Empire.
Gundar promised to relay the information to some of the more oppositional Maranaos, and
the conversation moved on to discussions of circumcision, whether or not Americans would
force Moros to wear hats, and a false rumour that Russia was at war with the United States.
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John McAuley Palmer also encountered datus who invoked the authority of the
Ottoman Empire. In April 1907, Palmer received letters from Datu Nurul Hakim, a prominent
political and religious figure on the eastern shore of Lake Lanao, saying that he should “take
into account the agreement of the Sultan of Istanbul with the Government, including the
President, the Secretary of War, and the Generals, that the Government established in Lanao
shall merely watch over Lanao and should not injure the inhabitants or change their customs.”
Hakim further stated he had specific orders from Sultan Abdul Hamid II “not to let the
Americans come to my rancheria.” However unlikely this directive was, it displayed a belief
among Maranao leaders that “the customs adopted by the said Sultan of Istanbul are the
customs of all the Datus of Lanao.” By exaggerating his links to Ottoman authority, Hakim
was symbolically placing himself under the protection of a Muslim entity that was a power on
the world stage (albeit a declining one) and, in his view, increasing his bargaining abilities
against the well-armed American forces at Dansalan and Camp Vicars. After Palmer
responded negatively, Hakim’s next letter was filled with threats. His rancheria at Rumayas
could not be attacked because it was “the domain of the Sultan of Istanbul” and if it was then
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“America [would] also be attacked.” Hakim threatened the lives of American civilian and
military officials, up to the President of the United States himself, and warned “by no means
can you vanquish the Sultan of Istanbul.” Moro interpreters for the Americans were cautioned
that “the day will soon come when your mouths will be cut and your feet and your hands and
your ears and your eyes.” Between threats, the datu presented himself as a mere extension of
the Sultan’s will. The ploy failed, and American forces destroyed Datu Nurul Hakim’s cotta
soon thereafter, but his letters provide clear evidence of how members of the Moro elite used
the wider Muslim world for leverage.

134

An unusual intersection of the Moros, the Americans, and the Ottomans came in the
final years of military rule, and arose from the cultural politicking of John Finley. Finley, the
longest-serving district governor in the region, took it upon himself to be the voice of the
Yakan and Samal Moros of Basilan and the Zamboanga Peninsula. In 1911, they bestowed
upon him (at his urging) the title of Tuan Maas, an honorific that translates roughly to
“Teacher, Sultan, and Father.” The following year, he convened a public meeting of Samal
Moros at Taluksangay, twenty kilometers from Zamboanga, where he was appointed Wakil
Mutalak (plenipotentiary) of the Muslims of the Zamboanga Peninsula and tasked with taking
a petition to Sultan Mehmed V in Constantinople. Finley himself devised the journey to the
Ottoman Empire, which was part of a complicated scheme to reorganize Moro power
structures.
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According to the plan, the petition would first be given to the Ottoman ambassador in
Washington, who would then forward it to the Sultan. It asked that the Ottomans take a
“wider and deeper interest” in Moro affairs, and begged “that a representative of His most
Supreme and Imperial Highness, The Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, Commander of All The
Faithful, should be sent to look into and examine the state of affairs here in Moro Province.”
This representative would help the Moros bring their “laws and customs…into line and

134

Hakim’s letters to Palmer are quoted at length in correspondence between Palmer and J.P. Jervey, the officer
who replaced George T. Langhorne as provincial secretary for the Moro Province in late 1906. See Letter from
John McAuley Palmer to J.P. Jervey, 20 April 1907, Box 1, Folder 11. John McAuley Palmer Papers, LOC-MD.
135

Record of the Minutes of a Public Meeting of Moros Held at Taluksangay, District of Zamboanga, 29 March
1912, Box 1, Folder 1. John Finley Papers, USAHEC.

395

agreement with the laws and customs of the American Government.” It also requested the
Sultan “advise and assist” the Moros in arriving “at a better, truer and purer Mohammedan
faith in obedience to that laid down in the Kuran and Hadis by the Prophet Muhamad, without
obstructing the laws of the State in any way.” The petition, signed by sixty Moro datus,
introduced Finley to the Ottoman potentate and informed him that the American was “more
than a father or an elder brother” to the Moros, and that the decision to name him Tuan Maas
was made “spontaneously and unanimously” by them. It concluded with florid praise of the
Sultan and the declaration that “no other person” besides him could “help us to the
136

accomplishment of our desires and wishes for a purer Mohammedan faith.”

Finley explained the petition’s rationale in detail in a collection of documents he
forwarded to President William Howard Taft through Leonard Wood, who was then serving
as the Army Chief of Staff. Finley explained that the “religious coloring” of the petition was
there to manifest “the spirit of the Moro people,” before giving a long recounting of his
various achievements during the previous decade. Though the plan and petition were products
of Finley himself, he framed them as genuine expressions of the Moro desire for a greater
degree of self-government. “These people are wards of the government and as such children
of the state. They should receive paternal care, more especially as they ask for it,” Finley
wrote to Taft. “It is the burden of their petition and their call should be heeded. If the Moros
believe that they can accomplish more for themselves and thereby for the progress of the
government by operating through the agency of a modern Mohammedan the plan is worthy of
a trial.”
The plan further stipulated that a representative of the Ottoman Sultan would be sent
to Mindanao and placed in a position of moral leadership. The Moros were to be instructed by
this “modern” Muslim, who would combat the “degraded form of Mohammedanism” that
was “manipulated by ignorant, fanatical native priests.” Persistent impediments to progress
identified by Finley – substance use, juramentados, gambling, swindling – would be
lessened, and the Ottoman representative would campaign against such “serious
evils…through the instrumentality of modern Mohammedanism.” On a practical level, Finley
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suggested whoever was selected for the job be “taken from a higher learning institution in the
Ottoman Empire.” The Moro Province would pay his salary, he would have his living
expenses covered, and would have an official title like “Moro Agent and Instructor” or
“Travelling Moro Deputy” or “Provincial Moro Advisor.” He would serve “for one year or up
18 months” preparing datus to assume his duties once he returned to Ottoman Turkey.

137

Finley’s plan was unabashedly paternalistic, and driven by the admission that “the
American rush for money and the material things of life has tended to upset the deliberate and
slow-going oriental ideas and methods of the Moros.” It would reorient Islamic teaching
towards American aims, giving religious legitimation to the colonial project. Finley laid out
in detail how the representative would instruct the Moros to follow sanitary laws, respect the
state monopoly on violence, curb gambling and other vices, develop their lands through
industry and agriculture, obey the local courts system, appreciate the separation between
church and state, and be “frugal, temperate, industrious, obedient to the laws, and respectful
of the authorities.” The Ottoman representative was to be supervised by an American official
in each district to ensure that these ends were pursued. The plan, in essence, was one of moral
and commercial reform not so different from the goals of Protestant missionaries like Charles
Brent, but filtered through an Islamic source more amenable to the Moros. To bolster the
plan, he cited English, French, and Dutch colonial precedents. These other Western powers,
he argued, recognized native titles and customs and it did “not appear to endanger the
maintenance of proper control by the home government.” The Ottoman intermediary would
allow for reasonable concessions to be made to the Moros while avoiding anything that
138

would strain “the Constitution or the policy of the Government.”

Shortly after the petition was drafted, Finley was sent back to the United States on the
orders of the War Department. John Pershing, no fan of the so-called Tuan Maas, made clear
to him that any return to Zamboanga would be unwelcome. Upon his arrival in Washington,
Finley met with a variety of powerful figures, including President Taft, Secretary of War
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Henry Stimson, and Leonard Wood. Convincing these men that the petition he brought
“represented the decision of the more thoughtful and intelligent leaders of the Moros,” Finley
was given a personal letter of recommendation from Stimson and continued on to Turkey.
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In Constantinople, he received an audience with the Sultan, who appointed Sayid Mohammed
Wajih ul-Gilani as Sheikh-ul-Islam for the Philippine Archipelago. Gilani was a graduate of
the theological school in Nablus (in present-day Palestine), and had also done training as a
religious judge at the Qadi College in Constantinople.
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After securing Gilani, Finley

departed Constantinople and was back in the Philippines by mid-July 1913. In Manila, he met
with the outgoing Governor General Forbes and explained that he had only travelled to
Turkey to collect and “deliver certain religious texts from the Ottoman Religious authorities
to the Moros….he said nothing to Governor Forbes of having induced or discussed with the
authorities in Constantinople the possibility or advisability of sending a religious teacher to
141

Mindanao.”

The appearance of Wajih Gilani in Mindanao at the end of January 1914 was met with
surprise and dismay on the part of American officials. Francis Burton Harrison had just
replaced Forbes in anticipation of the new Wilson Administration in Washington. In the
South, military rule was being dissolved and the Moro Province was transitioning into the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu. At the appearance of Finley and Gilani, the Governor
Frank Carpenter cabled Manila stating that their activities were “inopportune and probably
perversive of public order.” He added that Finley’s credentials were “solely with Muslims in
Zambo” and that he was unknown to Moros in Lanao, Sulu, or Cotabato. Nevertheless, Finley
was requesting transportation around the region, claiming that he was “authorized by the
Democratic Party to go around with this Mohammedan to preach the Mohammedan religion
and to teach the people here their Mohammedan catechism.”
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the Philippines, General J. Franklin Bell, was likewise concerned, and wrote to Harrison that
he was trying to find a way to get Gilani and Finley out of the country as soon as possible.
Bell believed that Gilani did not represent a way for the United States to more effectively
govern the Moros, but was an agent of Islamic revivalism who was a “grave menace” to
public order in Mindanao and Sulu. That Finley wore his U.S. Army officer uniform during
his travels was of added concern, and Bell felt the entire mission was “blocking [the]
civilizing influence [of the] United States Government and Christian denominational and
undenominational efforts in their private undertakings here.” Finley’s actions were
“objectionable from a military point of view…it is plainly inappropriate for any Army officer
to inject himself into the situation there,” particularly when it was in the service of what Bell
deemed “religious propaganda.”

143

Frank Carpenter’s concerns, stemming from an antipathy towards Finley’s meddling,
were serious enough that his annual report that year included an extensive commentary on the
Gilani affair. The governor placed Gilani in a category alongside other foreign Muslim
missionaries who appeared in the Southern Philippines “independent of any superior
ecclesiastical direction or control.” Exacerbating matters were wild rumours spreading
through the region that Constantinople was preparing to declare holy war against
Christendom. Carpenter thought that an emissary from the Ottoman Empire would only make
matters worse, and argued besides that the predatory behaviour of previous missionaries from
the Greater Middle East prejudiced Moro communities against them. Calling Gilani a
“Mohammedan propagandist” and, echoing Bell, a “grave menace” to the well being of the
department, Carpenter was categorical in his condemnation. Introducing the “reactionary and
militant propaganda” emanating from Constantinople into Mindanao and Sulu would “prove
fatal to immediate and continued progress in the execution of the government’s program
here.”
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Conversely, John Finley viewed the visit by Sheikh Gilani as an unmitigated success,
and penned an account of it for the Army and Navy Weekly, a newspaper for active and retired
servicemen in the Philippines. Although the article was published without a byline, the level
of detail and syntactical style suggest only Finley could have written it. In the article, he
spoke of Moros in Zamboanga crowding around Gilani to kiss his hands and garment. “To
them,” wrote Finley, “it was as the coming of the Messiah; their hopes were at last fulfilled.
Being Orientals their expressions of joy were the same as those of the crowds that followed
Jesus in Galilee in days of old.” He used the article to reassure American readers that “more
linkages between the sublime porte and Moroland” would better the Moros and help with the
“settlement of the difficulties that now surround the question of their government.”
Hyperbole aside, Finley sincerely believed that forging ties between the Moros and the
Ottoman state would make colonial governance in the Southern Philippines easier for the
145

Americans.

John Finley’s plan to join the Ottoman and American empires failed. Wajih Gilani
was ‘obliged’ to leave the Philippines within a few months of his arrival and Finley was
transferred back to the United States where he could no longer bother officials like Carpenter.
Nevertheless, Gilani took his appointment as Sheikh-ul-Islam seriously and shortly after
arriving in Turkey in September 1914 wrote to Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison
requesting funds to organize a return trip. In the letter, he spoke of the “pitiful state” of the
Moros and the desire of the “religious authorities in Constantinople” to provide them with
“instruction on the moral principles of our religion.”
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The Sheikh had some support, as his

possible return to the Philippines the following year “on a battleship” concerned Governor
General Harrison so much that he wrote to the Insular Bureau that such an event would

145

Finley-as-newspaper-correspondent further commented: “So long as the Moslem allows Christian missions
in his territory, why should he not establish Moslem missions in ours, especially as we are on his territory to
proselytize and he only comes to ours to teach his own. In a country that welcomes Buddhists, Theosophists,
and any ‘ism’ on earth, it seems a little hard to explain just why we should refuse to allow the influence of a
refined, educated, high class Mohammedan gentleman, such as Wajih Gilani proved himself, to be exerted in
behalf of the Moros when it would so obviously make for their betterment and for the settlement of the
difficulties that now surround the question of their government.” Found in “Colonel Finley Gives,” Army and
Navy Weekly, 11.
146

Letter from Wajih Gilani to Lindley Garrison, 23 September 1914, 2509, Box 1025. General Classified Files
1898-1945 (1914-1945 Segment), RG 350.3, NA-CP.

400

increase Gilani’s “prestige and influence among the Mohammedan population” and “the
embarrassment and possible consequences to us can not be too strongly considered.” Apart
from this, he said that most Moros were opposed to the return of Gilani, and that those
“encouraging his interest or return” were “negligible elements and a few Arabs, Turks, [and]
Malays.”
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Undeterred by official indifference or opposition to his mission, Gilani travelled to the
United States in August 1915 in hopes of meeting with President Wilson, to whom he wanted
148

to express his “great respect and admiration for the American people.”

The New York

Times reported on the Sheikh’s arrival, noting that his underage manservant, Nabou, was held
up at Ellis Island by customs due to being below the age of sixteen. The newspaper quoted
Gilani announcing that the Moros would “become citizens of whom the United States will not
149

be ashamed.”

John Finley continued his involvement with the Sheikh, writing a letter of

introduction for him to Hugh Scott in which he claimed the Ottoman envoy was best suited to
advise the Moros “regarding their religion and their duty to the government, in the
preservation of order and in progressive development.”
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While in the United States, Gilani

wrote to Najeeb Saleeby for advice, but received only a terse response that he should inform
the proper official channels before returning to the Philippines. He also contacted Secretary
of War Garrison again to let him know that while in Constantinople he had not informed
Ottoman authorities that he had been asked to leave the Philippines during his previous visit
so as not to jeopardize his mission. Gilani claimed he had come to the United States to
publish his “most progressive and peaceful religious views to American people.”
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Officials in the United States and the Philippines were irritated by Gilani’s
persistence, but Governor General Harrison was directed by the Bureau of Insular Affairs to
give the envoy grudging permission to return to the colony. The bureau drafted a response to
Gilani’s requests saying that the separation of church and state meant that “the government
has no interest whatever in religious work in the islands, and has no disposition whatever to
interfere with anyone in the pursuit of such work,” but for that reason “cannot lend
encouragement or aid to any particular missionary work in the islands.”
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In essence, the

insular authorities would marginalize Gilani by providing him with absolutely no aid, thereby
stripping him of any prestige gained had he been a guest of the government in Manila. The
affair resolved itself in an unspectacular manner in May 1916 with the death of Wajih Gilani.
The Sheikh-ul-Islam fell ill while in Washington and was sent to the Hygeia Hospital and
Sanitorium in Richmond, Virginia, where he died May 5th. Writing two years later, Frank W.
Carpenter called Gilani’s death “timely” in that it eliminated him as a threat to public order in
153

Mindanao and Sulu.

Muslim missionary figures from the Ottoman Empire and the Greater Middle East
were a reoccurring issue throughout the colonial period. As with Gilani, some Americans
feared their influence would turn the Moros away from the American secular model and
towards religious fanaticism, while others sought to direct them towards colonial ends.
William Kobbé, military chief of Mindanao and Sulu prior to the formation of the Moro
Province, wrote to Najeeb Saleeby asking for information on Islam. Saleeby responded by
giving him a breakdown of temporal and spiritual authority in the Ottoman world, as well as a
primer on Moro usage of the Arabic alphabet. He told Kobbé that Moros were generally
unschooled in Islam, but that he knew of four Afghan hadjis who acted as religious teachers
154

in the region.

Saleeby provided officials with information that situated the Moros within a

global Islamic context for over three decades. In 1935, for example, he forwarded Vice
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Governor J.R. Hayden a translation and interpretation of an encyclical letter drafted by Sultan
Jamalul Kiram II in the wake of the 1915 Carpenter Agreement. Saleeby’s commentary on
the text viewed the Sultan’s proclamations within the tradition of “Malayan sovereigns” who
all modified “the customary laws so as to conform as much as practicable to Mohammedan
principles and articles of faith.” He also linked questions of leadership and succession in Sulu
to those that were taking place within the crumbling Ottoman Empire, and to larger traditions
155

within Sunni Islam.

Charles Cameron, longtime Superintendent of Schools for the Moro Province, sought
to harness foreign religious leaders to influence the Moros. In 1906, he sent Sheikh Mustafa
Ahmed, an Arab religious teacher in Zamboanga, on a recruitment trip throughout the Sulu
Archipelago. Cameron hoped to establish a ‘Datu School,’ where the sons of prominent
Moros could be taught Middle Eastern iterations of Islam and Western notions of secular
government. This, he believed, would create a class of future Moro leaders who were
156

religious yet respectful of governmental authority.

In the prospectus for the school,

Cameron wrote that Ahmed would “have direct charge of the students and great care will be
taken to teach them to respect their religion and live in accordance with its
mandates…students will be taught to read and write their own dialect, to read the Qur’an and
translate it into their own language. American teachers will instruct them in English, the
American laws relating to government, and in all subjects which will enable these young men
157

to assist their people.”

More often, however, there was suspicion of foreign Muslims as potential fifth
columnists. Leonard Wood certainly thought this way, and blamed sustained resistance to
American rule during his tenure on “the Arab priest,” whom he called a “disturbing element.”
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Wood also pointed his finger at returning hadjis radicalized by their travels.

John Pershing

was even more strident in his condemnations of outside Islamic influences. According to him,
“Arabian and other Mohammedan teachers” plagued the Moro Province and their presence
not only hindered governmental initiatives but also gave “occult inspiration” to the
“opposition we have met among the Moros during the last ten years.” That some, like
Cameron or Finley, had suggested using foreign Muslims as teachers or guides with the goal
of reforming the Moros was “almost beyond belief” to Pershing, who opposed “any plan for
159

the propagation of Mohammedanism through the prostitution of the public schools.”

For religiously inclined empire builders, the question of global Islam was existential
and world historical. In a sermon given in Manila in 1912, Charles Brent worried that the
United States was treating the ‘Moro Problem’ as a local issue when in reality it was a
transnational predicament. Islam itself was a “world problem” and a “plague spot” in Europe,
British India, and Southeast Asia. Brent described Islam as a fanatic’s religion, where crazed
mystics convinced heathens they were invulnerable to the bullets of European and American
guns. Brent believed that the Islamic world was “a unified and sensitive organ” and as an
example of this claimed that “a word in Europe to the Turk sets the wild Pathan tribes in Asia
aflame.” The Moros suffered the attentions of “Arab priests” who transmitted the worst
aspects of Islam. While not prepared to call for the annihilation of these interlopers, Brent
was desirous that “Arabian immigration” be forbidden “for the sake of the personal safety of
our people.” In this outlook, the Moros were little more than pawns caught between the
civilizing tendencies of American culture and the fanaticism of Arabs and Ottoman Turks.
Blocking the latter while promoting the former through “hospitals and schools” was the surest
path to redemption. At the height of his oration, Brent summoned the memory of British
colonial missionary heroes like William Wilberforce, Henry Martyn, and David Livingstone,
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whose “fiery love for slave and Mohammedan and savage” was inspirational and
160

instructional.

Even more fervent in his fantasies of spiritual reform, Frank Laubach believed the
colonial state in Mindanao and Sulu represented “the one weak spot in Mohammedanism to
be found in the entire world today” and wrote of readying “a new assault on
Mohammedanism.” Because the Moros had been disarmed (at least officially), Laubach
thought that they presented a unique opportunity for conversion to Christianity. Writing to
Frank Carpenter in 1921, he mapped a plan to convert the Tausūg Moros of Sulu, who would
then “turn down upon Borneo, Java (with its 30,000,000 of Mohammedans), Sumatra, the
Straits settlements and, perhaps India…They will point back to the Philippines in proof of
what Christian civilization can do for Mohammedans, and you will have the privilege of
beginning the end of the Moslem regime.” Laubach implored Carpenter to help with the
global conversion project in messianic terms. “If God ever called a man for a specific work of
world significance,” he wrote, “you are that man, and America is that nation.”
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Although

Carpenter never seriously entertained these notions, Laubach’s letter evidenced a view of the
Moros as an offensive tool against the global menace of Islam.

Pervasive Connections
In the 1920s and 1930s, the emergent influence of an ethnic diaspora in the Southern
Philippines became a cause for alarm among Filipino politicians and business leaders.
Mindanao was by then home to the largest Japanese population in Southeast Asia, the
majority of whom lived in Davao Province. The colonial state initially encouraged Japanese
migrants to relocate to Mindanao and aid in development. By the end of the 1930s, they
162

dominated the hemp industry.

As early as 1916, Filipino nationalist publications bemoaned
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the presence of Japanese plantations and businesses in the South, with one reporting that the
Japanese had “materially invaded Moroland” and become “enormously rich” while Filipinos
163

remained destitute.

As American planters left the region and Filipino migrants to

Mindanao swelled in numbers, the competitive development of the South became rooted in
the intra-colonial dynamics of the Philippines as well as the growing assertion of Japanese
power in Asia.
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An American memorandum from 1930 described the Japanese in Davao in admiring
terms, saying they were as “compact in organization as an army. Their field leadership is able
and their technical advisors the best procurable.” The same memorandum commented on the
relative poverty of the Filipino migrants compared to the Japanese.
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The two thousand

Moros in Davao leveled complaints of land grabbing against the Japanese and Filipinos alike,
leading American commentators (not for the first time) to toy with the idea of creating “a
special reservation” to protect “the wild man” from “the land-hungry immigrant.” One
proponent of this plan compared it to the work that was being done with the Maoris in New
Zealand.
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The question of Japanese control of the hemp trade became colloquially referred

to as the ‘Davao Problem.’ Those opposed to Philippine Independence raised the specter of
Japanese colonial designs in their arguments for the continued importance of American
167

stewardship.

Nationalists used the issue to encourage increased Filipino migration to the

region, prosecuted illegal leaseholders, and accelerated the surveying and subdivision of
lands in Mindanao.
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The Japanese government monitored the situation closely, and
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Japanese naval cruisers visited Zamboanga and Davao on inspection tours.
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The Second

World War and its outcomes resolved the question of Japanese settlement in Mindanao, but
the issue, at its height in the 1930s, illustrated the complexity of the social, political, racial,
and commercial dynamics at play in the Southern Philippines, and how these dynamics
simultaneously drew from and transcended the spatial demarcations of the region, nation, and
empire. The ‘Davao Problem’ demonstrated that as American colonial empire receded in the
Southern Philippines, other agents from outside of Mindanao and Sulu, whether they were
from within the national body or further afield, would compete for influence and power in the
170

region against a backdrop of local collaboration and resistance.

Colonial state and society in the Southern Philippines during the period under
discussion was enmeshed in pervasive connections. Ostensibly an example of the colonial
remote – the hinterlands of America’s Pacific empire – Mindanao and Sulu were in reality
anything but isolated. Linked to Maritime Southeast Asia (and beyond) through a myriad of
regional and supraregional networks antedating and postdating Western colonialism, the
Southern Philippines was culturally and economically sequestered in imagination only.
Americans in the region embraced this heterogeneous landscape, participating in and
contributing to reciprocal flows of imperial knowledge production. In the preceding, we
encounter instances of Americans interacting officially and unofficially with the British,
Dutch, French, Portuguese, Spanish, German, Ottoman, and Japanese empires. A glance at
the mailing list for annual reports from the Moro Province provides succinct evidence of
these global connections. Among many others, the reports were sent to: Lieutenant General
Bindon Blood – commander of British forces in Lahore; Jules Cambron – the French
ambassador to Spain; Lord Cromer – former Consular-General of Egypt; Lionel Carden –
British minister in Havana; Dutch officials on Java; a variety of European and American
academics and journalists; a ‘Mr. Davis’ who represented Standard Oil in Batavia; Colonel
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William C. Gorgas of the Panama Canal Commission; Major Wilhelm Von Frihr of the
German Imperial Army; and the headmistresses of two girls’ schools in Havana.
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Through writings and pilgrimages, Moros also looked abroad, often using their
religious identity to situate themselves within Muslim histories of power and resistance to
foreign incursion. These intersections of the local and the global occurred in a region shaped
before, during, and after the American period by the circulation of peoples, religions, and
empires through it. The societies of the Southern Philippines and their American rulers
operated at a time when systems of imperial power were increasingly connected and
interdependent in their culture productions. In these places, individuals – Moro pilgrims,
American soldier-administrators, European merchants, Filipino agricultural colonists,
Japanese settlers – negotiated their positions in the world between and through colonial
empire.
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Wood Papers, LOC-MD.
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Conclusion / “The Ambient Air of Americanism”

The cacophonous variability of the colonial experience in Mindanao and Sulu resists
simplification. Throughout this project, I have struggled with the tension between drawing
neat conclusions and the urge to foreswear the argumentative reductionism required of me by
the discipline. The chaos of history expressed through an individual life is difficult enough to
capture. Where does that leave the preceding, which spans decades and continents as it
attempts to draw conclusions about a cast of characters, religions, languages, and governing
bodies repeatedly, and often blindly, intersecting with one another? I fully sympathize with
the notion that writing histories brings order to the past, but am uncertain if I agree with it. To
conclude with the didacticism and concision expected of me means a rehashing of each
section capped by a flailing attempt to draw together their arguments and sub-arguments into
a pithily-worded whole. I shall do so, albeit with mild protest. Forgive this selfish authorial
aside, which stems from a neurotic resistance to ‘drawing conclusions’ – as though I were a
scientist rather than a humanist feigning objectivity. “To be interested in something,” writes
Geoff Dyer, “is to be involved in what is essentially a stressful relationship with that thing, to
1

suffer anxiety on its behalf.” I echo the sentiment.
Moving on. There are two seams of argumentation running through the preceding
chapters, each related to a historiographical approach to American foreign relations. The first
concerns the study of culture. Here, the project contends that during the period between 1899
and 1942 American colonials, in both official and non-official capacities, carried out a project
of cultural reconfiguration in the Muslim South. To achieve this, they first essentialized ‘the
Moro’ by placing ‘him’ in an evolutionary continuum mapping human progress and blurring
the history of the United States and the Philippines together. They then implemented a series
of contemporaneous programs designed to transform Muslim societies in Mindanao and Sulu.
I have grouped these programs under the banner of ‘civilizational imperatives.’ When these
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imperatives were resisted or rejected by Muslim populations, armed representatives of the
colonial state used violence as a means of correction, resulting in numerous massacres. The
American public learned of the evolution of their Muslim wards through human exhibits,
visits by Moro elites, and popular entertainments.
The second seam is linked to transnational interpretations of modern history, although
for our purposes the term ‘transcolonial’ is most accurate. I argue that the American project in
the Islamic Philippines can only be properly understood if one places it within the global
colonial culture of the early twentieth-century. Each chapter contains instances of Americans
consciously and unconsciously mimicking or adapting European colonial practices. Beyond
this, the final chapter demonstrates how the Southern Philippines as a whole was shaped by
relationships with the ‘outside world.’ These exchanges force us to reconsider the notion of
the colonial remote as disconnected, and illustrate how even peripheral spaces drew from and
contributed to global flows of people and information. Only by conceptualizing the Muslim
South beyond its relationships with Washington and Manila do we gain a fuller appreciation
of the colonial experience there.
This project closes with two brief illustrative tales about the aftermaths of empire, a
consideration of the final years of U.S. colonialism in the Islamic Philippines, and a small
personal reflection.

Two Scenes
i.) A Death in Cotabato, 1937-1939
James Fugate, the last American provincial governor in the Muslim South, became a private
citizen in 1936. Uninterested in returning to the United States after decades in the Philippines,
the retired colonial official settled in the hills of Upi, Cotabato, where he supervised the
grounds of a small Episcopal mission. Fugate’s life was one of solitude, and in
correspondence with his friend, the Honolulu-based engineer H.F. Cameron, he admitted
some loneliness. Despite this, Fugate thought Upi was the “most attractive place in the
islands…outside of Baguio” and claimed his health was the best it had been in years. In
ambling letters, Fugate mulled over Cameron’s offer to run a plantation in Davao, gave
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character assessments of various ex-colonials still living in the Philippines, and expressed
lingering resentment about Bishop Brent’s school at Indanan. He bitterly related to Cameron
that he had received information that the school was “in a low condition” and in “poor
standing with the Moro people generally.” Fugate blamed this on MEF President Curtis J.
Mar, who he maintained only wanted “the racket of raising money to continue, irrespective of
what goes on at Indanan or the nature of school conducted.”

2

In another letter to Cameron from November 1937, Fugate complained of
conservationists who “lamented the cutting of any tree as a tragedy” and lumped his former
employers, Charles Brent and Caroline Spencer, into this category. With a surfeit of time
alone, his letters digressed into rants on the “parlor Bolsheviks” and “anti-imperialists of
Massachusetts” who lived off ancestral fortunes built upon exploitation. “So it goes and
continues,” he fumed. “One generation slaves, gets its money by any means whatsoever its
3

ingenuity can devise for its progeny to make asses of themselves.” The following year,
Fugate wrote Cameron in a more contemplative mood and spoke of the passing of American
“Old Timers” in the Philippines. “Eighteen nine eight was quite some time ago,” he
ruminated. Conjuring familiar notions of tropical breakdown, Fugate reflected that some
Americans in the Philippines “seemed to determinedly try to kill themselves – some by labor,
some by dissipations – drink, food, exposures Etc. Etc. Etc.” He closed the letter with the
spectral image of the last colonials, who still existed “in remote places where once in a while
4

one can run [into] them.” Reliably maudlin in his writings, we can reasonably assume Fugate
saw himself as a leftover from a vanishing era.
James Fugate was murdered in mid-December 1938 a short distance away from the
mission where he worked. Death came from a kris blow that nearly severed his head. Leo G.
McAfee, the mission clergyman, sent a brief telegram to Manila reading “Governor Fugate

2

Letter from James Fugate to H.F. Cameron, 1 November 1937, Folder 1. James Fugate Correspondence, 19371939, BHL. Fugate’s opinion of American school superintendent Edward Kuder was low: “He is a kind of
human freak, I learned too late and all to my sorry and disgust.” – Letter from James Fugate to H.F. Cameron,
17 November 1937, Folder 1. James Fugate Correspondence, BHL.
3

Letter from James Fugate to H.F. Cameron, 17 November 1937, Folder 1. James Fugate Correspondence,
BHL.
4

Letter from James Fugate to H.F. Cameron, October 1938, Folder 1. James Fugate Correspondence, BHL.

411
5

murdered Wednesday night. No clues.” In Manila, President Manuel Quezon expressed
shock at the “act of savagery” and praised Fugate as “one of those Americans who have
6

written their names in the history of the American noble work in the Philippines.” The
Manila papers immediately suspected Moro treachery in the crime, with the Daily Bulletin
suggesting it probable that “one of his old political enemies finally accomplished his vow
7

since it is said Moros ‘never forget.’” H.F. Cameron relayed developments in the
investigation and condolences from other Americans to Fugate’s brother Isaac in Louisville,
Kentucky. The initial belief that Fugate’s murder “originated in Jolo” among Muslim political
enemies caused Remsen Ogilby, head of Trinity College in Connecticut and acquaintance of
Fugate, to express a sense of colonial betrayal. “It would be tragic to think that he may [have]
finally [been] killed by a Moro, since he was in many ways as good a friend as this strange
8

people ever had.”

Both the local Philippine Constabulary and investigators from Manila followed leads
on the murder. The early detention of a Maguindanao Moro with bloodstains on his pants
9

proved groundless, and the suspected political motive also bore no fruit. In the meantime,
Isaac Fugate received reminiscences from those who had served with “Jim” during his nearly
four decades in the Philippines. Some evinced a deep bitterness. Greville Haslam, an
Episcopal teacher who met Fugate at the Brent School in Baguio, thought it “a travesty that a
man who put in forty years of martyrdom for what Mr. Taft called ‘our little brown brothers’
10

11

to have finally been murdered by them.” H.F. Cameron likewise called Fugate a “martyr.”
The reasons for the murder of James Fugate, revealed through investigation some months
after his death, were petty. No assassin travelled from Jolo to settle old scores on behalf of
some aggrieved Tausūg aristocrat. In fact, neither the Moros nor Fugate’s colonial service
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figured into the story at all. His murder was the result of a soured relationship with three local
men. One was a Christian Filipino clerk at the mission whom Fugate forced to do increased
manual labour, another a Lumad with unpaid debts to the church, and the third was the
clerk’s father-in-law, who clashed with Fugate over a botched pig castration.

12

The men

stopped Fugate on the trail behind the church property, ostensibly to talk, and when he bent
over to retrieve a dropped item the clerk mortally wounded him with a kris.

13

The old colonial was buried a hundred yards behind the church after a brief ceremony.
There was no headstone. Leo McAfee forwarded a request to Senator Alben W. Barkley,
representative from Kentucky, that Fugate’s body remain in Cotabato “as a place of
pilgrimage for the people he loved.”

14

Although Fugate’s family was informed that his “grave

was looked upon by the people as a sort of shrine” it is unlikely that it was. The teacher and
official spent many years on Siquijor and Jolo, but not in Cotabato. His friend, the
Constabulary officer Alejandro Suarez, thought the idea of burying him in Upi was
15

“nonsense.” Writing to Isaac Fugate after the apprehension of the killers, H.F. Cameron
used language that essentialized Malay characteristics. Malays, he declared, had “a very small
brain capacity for seeing the right or wrong” of a situation, and when they could not
16

understand an issue got “that small brain into a fever heat.”

Racial reductionism and native

irrationality, it seemed, explained the murder.
In his final letter on the matter, Cameron wrote that, alongside Hugh Scott, Fugate had
been one of “the only big men that ever worked in Sulu Province.” Following the lead of
dozens before him, he combined the story of the reconstruction of the Moros with that of the
American frontier. Fugate was atoning for the mistakes made in the previous century as the
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republic aggressively expanded. Instead of being an agent of a transformative order in Sulu,
he was a bulwark against an outside threat: Christian Filipinos. Fugate’s “uplifting ideals,”
Cameron believed, had saved the Moros “from being murdered outright by the armed
Filipinos as we in the United States killed off the Indians with our military in the West.”

17

In

this convenient vision, the violence of the American colonial state during the early decades of
the occupation vanished, and those who remained, like Fugate, became protectors against the
rapaciousness of a new order.

ii.) Philippine Valhalla, 1956
Two decades later and on the other side of the Pacific, William Cameron Forbes and Edward
Bowditch considered James Fugate for inclusion on their list of “The Brethren,” a group of
fifty men who shaped the colonial enterprise in the Philippines between 1898 and 1942. “He
was a thin undersized individual,” Forbes wrote in his brief biography of Fugate, “with the
18

heart of a lion, the spirit of a missionary, and the understanding of a father.”

Forbes had

previously memorialized the slain official in a December 1939 speech, where he incorrectly
claimed a “fanatical Moro” had murdered Fugate and called him “one of the many martyrs to
the great cause of pacification and betterment” of the Muslims.

19

Alongside Fugate in the

Brethren were other familiar characters, including Leonard Wood, J. Franklin Bell, Frank
McCoy, George Langhorne, Frank Parker, Charles Brent, John R. White, Ole Waloe, Dean
Worcester, Morgan Shuster, Frank W. Carpenter, and Bowditch himself. If all went to plan,
they would be valorized in a book charting the history of the American Philippines.
In 1956, Forbes lived in an apartment at the luxury Hotel Vendome in Boston’s Back
Bay neighbourhood. Eighty-six years old, the former proconsul was increasingly preoccupied
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with preserving the legacy of those who served in the Philippines. Six years prior, Forbes had
commissioned a book by Arthur S. Pier, American Apostles to the Philippines. Public
response was lukewarm. According to Forbes and Pier, “The Apostles” were a group of
twelve men, a number of whom were important to the recent history of the Muslim South:
Leonard Wood, John Pershing, Charles Brent, Frank Carpenter, and Dean Worcester. Pier
echoed Forbes in tone and ideological disposition. Those who once criticized the American
colonial venture had since been proven wrong. “No history is free from blots,” the epilogue
began. “In retrospect the page recording our adventure in the Philippines seems white and
20

shining.” In the pages of Apostles, American officials performed heroic civilizing feats
against resistance from uncomprehending natives and naysaying anti-imperialists back home.
Predictably, Pier and Forbes portrayed the acquisition of empire in passive terms. Creating
the Philippine nation-state was an unexpected duty thrust upon the men who peopled the
book, and their excellence stood in stark contrast to what came before and after.

21

Not satisfied with the impact of Pier’s work or his own book, The Philippine Islands,
Forbes corresponded with Bowditch and transcolonial sanitation specialist Victor Heiser
22

about the new project.

Bowditch had served as Forbes’ assistant and later as the Vice

Governor of the Moro Province. A Harvard man like his mentor, Bowditch, then living in
California, was responsible for compiling material and modifying plans based on the
increasingly ornery demands of his aging collaborator. In one letter, Forbes complained that
Bowditch was merely recording “interesting and amusing anecdotes” and including “the
black shading and the reverse side of the medal.” The former governor general sought
something transcendent and mythical: a “Valhalla” or “hall of fame” for American colonial
23

legends.

20
21
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The Brethren, conceived as an expanded version of the Apostles, were the team
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who selflessly brought the Philippine nation into existence and its inhabitants into the modern
24

world.

Beyond paying tribute to the Brethren, Forbes intended the work to be a sustained
exercise in colonial comparison. The book was “to start off with analysis of the objectives in
past colonial administrations, as for example: the spread of religion, acquisition of territory,
acquisition of peoples; acquisition of materials such as coal, iron, etc.; and the acquisition of
strategic points, such as Gibraltar.”

25

Forbes and Bowditch compiled a short essay tracking

Western expansion from early Spanish and Portuguese forays all the way up to the American
acquisition of the Philippines, placing the latter within a unified global history of colonial
empire. Cataloguing European objectives, climactic conditions, warfare, and commercial
motives, the two men finally arrived at “the appearance of the United States on the stage.”
This development, coinciding with the “yeasty desire for independence and freedom from
white domination” among colonized peoples, marked a paradigm shift in the rule of empires.
“For the first time, the future and well being of the native population, rather than the interests
of the conqueror, are the prime consideration,” they wrote. This paternal model for
trusteeship and decolonization, the two believed, was exceptional. In their retelling, Forbes
and Bowditch avoided discussions of state violence or debates over Philippine independence,
instead portraying the American period as an unbroken march towards freedom that inspired
the rest of the globe.

26

The Brethren and their achievements in the Philippines was intended to comprise the
bulk of the narrative. Here the penchant for antiquity and myth took over. The group of fifty
constituted a “Philippine Valhalla.” Its “heroes,” all Americans or Americanized Europeans,
lived their stories in a “Philippine saga.” These men “wrote a new page in colonial history,”
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according to Forbes and Bowditch.

Inexperienced in colonial rule, challenged by climate

and disease, and imperiled by aggressive natives, these “crusaders” eventually “won even the
most hostile elements over to the cause of civilization.” The authors claimed the Americans
inspired European colonial administrations in Southeast Asia, and convinced the King of
28

Siam to establish medical schools.

Bowditch was at his most grandiose in a letter sent to Forbes and Heiser about female
contributions to the Philippine Valhalla:
Should there be ladies in Valhalla? I suppose not for Valhalla was
limited to heroes fallen in battle, brought to be the warriors of Odin by the
Valkyries who hovered over the fields of battled mounted on winged
horses. The fact that they rode winged steeds gives us authority to let the
polo players and the grooms into the sacred halls. Yet there were the Rhine
Maidens, the Norns, and the wives of the Gods must have eaten somewhere.
I prefer the Greek version of a Mount Olympus, where there were many
maidens and heroines, the Muses, and all the rest. A very pleasant
29

company.

Waxing poetic and borrowing freely from antique spiritual realms, Bowditch spoke of the
wives of Leonard Wood and John Pershing, both of whom lived with their husbands in the
Moro Province. He singled out for special mention Caroline Spencer, the Rhode Island
socialite who, alongside Charles Brent, established the agricultural school on Jolo. Forsaking
“the delights of Newport” to serve on “that beautiful but volatile isle,” Bowditch thought
Spencer “a heroine” and nominated her “as a candidate for Valhalla.”

27
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In his early seventies, Bowditch was the youngest of the three men. Despite their
energies, the sequel to American Apostles in the Philippines was never completed. Wealthy
and socially connected, W. Cameron Forbes was the main force behind the project. His death
in 1959 effectively ended it. Despite this, the drafts and correspondence relating to the
planned book show the last surviving colonial officials preoccupied with shaping public
memory of America’s colonial legacy. Crucially, Forbes and his collaborators – the very men
who helped design the Philippine state – openly referred to American actions as “colonial
activity.”

31

They believed the methods employed in Manila and Zamboanga were a corrective

to the imperfect strategies of the Europeans; that the United States had mastered colonialism
and thereby eradicated it; that their civilizational imperatives were exceptional in modern
history. Far from expressing a sense of imperial denial, they wanted their fellow citizens to
recall the colonial experiment as a source of pride.

Of Lost Time32
“As I look about the streets of Zamboanga, I realize that we Americans have made a great
many mistakes in the Philippines,” Vic Hurley wrote in his memoirs. “We do not know how
to colonize a brown people. We have attempted to implant an Occidental civilization in the
lives of a race of brown Malays. The experiment was bound to fail...We went paternalistic in
33

a big way.” Hurley’s cynicism darkly juxtaposes the triumphant mythmaking of W.
Cameron Forbes. The irony is that the same race-thinking motivated both. For Forbes, the
annexation and reconfiguration of the islands was an unmitigated victory and proof that a
distinct form of American colonialism could conquer Asiatic civilizational torpor. For
Hurley, transmitting “Occidental civilization” to “brown Malays” was impossible. He
believed Americans lacked the European appreciation of innate racial characteristics. Forbes
and Hurley represented polarities of thought on the civilizing mission, even though their
racial assumptions were broadly compatible.
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Most commentators fell somewhere between Forbes (success) and Hurley (failure),
yet there was hardly a consensus opinion on whether or not the so-called ‘Moro Problem’ –
the transformation and integration of Muslim subjects into the Philippines – was waning at
the end of the American era. A succession of supposed ‘turning points,’ including
disarmament and the political normalization of Muslim majority provinces, failed to resolve
tensions. In the late 1930s, violent flare-ups saw the Philippine Army deployed against
Maranao cottas. Military planes bombed Maranao communities and Filipino soldiers were
given shoot to kill directives.

34

Republican critics of Filipinization and the establishment of

the Commonwealth positioned themselves as protectors of the Muslims. The United States,
they claimed, now had a duty to safeguard their former wards against the predations of
Christian Filipino nationalists. In a strange inversion, the fate of the Moros was tied to the
threat they faced from a colonial incursion within their own state, and also the threat they
posed to an independent Philippines. To illustrate the impossibility of Christian-Muslim
cooperation, American skeptics emphasized the incompatibility of the two groups, often
35

resorting to familiar tropes about Moro “fanaticism and cruelty.”

Filipinos were incapable

of governing Muslims, the argument went, and Muslims were incapable of governing
themselves. If independence for the Christians was inevitable, then Western Mindanao and
36

the Sulu Archipelago should be partitioned and continue as an American tutelary regime.
Governor General Frank Murphy countered critics by adopting the progressive

language of the Roosevelt Administration in Washington. There would be a “new deal” for
the Moros, with expanded funding for a range of government programs aimed at integration.
In 1934, Murphy toured the South promising the “complete recognition of Moro religious and
other rights” as well as “more and better schools, roads and improvement of economic
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conditions.” For their part, Filipino politicians claimed problems in the South stemmed
from American colonialism, and that without it enmity between Christians and Muslims
would dissolve. Nacionalista Party grandee Sergio Osmeña wrote that Moros were concerned
that Christian Filipinos were in league with the Americans. Once dissuaded of this erroneous
38

notion, Osmeña believed, Muslims could assimilate without friction.

Writing in the 1920s

for an American audience, Filipino journalist José Melencio took a different approach,
contending that the non-Christians, “reared exclusively under the ambient air of
Americanism,” were “immuned to the medieval” and “destined to be a vigorous element in
the ensuing processes of Philippine nationalism.”

39

Despite such reassurances, in private correspondence some Filipino leaders were
skeptical. A 1933 report from Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes chief Teopisto Guingona to the
Department of the Interior encapsulates these reservations:
How long will these good conditions last? How long will this peace be
enjoyed? Nobody can tell. As long as the majority of the Mohammedan
people live under the influence of their beliefs and traditions which justify
crime and glorify the criminal; as long as they do not give to human life its
true value, do no respect the rights of others to property, and have a
misguided, or at least different, conception of human justice; as long as they
ignore the law or attempt to ignore it in order to avoid its observance; as
long as the Mohammedan people feel in their veins the vigour with which
their fearless ancestors bravely fought to defend what they thought, rightly
or wrongly, was their independence from all outside interference, and are
zealous as they have been for centuries to preserve their own moral and
physical characteristics; as long as the Mohammedan people, although
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already changed to a certain extent, still consider themselves superior,
different and distinct from the Christians, nobody can state the time in
which our Moroland could enjoy complete peace and tranquility. There, no
bloody tragedy could be considered the last. We have to train, educate and
develop its inhabitants, moulding them to the type which we want, in order
to amalgamate them later with the rest of the nation. But for this gigantic
task, one decade is not enough, neither two, but the whole cycle of a
40

generation. A nation cannot be built overnight.

Emphasizing the criminal nature of the Moro and the need for civilizational reconfiguration,
Guingona wrote like an American colonial official at the turn of the twentieth-century. In the
North, ‘Moroland’ existed as a prehistoric space of myth and danger. Stories like Isidro L.
41

Retizos’ “Maguindanao Pearls” emphasized difference to children.

Even as Filipino

politicians in Manila stressed cultural compatibility, the notion of the Muslim South as a zone
of darkness persisted in the national imaginary.
Moro groups, caught between currents of Filipino nationalism and American colonial
revanchism, responded in a variety of ways. Some leaders, like Sultan Aragon of Momungan,
wrote directly to President Franklin D. Roosevelt to “beg” the Americans to stay. “I wish to
inform your honor,” Aragon wrote, “that ever since I heard that the ‘independence’ is to be
offered in the Philippines through the hands of the Christian Filipino Leaders, I heartily
opposed it, and do not like independence, for we Moros, the so-called non-Christians, never
42

agreed with the Filipinos.” On Jolo, local datus petitioned against James Fugate’s
impending dismissal as governor, warning of “bloodshed again in Sulu” were a Filipino
appointed in his place.
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The death of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in 1936 and subsequent power

struggle among potential successors allowed the Philippine Government to discontinue
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recognition of the Sulu Sultanate. Datu Piang’s passing in 1933 similarly reduced local power
in Cotabato. For some Moros, especially those from well-connected families, the transitions
of the 1930s were a period of opportunity. These were years that young educated Moros
(mainly of Tausūg and Maguindanao extraction) began identifying as ‘Muslim Filipinos’ and
44

used religious difference to stake a place within the multiethnic state.

Representative Ibra

Gundarangin, a Maranao from Lanao, pressed for greater Moro presence in government
organizations. Gundarangin specifically requested more Muslims in the Philippine
Constabulary. “The Moro officer who speaks the dialect, knows the customs, traditions and
even idiosyncrasies,” he wrote to J.R. Hayden in 1934, “of the people among whom he works
is preeminently more qualified than Christian officers who are sometimes ignorant of the
45

customs and traditions of the Moros.”

During the Second World War, many Muslims fought alongside Americans and
Filipinos in guerilla operations against the Japanese occupation. When U.S. forces returned to
the Sulu Archipelago in May 1945, they were welcomed by the datus of Jolo, who promised
46

“the assistance of the Sultan’s subjects.”

A year later, in June 1946, the United States

relinquished all sovereignty over the Philippines. After independence, Moro groups attempted
to integrate into the young nation and found their access to power limited. A national
minority on the fringes of the state, they existed outside of the semiotically linked cultures of
the Christian Filipinos. The marginality of Muslims and Lumads was exacerbated even in the
Southern Philippines itself as Christian settlers flooded into Mindanao. Newspapers reported
familiar tales of government encounters with Moro ‘outlaws.’ In December 1949, rebels on
Jolo killed fifteen Constabulary officers in attacks protesting recent election results. The
Philippine Air Force responded by killing at least thirty Tausūg holdouts on Jolo, dropping
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“flaming drums of gasoline” on them.

Despite such confrontations, in the first two decades

after independence Muslim elites demonstrated a willingness to work with central authorities,
as well as orient their people towards national citizenship. Political events in the late 1960s
and early 1970s disrupted this process, particularly the 1968 massacre of Tausūg and Samal
48

military recruits on the island of Corregidor.

The conflict continues at present.

In the United States, the afterlives of the colonial state had scant resonance. Citizens
of a global superpower post-1945, Americans reoriented themselves towards questions of
ideology and international order at the dawn of the Cold War. The newly independent
Philippines became an ally in the fight against Asian communism. Contrary to the wishes of
W. Cameron Forbes, the half-century transformation of the islands quickly receded as a topic
of interest in newspapers and periodicals. There was no “Philippine Valhalla” in the
American public imagination. On the contrary, the violent crescendo of racial logics during
the Second World War and the rise of nationalist movements in the Global South afterwards
made Western colonial projects deeply unfashionable. Oblivious to these shifts, Forbes and
his ilk assembled commemoratives to a period Americans no longer cared to remember.
If the transformation of the Philippines swiftly became a footnote in American
history, what occurred in Mindanao and Sulu was an addendum to that footnote. Depictions
of the Moros remained consistent. A New York Times account from 1950 described the
“primitive” Maranao Moros greeting Ambassador to the Philippines Myron Cowen with
“shrill yells” and “war dances.” The paper reported Cowen’s visit to Dansalan as “the first
journey through this wild, remote area ever attempted by an American chief of mission.”
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Despite a half-century of colonial expansion and development, descriptions of the Mindanao
interior remained remarkably similar to those penned in the first years of the twentiethcentury. The war provided a convenient demarcation for Americans. No longer was the

47

“Outlaws Slay 15 Police in Philippines,” Washington Post, 16 December 1949, 6; “Philippine Planes Wreck
Moro Camp,” Los Angeles Times, 26 December 1949, 1.
48

Rizal G. Buendia, “The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines: Unresolved National Question or
Question of Governance?” Asian Journal of Political Science 13.1 (2005): 114.
49

Tillman Durdin, “Americans Hailed in Visit to Moros,” New York Times, 10 June 1950, 4.

423

Muslim South a crucible for Occidental ingenuity and willpower, as it had been in decades
prior. Instead, it was a curious testing ground for a fledging nation-state.
This dissertation is an effort to recenter marginalized and unstoried histories, and
recreate the fabric of the colonial relationship between Americans and Muslims in the
Southern Philippines. For Moro groups, the extended encounter altered or demolished native
leadership structures, remade urban and rural landscapes, reoriented power north towards
Manila, and provided harsh lessons about the fate of national minorities. Although Americans
quickly forgot their ‘Mohammedan wards’ in the postwar era, during the period of U.S.
sovereignty they actively promoted colonial rule in the Southern Philippines. The Moro
Province was a prolonged experiment in civilizational transformation and reform. Many of
the period’s famed military officials tested their governance skills among peoples and
landscapes they understood in relation to the frontiers of the United States. After 1913,
American civilian officials in an array of bureaucratic positions simultaneously tutored
Christian Filipinos to govern non-Christians and viewed themselves as the protectors of
minority cultures. The relationship between colonizer and colonized was often fraught, and
state violence became normalized. Throughout the four decades under study, an array of
journalists, academics, teachers, missionaries, businesspeople, adventurers, and others
circulated through the Southern Philippines, recording their impressions and interacting with
the natives. Moros visited the United States, both as display objects and independent
travellers. Americans produced cultural products about their subjects in the form of novels,
films, poems, songs, and radio programs. In Mindanao and Sulu, colonial officials borrowed
from European models of rule, Europeans borrowed from the Americans, and the Moros
looked to the Islamic world for alternatives to Western dominance. Westerners and nonWesterners alike passed through or settled in Mindanao and Sulu, giving urban areas a
hybridic quality.
**
On my office desk is a postcard from the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis.
The print quality is low and indicative of its status as tourist kitsch – something for visitors to
send their relations in Arkansas or Ohio or Georgia. On the front of the postcard is a
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photograph, off-kilter, with the simple caption: “Moro Girl.” The girl in question appears to
be a teenager, perhaps fourteen or fifteen but possibly younger. She is pictured from the waist
up and wears a simple striped robe and rudimentary headdress. Her hair flows out of the
headdress and over her shoulders. In the background are the walls of a nipa-thatched hut, the
primary residences of the Samal and Maranao Moros at the Philippine Reservation. None of
these details are remarkable. Anthropological portraiture was commonplace during the
period, its gaze doubling as scholarly documentation and racialized spectacle. What is
striking is the girl’s facial expression. Frowning, she avoids the camera’s gaze. Her look is at
once defiant and ineffably sad.
This melancholy photograph captures a brief moment in 1904, yet writing the
preceding chapters I glanced at it often as a reminder that beyond theorization and sweeping
narrative are an overwhelming number of individual histories. The colonial exchange
between Americans and the Muslims of the Southern Philippines was tremendously variable,
which is why I avoid imposing any master narrative upon these stories. Doing so would be an
act of intellectual dishonesty. In my partial way, I’ve chosen to map the various patterns and
connections that drew Americans, Moros, Filipinos, and the rest of the world to one another.
Such impulses violently displaced and destroyed human bodies. Some were products of
questionable moralism and a sense of civilizational mission. Others were less troubling, as
very few stories are mere compendiums of ceaseless coercion. I also kept the postcard of the
Moro girl on my desk as an admission of failure. All histories are selective and presumptuous
assemblies of vanished peoples. As I collected the stories that comprise this project, I
acknowledged the unlikelihood of ever being able to give an account of the girl’s experiences
at St. Louis or in Mindanao. Her contribution to the historical record is a single photograph
encapsulating the strange and alienating experience of being a human exhibit, an experience
lasting mere months in a life that likely spanned many decades. I explored the histories of
American rule in Mindanao and Sulu with these shortcomings in mind.
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Appendix A / Maps

All Map Data © 2015: Google, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, General
Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans, United States Navy
Key:
i.)

Urban center or regional capital

ii.)

Settlement

iii.)

Natural landmark (island, mountain, lake, etc.)

iv.)

Government or military facility

Figure I – The Philippines and British North Borneo
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Figure II – Southern Philippines

Figure III – Zamboanga and the Sulu Archipelago
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Figure IV – Jolo Island
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Figure V – Lake Lanao Region
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Figure VI – Southwestern Mindanao
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Appendix B / Glossary
Abaca – A commercial crop harvested for its fiber. Also called ‘Manila Hemp.’ Commonly
grown on plantations in Mindanao and Sulu.
Agama Courts – Religious courts. The term ‘agama’ means ‘acquisition of knowledge.’
Courts conducted by Moro sultans and religious leaders.
Agong – Two heavy gongs suspended vertically. A common musical instrument in the
Southern Philippines.
Barong – A short dagger with a heavy, leaf-shaped blade.
Bejuco – A dense vine sometimes used to make switches.
Bichara – A ceremonial meeting of community leaders
Bolo – A machete-like knife. Often used to remove vegetation.
Buyo Box – An ornamental container for the storing of betel nuts
Campilan – A long Malay sword used on Mindanao. Appears in many Moro epics.
Carabao – Domestic water buffalo. Common throughout the Philippines.
Cotta – A Moro earthworks fortification. Often reinforced with trenches and traps. Common
around Lake Lanao and on Jolo during the early years of American occupation.
Datu – Community leader or headman. Common title for local strongmen in the Southern
Philippines.
Deportado – A person who has been deported or banished. In the context of Spanish
colonialism in the Philippines, the term often referred to prisoners who had been shipped to
Mindanao from the islands of the North.
Hadji or Hajji – A honorific given to a person who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca
Ilustrado – Hispanicized Christian Filipinos who argued for greater autonomy from Spanish
colonial rule. Provided intellectual momentum for Philippine independence movement.
Juramentado – “One who has taken an oath.” Spanish term referring to Moros engaging in
suicidal attacks on non-believers. Adopted by the Americans.
Kris – A wavy dagger common throughout Maritime Southeast Asia. Americans in Mindanao
and Sulu often collected them.
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Lantaka – A small bronze canon used by Moros and other groups in Southeast Asia.
Sometimes mounted to a seafaring vessel but often handheld.
Mestizo – A Spanish term for somebody of mixed ethnic ancestry.
Paliuntud – Homemade single-shot rifles used by Filipino and Moro insurgents.
Pandita – A Sanskrit term adopted by Moro groups to refer to a community priest or
religious leader. A pandita often served as the local teacher as well.
Panglima – A minor noble. Alternately, a commander or military leader.
Pensionado – A student who receives subsidies from the government to study outside of his
home district or province.
Prao – A small Malay sailing vessel, usually with a triangular sail and two parallel hulls.
Sacop – A peasant or subordinate.
Sherif – One who claims familial descent from the prophet Muhammad. Occasionally used a
designation for a community leader.
Vinta – A dugout canoe, often with a small sail. Used for inter-island trade and transport.
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• Deception: The 12th Annual East Asian Studies Graduate Conference
• Department of East Asian Studies – University of Toronto
• March 2012

GUEST LECTURES
“Visuality, Violence, and Public Space”
• Department of History – University of Western Ontario
• History 9808a: Digital History
• November 2015
“Late Stalinism, 1945-1956”
• Department of History – King’s University College
• History 1403E: Totalitarianism in the 20th Century
• March 2015
“Mass Violence and Modern History”
• Department of History – Huron University College
• History 1801E: Major Issues in World History
• February 2015
“Looking and Looking Away: Photography and Mass Violence”
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• Department of History – University of Western Ontario
• History 9831A: The Killing Fields: A Global History of Mass Violence
• November 2013
“American Colonial Empire, 1898-1945”
• Department of History – Huron University College
• History 2301E: The United States, Colonial Period to the Present
• January 2013
“The Global Impact of 9/11”
• Global Studies Department – Wilfrid Laurier University
• Global Studies 101: Introduction to Global Studies
• November 2012

ACADEMIC AFFILIATIONS / MEMBERSHIPS
Middle East and North Africa Research Group (MENARG)
• An interdisciplinary group dedicated to research on Islamic topics and related fields
• Director: Professor Maya Shatzmiller
• Summer 2012 – Present
American Historical Association
• Current Member
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations
• Current Member

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The United States in the World
Colonial Empires and Imperialism
Transnational History
Visuality and Mass Violence
Comparative Genocide Studies
Intellectuals and State Violence
Colonialism in Southeast Asia
Islam in Southeast Asia
Digital History

CURRENT PROJECTS
“Civilizational Imperatives: American Colonial Culture in the Islamic Philippines, 18991942”
• Dissertation
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“Tropical Idylls: Charles Ivins and the Maintenance of Anglo-American Leisure Space
in Colonial Zamboanga”
• Article, in progress
“Shifting Frontiers: Understanding the Philippines’ Muslim South Against the
Backdrop of the American West”
• Article, in progress
“’Kingly Prerogatives’ and ‘Benevolent Intentions’: The United States, Spain, and
Colonial Legacies in the Islamic Philippines, 1899-1920
• Article (w/ Gregg French), in Progress

LANGUAGES
• English (Native Speaker)
• Spanish (Reading)
• French (Reading)

